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ABSTRACT
Shakespeare’s Problem Comedies as Self-Critique
by
John-Paul Spiro
Advisor: Richard C. McCoy

I argue that Measure for Measure and All’s Well That Ends Well reveal underexplored features
common to Shakespeare’s comedies. Often interpreted as “problem plays,” they are more
representative of the genre than previously acknowledged. I suggest that Shakespeare wrote them
to de-nature and de-familiarize his own practices. The plays present the coercion inherent in the
normativizing of marriage as the basis for social and political order. The “happiness” achieved—
or at least gestured towards—at the end of Shakespearean comedy restricts human possibilities
and is often presented as an imposition or injunction rather than a reflection of spontaneous,
collective emotion. In particular, the late plays foreground the function of the woman dedicated
to marrying a specific man, what I call the “henikosexual” woman, as the anchor of all of
Shakespeare’s comedies and the origin of the plays’ sexual and marital norms. These plays also
highlight the inadequate rational explanations for comic action, frequently promised but deferred
in the endings of Shakespeare’s comedies, often with an attendant command to find the
proceedings joyful and festive. Shakespeare’s comedies close with the policing of knowledge
and affect and the unjustified elevation of monogamous heterosexual commitment as a means to
encourage communal subjection to civic authority. Shakespeare therefore exposes one of his own
genres—which was distinct from the comic practices of his contemporaries—as amoral,
coercive, and arbitrary, in the service of a “happiness” enjoyed by a small minority.
iv
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Introduction
“Your gentleness shall force”: Taking Shakespeare’s Comedies Seriously
“Would it not be possible for us, however, to calculate as we actually do (all agreeing, and so on),
and still at every step to have a feeling of being guided by the rules as by a spell, feeling
astonishment at the fact that we agreed? (We might give thanks to the Deity for our agreement).
“This merely shews what goes to make up what we call ‘obeying a rule’ in everyday life.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein1

A New Paradigm
William Shakespeare’s last two comedies, All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for
Measure, are often understood to be anomalous or “problem” plays, but I argue in this
dissertation that they are more exemplary of the genre than is common accepted, and
furthermore, that the genre of “Shakespearean comedy” can be theorized through them. These
two plays display qualities, implications, and ideological underpinnings that are less obvious but
nonetheless present in Shakespeare’s prior comedies: The Comedy of Errors, The Two
Gentlemen of Verona, The Taming of the Shrew, Love’s Labor’s Lost, A Midsummer Night’s
Dream, The Merchant of Venice, The Merry Wives of Windsor, Much Ado about Nothing, As You
Like It, and Twelfth Night. The standard interpretations of Shakespearean comedy are not wrong
so much as they are inadequate, and I hope to remedy that not by introducing a novel theory of
my own so much as by attending to Shakespeare’s own criticism of his work.
Much of that which seems to be peculiar in All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for
Measure is present, if unappreciated and understudied, in Shakespeare’s other comedies. These
two plays feature:
1) a woman who wants to marry a specific man and will accept no substitute,

1

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1953),
§§234-235.

1

2) the plot and the society created at the end of the play serves the interests of such women,
3) the abuse and humiliation of those who question or hinder the desires of the favored
characters,
4) marriage attends and sometimes brings about solutions to social and political problems,
5) the use of deception to force people to choices they would not make for themselves,
6) marriage pressured upon people who prefer a different form of life,
7) the instrumentalization of Christian practices and concepts (such as conversion,
pilgrimage, and resurrection) for the secular ends of marriage and social order,
8) the threat of lethal violence narrowly averted, but retained for future use,
9) the affirmation of the power of the sovereign ruler,
10) the deferral or neutralization of explanation or rationalization for the above, such that
acceptance of it is assumed and dissent is silenced,
11) the injunction to the characters and the audience to enjoy what they have seen.
Some of these qualities are familiar in the critical literature of Shakespearean comedy,
but when one takes them together, one can recognize the implicit politics of the genre. Many
accounts of the common features of the genre are positive and credulous, even celebratory. For
example, Leo Salingar writes that the comedies “usually end with a promise of fresh happiness”
but also “a return in some form to the original state of affairs. [...] The plots seem to accomplish
a circular movement in bringing the main characters back to their rightful or natural position.” 2
He continues,
love in his comedies always leads towards marriage, marriage (subject to the
husband’s authority). […] His comedies […] are essentially celebrations of
marriage. […] The marriage plot in his comedies is often entangled in social or
moral considerations affecting society at large, but in such a way that by the end
2

Salingar, Shakespeare and the Traditions of Comedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 14.

2

of the comedy marriage appears as the resolution of the broader tensions, as the
type or focus of harmony in society as a whole. 3
I will attempt to show that the later comedies demonstrate what is problematic about such claims.
The return to morality is not natural but imposed and sometimes forced, the social harmony is
fragile and perhaps false, the assent is hardly universal, and the happiness is unequally
distributed. Most importantly, the “order” created is so arbitrary that it is defensible as order, i.e.,
as an alternative to violence and chaos, and thus the genre amounts to an argument for the
necessity of government, premised upon a particular conception of human nature.
The society created at the end of a Shakespearean comedy seems to resolve tensions and
achieve concord, but only at great cost. All’s Well That Ends Well portrays the standard comic
elevation of a woman’s desire for marriage as a central organizing principle (for the genre and
the society depicted within it) without attempting to make the story appealing to the audience,
while Measure for Measure renders the politics of Shakespearean comedy explicit. These plays
alert us to the possibility that the “happiness” and “liberation” of the previous plays, often
celebrated by critics and audiences, is open to question if not dissent, even if the plays
themselves stifle or silence that dissent. The previous comedies seem to present certain states of
affairs as supposedly desirable, and thus have a normative function: the movement towards
marriage and order is presented as both natural and conventional. The late comedies challenge us
to see these states of affairs as not only questionable but arbitrary, capricious, and forced.
Before I develop these claims, much clarification and qualification is in order. For the
purpose of this dissertation, I will refer to “Shakespeare’s comedies” as many (though not all) of
the plays listed as such in the First Folio (see below).

3

Ibid., 17.
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Source: Leeds University Library
The existence of dramatic genres and their use to condition the audience’s expectations
was an established practice of the Elizabethan and Jacobean theater. Shakespeare’s First Folio—
Mr. William Shakespeare’s Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies—was organized by genre
following the example of Ben Jonson’s Works, “conferring the dignity of ancient drama” 4 on the
contents. Andrew Gurr explains that “romantic comedies,” i.e., comedies about love and

4

Stephen Orgel, “Shakespeare and the Kinds of Drama,” Critical Inquiry 6.1 (1979): 109.
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courtship, were part of the Lord Chamberlain’s Men’s brand; the principal difference between
them and the Admiral’s Men was the latter didn’t do romantic comedy. 5 Ben Jonson’s satires
were written as “a radical alternative to [Shakespeare’s] company’s romantic comedy tradition,”
and therefore Shakespeare’s own comedies were distinct from those of his rivals but similar
enough to one another to constitute a genre unto themselves. His comedies grow out of
schoolboys’ and lawyers’ “moot games,” wherein “extravagant or extreme situations” are
presented so as to exercise moral and legal reasoning. Shakespeare added the feature, in his early
comedies, of making them like dreams, wherein the characters in a play “were like a theatre
audience, sharing an experience that was fantastically strange, meaning abnormal, a matter for
alienation and admiration, that grows into constancy.” 6 From the outset these plays entertained
complex moral and political (as well as philosophical and theological) questions while also
introducing incidents of wonder which defy explanation. His plays simultaneously disinvite
extensive analysis or interrogation while reflexively dramatizing the experience of watching a
play with its attendant affective, intellectual, and social components.
The definition of early modern comedy is controversial. Jill Levenson, condensing the
scholarship, states that comedy is “sequence [of events that] commences with an error which
leads to confusion finally dispelled in a happy ending.” 7 Comedies also typically have
“characters whose behavior indicates misunderstanding of their situations or the matters in
question.”8 Implicit in this definition is that the achievement of the happy ending requires the
recognition of human fallibility. The characters in a comedy are “saved” by the plot, or the

5

Gurr, The Shakespeare Company, 1594-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 135.
Ibid., 141, 145, 146.
7
Levenson, “Comedy,” in The Cambridge Companion to English Renaissance Drama, eds. A. R. Braunmuller and
Michael Hattaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 264.
8
Ibid., 265.
6
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person who advances it. They often don’t understand what’s happening, but it happens, and it’s
good for them, or for the society and audience.
Andy Kesson argues, however, that “genre in Shakespeare’s time […] was itself
undetermined.”9 People during this period didn’t know exactly what a comedy was and they used
the term casually. Scholars and audiences have too easily taken Shakespeare’s categories as
applicable to the entirety of early modern English drama (and the drama of subsequent eras and
locales): “Comedy, history and tragedy are not comprehensive, self-evident or discrete as
descriptors of early modern playwriting, but they are especially disruptive of our understanding
of early commercial theatre.”10 Kesson notes that the plays that we call “early modern comedies”
are too heterogenous for the term to be useful, or at least for its usefulness to outweigh its
distortions, and this has led scholars to misread, for example, the comedies of John Lyly as
having “happy endings.” On the other hand, according to Martin Wiggins, the anti-theatrical
preacher Stephen Gosson, who wrote plays before denouncing them from the pulpit, described
Elizabethan drama as divided into tragedy and comedy in the 1570s, before Shakespeare began
writing.11 Sir Philip Sidney also wrote of comedy and tragedy as distinct, well-understood forms
with standard criticisms (such as comedy representing the lower qualities of human character). 12
Shakespeare worked with established genres and some common notions of their distinctions. The
vagueness of instability of critical terms does not render them useless so much as require one to
be as precise as possible while also acknowledging that this vagueness has strategic value for an
artist who requires audiences to have expectations so as to alternately (and sometimes

9

Kesson, “Was Comedy a Genre in Early Modern English Drama?” The British Journal of Aesthetics 54.2 (2014):
216.
10
Ibid., 222.
11
Wiggins, Shakespeare and the Drama of His Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8-9.
12
Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie, ed. Edward Arber (London: A. Murray and Son, 1858), The Poetry Foundation,
October 13, 2009, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/articles/69375/the-defence-of-poesy.
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simultaneously) satisfy and subvert them. Nonetheless, in this dissertation I am referring
specifically to Shakespeare’s own comedies as a genre unto themselves, and my claims are
specific to his plays and do not apply to those of Shakespeare’s contemporaries, much less to
“comedy” as we might refer to contemporary films or late night talk show hosts. When I refer to
“comedy” in this dissertation, I am always referring only to certain plays of Shakespeare, unless I
specify otherwise. My analyses of Shakespearean comedy may also be applied to other examples
of romantic comedy, such as some 18th-century Italian operas, Hollywood “screwball” comedies
of the 1930s and 1940s, or television situation comedies, but these texts are beyond the scope of
my inquiry.
Though I rely on the First Folio for its distinctions among genres, I will not include The
Winter’s Tale, The Tempest, Pericles, Cymbeline, and The Two Noble Kinsmen in this study,
even though the first two are classified as comedies in the First Folio table of contents (see page
4). Many critics and editors since Edward Dowden 13 have treated these plays as a separate
category, labeling them “romances” (as they are designated in The Riverside Shakespeare) or
“tragicomedies” or simply “last plays” (as they are designated in The Norton Shakespeare). I
also do not include Troilus and Cressida, which is listed as a comedy in the Riverside and the
Norton but is not listed with the comedies in the First Folio.14 As indicated in my first paragraph,
I consider All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure to be Shakespeare’s last

13

Dowden, Shakespeare: A Critical Study of His Mind and Art (New York: Harper, 1875), 406. See Pollard, “Genre:
Comedy and Tragedy,” in The Routledge Research Companion to Shakespeare and Classical Literature, eds. Sean
Keilen and Nicholas Moschovakis (New York: Routledge, 2017), 50, for a discussion of the inherent hybridity of
classical genres and the origins of the tragicomedy.
14
Troilus and Cressida is nonetheless included in the First Folio between the histories and the tragedies, though it
lacks page numbers and it is not named on the Table of Contents. Emma Smith suggests that the compilers of the
Folio had difficulty securing the rights to the play and it was added at the last minute; see Shakespeare’s First Folio:
Four Centuries of an Iconic Book (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 5. I think the play may have been so
hard to categorize that John Heminges and Henry Condell chose not to list it but then put it closer to the plays to
which it had stronger affinities.

7

comedies.15 The later plays, as Dowden and others note, focus on forgiveness as a means to
social harmony. Many of these plays foreground the magical and miraculous (which is missing
from the romantic comedies except Midsummer) and they otherwise exceed the confines of the
genre geographically, psychologically, and politically. In Cymbeline, Troilus and Cressida, and
The Two Noble Kinsmen, some characters die violently, linking these plays more closely to the
brutal histories and tragedies. All of these plays retain some similarities to the comedies, such as
an obsession with female sexuality, and many of them project erotic desire as dangerous and in
need of channeling and containment, though they do not emphasize courtship and marriage to the
extent one sees in the romantic comedies.

Shakespeare’s Comedies of Marriage
It is the norm for a Shakespearean comedy to be about marriage, including about
marriage and the pursuit of it as a norm. Most of the plays depict courtship, but some (The
Comedy of Errors, The Taming of the Shrew, The Merry Wives of Windsor, A Midsummer
Night’s Dream, and All’s Well That Ends Well) represent married life, often with some concern
about adultery or other sources of marital discord. All of those plays also feature courtship:

15

Debates about the dates of composition and performance of the plays are beyond the scope of this inquiry. It is
safe to consider The Comedy of Errors, The Two Gentlemen of Verona, and The Taming of the Shrew to be “early”
plays (circa 1592-1594); Love’s Labor’s Lost, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, The Merchant of Venice, The Merry
Wives of Windsor, and Much Ado about Nothing to be “early-middle” (circa 1594-1598); As You Like It and Twelfth
Night to be “late middle” (circa 1599-1602); and All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure to be “late”
(1602-1604). On this matter I follow the standard chronologies of most editions of Shakespeare’s works.
Laurie Maguire and Emma Smith have proposed recently that All’s Well That Ends Well was written closer to 1607
than to 1603, and thus it should be grouped and understood with the later “romance”/“tragicomedy” plays, such as
Pericles and The Winter’s Tale; see Maguire and Smith, “All’s Well That Ends Well,” Times Literary Supplement
June 8, 2012: 6. Though I recognize the connections between All’s Well and the romances, I think its similarities to
Measure and to the preceding comedies is stronger, and I hope that my arguments throughout this dissertation,
particularly about the role of what I call the henikosexual woman, establish these intertextualities.
Maguire and Smith also propose Thomas Middleton as a co-author: see “Many Hands—A New Shakespeare
Collaboration?” Times Literary Supplement April 18, 2012: 13-15. The authorship/collaboration question is not
relevant to my claims here.
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Errors has a developing romance between Luciana and Antipholus of Syracuse, Shrew has the
Bianca-suitors subplot, Merry Wives has the Anne Page-Fenton subplot, Midsummer has the
confused young lovers, and All’s Well has Helena’s pursuit of Bertram before and during their
marriage.
There are other variations as well, such as in Love’s Labor’s Lost, wherein the marriages
are deferred and the engagements are conditional. However, Shakespeare was uncommonly
consistent, as Kesson notes: “perhaps the very idea of asking for a ‘generic norm’ […]
demonstrates how firmly Shakespeare dominates our aesthetic expectations of form.” 16
Shakespeare was interested in the variety of ways he could achieve the same ends, and the
cumulative effect of reading and viewing his comedies is to recognize marriage as inevitable for
most of his comic characters. As he went from comedy to comedy, he seems to ask, “Right, this
is the rule, but what about this kind of exception?”—this man is in debt, or this man is
disinherited and this woman is in exile, or this man is a woman, or this man does not want that
woman, or this woman prefers celibacy, and so on. The particulars vary but the conclusions are
consistent. Kesson further notes that “Shakespeare’s later contemporaries, particularly Jonson in
plays such as The Alchemist, also suggest we treat Shakespeare’s repeated narrative movement
towards successful heterosexual courtship as odd.”17 It is odd, and throughout this dissertation I
will counter critics who attempt to normalize and rationalize it, rather than recognize it as
normative without being adequately justified.
Although critics disagree about Shakespeare’s level of irony, Shakespeare generally links
marriage in his comedies with joy and communal feeling. Nevill Coghill writes, “The joyful

16

Kesson, “Encountering the Present II: Shakespearean Comedy and Elizabethan Drama,” in The Oxford Handbook
of Shakespearean Comedy, ed. Heather Hirschfeld (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 89.
17
Ibid., 100.
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solemnitas of marriage is an image of happiness that ends his comedies almost as invariably as
death ends a tragedy. Unless Measure for Measure be an exception in his use of this image, there
are no exceptions.”18 William C. Carroll notes the irony while retaining the idealization: “It is an
ironic fact that rarely if ever does Shakespeare show us a truly happy marriage in progress […].
Still, the comedies show us what marriage ought to be, for better or worse, for richer or
poorer.”19 Lawrence Danson interprets the genre as associated with justice, redemption, and
eros: “In Shakespearean comedy the reward of virtue (and sometimes the forgiveness of vice) is
the mythically life-giving energy of sex contained within the licensed arena of marriage.” 20
People can live together and be happy provided they marry and/or let others marry. Comedies
thus possess what Stephen Orgel identifies as a “generalizing and normative nature,” 21 in that
they show that most people will get what they want if they follow rules and channel their
energies. But what does marriage mean in comedies, particularly when it is offered as a form of
conflict-resolution? Marriage does not declare a winner; it forces the opposing sides to stop
opposing, though it leaves them with structural asymmetries of power that are still open to
challenge after the play ends. The community is premised upon its members’ acceptance of its
specific form of order and hierarchy.
Comedies are also heteronormative, i.e., they depict marriage as between a man and a
woman, even if same-sex desire is expressed during the play (The Merry Wives of Windsor
contains a curious exception). Laurie Shannon provides a useful overview of the debate on this
issue as of twenty years ago;22 since then, several critics have made strong cases for the

18

Coghill, “Comic Form in Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare Survey 8 (1955): 18.
Carroll, The Metamorphoses of Shakespearean Comedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 59.
20
Danson, Shakespeare’s Dramatic Genres (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 65.
21
Orgel, “Shakespeare and the Kinds of Drama,” 121.
22
Shannon, “Nature’s Bias: Renaissance Homonormativity and Elizabethan Comic Likeness,” Modern Philology
98.2 (2000): 186.
19
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recognition of same-sex desire and relationships, as well as other forms of queer identity, in the
comedies.23 Nonetheless, according to Mario DiGangi, Shakespeare’s popularity may be
attributed partially to how he “celebrates the affective heterosexual couple that we ‘recognize’ as
the source, both biologically and historically, of the modern family.” 24 Similarly, Phyllis Rackin
claims, “anticipations of the biologically grounded ideology of compulsory heterosexuality that
authorizes the modern nuclear family can be found in plays that focus on the life of the protobourgeoisie.”25 But we need not read this normativity as biological, and whether it is or not, we
can still call attention to the ways it is compulsory. Kathryn Schwarz contends “that
[Shakespeare’s] comedies present marriage as an extreme social practice” that “masquerades as a
default position.”26 But we do not have to accept the terms of the genre, especially since the late
comedies enable us to recognize the peculiarity and even undesirability of a regime founded
upon marriage as a norm. It’s not that women have to marry; it’s that women in comedies have
to marry. Shakespeare chose not to write plays about women outside of the matrix of male
heterosexual desire and the social convention of assigning a woman an identity always in relation
to a man.

23

See, e.g., Crawford, “All’s Well That Ends Well, or, Is Marriage Always Already Heterosexual?” in Shakesqueer:
A Queer Companion to the Complete Works of Shakespeare, ed. Madhavi Menon (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2011), 39-47; “The Place of a Cousin in As You Like It,” Shakespeare Quarterly 69.2 (2018): 101-127;
“Shakespeare. Same Sex. Marriage,” in The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare and Embodiment: Gender, Sexuality,
and Race, ed. Valerie Traub (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 251-268; DiGangi, “Queering the
Shakespearean Family,” Shakespeare Quarterly 47.3 (1996): 269-290; “Rethinking Sexual Acts and Identities,” in
Shakespeare in Our Time, eds. Dympna Callaghan and Suzanne Gossett (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 31-35;
Sexual Types: Embodiment, Agency, and Dramatic Character from Shakespeare to Shirley (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Jankowski, “‘The Chick Got in the Way,’ or, the Woman Is/As Queer: Feminism,
Queer Theory, and the Unlocking of Female Subjectivity in Early Modern Drama,” Early Theatre 7.2 (2004): 98110; Morrison, “Measure for Measure: Same-Saint Desire,” in Shakesqueer, 216-224; Menon, “HexaSexuality,” in
Shakespeare in Our Time, 35-41; Bruster, Shakespeare and the Question of Culture: Early Modern Literature and
the Cultural Turn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). I will address this in greater detail in Chapter Five.
24
DiGangi, “Queering the Shakespearean Family,” 270.
25
Rackin, Shakespeare and Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 28.
26
Schwarz, “Comedies End in Marriage,” in The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare and Embodiment: Gender,
Sexuality, and Race, ed. Valerie Traub (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 284.
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Even if the endings of Shakespeare’s comedies are taken as happy, they need not be the
only viable vision of happiness. Why the repeated insistence on marriage, along with reunion and
the evasion of death? Lisa Hopkins provides us with an alternative—and more convincing—
understanding: “The Shakespearean ‘happy’ comedies do not celebrate marriage: they reveal its
crucial functioning in the maintenance of society and also the internal stresses and contradictions
to which it is constantly subject—an instability instanced by the repeated structural decentering
of marriage from its supposed position of comic closure.” 27 The late comedies highlight the
instability of marriage as an institution and the difficulty of separating what is desirable from
what is good; as David Scott Kastan writes about All’s Well That Ends Well, it “makes us
recognize the inadequacy of a conception either of comedy or of ethical behavior that focuses
exclusively on ends.”28 Desire itself is unreliable and peculiar throughout Shakespeare’s
comedies, and organizing a society around favoring certain people’s desires (and disfavoring
others’) has its costs. In these plays, Shakespeare warns us about societies focused on specific
ideas about pleasure, happiness, and nature. Such societies may be preferable to others, but only
insofar as some people’s preferences are given priority, while other people must conform and/or
be silent.
The strangeness of the late comedies is derived from the general consistency of the
comedies before them. Shakespeare’s comedies are striking in their similarities, especially on the
level of structure. Samuel Johnson asserted that “The players, who in their edition divided our
author’s works into comedies, histories, and tragedies, seem not to have distinguished the three
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kinds, by any very exact or definite ideas,”29 but subsequent critics have challenged that claim, as
I do. Northrop Frye counters, “Shakespearean comedy is a form in which the same devices are
used over and over again.”30 Similarly, Bart van Es asserts, “Shakespeare had a more consistent
idea of what comedy was than is now often asserted.”31 Even if scholars disagree about how to
properly define and classify a comedy, genres are not critical fictions, but implied contracts
between artists and audiences. Audiences anticipate certain plot points and character types, but
more importantly, they expect to have certain feelings about what they see and hear. For Heather
Dubrow, a genre “functions much like a code of behavior established between the author and his
reader.”32 Shakespeare’s audience knew that his comic plots generally depended upon “errors”
and obstacles which would be overcome by varied means in order to provide the expected
romantic ending. As Karen Newman writes, “the repeated act of viewing plays makes the
audience expect that plots will behave in a certain way, for no matter how we arrange the various
possibilities a mistake or error offers, we must always have the discovery in order to resolve a
given plot. Discovery, we might say, is the comic convention par excellence.”33 Jean Howard
suggests that audiences could learn about and identify genres
inductively. One would not have to see many plays, for example, to recognize the
differences between comedy and tragedy in terms of the predominant social rank
of the principal characters. But there is evidence that acquired generic literacy
was a good deal more sophisticated and discriminating than the mere recognition
of the class valences of certain genres. 34
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Therefore, when audiences encountered All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure,
they would have seen enough of their antecedents to know what to expect, and thus have their
anticipations frustrated as well as fulfilled in unfulfilling ways. The formula or recipe for a
dramatic genre was not known so much as it was felt; as Stephen Orgel writes, “Shakespeare
thought of genres not as sets of rules but as sets of expectations and possibilities. Comedy and
tragedy were not forms: they were shared assumptions.”35 Shakespeare’s own prior comedies
would have sufficed to provide the contours of the genre, and some members of the audience
would have been aware that Shakespeare did not invent the structure and themes of his comedies.
These plays are based on, as Frye notes, “the formula transmitted by the New Comedy pattern of
Plautus and Terence.”36 Tanya Pollard argues persuasively that his early comedies in particular
“lean especially heavily on classical models.” 37 Shakespeare’s contemporaries wrote their own
comedies with varied respective generic 38 features, and thus Shakespeare’s classicism is chosen
and self-imposed.

The Continuing Utility of Genre Theory
When an author writes a text within a specific genre, that author does not merely include
certain features in the text. She deploys those features for particular ends: a kind of language is
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used in order to represent certain kinds of people, events, and ideas, so as to achieve certain
effects. Jean Howard provides a useful definition:
Genre […] is a concept that lets critics and readers make productive connections
between texts. Within an overarching literary system, genre allows the general
expectation that certain topics will be matched with certain treatments—that the
Pindaric ode will not only employ its characteristic formal pattern of strophe,
antistrophe, epode, but will use it to depict events of unusual grandeur and
emotional intensity.39
When Shakespeare writes a comedy, he invites audiences to make connections between it and his
other works. It is a comedy insofar as it resembles the other comedies and it is markedly different
from tragedies and other genres, and it is distinctive in itself insofar as it is unlike other comedies
(and therefore, perhaps, similar to a specific tragedy). For example, Much Ado about Nothing is
similar to Shakespeare’s other comedies in its story of two sets of lovers overcoming obstacles to
achieve marriage as well as in its use of deceptions and japes. Much Ado is distinct from other
comedies, however, in its similarities to Othello (the jealousy plot) and Romeo and Juliet (in its
theme of fighting men playing at love, and in its death-and-resurrection ruse planned by a friar).
We can analyze Shakespeare’s choices in a particular play with reference to the choices
he makes in other plays; as Frye writes, “Shakespeare’s ‘meaning’ or poetic thought can be
expounded only through a structural analysis of the play which keeps the genre of the play in
mind as an essential part of the critical context.”40 Part of Howard’s definition is that each genre
has its own purposes: it is “normal” for a person in an audience to respond to certain generic
features in certain ways. Each genre creates an affective community: if one responds incorrectly
or inappropriately, one does not belong, such as when one doesn’t get the joke or doesn’t find it
funny. Beyond (and informing) the affective response, the intellectual response is to associate
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members of a genre with one another and make sense of the comedies as a whole (while
attending to the peculiarities of each of them) by comparing and contrasting them to one another.
One can then attend to each work’s distinctive contribution to the genre as well as to the nature
of the genre itself, not solely as a critical category but as an active, ongoing phenomenon.
Stanley Cavell asserts, “the members of a genre share the inheritance of certain conditions,
procedures and subjects and goals of composition, and [...] each member of such a genre
represents a study of these conditions.”41 This dissertation is a study of those conditions in
Shakespeare’s comedies, as if each comedy is a case study in its own form. Furthermore, I will
argue that these plays are case studies in rule-following itself, in the ways that certain practices
are rendered natural and normative, sometimes through coercion, including and especially the
practice of producing and encouraging affective responses in audiences.
In order to clarify my intervention in the theory of Shakespearean comedy, I will survey
the critical literature on the subject. The literature is extensive and thus my overview is of
necessity selective. I will here focus on the foundational literature, which remains relevant as
critics echo it or argue against it. I will highlight the affective response of the critics, and of
audiences as appropriated by the critics: it is the common presumption not just that comedies
have “happy endings” with what Kastan calls “comforting patterns of wish fulfillment” but that
the worlds created at the end of comedies are “self-consciously improbable—though thoroughly
desirable,”42 i.e., preferable to other worlds. The descriptive function of genre theory often slides
into prescription. Shakespeare’s comedies have a psychological, moral, and political program: to
make claims about (1) human nature, (2) the proper ends of human life, and (3) the proper
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organization of human societies, and to make audiences believe that the pleasure they may derive
from these comedies attests to the rightness and naturalness of these claims. Critics tend to state
these features as simple facts and frequently they concede or even endorse the comic ideology.
All of these claims—that Shakespearean comedy is mimetic, as well as morally,
politically, and affectively normative—are controversial, but they are recurring features in
critical examinations of the genre. William Hazlitt declares that audiences enjoy letting
Shakespeare’s characters be their silly, natural, un-self-conscious selves:
the foibles and follies of individuals are of nature’s planting, not the growth of art
or study; in which they are therefore unconscious of them themselves, or care not
who knows them, if they can but have their whim out; and in which, as there is no
attempt at imposition, the spectators rather receive pleasure from humoring the
inclinations of the persons they laugh at, than wish to give them pain by exposing
their absurdity. This may be called the comedy of nature, and it is the comedy
which we generally find in Shakespeare. […] His whole object is to turn the
meanest or rudest objects to a pleasurable account. 43
In this formulation, the audience feels superior to the characters while indulging them, and
accepts that they act according to their normal, untutored inclinations. Other writers’ comedies
are about self-consciousness, judgment, and subjecting people to ridicule and criticism, but
Shakespeare’s comedies foster tolerance. Hazlitt’s generalization is premised upon Twelfth Night
being the paradigmatic Shakespearean comedy, even though that play has little tolerance for
Malvolio, Antonio, or Sir Andrew Aguecheek. Some natural inclinations are permitted while
others are punished, and it’s not even clear that, for example, Orsino’s inclinations are not “the
growth of art or study.” Nonetheless, for Hazlitt, the pleasure of the audience is not merely in
response to the events of the play but from the granting permission to find “the meanest or rudest
objects” to be pleasurable.
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A. C. Bradley’s groundbreaking work on Shakespeare’s tragedies was based, in part, on
interpreting them as comedies had been interpreted, i.e., morally, as conflicts between rival
models of human nature and conduct: “To create that conflict between value positions whose
resolution would accord with ethical norms was the essence of one Renaissance comic tradition.
[...] According to it, oppositions between such archetypes as the senex, parasite, and matrona
evolved into a victory for those in the group representing the principles with which the audience
might side.”44 The victory is not moral so much as it is popular, in accordance with the
audience’s preferences and prejudices. Comedies do not explain why, for example, the young
should triumph over the old, or why the pursuit of love and marriage is superior to other forms of
life; they simply rest upon everyone already having such beliefs, or assenting to them without
resistance.
The assumption underlying Shakespearean comedy—as critics understand it—is that
erotic life is both natural and, when it leads to marriage, the source of happiness, and the forces
which oppose or resist the procession of erotic desire and marriage life must be overcome.
Audiences are predisposed to dislike characters who are not erotic and/or who complicate or
challenge the rites of courtship. As C. L. Barber writes, “The butts in the festive plays
consistently exhibit their unnaturalness by being kill-joys.” 45 The festivity that Barber associates
with Shakespearean comedy is a form of authentic life that counters the falseness and misery of
workaday life, or of any life other than the festive. Pleasure-seeking entails not merely release
but a higher moral standard and a source of social attachment: “Pleasure thus becomes the
touchstone for judgment of what bars it or is incapable of it,” and comedies grant a “sense of
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solidarity about pleasure.”46 That kill-joys exist, in the plays as well as in the audience (and,
more likely, outside the theater), means the solidarity creates a bond among those who elevate
pleasure as a moral standard, perhaps without avowing it but nonetheless feeling it and
acknowledging the shared feeling in the affective community. Any people with other moral or
personal aspirations fall into the kill-joy category and will be humiliated: “While perverse
hostility to pleasure is a subject for aggressive festive abuse, high-flown idealism is mocked too,
by a benevolent ridicule which sees it as a not unnatural attempt to be more than natural.” 47 This
idealism can be found among the men of Love’s Labor’s Lost at the start of the play in their
elevation of knowledge, glory, and male friendship, but another form could include idealism
about heterosexual love itself, such as Orlando’s in As You Like It. In the case of Measure for
Measure, as Leah Marcus asserts, “unless Claudio is played as an unusually repellent character,
he tends to generate audience sympathy, at least by comparison with Angelo, just as his plight
generates sympathy from onlookers within the play.”48 The plays themselves condition the
audience’s responses, which is why audiences divide when they are forced to choose, e.g.,
between Claudio and Isabella.
The mockery and tempering of idealism in Shakespeare’s comedies has implications for
the human capacity to solve problems or create new possibilities for human life, i.e., it has a
conservative political ideology that casts skepticism on new ideas or endeavors. Older forms are
employed as means towards the perennial end of social harmony and cohesion, but without the
attendant commitments of those forms, and without any new commitments other than to the
“happiness” derived from (and constitutive of) that harmony. The genre itself is nostalgic, as
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Heather Dubrow argues: “When an author chooses to write in a given genre, he […] is issuing
certain statements about his art and often about art in general. The very act of adopting a literary
form, especially a well-established one, implies a respect for the past, or at least for one
particular period or school within it.”49 As Shakespeare’s rival dramatists experimented with
forms and styles, Shakespeare chose to repurpose an ancient form for the contemporary stage
with both classical and medieval Christian associations. Medieval comedy, however, was
cosmological, and the love at its center is theological; Shakespeare’s comedies, as Nevill Coghill
writes, “end in joy and are centered in love, albeit human love.” 50 His genre is not entirely
secular though it is secularizing in its mixture of the classical, the Christian, and the everyday.
Coghill’s “human” caveat is key, because there is no transcending the human, no gaining
of the Promised Land or union with God in a Shakespearean comedy. At best, these plays grant
us—the characters and the audience—unity with one another for its own sake. They promise a
kind of worldly happiness achieved via old methods deployed without their respective cultural
commitments. We can enjoy the classical and the Christian forms embedded in Shakespeare’s
plays without committing to any classical or Christian ideals. The plays can inspire wonder
without making you believe in anything other than the pleasure you receive from the show; in
Richard McCoy’s words, “Shakespeare makes poetic faith feel like religious faith by using
religious language to make the improbable sound supernatural.” His plots advance by means
“theatrical rather than occult.”51
William Hamlin articulates the relationship between Shakespeare’s use of genres and
secularity astutely:
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[A] profound current of skepticism about the transcendental grounding of
powerfully held beliefs is often implied through Shakespearean dramaturgy. This
is true both because of the prominence of generic convention in shaping the ways
that belief is expressed and because of the implication, through this very
dependence on genre, that such matters may be explored only within specific
ideological frameworks: that, in other words, we may have no access to
unmediated truth, and thus our attention is perhaps best focused on forms of
mediation and on the practical ethical quality of specific acts of belief. […]
[Shakespeare] suggests that adherence to established systems of belief tends to
encourage self-subordination and intellectual humility, qualities that in turn
strengthen networks of human affinity and interpersonal obligation. Even if
beliefs of this sort appear to be unsupported by the world in which they manifest
themselves—as so often and so emphatically in Measure for Measure—we are
encouraged to feel that discarding them in favor of cool agnosticism or corrosive
doubt is a perilous transaction.52
It is useful to think of genres as “ideological frameworks” that ask people to assent to structures
without believing in them. Rational justification is displaced by fear of worse alternatives and by
the self-justifying “networks of human affinity and interpersonal obligation.” The ideology can
be exposed as ideology and yet embraced nonetheless.

The Comic Ideology
I will attempt to be clearer about what I mean by “ideology” and how I think the ideology
of Shakespearean comedy is displayed most explicitly in All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure
for Measure. I am not arguing that Shakespeare writes on behalf of an identifiable political
agenda from the Elizabethan or Jacobean periods in England. I mean something broader that
reaches beyond the original dramatic context and into generations of readers and audiences. I
have in mind David Quint’s examination of the genre of the classical epic:
This capacious sense of ideology attaches to epic’s inherited formal and narrative
structures a whole series of cultural and psychic associations [...] that reach into
other, less overtly political sectors of the reader’s lived experience. These
associations play at the edges of the ideology (in the narrower sense) of the
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historically situated poem. As they naturalize or universalize an official ideology,
they also perform a legitimating function.53
One can attend to the “legitimating function” of a genre while excluding, or at least qualifying,
questions of Shakespeare’s intentions when discussing the ideology of his forms. I am not
suggesting that Shakespeare had a conscious agenda in writing his comedies or that the late
comedies represent a shift in his mood or temperament. 54 There is no way to know his intentions,
though I could speculate that as he staged and performed in his own comedies over time,
Shakespeare may have observed some of his own tendencies and he thus sought to lampoon or
critique—or at least expose—them in his later works. The titles of the late comedies themselves
are both repetitive (All’s Well That Ends Well, Measure for Measure) and normative, in that they
refer to proverbs about the nature of justice. Such speculation aside, as Quint writes, ideology is
what takes hold of readers, and I have demonstrated that several critics see their task as
legitimizing the comedies’ supposed claims about nature, marriage, the role of faith and wonder,
the relationship of the individual to the community, and the function of the state. Comedies have
deep associations to lived experience: love, marriage, sex, family disagreements, and the rest is
relevant to nearly everyone in the audience. These matters are already quite naturalized, but in
comedy we get the affirmation of state power, the agency of women entertained and contained,
and the acceptance (and requisite celebration) of marriage as the preferred fate for all.
Quint further writes about genres as representing the manner in which a conflict is
properly resolved, wherein the winners can “impose a unified meaning” 55 upon the proceedings.
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I would add that a genre may be understood as the introduction of possibilities that then get
closed as a path is taken. The path can be received as inevitable or desirable, but it’s also
possibly neither: Shakespeare tends to advance his plots with some quantity of chance, accident,
and coincidence, and the audience is given space to wonder how the story could have proceeded
differently. This is especially the case in All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure,
since both plays feature the plots driven by a combination of nearly superhuman effort by a
single character as well as a series of favorable accidents and willing co-conspirators. What
appeared natural or fortuitous becomes deliberate and thereby strange and idiosyncratic. Stephen
Greenblatt writes of the effect of the earlier plays: “In actual social practice, as Shakespeare
understood, the unspoken may be more eloquent than the spoken, and the order of things that
asserts itself spontaneously—as the apparently improvisational expression of a collective
desire—may be more powerful than the official rule painstakingly promulgated and theoretically
defended.”56 If the plots of a Shakespearean comedy are the expression of a singular desire
posing as a collective desire, the ideology is more explicit and the expected pleasure is reduced
or spoiled.
To return to the initial set of claims about Shakespearean comedy with which I began this
Introduction, I will show how this dissertation is an intervention in recent scholarly debates
about Shakespeare’s moral and political ideas, his representation of women and sexual identity,
and the ideological and affective content of his genres. These debates are ongoing and thus I
engage with critics of earlier generations as well as recent work. It is not new to say that the later
comedies, especially Measure for Measure, are explorations (and possibly rejections) of the
comic form itself. Harold Bloom refers to Measure as “a comedy that destroys comedy,”57 while
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Marjorie Garber states that Measure “is the most evidently impatient or uncomfortable with its
inherited generic form. It is a comedy that exposes the difficulties, or perhaps the impossibilities,
of its being a comedy.”58 Marissa Greenberg writes that the end of Measure “reflects
Shakespeare’s frustrations and experimentations with comedy.” 59 Kiernan Ryan notes that the
late comedies “put the genre itself on the rack.” 60 However, critics do not follow through and
apply the late comedies’ critique to the comedies that precede them. Their position is that the late
comedies are the problem, particularly the mismatch between their form and their content, but I
argue that the problems are inherent to the form itself.
The simplest statement of the ideology of Shakespearean comedy is: human beings must
participate in structures of erotic relations. They must either be erotic or eroticized—i.e., must
experience and submit to the force of sexual desire, whether it be their own or someone else’s.
This force should then lead to marriage, and society should be organized around this fact. Since
being erotic is not the same as being monogamous or interested in marriage, therefore this norm
must be enforced. The state can be the apparatus of enforcement, but it is better when the
community itself performs this function; the late comedies present sovereign rulers who take this
role when the community has failed. Those who oppose or resist marriage and the proper
expressions of eros are enemies to be defeated or converted. Actual erotic feeling is not
necessary on the part of the characters, but they must affectively assent to the erotic exchanges of
courtship and marriage, even if those exchanges are vehicles for other concerns, such as social
advancement, material gain, communal belonging, or even the facilitation of other relationships.

58

Garber, Shakespeare After All (New York: Anchor, 2004), 577.
Greenberg, “Crossing from Scaffold to Stage: Execution Processions and Generic Conventions in The Comedy of
Errors and Measure for Measure,” in Shakespeare and Historical Formalism, ed. Stephen Cohen (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2007), 141.
60
Ryan, Shakespeare’s Comedies (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 271.
59

24

It is not the case that every single character must be erotic or eroticized, though it is the case for
nearly every young character and especially every young woman; however, those who do not
participate directly in the love-plots are obligated to enable and assist those plots. Shakespeare’s
comedies are not just about marriage but about marriage instead of something else. The comic
community prioritizes marriage to the subordination or exclusion of other pursuits. The late
comedies expose what could be called the normative coercion of the comedies.

Shakespeare’s Self-Critique
Throughout this dissertation, I will apply the critique of Shakespearean comedy provided
in All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure to the earlier comedies. As I have already
shown, I will use genre theory to show how genre works in a play, and how it shapes and is
analogous to psychological and political considerations, especially with reference to gender and
sexuality. This has been done before but I have my own claims. I also use feminist and queer
approaches, but where these critics see limitations placed upon (or, in certain cases, opportunities
presented for) women and queer characters, I see limitations placed upon nearly everyone, and
only certain people’s interests served. I argue that genres are norm-enforcing structures that limit
human possibilities. Genres have biases; they make characters tend in particular directions. They
make moral claims without offering moral arguments, and comedy specifically mocks and defers
the necessity for justification. It offers “pleasure,” “happiness,” and “wonder,” even while
showing that these experiences are selective and instrumental. Comedy tends to characterize its
alternatives as violent or anti-life.
In Shakespearean comedy, a norm for human life is enforced upon a collection of diverse
individuals; heterosexual monogamy displaces promiscuity, celibacy, and homosexuality. This
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doesn’t mean that people will not live celibate or homoerotic lives, but the norm itself must be
affirmed publicly. Gene Fendt argues that comedy encourages its audiences to apply what the
genre teaches them: “the enactment of the personal, interpersonal, and social integration on stage
will be imitated so far as possible in the world outside the theatre. This is, I assume, the more
usual view of comic catharsis, and it is sufficient, if true, to defend comedy against its cultured
despisers, for according to it comedy has a quite beneficent social and moral effect.” 61 If this is
so, then Shakespeare also warned his audiences about comedy’s effects; he often presents his
comic worlds as natural but also arbitrary and absurd. Though I will rely upon and engage with
critics throughout this work, I will use Shakespeare as his own theorist, and the late plays as my
primary critical texts.
The late comedies show that the comic drive towards marriage and social harmony
requires a narrow conception of human nature and community. Marriage is an institution of
social control which orients people toward one another and the future, and towards the continuity
of life itself; it also preserves gender norms and hierarchy, and several critics have read
Shakespeare’s comedies in that light. Danson summarizes this position well: “The marriage-plot
[…] is Shakespeare’s way of participating in the ancient association of comedy with fertility and
futurity; it is his way of rationalizing comedy’s triumph over death itself.” 62 One sees this, for
example, in one of the closing lines of The Comedy of Errors: “After so long grief, such
Nativity” (5.1.407).63 It is part of the classical heritage of the form, as Colin Burrow notes:
“When a slave in Plautus says ‘I have a plan’ (‘consilium’), he tends also to mean ‘I have an idea
how this play might end,’ or ‘I can see a possible story ahead.’ The plays therefore associate
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drama with conjecture and anxiety about the future, turning comedy into a kind of improvised
attempt to control and direct the onstage action.” 64 Shakespearean comedy has characters (and
audiences) with a sense of the form, how it works and can be directed, and how it proceeds
towards an end.
My view is more aligned with Kathryn Schwarz, who recognizes the underside of the
repetitions and exclusions of the genre:
For Shakespearean comedies, continuity is a technique of erasure, linking disposal
to supersession and exposing the inconsequence of individuals within an
adequately populous collective. When disguise plots, bed tricks, enchantments,
and twin trades use the body doubles of error to produce the doubled body of
marriage, when mistaken identities affirm that any identity can be taken into
thrall, when signs of difference propagate claims to sameness, social survival
reaches its apotheosis. […] Precise mechanisms absorb viable persons into
marriage, and quarantine the useless remains. 65
Schwarz sees comedy as bound with death, the death of this generation for the sake of the future.
I agree with her point about what marriage does to individual identities, but she and the other
critics offer rationalizations that Shakespeare himself does not. Benedick may say “the world
must be peopled” (Much Ado 2.3.242) but the later comedies demonstrate the simple fact that
love and marriage are not necessary for reproduction. All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for
Measure prominently feature pregnant but unmarried women—the only earlier comedy in which
this takes place is Love’s Labor’s Lost—and in All’s Well, Helena wonders aloud at the simple
fact that sex does not require love:
O strange men,
That can such sweet use make of what they hate,
When saucy trusting of the cozen’d thoughts
Defiles the pitchy night; so lust doth play
With what it loathes for that which is away[.] (4.4.21-25)
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For such an obvious point to be presented as a revelation demonstrates how well comedies link
sex with love and marriage, implying the necessity of the latter two as a means of managing the
former. The late comedies sever this connection so as to re-establish it, thus exposing it as
artificial. Shakespeare’s comedies do not rationalize marriage so much as present it as if it is
already rationalized, or as if we must provide the rationalization for it. Marriage is not justified
as a means of guaranteeing social and biological continuity; it is just something that certain
characters in the plays want.
Some critics rise to defend comic conventions and the social norms they endorse as if
these norms are natural, healthy, or even liberating. Andy Mousley states the ideology directly:
“Where tragedy dramatizes the painful loss of the human, romantic comedy invites us to
recognize its presence in the sentimental pleasure we might take in the idealization of
attachment.”66 Again, we see the alignment of the ideology with “pleasure” and a positive moral
message, what Mousley calls an “ethos of intimacy,” which “is present in romantic comedy not
only as theme, but as dynamic between text and reader for play and audience: romantic comedy
beckons us to form an intimate relationship with it because it is supposedly about ‘us’ and our
emotional needs, one of which is precisely the need to belong.” 67 Comedies tell us what to enjoy,
want, and need, and they pathologize non-erotic interests as well as erotic interests that do not
earn social affirmation. They argue that human beings are oriented towards specific ends. The
last plays are different insofar as they render the resistance to monogamous heterosexual life
more acutely and the dedication to it more intensely. As Slavoj Žižek avers, “the failed ending is
the usual place at which the inconsistency of the work’s ideological project becomes visible.” 68
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This dissertation is inspired especially by recent work by Caroline Levine on form 69 and
Sara Ahmed on happiness.70 I focus on the genre of Shakespearean comedy so as to explore its
mechanisms of compliance. Shakespeare’s characters—and audiences—are promised happiness
in exchange for obedience to their sovereign, to law, to moral and religious injunctions, to
“nature,” and to social conventions about speech acts (including marriage, testimony, rhetorical
exercises, and silence). Levine contends that “Attending to the affordances of form opens up a
generalizable understanding of political power.”71 Genres and forms are not identical: genre
applies to texts, while form pertains to social patterns, but Levine shows how literature can be
read “not as epiphenomenal responses to social realities but as forms encountering other
forms,”72 as when the form of the gender binary encounters the form of the Bildungsroman. We
can see in Shakespearean comedy, for example, the form of the pursuit and maintenance of
marriage as encountering the form of generational turn, the form of regime-refounding, and the
form of secularization. The secondary characteristics of Shakespearean comedy can also be
understood as features of the form of communal building and bonding: exposing the hypocrite,
discovering that one has been misled (by oneself and others), recognizing one’s lost family, and
defeating the kill-joy (through conversion, punishment, or exclusion). The individual’s claims to
knowledge and agency are thus undermined and subordinated to those of others. All interests
must serve the “happiness” the plays endorse. As Ahmed’s work shows, other people’s
happiness becomes an obligation for others to affirm, whereas raising questions about that
happiness can be a “protest against the costs of agreement.” 73 Ahmed allows us to recognize that
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happiness is rarely truly collective and it can often be coercive. Her book The Promise of
Happiness builds on her earlier work, particularly The Cultural Politics of Emotion, in which she
claims, “emotions are not simply something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have. Rather, it is through emotions, or
how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made: the ‘I’ and the ‘we’
are shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others.” 74 When critics refer to audiences,
there is often an assumption that emotional responses are generally uniform, and that invitations
to feel happy at the ending of a Shakespearean comedy are presented from the cast as a whole to
the audience as whole. My work, inspired by Ahmed, stresses the divisions both onstage and in
the theater (and among readers). As she states, “even when we feel we have the same feeling, we
don’t necessarily have the same relationship to the feeling.” 75 My analyses of affective responses
throughout this dissertation will assume their complexity, particularly at the level of sociality,
accounting for the pressures placed upon individuals who resist inducements to festivity and
approval.
I also occasionally build upon the work of Simon Palfrey and Tiffany Stern in
Shakespeare in Parts. They argue that since early modern actors were given their “part” or “role”
rather than the entire play, then the first performances of a play would involve the actors-ascharacters being surprised at the events that take place. There would be much the actors did not
know, and actors would have to manage their own, occasionally very long, silences while they
listened for their cues from the other actors. Recurring performances, if and when they happened,
would aim to recapture the electricity and possibility of that initial staging. They assert, “The
first performance is the thing, the event for which the part is written, and the touchpaper that
must be relit if the actor is ever asked to play that part again. Recovering the ‘original’ is the key
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to early modern notions of truth and authenticity.” 76 When actors performed, their emotions
would not be fixed, and they would not necessarily have made clear decisions about how they
would enact their passions onstage: they were “open to the actor to shape and the spectator to
interpret,”77 and actors would also be sensitive to “the particular moments when those emotions
yielded to other emotions.”78 In my analyses of moments in Shakespeare’s comedies, I will
attend to the possibilities of varied emotional expressions on the part of the actors, as well as to
the pressures those actors may have felt to supply affective gestures in accordance with others’
preferences and expectations. Evelyn Tribble writes, “Early modern actors, trained in the art of
gesture and action, relied upon their abilities to harness and manipulate audience affect, in an
ongoing process of negotiation between the skilled player and the canny playgoer,” 79 though her
claim implies that the actors were aware of the particular affects they sought to circulate. I
consider Palfrey and Stern’s possibility that the actors could be surprised by the developments in
plays in which they performed, and that the silences and cues provided them with myriad
possibilities for affective response.
Throughout this dissertation, I will for the most part treat Shakespeare’s comedies as a
relatively closed system: I am interested in how they refer to one another rather than how they
refer to things outside themselves. My work here is therefore decidedly not historicist. Much
work has already been done on contrasting Shakespearean comedy to those of his fellow
playwrights80 and on the historical context of the plays, particularly with reference to marriage,
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politics, and theological controversies. 81 But much can be said about the plays’ political,
philosophical, and theological contentions without restricting oneself to the historical particulars
of Elizabethan-Jacobean England and its theatrical scene. As Richard McCoy states, “scholarly
fixation on Reformation controversies and futile conjecture about Shakespeare’s religious beliefs
cannot explain his plays’ numinous energy or their extraordinary and enduring impact on
audiences today, long after arguments about the Eucharist, purgatory, and kingship have lost
their historical urgency.”82 Historical information is useful, but it cannot account fully for what
makes Shakespeare’s comedies distinctive. For example, Frances Dolan’s overview of marital
practices and discourses shows us that Shakespeare’s comedies are not “realistic.” People
married for various reasons in Shakespeare’s time, and “the only common knowledge about
marriage was that it did not guarantee anything.” 83 As Dolan documents, many people in early
modern England—including women—did not marry, but Shakespeare’s comedies suggest the
practice is near-universal and difficult to avoid. 84 Phyllis Rackin explains, “It may very well be
that the oppression and constraints that define the roles of women in the plays we have come to
assume as normative were actually counterfactual fantasies rather than reflections of the lives
that a majority of Shakespeare’s original audience knew outside the theater.” 85 Similarly, Holger

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Bowers, Radical Comedy in Early Modern England (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate, 2008).
81
Some recent examples: Giese, Courtships, Marriage Customs, and Shakespeare’s Comedies (New York:
Palgrave, 2006); Sokol and Sokol, Shakespeare, Law, and Marriage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003); Dolan, “Shakespeare and Marriage: An Open Question,” Literature Compass 8.9 (2011): 620-634; Belsey,
Shakespeare and the Loss of Eden: The Construction of Family Values in Early Modern Culture (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1999); Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution: Late-Elizabethan Politics and the Theatre of
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010); Hadfield, Shakespeare and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005); Cefalu, Revisionist Shakespeare (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Hunt, Shakespeare’s Religious
Allusiveness: Its Play and Tolerance (New York: Routledge, 2019); McCoy, Faith in Shakespeare; Taylor and
Beauregard, eds., Shakespeare and the Culture of Christianity in Early Modern England (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2003); Woods, Shakespeare’s Unreformed Fictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
82
McCoy, Faith in Shakespeare, xii.
83
Dolan, “Shakespeare and Marriage,” 621.
84
Ibid., 622.
85
Rackin, Shakespeare and Women, 71.

32

Syme shows that Shakespeare’s representation of legal proceedings, including in comedies such
as The Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure, are deliberately inaccurate and thus “it
enables us to see the division between real-world and theatrical procedures”; they have a “deeply
decontextual character.”86 In another close historicist study of Measure for Measure, Leah
Marcus writes about the play’s “chameleon indeterminacy” about confessional and political
divides: it could be “Stuart propaganda, or an expression of a contemporary nightmare.” 87
Shakespeare’s comedies are fantasies as well as warnings. They do not mirror “real life” so much
as they match the unreality of much ideological discourse, in Shakespeare’s time and our own.
The comedies can be read as didactic, if equivocally, and the late plays highlight the side effects
of the genre’s standard prescriptions.

In my first chapter, “Shakespeare’s Critique of Happiness in All’s Well That Ends Well,”
I survey various critical justifications of Shakespearean comedy, highlighting the enthusiasm and
uncritical endorsement that often informs such accounts. I state my own theory of Shakespearean
comedy, which is that the genre manufactures happiness though varied means: the prioritization
of heterosexual marriage driven by female desire, the discouragement of analysis, and often the
literal instruction to the characters and the audience to recognize social concord and participate
in its joys. All’s Well That Ends Well foregrounds a woman’s quest towards marrying the man
she loves, at great personal cost and despite his lack of love for her, and I show that the play
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critiques the genre’s presentation of heterosexual female fulfillment as an image of happiness as
well as its encouragement of affective responses of joy and wonder.
In my second chapter, “Measure for Measure’s Anatomy of Happiness,” I interpret the
play as providing an inventory of the central features of Shakespearean comedy, yet because they
are all forced into the play by the scheming of the Duke, the play fails to produce the happiness
for which comedies are designed. I focus on the Duke’s promotion of Mariana’s interests as a
way to simultaneously solve the problems of Vienna and make Measure for Measure into a
comedy. Though a minor character, Mariana’s fulfillment becomes the Duke’s priority, and her
happiness at the end of the play—which may not transfer to the audience—becomes the basis for
the social order the Duke promotes. I further demonstrate that the play’s deployment of the term
“pleasure” indicates that the Duke’s work is both politically and psychologically enjoyable, and
that he arrogates to himself the privilege to which the theatrical audience is accustomed.
My third chapter, “The Pleasures of Government: Measure for Measure,” provides my
account of the play’s political ideology. Since I argue that the late plays are more exemplary than
anomalous, Measure’s political ideology can be applied to Shakespeare’s previous comedies, in
which the ideology is much subtler. I argue against critics who praise Duke Vincentio’s equity
and moderation, and claim instead that his vision is in actuality an extreme world of coercive
normativity and deference to authority. The Duke uses varied means to reestablish his rule over
Vienna and seems to seek power for its own sake, and his deploying of comic tropes for political
purposes alerts us to the tyrannical tendencies of Shakespeare’s comic worlds.
My fourth chapter, “From Henikosexuality to Heteronormativity,” completes my
discussion of Measure for Measure as a critique of Shakespearean comedy. The play stages the
political enforcement of the norm of marriage and it demonstrates the alignment between
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patriarchal powers and women who are what I call “henikosexual,” i.e., determined to marry one
man and unwilling to accept a substitute or consider a different form of life. The genre therefore
complicates any binary figuration of gendered interests. In my interpretation, Isabella is the
greatest victim of the Duke’s work in the play, in that his proposal to her amounts to an
injunction for her to abandon her way of life as a celibate nun. His act clarifies the genre’s
elevation of heterosexual marriage as the norm for human life and the center of community,
wherein celibacy is treated as just as deviant as promiscuity.
In my last chapter, “Rethinking Sexuality, Authority, and Happiness in Shakespeare’s
Comedies,” I will show how Shakespeare’s previous comedies can be better understood with
reference to my analysis of the late comedies, particularly in the prioritization of the devoted
heterosexual woman, the discouragement of questioning, the instrumentalization of “wonder,”
the insistence on certain characters’ happiness being taken as general happiness, and the
normativizing of married life. I argue against critics who identify Shakespearean comedy as
“liberating,” and I examine Shakespeare’s ten previous comedies in short essays addressing their
varied engagements with what I consider to be Shakespearean comedy’s central tropes.
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Chapter One
Shakespeare’s Critique of Happiness in All’s Well That Ends Well

The Nature of the Critique
As I argued in my Introduction, Shakespearean comedy is an idiosyncratic genre that
became normalized. Unlike his contemporaries, Shakespeare based his comedies on classical
models and thus focused on courtship and marriage, as well as mistaken identity (among other
forms of confusion), leading to an image of happiness and social order. These and the other
common features of his comedies, such as the narrow evasion of death and the reappearance of
characters thought to be dead, are distinctive to his work if not unique. But why are
Shakespeare’s comedies like that? What does Shakespearean comedy mean?
In All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure, Shakespeare presents his own
analysis of the genre. He foregrounds his own quirks and he explores their moral implications.
He shows in these plays that the happiness and social order created in his comedies function by
prioritizing some people’s interests over others and compelling everyone else to comply, not by
the direct threat of violence but by normative coercion. A person or some people want to get
married, they overcome their obstacles, they call themselves happy, and all are invited to share in
their happiness; no further justification or rationalization is necessary. The results are
asymmetrical: some people’s desires are fulfilled, some less so, and some not at all. We can note
patterns among the winners and losers of the comedies in order to reveal their ideological
underpinnings, and we can attend to the anomalies and exceptions in the late comedies so as to
discover the rules that the other comedies follow.
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Critics debate how seriously to take the promises of happiness in Shakespeare’s
comedies. They suggest it offers a moral vision based in intimacy, relationality, psychological
health, or theatricality. Alternatively, they see it as promoting sexual regulation, specifically the
control of women, and guaranteeing the continuation of human society by promoting childbirth
and the concerns of the young over prior generations. The comedies also address and contain
anxieties about death, illegitimate children, and unruly women. They celebrate communal rituals
and the rhythms of the natural world. These theories are all plausible and instructive, and my
response to them is not to contradict them but to offer a mixture of nuance and skepticism. 88
My own theory, based on the late comedies, is that the happiness conferred to the
characters and the audience is premised upon the general (but not total) assent to and approval of
the comic conclusion. This is not merely circular reasoning: Shakespeare often dramatizes the
assent and the announcements of personal and communal joy. Skeptics are converted or silenced,
and kill-joys are punished and/or excluded. Most importantly, the characters are told to wonder
but not to analyze what has happened, and they are often promised an explanation to be given
after the play ends. The implication of the deferred explanation is that the explainer possesses
knowledge the characters lack and thus one character masters not only the proceedings but their
interpretation. Much of what the characters (and audience) wonder at is mistaken for miracles
and acts of providence, “a showing of a heavenly effect in an earthly actor” (All’s Well 2.3.2324); what is apparently or nominally religious in nature is deployed for the comic ends of
marriage, confusion, communal renewal, and the pleasure of the audience. Religious claims and
practices may lend some meaning and legitimacy to the romantic plots and foster a sense that
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certain characters and actions are favored or blessed, contributing to the (perhaps illusory) sense
of happiness.
The sources of comic happiness vary from play to play but one factor is constant. The
marital sorting and social conformity depicted in the comedies gives precedence to women who
want to marry specific men, and all other preferences are subordinated, silenced, or opposed.
Women who do not have this preference suffer or comply, and men in general suffer or comply;
the man’s desire, in most cases, is less important than the woman’s desire. A Shakespearean
comedy may end with a heterosexual man being denied the woman he desires, but never the
reverse. A woman’s desire is thwarted only when she desires another woman. This rule is never
announced as a rule, but it is followed nonetheless. It is distinctively prominent in All’s Well
That Ends Well, while it is the subplot of Measure for Measure, wherein it serves to overtake and
solve the problems of the main plot.
I argue therefore that All’s Well That Ends Well is to a large extent the paradigmatic
Shakespearean comedy. Its plot is the most narrowly focused on the obsessed woman: Helena,
the daughter of a doctor, wants to marry Bertram but she knows he will reject her, so she cures
the King of France to gain the right to choose any husband she pleases. The King forces Bertram
to marry her, but he flees France to be a soldier and a “hater of love” (3.3.11); Bertram prefers
violence, male camaraderie, and sexual promiscuity, and thus he rejects Helena, marriage, and
monogamy. Helena then deploys a “bed-trick”: Bertram attempts to seduce a virgin named
Diana, but Helena has sex with him in her place. Helena then fakes her own death, and Bertram
returns to France to marry a woman of his own class. Diana publicly accuses Bertram, but then
Helena emerges and reveals the bed-trick. Bertram agrees to be her husband: “If she, my liege,
can make me know this clearly, / I’ll love her dearly, ever, ever dearly” (5.3.314-315). The King
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of France gets the final lines of the play, in which he instructs Diana to find a husband and
assures everyone else that “more leisure shall express” (5.3.332) the details of the story, “To
make the even truth in pleasure flow” (5.3.326). Most of the play is focused on Helena’s pursuit
of Bertram; the scenes involving Bertram and his associates at war are disheartening and cynical,
emphasizing that Bertram has made the wrong choice.
Measure for Measure, on the other hand, takes place in a world where sex is abundant but
marriage is rare. Duke Vincentio attempts to set his city aright by appointing Angelo as his
deputy; Angelo then sets out to punish and eradicate fornication and prostitution. Angelo arrests
an unmarried couple, Claudio and Julietta, because Julietta is pregnant. Claudio’s sister Isabella,
a novice nun, pleads with Angelo, and Angelo demands that she have sex with him in exchange
for her brother’s life. She refuses, but then Duke Vincentio, in disguise as a friar, proposes a bedtrick: Isabella accepts Angelo’s offer, but in her place will be Mariana, Angelo’s former fiancée,
whom he jilted and slandered. The bed-trick is successful but Angelo, terrified of reprisal, orders
Claudio’s execution anyway. The Duke, still in disguise, substitutes another man’s head for
Claudio’s. He then “returns” to the city to evaluate Angelo’s progress. Isabella and Mariana, as
part of the Duke’s plan, publicly accuse Angelo, who denies everything and accuses the
“meddling friar” of plotting against him. The Duke reappears as the friar, and when his disguise
is revealed, Angelo’s guilt is apparent. The Duke orders Angelo to marry Mariana, after which
he is to be executed; he promises Mariana “To buy you a better husband” (5.1.425), but Mariana
insists, “Oh my dear Lord, / I crave no other, nor no better man” (5.1.425-426). Mariana and
Isabella then plead for Angelo’s life, and the Duke agrees to spare him. The Duke then reveals
that Claudio is alive. The play ends with the Duke promising to explain to his confused citizens
what has happened, and proposing marriage to Isabella, who does not respond.

39

The plots of these two plays are elaborate and strange. They each feature jilted women
determined to regain their lost loves, women dedicated to their virginity, bed-tricks, faked
deaths, strong rulers, ambitious men who get humiliated, and a considerable amount of low talk
about sex and human nature. The erotically-driven women get their husbands after the men are
publicly humiliated and exposed. These plays are unlike many of the previous comedies in that
the marriage happens during the course of the play (offstage, in both cases) rather than being
planned for the near future. The women committed to nonsexual life are told to change: All’s
Well ends with the King telling Diana to marry, while Measure ends with the Duke proposing to
Isabella. Shakespeare was aware of the dark tone of both plays, that the endings are “happy”
insofar as they bring deliverance from suffering; the King in All’s Well reassures, “All yet seems
well, and if it end so meet, / The bitter past, more welcome is the sweet” (5.3.333-334), while
Isabella in Measure refers to the Duke’s machinations as “a physic / That’s bitter to sweet end”
(4.6.7-8).
Many critics and audiences find both plays off-putting. For example, Arthur Kirsch
writes of All’s Well That Ends Well, “That Helena should have to suffer such a man, and more,
that she should choose to love him, are of course the real problems of the play, and Shakespeare
does not allow us to resolve them simply by treating them as conventions and thereby ignoring
them.”89 M. C. Bradbrook refers to Helena as “purely conventional […] the puppet-figure of an
overworked craftsman.”90 Mark Van Doren laments of Measure for Measure, “it goes against
[Shakespeare’s] grain to make comedy out of such matter.” 91 The tension between the plays’
genre and their contents is palpable. However, All’s Well and Measure do not only conclude with
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marriages and reunions, but they emphasize that men must accede to marriage-minded women’s
demands even if the man does not return or deserve her love. She must be satisfied and all are
invited to share in her happiness. If audiences do not find the conclusions of these plays to be
pleasurable, they must at least recognize that Helena and Mariana have been accommodated, and
that the happy endings of Shakespeare’s comedies generally include such women having their
wishes fulfilled.
The term I will use in this dissertation for such women is henikosexual: drawn towards an
individual man,92 with the goal of marrying him. Discourses about the sexual preferences and
orientations of Shakespeare’s characters have been too embedded in categories: a person feels
desire for certain types of people. As I will explore in more detail throughout this dissertation,
critics have done interesting work exploring Shakespeare’s comedies as studies of human
sexuality; the genre seems to endorse heterosexuality while including several incidences of
homosexuality and bisexuality, among other practices. The comedies are also studies of
monogamy and marriage, with their attendant anxieties about adultery. However, Helena and
Mariana are striking in their singular and desperate devotion to individual men, and the narrow
obsessiveness of their desire is at least as important as its being heterosexual.
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The henikosexual woman can be, depending on the play she is in, a transgressive figure
of agency or a passive figure of obedience. She can be aligned with patriarchy and social power
or oppose it. I have in mind here Mario DiGangi’s notion of the “sexual type”: “when a sexual
type is embodied in a dramatic character, the character’s own strategies for resisting the
constraints of dominant social and sexual ideologies can disturb the logic of the reductive and
vilified associations imposed by the type. Thus a particularly dissident instantiation of the type
can put the type itself under scrutiny, suggesting its partiality or inadequacy as a standard for
classifying and evaluating the social practices of an individual.” 93 Helena and Mariana may be
taken as “particularly dissident instantiations of the type” and therefore they enable examination
of the work of heteronormativity in Shakespearean comedy. The henikosexual woman is, in a
sense, not dissident at all, since she embodies ideals of faithfulness and seeks only to participate
in social institutions that legitimize dominant forms of gender relations and sexual morality;
however, this sexual type is simultaneously capable of disrupting a social order and restoring it
to its supposedly proper place, and she compels men and often sovereign rulers to cater to her
interests. Even when she is a passive figure, she dominates the comedy structurally and enables
its acts of ordering and community-construction.
My concern in this chapter is exploring what constitutes happiness in the happy ending of
a Shakespearean comedy, and then showing how All’s Well That Ends Well highlights and
critiques that happiness. My claim is that the plays favor henikosexual women, to the extent that
their happiness is happiness and their desires matter the most of all desires. Men should submit
to and facilitate them; other women should imitate them and facilitate them. In some cases,
henikosexual women are promised sexual fulfillment, but always in connection to marriage.
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Women who do not desire a specific man, or who desire a woman, are compelled to accept a
husband not of their choosing, while a man sometimes does not get the specific woman he
desires. The power differential varies in the comedies between the men and the women, but in all
cases, the henikosexual woman gets the man she desires, whether it means mastery or servitude
for her. I here dispute Lisa Hopkins’s claim that “In the early modern theatre, comedy typically
depends on two things: ultimate acceptance of normative gender roles (even if these are
contested during the course of the play), and a principle of interchangeability most often
manifested in the ultimate acceptance of a different sexual partner from the one initially
preferred.”94 The former point is well-made, but every one of Shakespeare’s comedies features a
woman who, for better or worse, refuses to accept a different man than her initial preference. I
also argue against R. W. Maslen, who claims of A Midsummer Night’s Dream that it is “a
romantic comedy that celebrates the love that binds communities rather than individuals; and this
is what rescues it from becoming the sort of tragedy that occurs when love becomes too specific,
too exclusive.”95 Exclusivity is just as essential to comedy as to tragedy. R. W. Dent, also writing
about Midsummer, observes, “As so frequently in Shakespearean comedy, the men fluctuate
before finally settling down to a constant attachment such as the heroines exhibit from the
start,”96 but he does not develop the idea or explore its function.
The happiness of the comic endings also involves some amount of stupefaction on the
part of the characters, often with an expression of wonder at what has happened: it is as if
happiness requires not knowing, and not being able to find the answers for oneself. Characters
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(and sometimes audiences) are told not to analyze but to accede, and to further accept the
explanations promised to them. Other factors common to the endings of Shakespeare’s comedies
are secondary. Some of the plays contain magic and miracles, while others mock such
possibilities. Some plays endorse the political power of existing authorities while others expose
those authorities’ limitations. Sometimes the rule of law is endorsed, while in other cases equity
and prudence take precedence. Sometimes men need to change before they can marry, but often
the henikosexual woman is indifferent to the man’s moral and psychological state, or she
continues to desire marriage with him even after his worst behavior. The woman is the final
arbiter of the legitimacy of her desire and the means for achieving it. The motives of those who
assist her and those who oppose her also may vary, as may our affective responses to them. The
deferred explanations and expressed hopes for pleasure signify that happiness may require
ignoring or abjuring the moral and philosophical implications of the comic endings. Wonder,
pleasure, and empathic identification with the comic heroine are the principal measures of comic
happiness.
I will explore the implications of this theory throughout this dissertation, but in this
chapter my focus will be on its moral valence and its conditioning of affective response. What I
hope to show is that the late comedies reveal that there is no special reason or justification for
prioritizing henikosexual women in this fashion. A woman’s desire to marry a specific man is
one personal preference among others. Shakespeare often makes the desire singular and
eccentric: his romantic heroine sees something in her beloved that others do not, and yet she is
not to be refuted or disappointed. Sometimes the woman is motivated by sexual desire, but this is
not necessary; her interest is marriage, and this marriage may or may not make her happy, or free
her from some kind of bondage, or be the means to some other possible end, but these reasons
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are also ancillary. It is good when the desired man accepts her wishes, but if he doesn’t, he can
be compelled; moreover, he may experience his own desire for the woman as itself an
unwelcome compulsion. In some cases, the woman does not even express her preference but she
struggles towards marriage anyway, as if she has no other options.
The prioritizing of the interests of henikosexual women can be a means to disciplining
men, and other women, and fostering social order. The women’s desire and the social order that
caters to it are self-justifying, if they are justified at all. DiGangi notes, “In Shakespearean
comedy, women’s agency in choosing a marriage partner is one area in which the ‘tropes’ of
patriarchal authority are most vigorously articulated and resisted,” 97 and I will attend to the
relationship between the henikosexual woman and patriarchy throughout this dissertation. I will
furthermore explore how the late plays encourage us to question the supposed “happiness” and
“order” generated by the genre, not to deny or refute it so much as to recognize how it is
constructed.
In the ensuing pages, I will survey the critical apologias for Shakespearean comedy. My
goal is not only to distinguish my claims from others’, but to demonstrate how these critics
follow the cues from Shakespeare to endorse and naturalize comic conventions while ignoring
Shakespeare’s other cues to be suspicious or reflexive of those conventions. I will offer an
overview of the critique of Shakespearean comedy offered in All’s Well That Ends Well and
Measure for Measure. I will then examine All’s Well That Ends Well in detail, showing how its
claims for happiness, order, and wonder in its conclusion do not match its presentation of
Helena’s quest and Bertram’s eventual submission.
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Defending What Shakespeare Would Not
When critics attempt to present a comprehensive account of Shakespearean comedy, they
tend towards legitimizing its ideological claims as they understand them. The “problem” of All’s
Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure, for these critics, is their challenge to this
legitimacy, and thus these plays are ignored, explained away (as if they are not as “dark” as they
seem), or lambasted for their insufficient festivity. Studies of the comedies by C. L. Barber,
William C. Carroll, Ralph Berry, Peter G. Philias, Louis Martz, Michael Mangan, and G. Beiner,
for example, omit All’s Well and Measure, while Robert Ornstein includes All’s Well but not
Measure.98 Berry is the most skeptical of comic happiness of this group. Marilyn Williamson’s
feminist analysis incorporates the late plays and, therefore, she critiques the comic ideology. 99
Kiernan Ryan’s recent study—which excludes the late comedies—however, seeks to reclaim the
happiness of the comedies but to celebrate their potential for liberation: he asserts that the
“complex utopianism of Shakespearean comedy” has a “covert mission: the hasten the day when
the face of affliction will smile once more and desolation will be turned to delight.” 100 Ryan
assumes that the appropriate response to Shakespearean comedy is to share the joy, i.e., to
participate in the work’s ideological commitments.
Ryan’s celebration of comic happiness draws on a long critical tradition that presents a
paradox wherein comedies reveal reality while articulating a supposedly common fantasy. For
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example, Northrop Frye argues that Shakespeare’s comedies are simultaneously mimetic (i.e.,
representing human beings “as they are”) and aspirational or fantastical (i.e., representing human
beings “as they should be” or “as we wish they could be”). According to Frye, “Usually
Shakespeare achieves his high mimetic pattern by making the struggle of the repressive and the
desirable societies a struggle between two levels of existence, the former like our own world or
worse, the latter enchanted and idyllic.”101 Frye, typically, aligns the “realistic” (“our own
world”) with the “repressive,” and the “desirable” with fantasy and magic: “Happy endings do
not impress as true, but as desirable, and they are brought about by manipulation.” 102 In Frye’s
formulation, with which many critics before and after him concur, comedies go from a “bad”
world to a “good” (or at least “better”) world, one which is supposedly less rigid and cruel. Frye
asserts that the worlds at the end of comedies are inclusive,103 but repeatedly he simply declares
that audiences prefer them: “the final society reached by comedy is the one that the audience has
recognized all along to be the proper and desirable state of affairs,” and therefore comic closure
is “an act of communion with the audience.” 104 The audience enjoys the comic ending not
because of a great moral victory but because morality is itself opposed by the aesthetic and
affective frisson of people accepting themselves as they are (or as they have come to be), and
making a society which discourages moral judgment except of those who presume to make moral
judgments. This is what makes a “happy ending” happy: “the normal response of the audience to
a happy ending is ‘this should be,’ which sounds like a moral judgment. So it is, except that it is
not moral in the restricted sense, but social. Its opposite is not the villainous but the absurd, and
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comedy finds the virtues of Malvolio as absurd as the vices of Angelo.” 105 Frye repeatedly aligns
the “desirable” and the “happy” with the “normal” and the carefree. Comedy creates a
community in the audience of people who approve of the proceedings. To disagree or object is to
be a kill-joy, and to take what one has seen “too seriously.”
Similarly, Anne Barton presents As You Like It as the exemplary Shakespearean comedy,
and she follows Hazlitt and Frye in her claim that the play offers a vision of social harmony. She
refers to “the unprecedented generosity and inclusiveness of the society which finally emerges
from Arden” and “the flexibility of the new social order, its ability to accommodate deviation.
More than any of its predecessors, As You Like It demonstrates Shakespeare’s faith in comedy
resolutions. It is a triumph of form.” 106 She claims that Jaques’s departure “suggests that there
are certain kinds of experience after all, certain questions, which lie outside the scope of the
happy ending, generous and convincing though that is.”107 The happy world is a place of feeling,
not questioning (or answering), including questions about the nature of the happiness itself.
Barton admits that the ending of As You Like It is not actually as happy as it claims to be, but it
makes us think about a world in which happiness is possible, and even in that case, it’s just
happiness for certain people.
Other critics make similar claims about comedies being accommodating of difference and
fostering a sense of community. For example, Lawrence Danson writes, “Shakespeare’s comic
marriage-plots accommodate a complex of competing interests; and that accommodation—which
dramatically constructs authority as beneficent to individuals’ desires—constitutes part of what
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we call the happiness of his comic endings.” 108 Danson notes that the comic community is not
merely one wherein people’s wishes are granted, but also wherein a benevolent power recognizes
and authorizes those desires. Martin Wiggins identifies the happiness of the comic community by
its peace and concord: “Comedy […] ends by re-establishing a fitly ordered society as it was
then conceived: lovers are married, families reunited, and shrews tamed, and any disharmonious
elements are purged away. […] [U]ltimately the comic structure limits and contains the
disruptive energies of the aspirant imagination.” 109 Again, the “disruptive elements” are those
which resist the erotic, nostalgic, and (in this case) patriarchal forces and have other priorities.
The emphasis on “stability” suggests that Shakespearean comedy has a therapeutic as
well as an escapist function. Michael Edwards, addressing comedy in the broad sense, claims
that it offers the comfort of forgiveness without the theological baggage: “comedy [...] exposes
and contends with a corrupted world. Its material is egoism, violence, conflict, suffering,
sickness, death, nightmare, judgment. [...] It deflects our profounder dismays, by directing
laughter towards deformities and failures that are other than moral and spiritual.” 110 This echoes
Frye’s language about comedy’s opponents being more absurd than vicious; they are not evil or
wrong so much as out of place, in the wrong play. Moral questions are transformed into
problems of belonging. Individual concerns are elided into and ultimately equated with
communal concerns. Therefore, the pleasure comedy brings is not exciting so much as it is
comforting. John Russell Brown writes,
Shakespeare’s plots are often complicated […] yet the disorder will always seem
eminently tidiable. Each of the comedies is viewed within the frame of an
expectation of ordered resolution so that, as the stage fills at the end of the
performance, the audience observes it all gratefully, with a sense of completion
and satisfaction. Even when the audience is concerned with the most precarious
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moments in the unfolding of the comedy, a deeper and timeless consciousness
may still keep its members aware of the incipient balance, the final stability. 111
One’s familiarity with the genre leads to a greater sense of the promised stability, such that one’s
enjoyment of a Shakespearean comedy grows with the assurance that the promised end will be
delivered. The fantasy element is not just that the ending is achieved through magic and
providence but that human problems can be solved without human effort, as Mary Beth Rose
writes: “Romantic comedy, then, dramatizes that longing for a happy ending which is a wishfulfillment fantasy of attaining all of one’s desires without social, emotional, or moral cost: ‘Jack
shall have Jill / Nought shall go ill.’”112 Again, the audience accepts the endings because the
endings tell them how to feel. While attitudes about love and marriage changed and were
contested in Shakespeare’s time, the focus on marriage was justified by its social utility: “In
Shakespearean comedy happiness and stability are the same.” 113 If this is so—and I think
Shakespeare is more ironic than these critics allow—then these plays preclude the possibility that
other forms of happiness could exist, or that “happiness” itself is not the highest good.
Following the influential works of Barber and Frye, the critical debate about
Shakespearean comedy focused on “happiness,” not just in the convention of the “happy ending”
but in the validity and legitimacy of the happiness itself. The critics assumed a shared moral
sense between Shakespeare and his audience, and this either justifies the genre or is part of the
indictment against it. Apologetic critics often used the affective responses of audiences to lend
credence to their readings, as if a cheering crowd is sufficient to justify a moral and social vision.
This is precisely the argument of Robert Ornstein, who encourages critics to marvel at
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Shakespeare’s “ability to fuse moral insight and aesthetic affect” rather than “conduct a moral
audit of the plots and decide which characters are insufficiently noble or repentant to deserve the
second chance at happiness that the plays allow.” 114 But what if the late comedies challenge us to
look at the ways the plays enforce a sense of “rightness” to their structures that inhibit but do not
fully suppress critical disagreement? We have an opportunity to examine the mechanisms by
which happiness is manufactured.
The happy ending of a Shakespearean comedy is premised upon a blend of sentiment and
hope. Tony Tanner summarizes the varied constituent parts of the affective pleasures afforded by
comic closures, demonstrating that the plays do not promote an idea of progress so much as a
reassertion of prior circumstances and values, and a trust in whatever agents and processes
facilitate this recovery:
The end of Shakespearean comedy (perhaps all comedy) is characterized by at
least some of the following “re-” words. I apologize for the list, but it does have
some cumulative point: return (which implies a previous dislodgement or flight),
restoration (after displacement, exile or usurpation); recognition, which includes
clarification and unravelling (after confusion, tangles, darkness); reconstitution
and reassemblage (after a disordering and scattering); remedy (for sickness);
release (after constraint, repression); reversion (after inversion, and perhaps
perversion); revitalization (of lost energies); replenishment and refreshing (for
emptiness and desiccation); recovery (of someone/something missing or lost);
reunion (after separation); resolution (of problems and uncertainty); reconciliation
(where there was discord and enmity); reordering (of actual or potential chaos);
rebirth (after seeming death); renewal (after stagnation); regeneration
(superseding blocked generation); and—perhaps—redemption (of sins). 115
The repetition of “re-” reinforces the inherent nostalgia of the genre, the promise or wish that lost
things can be found, and that the world has gone wrong, but it can be set right by looking
backwards. Often the “recovery” and “renewal” is achieved by forces other than human agency,
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and thus a cyclical view of history is implicit in the movements of comic plots. Tanner does not
include “repetition” among his “‘re’-words,” but one encounters it from one comedy to another.
The critical consensus was and is far from absolute, and varied critics raised objections to
the “happiness” of Shakespeare’s comic worlds. Leo Salingar (in Shakespeare and the Traditions
of Comedy) and Ejner J. Jensen (in Shakespeare and the Ends of Comedy) summarize and
challenge these objections. Salingar’s work is more analytical while Jensen’s is polemical. I will
provide a brief overview of their account of the debate and then clarify my intervention. I
contend that the Barber/Frye consensus remains dominant in studies of Shakespearean comedy,
partially because many critics have moved on to other questions, and partially because critics
have tried to find new possibilities for happiness within the comedies without questioning—as, I
say, Shakespeare himself does—whether “happiness” is appropriate as a critical paradigm.
Salingar argues, in reply to Derek Traversi and other critics he does not name, that
“Shakespeare enjoyed the ‘magic’ transmitted through [his] stage contrivances.” 116 When critics
discuss the features of Shakespeare’s plays as merely conventional, they deny the possibility that
such conventions have meaning or content. For Salingar, this suggests an unnecessary distinction
between affective and intellectual apprehensions of Shakespeare’s dramaturgy: “The apparent
opposition in discussions of Shakespeare’s comedies between the critics’ pleasure and the critics’
judgment must stem very largely from the long-established assumption that a comedy should be
intended as a reflection of something else.”117 When a theatrical device is distasteful or
unsatisfying, critics designate it as a convention or a local prejudice; if it does not give us
pleasure, we can assume that it gave someone else pleasure at some point in time. But Salingar
proposes that critics follow audiences by interpreting the plays as both real and false, a reflection
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of life and a diversion from it, both ritualistic and ordinary. Audiences can enjoy a play without
intellectualizing it. Salingar then glosses (with approval) the Barber/Frye interpretation of
comedies as presenting “a festive but yet critical passage of time, when the characters are swept
out of their previous selves and brought into a fresh harmony with a natural order and sequence
in life,” leading to “a feeling of integration and the promise of a new beginning in life for the
leading characters.”118 The social concord and renewal is possible because of the characters’
openness to change from their unnatural to their natural selves. Again, this process is justified
because it emerges from and provides the evidence for some reality greater than human agency:
“the cycle of Fortune in the comedies […] answers an intelligible common expectation about the
presence of a natural rhythm affecting human affairs.” 119 Salingar suggests that Shakespeare is
not only selling this position but that he buys it himself; this is presented not as mere
entertainment but as wisdom, fostering the feeling among the audience in a somewhat secular
form of communal ritual.
Salingar follows Barber and Frye in his claim that ritual patterns reflect—and testify to
the reality of—natural patterns. It is as if we can understand the patterns of life and recognize
them not just in the thematic elements of Shakespeare’s comedies but in their very grammar. I
think Shakespeare similarly encourages us to be suspicious of such claims about nature, and that
if we profess natural rhythms of life and renewal, we must also find decadence and death to be
equally natural. These claims about nature also suggest that the characters in comedies lack
freedom, except to the extent that they choose to live erotic lives. Salingar argues—and I will
challenge this claim extensively in subsequent chapters—that the marriages in Shakespeare’s
comedies are “in accordance with the Elizabethan ideal of a free choice of suitable partners and
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mutual love and trust.”120 If happiness is premised upon people getting their free choice of
spouses, then many Shakespearean characters are not happy—and we also have reason to doubt
that those who do get their wishes fulfilled will fare much better.
On the other hand, according to Jensen, it is possible to avoid controversies about the
happiness of a comedy’s conclusion by focusing not on the endings of the plays but only on the
episodes which we enjoy. Defining a comedy by its conclusion goes back at least to Samuel
Johnson, who wrote (inaccurately) of Shakespeare and his contemporaries, “An action which
ended happily to the principal persons, however serious or distressful through its intermediate
incidents, in their opinion constituted a comedy. This idea of a comedy continued long amongst
us, and plays were written, which, by changing the catastrophe, were tragedies to-day and
comedies to-morrow.”121 But Jensen attempts to rebut those who read the comedies as
“unsatisfying” or troubling, by arguing that they are simply asking too much of comedies:
This insistence on revelations of meaning at the play’s close converts comic
endings into instruments of teleological design and transforms elements of
dramatic structure into vehicles of thematic purpose. What gets lost when closure
receives such emphasis is the very heart of comedy, its moment-by-moment
development on the stage as it provides its assortment of theatrical pleasures. 122
Jensen’s claim is valid—of course Shakespeare’s comedies provide pleasure, and a play is not
merely its ending. One can enjoy the thrills of a gangster film without thinking too much about
the gangster’s violent death or deep disappointment at the film’s ending. But endings still matter,
especially in comedies, and I challenge the idea of pleasure as a critical category specifically
because the claims about pleasure made by Jensen and others are themselves normative, even if
the pleasure is not felt by everyone. It is as if an ending can be excused or endorsed if one
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enjoyed oneself on the journey towards it. The ending of a play reveals its ideological
commitments; it tells us who wins, how conflicts are managed, and what makes a comedy a
comedy. Jensen claims that moments of exuberance and energy are more important than
resolutions, but one experiences similar moments in Romeo and Juliet, Henry IV, and even
Hamlet. My contention is that comedies are not just about happiness but about how happiness is
distributed. Certain people’s wishes are prioritized while others are mocked or ignored. Violence
is threatened, order is restored, and the forces which can grant these wishes demand submission.
Jensen’s work is largely a response to Ralph Berry, who rejects pleasure as a critical
category only to deny the validity of any moral response to Shakespearean comedy: “In place of
the pleasure principle, I advance the reality principle as the proper criterion of the conclusion,
hence of the comedy as a whole. The great advantage of the reality principle is that it upholds no
system of values whatsoever. It simply asserts that actions will have consequences.” 123 Berry
argues that the comedies encourage ambivalence and thus provide us with critical distance. We
do not have to participate in the feast. However, Berry does not acknowledge that distance is also
powerlessness; the feast goes on, as an image of “reality.”
Even when critics don’t emphasize pleasure or happiness, they can nonetheless render
Shakespearean comedy normative by stressing its teleology. Families are reunited, pleasing
young and old, and future generations are promised in the marital unions. C. L. Barber and
Richard Wheeler, for example, generalize from The Comedy of Errors and find in the “comic
resolution a renewal of life in both generations” and a promise of temporary peace. 124 Wheeler
writes of comic characters reaching maturation by achieving intimacy with another, and these
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bonds becoming the basis for the social trust necessary for community and continuity. 125 Louis
Adrian Montrose, who writes more critically of comic ideology, sees it as depicting rites of
passage such as the pursuit of self-knowledge,126 the healing of familial relationships, and the
easing of generational transitions, so as to “give a social shape, order, and sanction to personal
existence.”127 Andy Mousley re-moralizes this interpretation, rendering Shakespearean comedy
as an education in self-surrender as a means towards personal and social fulfillment: “The test
that Shakespeare’s lovers must pass in order to proceed to the happy ending of comedy is to
acknowledge their insufficient understanding of the complexities of love. And for this, humility
is required.”128 If the happiness of Shakespearean comedy is not sensually pleasurable in an
Epicurean sense, it dramatizes human flourishing in an Aristotelian sense, or at least human
sexual development in a psychoanalytic sense.
Many feminist studies of Shakespeare’s comedies—the genre as a whole, not just the
problem plays—tend to grant the Barber/Frye developmental interpretation with an emphasis on
gender disparity. Marilyn Williamson, for example, notes that male foolishness and callousness
is always forgiven in comic endings, implying “the privilege of the males to err with
impunity.”129 Marriage marks a man’s arrival and ascent in society and the end of a woman’s
power, which was at its highest during courtship.130 Mary Beth Rose also associates comic
closure with patriarchy:
Although Frye needs a corrective, it remains true that in Shakespearean romantic
comedy, much of the point is that the heroine herself comes to identify her
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interests with those of the hero; this syndrome, in fact, may be seen as the location
of the comic wish-fulfillment generated by the male perspective, including both
Frye’s and Shakespeare’s. The conservatism of Shakespearean comedy in terms
of sexual politics can best be perceived in contrast to the satiric comedies and
tragedies written by his contemporaries. 131
Rose highlights the comic heroines’ surrender of their male disguises in the cross-dressing
comedies as a voluntary loss of freedom and enforcement of “traditional sexual roles,” “thereby
allowing the play’s androgynous vision to remain spiritual and symbolic without awakening the
audience’s dissatisfaction or desire for social change.” 132 Shakespeare refuses to represent
women seeking sexual freedom, as his contemporaries Ben Jonson and Thomas Middleton did,
and instead he depicts women exercising independence and initiative temporarily so as to
ultimately submit to a man.
More recent analyses of Shakespearean comedy emphasize general social control, not
merely the regulation of female desire and behavior. Laurie Shannon argues that the maintenance
of gender hierarchy requires domination over the full spectrum of human sexual activity to
ensure procreation and social continuity: “husbandry is governance.” 133 DiGangi links gender
and sexual normativity with social and psychological development:
As a social and economic rite of passage, marriage bestowed the responsibilities
and privileges of adulthood. Shakespeare’s comedies dramatize the obstaclestrewn process by which young women transfer allegiance from paternal
households to conjugal households and by which young men advance from
domestic subordinates to householders. 134
DiGangi notes rightly that the marriages of Shakespeare’s comedies are marked and justified by
the characters’ advances in status. Their interests are served even when their passions are not.
Furthermore, it is possible to see women’s pursuit of men as resisting patriarchal authority just as
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much as submitting to it. One’s response to the conclusion of, for example, A Midsummer
Night’s Dream “largely depends on the degree of benevolence one attributes to the social
function of the early modern household and the ideological function of comedy in representing
its formation.”135
I have shown that several critics unflinchingly endorse the comic ideology. I am more
sympathetic to DiGangi and other critics for whom Shakespearean comedies create space for
reflection upon the ideology Shakespeare performatively displays. While the critics I survey
above accept the premises of the happiness the comedies depict, it is possible to explore those
premises and address their ideological contents. Kathryn Schwarz offers one of the harshest
descriptions of the ideology—that “social death serves social goals”—while maintaining that
“Shakespearean comedies expose and interrogate this embedded premise. [...] comedies that end
in marriage stage performative enquiries into the practical and ethical failure to use people
well.”136 This “practical and ethical failure” is most prominent in Measure for Measure, but even
when one feels that a Shakespearean comedy ends well, we can see how Shakespeare generates
communal consent and approval.
Shakespeare’s comedies are undoubtedly meditations on gender, sexuality, and
governance, as I will discuss further in subsequent chapters. What is missing from these
ideological critiques is an accounting of the comic conclusions as occasions for personal and
communal joy. Patriarchy may be affirmed, dissent may be silenced, and characters may be
dumbfounded, but Shakespeare consistently displays at least one woman satisfying the only need
she expresses, and frequently the community and audience are enjoined to delight in her wishfulfillment. Our interpretations and reservations are irrelevant to her experience.
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Declaring the Ending Happy
The endings of All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure help us to examine
what constitutes a “happy ending” for a Shakespearean comedy. Even if our affective response to
them differs from our response to the earlier comedies, we can still recognize common features
among the endings and attend to salient variations and divergences among them as well. The late
comedies emphasize tropes common to the comedies: the henikosexual woman receiving the
man she desires, expressions of confusion and wonder, promises of clarification, and
announcements of pleasure and joy with an invitation to the characters and the audience to
participate.
In many cases, the ending of a Shakespearean comedy advertises its own happiness and
wondrousness. Not everyone in the audience may share the feeling, but they can still recognize
the injunction to share the happiness, or at least acknowledge someone else’s. They can reflect
upon what brings them and others pleasure and how communities are formed. According to
Indira Ghose, Shakespeare’s comedies are “a project to mould the taste of the playgoers.” 137
They are told what is funny, what is joyful, and who deserves rewards and punishments. The late
comedies, with their last-scene trials, stage the acts of judgment and the formation of affective
communities reflexively. The audience may enjoy their power to decide what they enjoy but it
can also be alerted to the ways it has been manipulated into accepting what it has not questioned
or examined adequately.
As Shakespeare wrote comedy after comedy, the reflexiveness about the audience’s
position became more prominent. The titles of his comedies are initially descriptive (A Comedy
of Errors, A Midsummer Night’s Dream), character-focused (The Two Gentlemen of Verona, The
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Taming of the Shrew, The Merchant of Venice, The Merry Wives of Windsor), or judgments of
the play’s contents (Love’s Labor’s Lost, Much Ado about Nothing). The later titles refer to the
audience’s preferences (As You Like It, What You Will), and then about closure (All’s Well That
Ends Well) and judgment (Measure for Measure). The audience may have grown accustomed to
its status as customers whose pleasure is paramount. Alison Shell writes that the early modern
theater, since it was no longer religious,
maximized points of divergence from an auditor, weakening if not destroying
their edifying function. While this drama played to an audience well versed in
Christianized moral discriminations, it made outwardly directed judgmentalism
compulsory and self-examination optional. Its allurement, and for some its
danger, was that it maximized the pleasures of moralism while minimizing its
impertinences, bringing with it the freedom not to be exhorted, challenged and
changed. One can speculate—if nothing more—that this change of direction was
due to conditions of the professional theatre, which had every interest in treating
its audience members like the patrons they were. 138
Judgment without self-examination is a privilege. Shakespeare’s comedies indulge the “pleasures
of moralism” but also account for their costs. The late comedies foreground moral questions and
complicate the pleasures of moralism. These plays model acts of judgment: each feature rulers
who favor various characters while humiliating and disciplining others. These rulers insist on
their own capacity to judge according to their personal moods and preferences but need not
account for their reasoning. However, they also demonstrate that no one has “the freedom not to
be exhorted, challenged and changed,” and they provide us with a framework for evaluating the
previous comedies’ claims to happiness.
We can observe the ways that the audience is exhorted and challenged in the final 32
lines of All’s Well That Ends Well. Shakespeare provides many of the key elements of his happy
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ending; the audience’s expectations are met and the characters provide cues for how to respond
emotionally and bodily.
HELENA

BERTRAM
HELENA
LAFEW

KING

O my good lord, when I was like this maid,
I found you wondrous kind. There is your ring,
And look you, here’s your letter. This it says:
“When from my finger you can get this ring,
And [are] by me with child, etc.” This is done.
Will you be mine now you are doubly won?
If she, my liege, can make me know this clearly,
I’ll love her dearly, ever, ever dearly.
If it appear not plain and prove untrue,
Deadly divorce step between me and you!
O my dear mother, do I see you living?
Mine eyes smell onions, I shall weep anon. Good Tom
Drum, lend me a handkercher. So, I thank thee; wait on me
home, I'll make sport with thee. Let thy curtsies alone,
they are scurvy ones.
Let us from point to point this story know,
To make the even truth in pleasure flow.
[To Diana] If thou beest yet a fresh uncropped flower,
Choose thou thy husband, and I’ll pay thy dower,
For I can guess that by thy honest aid
Thou kept’st a wife herself, thyself a maid.
Of that and all the progress, more and less,
Resolvedly more leisure shall express.
All yet seems well, and if it end so meet,
The bitter past, more welcome is the sweet.

Flourish
[EPILOGUE]
The King’s a beggar, now the play is done;
All is well ended, if this suit be won,
That you express content; which we will pay,
With strife to please you, day exceeding day.
Ours be your patience then, and yours our parts;
Your gentle hands lend us, and take our hearts.
(5.3.309-340)
The repeated use of “won” by Helena (5.3.313) and the King (5.3.336) signifies the
competitiveness at the heart of this play. Characters contend for victory and thus some are
defeated. The word “won” is used several times in the play with reference to Bertram’s
attempted sexual conquest of Diana (3.7.31, 4.2.64, 4.2.65, 5.3.141), but at the end Helena
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conquers Bertram sexually and maritally. The King declares that “All is well ended, if this suit
be won”; the “if” and the ambiguity of “this” signal that Helena’s victory over Bertram is
incomplete and uncertain, as is the play’s victory over the audience. However, the King’s rapid
shift from “All yet seems well” to “All is well ended” encourages the audience to either take his
word or note that the King—who spends much of the last scene displaying pique and caprice—is
protesting too much that the play’s conclusion is cause for celebration and applause. He begs
them to approve of what they have just witnessed.
Helena predicts her own victory in the first scene of the play, when she announces her
single-minded dedication to making Bertram her husband: “my intents are fix’d, and will not
leave me” (1.1.229). As Schwarz explains, “If the social and generic tenets of All’s Well
approach syllogistic certainty, they begin with the premise of a woman’s intentional desire.” 139
Helena is the epitome of the henikosexual woman. She loves Bertram only: “My imagination /
Carries no favor in’t but Bertram’s. / I am undone, there is no living, none, / If Bertram be away”
(1.1.82-85). She can live no other life, and all her actions in the play are a means to achieving
this end. When she lies to the Countess about her motives for healing the King, she describes
herself as “her whose state is such that cannot choose / But lend and give where she is sure to
lose” (1.3.214-215). The King offers other men but she refuses them; she cannot accept a
substitute or alternative, unlike Lafew, who proclaims, “I will buy me a son-in-law in a fair”
(5.3.148) when he learns that Bertram is already married. That Helena’s desire is unwarranted is
acknowledged in the play when Bertram’s own mother twice calls him “this unworthy husband”
(3.4.26, 30). Helena herself recognizes her desire as conventional—“Who ever strove / To show
her merit, that did miss her love?” (1.1.226-227), and the audience (who may have been familiar

139

Schwarz, What You Will: Gender, Contract, and Shakespearean Social Space (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 113.

62

with the source material) can as well, but, as Anne Barton notes, Shakespeare makes Helena and
Bertram less appealing than their antecedents in Boccaccio and Painter, though he creates several
characters who side with Helena140 and thus encourage us to do the same.
Shakespeare also depicts Helena claiming divine assistance, suggesting either that God is
on her side or that she acts as if God is on her side. She professes that she can cure the King not
just because of her competence but because her father has won her God’s favor: “his good
receipt / Shall for my legacy be sanctified / By th’ luckiest stars in heaven” (1.3.244-246). She
argues to the King that heaven should be credited if she cures him: “He that of greatest works is
finisher / Oft does them by the weakest minister / [...] Of heaven, not me, make an experiment”
(2.1.136-137, 154), and after her success, she tells all the lords that “Heaven hath through me
restor’d the King to health” (2.3.64). Just as God assisted her miraculous cure of the King,
Helena’s pursuit of Bertram is blessed. The Countess refers to “her prayers, whom heaven
delights to hear / And loves to grant” (3.4.27-28), and Helena herself claims that God approves
of the bed-trick plot: “Doubt not but heaven / Hath brought me up to be your daughter’s dower, /
As it hath fated her to be my motive / And helper to a husband” (4.4.18-21). These repeated
claims can facilitate the audience’s sympathy, if not identification, with Helena; if the audience
has reservations about the match, the play suggests that God nonetheless sanctions, and possibly
ordains, it. Kirsch, following critics who accept and endorse the terms of the genre, argues that
“an ultimately beneficent Providence is a central protagonist of the play, and Helena throughout
is explicitly associated with it, acting as its instrument and agent.” 141 Why must we recognize
this force as beneficent? The audience can feel a variety of responses and acknowledge that
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variety among themselves. The play itself dramatizes the problem that people have differences of
sentiment and judgment, and that moral assessments tend to be based on feelings as well as one’s
reflections on those feelings, one’s recognition that others could feel differently.
Shakespeare accentuates Bertram’s caddishness so as to render Helena’s desire for him to
be peculiar to her. Though she acknowledges his superiority to her in social rank (“he is so above
me,” 1.1.87), she does not seem motivated by a desire for his wealth or position; if anything, it
makes her feel inferior and distant from him. She blames herself when he rejects her (3.2.99-129)
and goes so far as to pre-emptively take responsibility if he dies in war: “Whoever shoots at him,
I set him there; [...] though I kill him not, I am the cause / His death was so effected” (3.2.112,
115-116). She repeatedly submits to him: “I give / Me and my service, ever whilst I live, / Into
your guiding power” (2.3.102-104), “I am your most obedient servant” (2.5.72), “I shall not
break your bidding, good my lord” (2.5.88), and she engineers the bed-trick to use his desire for
other women as a means to entrap and regain him. She worships him: “my idolatrous fancy /
Must sanctify his reliques” (1.1.97-98), and characterizes her love for him as something lesser
aspiring towards something greater; as a consequence, as Robert Ornstein puts it, “It never seems
to occur to Helena that success in winning Bertram might depend on his feeling for her;
assuming that she is nothing to him, she never attempts to gain his affection.” 142 Her desire is
singular, inaccessible, and unstoppable. Gerard F. Gross attempts to justify Helena’s desire for
Bertram by noting his reputation for courage and gallantry (3.5.52, 78), but he still concedes that
Shakespeare deliberately made Bertram unappealing and his acceptance of Helena unconvincing:
One feels that Shakespeare has taken the standard romantic happy ending, and if
not stood it on its head, has at least abbreviated it and diluted its impact so much
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that we are forced to question whether the simple fact that hero and heroine are
united at the end is any guarantee of their achievement of happiness. 143
As I noted above, the King’s final lines echo the doubt about their happiness, but Shakespeare
here shows us that Helena’s desire for Bertram is beyond our judgment. The end of the play is
happy insofar as she is happy and we recognize her desire without reference to our own
preferences.
Bertram submits to Helena, but his final lines, promising to love Helena, are addressed to
the King. His humiliation is public, and so is his reunion and redemption. His promise is
conditional on his understanding of what has happened; he is in a state of confusion and wonder,
but he has faith that he can be instructed. Earlier in the play, he refused to marry Helena: “A poor
physician’s daughter my wife! Disdain / Rather corrupt me ever!” (2.3.115-116). Despite the
King’s entreaties, Bertram insisted, “I cannot love her, nor will strive to do’t” (2.3.145). He takes
those words back with his last lines, though his promise is brief and—unlike his professions of
love in his seduction of Diana—he has few kind words for his wife. Gross argues that Bertram’s
brevity implies greater sincerity,144 while Simon Palfrey and Tiffany Stern claim that the actor
playing Bertram would not have known which woman he was pledging love to until the first
actual performance, wherein he would have been taken aback and discomfited. It is “hard to
imagine” a part-script, they write,
that more encourages a frigid separation from the pleasures of others, or indeed
from the pleasures of theatre. Even inwardness here lies unexpressed, and
somehow unrecognized. If Bertram is “dismissed to happiness” (as Dr. Johnson
had it), then the Bertram-actor remains exactly where he is: energies unreleased,
preparations subtly embarrassed, and tricked into petrified submission. 145
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Their argument is premised upon the actor being unfamiliar with the story and, by extension, the
genre. Nonetheless, the joy of the ending is centered on Helena, and it is difficult to imagine
Bertram joining it with any sincerity. He is defeated. He is at last obeying the King, who insisted
throughout the play that he knows what was best for Bertram: “Obey our will, which travails in
thy good” (2.3.158). Just as Helena worships Bertram, the King demands Bertram’s fealty: “As
thou lov’st her, / Thy love’s to me religious; else, does err” (2.3.182-183). Bertram’s reciprocal
love for Helena is not a feeling or even a commitment to her but an acknowledgement that her
demand on him is equivalent to the King’s sovereignty over him. The play presents a woman’s
pursuit of a particular man as fixed and immutable, and the man’s submission to the woman as a
gesture of deference borne in exposure, humiliation, confusion, and exhaustion. It also indicates
that the impetuous aristocrat, burned out on attempts at martial heroism, can submit to the
authority of his King. His acceptance of Helena has political valence; it reestablishes the King’s
authority just as it grants Helena her only aspiration.
Shakespeare amplifies Helena’s victory over a man who rejects her as a result of her plots
against him and social pressures, rather than of any change in affection or moral sense within
him. It is likely that Shakespeare deliberately made Bertram’s submission to Helena
unconvincing, or at least supremely difficult for an actor to perform. Shakespeare changed the
ending from William Painter’s The Palace of Pleasure, in which Beltramo (the Bertramcharacter) was much more forthcoming:
The Countess to the great admiration of the Count, and of all those that were in
presence, rehearsed unto them in order all that which had been done, and the
whole discourse thereof. For which cause the Count knowing the things she had
spoken to be true (and perceiving her constant mind and good wit, and the two
fair young boys) to keep his promise made, and to please his subjects, and the
Ladies that made suit unto him to accept her from that time forth as his lawful
wife, and to honour her, abjected his obstinate rigour, causing her to rise up, and
embraced and kissed her, acknowledging her again for his lawful wife. And after
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he had apparelled her according to her estate, to the great pleasure and
contentation of those that were there, and of all his other friends not only that day,
but many others, he kept great cheer, and from that time forth, he loved and
honoured her, as his dear spouse and wife. 146
Painter provides what Shakespeare does not: a full recounting of what the heroine has done, and
her husband’s comprehension, acceptance, and sense of moral and political duty. Painter even
describes the psychological pressure placed upon Beltramo directly by the Ladies and indirectly
by his own need to “please his subjects,” leading to his affecting “great cheer” for the rest of his
life. Beltramo performs the role of husband, doing all of the physical and ceremonial duties, and
he performs happiness for everyone's sake. Shakespeare, however, provides his actor with two
mere lines, addressed to the King, promising love. Bertram’s use of “dearly” resonates beyond
the standard meanings of “richly,” “deeply,” and “affectionately” to “at high price or great
cost.”147 It is also possible that Shakespeare required his actor to perform submission with his
body rather than with words. The Bertram-actor could kiss the Helena-actor, touch her face and
look deeply into her eyes, get down on his knees, and so on. This would signify that such
gestures convey sincerity more than words could, since Bertram has already demonstrated that he
is not to be trusted, and Parolles (among others) has demonstrated that speech is itself suspect.
(At the end of the play, Parolles, like Edmund and Iago, refuses to speak further: “I know more
than I’ll speak. [...] I will not speak what I know,” 5.3.256, 265-266). Bertram was ensnared by
the physical acts of sexual intercourse and bestowing a ring, and his final act of submission in the
play should also be physical rather than verbal.
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The King, on the other hand, insists on his own wisdom, his position as judge, his right to
pleasure, and his freedom from the obligation to be consistent. Shakespeare affirms the authority
of the sovereign with no small amount of mockery. The King speaks on behalf of his subjects’
interests, and he implores the audience to defer to his judgment as well. The audience can follow
his lead while becoming aware of its position being analogous to his, and the play enables them
to be more self-conscious about their position than the King can be about his own. Act Five
Scene Three begins with the King claiming to “have forgiven and forgotten all / Though my
revenges were high bent upon” Bertram (5.3.9-10). Bertram not only lives and dies with the
King’s judgment, but the King can declare him “a stranger, no offender” (5.3.26), as if Bertram’s
history can be erased and his identity fashioned anew; as Lafew then says, “All that he is hath
reference to your Highness” (5.3.29). The King later warns that he can be moody and
unpredictable: “I am not a day of season / For thou mayst see a sunshine and a hail / In me at
once” (5.3.32-34). He then expresses regret in ever having trusted Bertram and laments his own
poor judgment: “My fore-past proofs, howe’er the matter fall, / Shall [tax] my fears of little
vanity, / Having vainly fear’d too little” (5.3.121-123). He reverses himself again and approves
of Helena’s reclamation. In his final words, he instructs Diana to find a husband (5.3.327-330)—
he knows what’s best for her as well—and he commands the story be retold “To make the even
truth in pleasure flow” (5.3.326). If the audience is confused or apprehensive at this moment, the
King has told them that the story will be enjoyable in their memories and retellings.
Pleasure is the King’s prerogative: other characters frequently use some version of the
common phrase “please your majesty” (2.3.68, 5.3.88, 5.3.238, 5.3.258) while the King and
others make several references to his “displeasure” (4.3.9, 4.5.75, 5.3.63, 5.3.235). Shakespeare
shows here what happens when an individual’s affective response is the measure of everyone
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else’s well-being, such that the individual determines rewards and punishments and claims full
knowledge over the community’s interests based on his own self-avowed whims. Audiences
claim this power for themselves when they see theater, and they can be annoyed when, for
example, a female protagonist loves a man who they do not. The play encourages the audience to
be reflexive about this power, how they have used it in the past, and how they have been
conditioned to find certain stories and states of affairs as happy.
If the ending of All’s Well That Ends Well is happy at all, it is because it is so hard-earned
and long-awaited. Pleasure can be manufactured as simple relief after a lengthy period of
deprivation. Shakespeare reveals the formula in Parolles’s (false) explanation for Bertram’s
refusal to consummate his marriage:
The great prerogative and rite of love,
Which, as your due, time claims, he does acknowledge,
But puts it off to a compell’d restraint;
Whose want, and whose delay, is strew’d with sweets,
Which they distill now in the curbed time,
To make the coming hour o’erflow with joy,
And pleasure drown the brim. (2.4.41-47)
Parolles shows here that he knows how a man may manipulate his own body (and the bodies of
others) to generate frustration and thus greater pleasure. Shakespeare may be experimenting in
All’s Well That Ends Well with how much frustration an audience will endure and how much of a
payoff is necessary to merit the required patience. The King acknowledges in the epilogue that
the actors have suffered as well, “With strife to please you, day exceeding day. / Ours be your
patience then” (5.3.338-339). The play’s ending may be well simply because it is an ending, and
the release following conflict and frustration can be shared between audience and performers.
The audience can also recognize how they may be manipulated by the ways the
characters onstage react to what they have seen. Whereas Painter describes the pressure placed
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upon Beltramo to accept Giletta and his place in the story, Shakespeare places similar pressure
not only on his actor but his audience. The end of All’s Well cues the audience to cry, laugh, and
applaud. Lafew sheds tears at Helena’s victory and makes humor of it: “Mine eyes smell onions,
I shall weep anon” (5.3.320). He models for the audience the emotional capacity to feel joy on
another’s behalf. Lafew has reason to be aggravated at what he has seen, since he intended
Bertram for his own daughter, but his respect for Helena enables him to appreciate her
achievement. The King also implores the audience to “express content” (5.3.337) for what it has
seen, and to exchange positions with the players; the audience can take the actors’ “parts” and be
performers themselves, responding to cues and participating in the play by reflecting on it while
letting it be what it is. The King requests that the audience feel for and with the characters as
well as the actors. Much depends on our response to Helena; as Bridget Escolme writes, “the
passionate irrationality of Helena’s love […] is essential to the play’s theatrical pleasure.” 148
Andrew Hadfield is even more sanguine: “we have no idea whether this marriage will work. On
the other hand, reading the play in a more optimistic manner, the plot proves worthwhile because
the girl ends up with the boy, which is what should happen in a romantic comedy.” 149 The ending
is happy insofar as it is happy for someone; the audience can share the joy but not set the terms.
Just as Shakespeare provides cues for the audience to enjoy Helena’s quest and interpret
it as providential, he also encourages worry and doubt. Helena’s statements about heaven’s
endorsement contradict her own early claim about her own (and all human) power: “Our
remedies oft in ourselves do lie, / Which we ascribe to heaven” (1.1.216-217). She has her own
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doubts, “my project may deceive me” (1.1.228), but after the first scene she confidently declares
her own competence and God’s favor. When she cures the King, Lafew cites the event as an
instance to be generalized against modern disbelief: “we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing
ourselves into seeming knowledge, when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear”
(2.3.3-6), but Parolles mocks this as “the rarest argument of wonder that hath shot out in our
latter times” (2.3.7-8). Lafew’s faith is informed by reading a ballad called “A showing of
heavenly effect in an earthly actor,” and this scene provides an internal audience, with divergent
responses, to the first major event of the play. One may or may not interpret the cure as
miraculous, but one can, with Parolles, recognize that such a belief in “great power, great
transcendence [...] should indeed give us a further use to be made than alone the recov’ry of the
King” (2.3.34-36). Belief in miracles opens new possibilities but also subjects one to
manipulation.
The play casts further doubt on the apparent providentialism of its plot by showing how
religious practices and concepts are instrumentalized (and even travestied) towards the secular
ends of Helena’s marriage and the King’s authority to command. Marriages are themselves
sacramental events, but the play strips it of its religious meaning. Helena marries Bertram
because she worships him: her love is “idolatrous” (1.1.97), and when she informs the Countess
of it, she deploys religious language and imagery to emphasize that she immovable, her love is
intractable and a source of suffering:
Then I confess
Here on my knee, before high heaven and you,
That before you, and next unto high heaven
I love your son. [...]
I know I love in vain, strive against hope;
Yet in this captious and intenible sieve
I still pour in the waters of my love
And lack not to lose still. Thus Indian-like,
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Religious in mine error, I adore
The sun, that looks upon his worshipper,
But knows of him no more. (1.3.191-207)
Though she confesses to “high heaven,” her love is a pagan practice, an “error,” a devotion to an
impersonal object rather than a personal God. She uses “religious” here to signify that she is
devout in the sense of being unthinkingly dedicated to something unworthy. 150 Helena uses the
language and practice of religion to highlight her helplessness before her own desire and her
sense of its futility and wrongheadedness. She asks not for assistance but for pity (1.3.213).
When Helena marries Bertram, the rite is further denuded of its meaning by being
coerced. The King demands that Bertram marry Helena against his will, and he explicitly
informs Bertram that he demands obedience; the marriage is as much about the bond between
Bertram and his King as it is between the betrothed:
Good fortune and the favor of the King
Smile upon this contract, whose ceremony
Shall seem expedient on the now-born brief
And be perform’d tonight. The solemn feast
Shall more attend upon the coming space,
Expecting absent friends. As thou lov’st her,
Thy love’s to me religious; else, does err. (2.3.177-183)
The King, as elsewhere, insists that he has everyone’s best interests in mind, though these lines
also have the quality of threats: Bertram should marry or face the King’s wrath. As Bertram
shows at the end of the play when he promises to the King that he will love Helena, the play
indicates that this marriage is a function of state power. The details of it are secondary or even
unnecessary: Bertram’s preferences, public celebration, and private consummation are all
deferred. The marriage is the King’s achievement on behalf of Helena to repay her for the
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supposed miracle she performed for him; there is nothing holy about it, though he demands
loyalty at the level of religious devotion.
The parodic deployment of religious ideas and practices accelerates in the second half of
the play. Helena pursues and recaptures Bertram by pretending to be a pilgrim, going so far as to
don the required garb; unlike Shakespeare’s other comic heroines, she does not disguise her
identity, only her intentions. In Act Three Scene Five, Helena uses her disguise to take notice of
Bertram (and comment on his attractiveness, 3.5.81), solicit intelligence about her own
reputation, and begin planning the bed-trick with the Widow and Diana, two characters whose
names have pagan associations. After the bed-trick, she fakes her own death, and her reputation
evolves such that she is thought of as a martyr or angel. A French lord tells her story as such:
“Sir, his wife some two months since fled from his house. Her pretense is a pilgrimage to Saint
Jaques le Grand; which holy undertaking with most austere sanctimony she accomplish’d; and
there residing, the tenderness of her nature became as a prey to her grief; in fine, made a groan of
her last breath, and now she sings in heaven” (4.3.46-53). The contrast between the solemn
report and the actual vulgar events is humorous, but also fully comedic in that acts of religious
observance, with their constrictions and demands of scruple, provide cover for human and
earthly pursuits. The French lord includes the detail that, since Helena could not send news of
her own death, it “was faithfully confirm’d by the rector of the place” (4.3.58-59). As in many
other comedies, a member of the clergy provides assistance in the deceptions necessary for the
romantic leads to achieve their goals. However, Helena’s language about the unshakable
intensity of her passion for Bertram, and the various deceptions she employs to entrap him,
suggest that we should not view religious devotion and the personal pursuit of marriage as a
dichotomy between restriction and freedom. Helena’s love is religious in the same sense that
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Bertram’s obedience to the King is: these characters are not making choices but rather complying
with irresistible demands.
Thus the “happy ending” of this play is further ironized by its mocking use of religious
ideas and practices. Experiences of wonder in the play, by the characters and the audience, are
either misapprehensions of theatrical phenomena or expressions of personal investment in the
meaning of an event. Things can be interpreted as spiritually or theologically meaningful but the
play does not present them as such; rather, the play presents religious language and thinking as a
way of getting people to believe or accept what is either false or questionable. For example,
Helena fakes her own death so she may appear “resurrected” in the last scene. When she enters
the stage, the King asks, “Is there no exorcist / Beguiles the truer office of mine eyes? / Is’t real
that I see?” (5.3.304-306). “Exorcist” here refers to a conjurer 151 or “illusion monger,”152 and the
King’s stupefaction is, again, a source of humor (and possible poignancy) because the audience
is aware of the ruse. However, Helena’s reply suggests that the theatrical illusion is more than a
trick, but a reflection of herself as not fully a person because she is not fully Bertram’s wife:
“No, my good lord, / ’Tis but the shadow of a wife you see, / The name, and not the thing”
(5.3.306-308). Helena’s machinations deceived the court and thus inspire them to (continue to)
view her as capable of working miracles, but she herself is not sure if she is truly alive or truly
herself. Her illusions are a means to the end of securing Bertram’s acceptance of her as his wife,
if only because he learns the lengths she will go on his behalf, and how she still desires him
despite his behavior.
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The Necessity of Marriage
The deployment of religious ideas and practices for secular ends is typical of many of
Shakespeare’s comedies, and it need not be characterized so negatively. Richard McCoy
persuasively documents the instances of “poetic faith” in Shakespeare’s work wherein
miraculous and marvelous events are understood as theatrical and literary devices yet they retain
their power to move audiences to deep feeling and intellectual reflection; they enable us to
“move beyond skeptical disbelief and delusional credulity.” 153 In particular, this faith enables
fulfillment in “imperfect human relationships,” including those between “actor and audience” as
well as between “lover and beloved.”154 If anything, All’s Well That Ends Well suggests that
relationships are imperfect, but the play also shows how theatrical miracles and the language of
providence are used to manipulate people, ratify falsehoods, silence dissent, and demand
compliance towards political authorities. The late comedies compel us to ask, “Just how
imperfect can these relationships be before we resist the means used on their behalf?”
If we turn to some of the more comic scenes of the play, we will see that All’s Well That
Ends Well instigates further doubts about the instrumentalizing of religion for the “happy” ends
of the genre. The clown Lavatch parodies the Christian rationalizations for marriage and exposes
them as uncomfortably close to the rationalizations frequently offered in defense of
Shakespearean comedy:
COUNTESS
FOOL
COUNTESS
FOOL
COUNTESS
FOOL
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Tell me thy reason why thou wilt marry.
My poor body, madam, requires it. I am driven on by the
flesh, and he must needs go that the devil drives.
Is this all your worship’s reason?
Faith, madam, I have other holy reasons, such as they are.
May the world know them?
I have been, madam, a wicked creature, as you and all flesh
and blood are, and indeed I do marry that I may repent.

McCoy, Faith in Shakespeare, 17.
Ibid., 6.
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COUNTESS

Thy marriage, sooner than thy wickedness. (1.3.27-38)

Lavatch’s claim that the “devil drives” his body towards sex and thus provides a “holy reason”
for marriage to save him from wickedness is simultaneously a mockery of Christian marriage
(Paul’s “But if they cannot abstain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn,” 1 Cor.
7:9) and a confession of his own condition. Lavatch means what he says and mocks the fact of
saying it at the same time, which is another way of understanding how spiritual matters function
in Shakespearean comedy: as simultaneously sincere and ironic.
Lavatch continues in his jest to name further justifications for marriage (and comedy): the
acceptance of human imperfection and the end of conflict for the sake of community. He refers
to the possibility of his wife committing adultery as purely to his advantage:
He that ears my land spares my team, and gives me leave to inn the crop. If I be
his cuckold, he’s my drudge. He that comforts my wife is the cherisher of my
flesh and blood; he that cherishes my flesh and blood loves my flesh and blood;
he that loves my flesh and blood is my friend: ergo, he that kisses my wife is my
friend. If men could be contented to be what they are, there were no fear in
marriage, for young Charbon the puritan and old Poysam the papist, howsome’er
their hearts are sever’d in religion, their heads are both one: they may jowl horns
together like any deer i’ th’ herd. (1.3.44-55)
Marital happiness is, for Lavatch, economy, leisure, the extension of friendship to family, selfacceptance, confessional tolerance and reconciliation, and a feeling of universal humanity. He
envisions happy marriage as genial permissiveness and lack of possessiveness of his wife. He
prioritizes owning land and saving labor, but his wife is not his commodity and he makes no
demands of her. This routine shows us that, if Lavatch is correct, then most of the marriages in
Shakespeare’s comedies—especially that of Helena and Bertram—would not be so content
because they involve profound feelings of possessiveness and attachment.
Shakespeare places this short scene between Lavatch and the Countess just before the
Countess speaks with Helena and learns of her ardent desire for Bertram so we may see the
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contrasts and connections between them. Both speak of their beloved’s friends posing a potential
problem for their relationship: Lavatch says, “I am out a’ friends, madam, and I hope to have
friends for my wive’s sake” (1.3.39-40) while Helena confesses, “My friends were poor, but
honest, so’s my love” (1.3.195). They also both evoke religion (1.3.52-54, 205) and appeal to the
Countess for approval and advice. The most striking contrast, however, is that Lavatch describes
a happy marriage of minimal feeling while Helena is all passion and misery. Andrew Hadfield
addresses the equivocal nature of this scene’s discourses on marriage:
If Helena wants to marry Bertram and Bertram does not want to marry Helena
there are only two solutions, both of which will leave at least one, possibly both,
unhappy: they either marry or they do not. The clown describes what looks like
the opposing case when a marriage partner loves someone else and all parties
simply have to make the best of an unhappy situation. Perhaps the real moral of
this scene, one that overshadows the action of the play, is that there is no right
solution when parties who have to be together cannot agree what to do and want
opposing things. Not everyone can have what they want and the best solution is
probably to compromise—but at what cost? 155
All’s Well That Ends Well proposes that the happiness Helena seeks is not the happiness of the
ending of conflict or the granting of freedom to be oneself, but rather a form of devotion that also
functions as ownership. The cost is whatever it will be for she and Bertram to be married to one
another.
I have argued that Helena’s overriding concern is marrying Bertram, and that all of her
actions in the play contribute to her achievement of that end. It is notable that she forms alliances
with other women—the Countess, the Widow, and Diana—in her pursuit of this goal. Helena’s
desire to marry Bertram may or may not be driven by sexual desire; Julie Crawford makes an
interesting argument that Helena is at least as driven by socioeconomic ambition and forming
bonds with other women as she is marrying Bertram, and therefore the critical emphasis on the
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heterosexual teleology of Shakespearean comedy—a literature to which this dissertation is a
contribution—is misplaced. Crawford notes that women can retain bonds after one or more of
them marry, and they form bonds along the way that cannot be fully articulated or expressed but
“give us a hint of the possibilities the play imagines in these semi-articulated and formally
unaccounted-for bonds that are so central to its plot.”156 Crawford further argues that Helena’s
gift of money to Diana for her dowry could even be a way of securing Diana’s financial
independence, and it could
forge networks of female support and community. [...] The marriage that ends the
play is not the single-minded triumph of heterosexuality critics so often strain to
see it as. Indeed, this strained insistence exposes the work it takes not only to
script a heterosexual telos for human sexuality and for the genre of comedy but
also to make them map so tidily onto one another. 157
I agree that the play demonstrates that heterosexual marriage is difficult, particularly when the
protagonist is a non-noble woman who loves a noble man and no one else. All’s Well is further
notable because it contains a young female character who is not betrothed at the end of the play;
Diana, as her name indicates, is dedicated to virginity:
My chastity’s the jewel of our house,
Bequeathed down from many ancestors,
Which were the greatest obloquy i’ th’ world
In me to lose. (4.2.46-49)
Unlike Isabella in Measure for Measure, no one proposes to her. (Shakespeare could have ended
the play with Parolles, for example, proposing to her, a possibility with high comic potential that
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could also suggest moral reform for his character.) Nonetheless, as I quoted above, Helena
defines her relationship with Diana as one of mutual support towards each securing a husband,
and as such ordained by God (4.4.18-21). If Helena and Diana forge some kind of bond, it is not
acknowledged at the end of the play; Helena enters the stage just after Diana’s final speech and
never addresses her, though she refers to “this maid” (5.3.309) when speaking to Bertram about
the bed-trick. The play ends with the King ordering Diana to find a husband (5.3.328), promising
her that he will pay the dowry. The King’s claim to Diana isn’t openly opposed or endorsed,
however, and it is possible to imagine Diana and Helena being friends (or more) after the end of
the play, just as it is possible, for example, to imagine a relationship between Viola and Olivia in
Twelfth Night.
On the other hand, what Crawford’s argument suggests about All’s Well That Ends Well
is that the play may not be about erotic attraction at all but rather about Helena, Diana, and the
Countess wanting sisterly-familial-friendly comfort together with all the advantages of wealth
and social position, with Bertram used as a means to that end. His male freedom is a threat to
their desire for status and community, and so they trick him so they can get the lives they want.
What does this show about the genre’s depiction of sex and marriage? Since the promise if not
the enactment of marriage is so central to comedy, particularly in its insistence that the
henikosexual woman—the woman with one desire for one man—marry the man of her choosing,
then it is possible to view Shakespeare’s comedies as having little to do with eros in itself. Joel
Fineman claims that
Shakespearean desire […] requires the loss of presence in order to motivate its
yearning. The comedies cannot admit such loss into themselves without thereby
transgressing the logic and psychologic of their genre. This is why, for all the
bawdy puns, Shakespearean comedy is presexual. It is not simply that the comic
marriages are consummated after the conclusion of the play. Rather, desire is
structurally foreign to comedy, inadmissible within it, because, being built up out
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of a constitutive rupture, its presences forecloses the possibility of “oneness.” The
eroticism of Shakespearean comedy is in this way always promissory: the comic
play is always foreplay, titillating but unresolved.158
It is essential that consummation cannot be represented; the bed-tricks, literally “obscene,” occur
offstage. Since sexual union is promised at the end of Shakespeare’s comedies—I will note in
Chapter Five how many of them include a character enjoining the couples “to bed”—the genre
privileges fulfillment over desire. All’s Well That Ends Well stages the victory of a woman who
wants marriage over a man who wants sex: his desire makes him subject to manipulation.
As I will discuss with reference to Shakespeare’s other comedies, the heroines’ motives
vary and are not always clear. In Measure for Measure, Julietta confesses that the sex between
herself and Claudio “was mutually committed” (2.3.27), but we do not know, however, why
Mariana loves Angelo. She has little beyond her home and her Boy when we see her—no family,
no money, no friend aside from the Duke, and a socially blotted name. She may or may not feel
sexual desire for Angelo, but she knows that sex with Angelo will make him her husband, which
is all she professes to want. Perhaps Mariana is not erotic so much as acquisitive, which makes
her a better match for Angelo than we may otherwise think.
We also do not know, to name another example, if in Twelfth Night Viola’s desire for
Orsino is motivated by something more than an ambition for status (she speculates about his
marital status before she sees him, 1.2.28-29), though we do know that Olivia’s desire for Viola
as “Cesario” is thoroughly sexual. In As You Like It, Rosalind’s desire for Orlando is probably
sexual—she sees him wrestling and he wins, and she pines for him—and the love between Celia
and Oliver has nothing to do with status or wealth but rather with renouncing them. Beatrice in
Much Ado about Nothing is often portrayed as having sexual chemistry with Benedick, but Hero
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is opaque. Portia in The Merchant of Venice plays a trick on her husband so as to make a claim
that she has the right to “have that doctor for [my] bedfellow” (5.1.233), the doctor being her
male alter ego.
Nonetheless, even if we follow Ejner Jensen’s model and focus more on pleasurable and
promising episodes in the comedies rather than their conclusions, it remains the case that in
Shakespeare’s comedies, heterosexual pairing is consistently affirmed and performed; it must be
the “official” arrangement even if, for example, Bassanio and Antonio maintain a relationship
after the end of The Merchant of Venice, or if a production of Twelfth Night ends with Viola and
Olivia exchanging looks of longing. If same-sex affective bonds and networks of community can
only be facilitated or maintained by the institution of heterosexual marriage, however much that
institution is the subject of ironic mockery or revealed to be based on fragile assumptions, then
heterosexual marriage is still presented as a necessity, and Shakespearean comedy stages that
necessity. Marriage authorizes various forms of human desire: for sex, ambition, friendship,
community, children, social acceptance, personal growth, and so on, and Shakespeare
demonstrates how the end of marriage can justify or excuse whatever was necessary to achieve
it. Shakespeare’s comedies do not convey the “triumph of heterosexuality” itself but the
necessity of the social appearance of heterosexuality and its public affirmation. The characters
require heterosexual marriage in order to obtain whatever else they may want.

The Argument of Wonder and the Deferral of Explanation
One’s enjoyment of All’s Well That Ends Well is conditioned on one’s acceptance of its
“argument of wonder.” Lafew and Parolles are risible for different reasons, and Shakespeare
provides another instance for the audience to meditate on their own participation in the play’s
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world. As Dennis Kay explains, “Helena’s magic, just like Prospero’s, is shown finally to draw
its power from the assent and goodwill of the beholders. The play’s conclusion is thus
simultaneously final, resolving the action, and the inception of a process that will release the
‘even truth’ to flow in pleasure.”159 One’s response to the play affects one’s response to the
world. Pleasure is available, but at a cost. The audience is in this instance in a similar position to
Bertram, who is tricked and manipulated specifically by way of his insistence on his own
prerogative and pursuit of personal pleasure. As David Bevington observes,
Bertram, tricked by a miracle that is illusory in the same way that theater itself is
illusion, must turn true believer and take to his heart the Helena who is what she
has been all along, miracle worker and clap-trap magician (like Rosalind in As
You Like It). The magic of the play’s final scene depends most of all on the
coalescing in Helena of the seemingly disparate halves of any theatrical
experience, disbelief and willing suspension of that disbelief. 160
The play’s conclusion is happy and joyful, the source of communal bonding, only if the audience
grants Helena’s claims about her own desire and agency and sides with her as the authoritative
forces of King and God do. The King’s promise of “truth in pleasure” is therefore tantalizing as
well as suspect. To share the joy, the audience must suspend their judgment of Bertram while
identifying with his position in the play.
The final moments of All’s Well That Ends Well feature a common occurrence in
Shakespeare’s comedies: an expression of wonder at a seemingly miraculous event, followed by
a promise to explain. The King assures all who listen, “all the progress, more and less, /
Resolvedly more leisure shall express” (5.3.331-332). The deferred explanation is, like the
henikosexual woman, an underappreciated staple of the genre. It is another way to command
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assent from characters in the play whose desire for knowledge, like the desire for pleasure, leads
them to seek membership in community. Their position as non-knowers makes them deferential
and humble, and the as-yet-unfulfilled promise fosters a sense of continuity after the play ends.
The audience can imagine what the characters are doing: feasting, possibly preparing for bed, but
also listening and learning, marveling at the coincidences and possibly laughing at and/or being
ashamed of their own ignorance. The ending is happy for the characters insofar as they will come
to understand what has transpired—they will not be left in the dark—but the knowledge they
gain will be private. The audience may feel it already understands what it has seen, but it is not
given access to the debriefing promised to the characters who, it must be said, cease to exist after
the end of the play.
As I have already discussed above, in Painter’s “Giletta of Narbonne,” Beltramo received
a full explanation of the tricks his wife played on him, and this led to his acceptance of her and
his “great cheer” for his subjects thereafter. Shakespeare, however, changes the end of the story
to make it more consistent with his comedic practice: Bertram requests for his wife to “make me
know this clearly” (5.3.314-315), and his promise to love her is conditioned on her satisfying his
curiosity. The King, who moments earlier was shocked to find Helena alive and doubted his own
perceptions (“Is there no exorcist / Beguiles the truer office of mine eyes? / Is’t real that I see?”
5.3.304-306), begins immediately to guess what happened and wants to plan for Diana’s future;
he asserts his authority and claims to be able to discern what has been hidden from him. Bertram,
however, trusts Helena’s capacity and willingness to reveal the mystery and help him
understand. His last lines are a conditional offering of trust and exchange, and an expression of
desire to know what his wife knows, specifically, how she has manipulated him.
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Bertram wants to know what happened but he does not ask why. He is, as Ornstein
characterizes him, “the least philosophical and perhaps the least intelligent of the heroes of the
comedies. He does not reflect on his experiences, much less on life, and he seems incapable of
introspection and self knowledge.” 161 He is comfortable in his ignorance. When Diana tricks him
into giving his ring to Helena, she promises to explain later: “My reasons are most strong, and
you shall know them / When back again this ring shall be deliver’d” (4.2.59-60). At this point in
the play, Bertram is uninterested in knowledge or sense-making. He fights in a war with no clear
rationale (Shakespeare begins Act Three Scene One immediately after the reasons for the war
have been stated) and he is easily duped because, as the Widow tells Diana, men his age are
predictable: “My mother told me just how he would woo, / As if she sate in ’s heart. She says all
men / Have the like oaths” (4.2.69-71). Helena sees Bertram as a “star” (1.1.91, 1.1.183) but he
is a typical man. Bertram just wants to know Diana’s body, and he instead knows Helena’s body
without knowing it. His ignorance, ironically, provides him with pleasures that may serve his
good, and he learns to defer to his wife’s superior knowledge. The comic phenomenon of the
deferred explanation is Shakespeare’s dramatization of the way the desire to understand forges
communities and restructures hierarchies. Helena began the play worshipping Bertram, and after
the play she will tell him all the ways she fooled him. Bertram does not analyze; he learns to
accept what she gives him.
Shakespeare defers explanations to end the play and to keep the play alive in the minds of
theatergoers. If the ending is happy, its happiness may be experienced again in the
reconstruction; the audience can model itself after the play’s characters who are themselves
divided among the knowers and the wonderers. Shakespeare instructs his audience to retell and
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interpret, and to ask questions about what does not compute or cohere. Robert Weimann
speculates that in Shakespeare’s epilogues, the actor draws attention to his status as an actor; he
releases the character and provokes the audience to remember the play, continue the
conversation, and make the play real in their lives and their world. He writes,
As the theater was in the last instance confronted with the terms and duration of
its own purpose and validity, the question was not only how to forestall an abrupt
suspension of dramatic representations but, rather, how to retain at least a portion
of what pleasure, insight, knowledge, vision, excitement, and satisfaction the
performance had amounted to. [...] The strategy was to stimulate both the
audience’s involvement and detachment, their readiness, as the conclusion to
Romeo and Juliet has it, not to go hence without having “more talk of these sad
things” (5.3.306).162
Weimann, following Dennis Kay, argues that Shakespeare’s endings are incomplete on purpose
so the audience can complete them and recapitulate them; the play can be a continuing source of
pleasure and excitement for those who enjoyed the play upon first viewing. Those who
disapprove or who otherwise did not enjoy the play know they must have missed something and
can be excluded from the affective community, attempt to join it by trying again and responding
to the play’s cues, or—like the characters in the comedies themselves—prioritize the happiness
of others. All’s Well That Ends Well demonstrates that a happy ending functions as the
foundation of an affective community, one that requires a suspension not only of belief but
judgment.
Finally, it is possible that an unhappy ending is simply not happy yet because we have
not become people for whom it could be happy. The audience can try to acclimate itself to the
ending, or think about why they prefer the earlier comedies. The disjunction between
Shakespeare’s values and our own can be an occasion for our complaint and criticism, or an
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injunction for us to modify our perspective until the play becomes enjoyable. Lars Engle
documents the history of responses to Helena, whose energy and dedication disappointed and
repelled audiences until recently: “These characteristics in Helena please audiences now, and
they fit twenty-first-century norms of female agency without enormous dissonance, but these are
norms which have altered quite substantially in the past four or five decades, and have altered
enormously in the past four hundred years.”163 Shakespeare’s late comedies facilitate reflexivity
about the relationship between pleasure and norms.
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Chapter Two
Measure for Measure’s Anatomy of Happiness

Measure for Measure takes up the question of the relationship between happiness and
judgment directly. It provides a full taxonomy of the markers for Shakespearean comedy
outlined in my Introduction: the plot and the society within the play favor what I call the
henikosexual woman (i.e., a woman who desires marriage with a specific man), characters
uninterested in marriage are pressured into it, social problems are ameliorated, Christianity is
instrumentalized, offensive characters are abused, deception achieves comic ends, death is
threatened but averted, the sovereign’s power is reinforced, explanations are deferred, and the
ending is pronounced as an occasion for joy. In this chapter and the next I will focus on the
deployment of these characteristics in Measure for Measure and the ways they lead to the comic
“happy ending” even if they fail to generate positive affective responses from the characters and
audience. I will also address some of the political and metatheatrical implications of the play’s
dramaturgy, particularly the ways that the Duke’s insistence on his own “pleasure” mirrors that
of the audience. The ways that Measure for Measure engages with and provokes reflections
about the elements of Shakespearean comedy is bound up with the play’s depiction of the Duke’s
power. The play suggests that when comedy does not have Greenblatt’s “apparently
improvisational expression of a collective desire,”164 then comic plots and the comic world
become coercive, even tyrannical.
All’s Well That Ends Well focuses specifically on the quest of the henikosexual woman to
marry and keep her husband. I argued in my previous chapter that with that play Shakespeare
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prompts his audience to reflect upon Helena as an exaggerated version of a character-type
common to his comedies. In Measure for Measure, Mariana—and, to a lesser extent, Julietta—
embody this type, but they are minor characters; the play’s main female character, Isabella, is
distinctive among Shakespeare’s heroines for her interest in consecrated celibate life. In
Measure, Shakespeare presents the dramatic machinery required for the henikosexual woman to
achieve her goal if she does not accomplish it herself. Duke Vincentio and Isabella assist
Mariana and Julietta and the play suggests a reordering (and, as I will later argue, a
normativizing) of the society around such women’s interests.
Measure for Measure extends the premise of All’s Well That Ends Well that his comedies
are, to varying degrees, preoccupied with the struggles and success of the henikosexual
woman.165 Measure for Measure politicizes this idea by reversing the level of agency between
the woman and her ruler. In All’s Well, the woman takes charge of her own story, with her King
as her supporter and witness; in Measure, the Duke controls the story, while the woman is his
accomplice and witness. Measure also has four marriages, while All’s Well has only one;
Measure is therefore concerned with generalizing and normativizing the comic drive towards
marriage. Helena’s actions in All’s Well have little lasting effect on anyone other than herself,
her husband, and the King, but the Duke’s actions in Measure affect his entire city. Measure for
Measure raises several questions about the world created at the end of a Shakespearean comedy.
What if all the obstacles to marriage, including a man’s unwillingness, were cleared away? What
if marriage were demanded of people rather than letting them be celibate or promiscuous (or
165
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monogamous but unmarried)? What if certain women’s welfare were promoted over everyone
else’s? What if their sovereign told his subjects that all this is for their good and that he derived
pleasure from it? What if there is no justification for the ending offered at all beyond the
sovereign’s pleasure and his unsubstantiated claims that all will benefit? What if the audience
were given no cues about how to respond to what they have seen? In this chapter I will clarify
Measure for Measure’s relationship to its genre by attending to its discourses of happiness and
pleasure, arguing that they are inseparable from acts of domination and arbitrary (or, at least,
unjustified) favoring of one character and way of life over others. I will for the most part make
my argument via a close reading of the play. In addition, I will clarify the play’s position on
sexuality, particular the norm of heterosexual marriage. I will argue that the play’s treatment of
Isabella, a major point of disagreement among critics, is best understood as a comment on the
genre and the expectations it fosters among audiences.

Measure for Measure as Anti-Comedy
It is a critical commonplace that in Measure for Measure Shakespeare expresses
discontent with his own genre: in Ronald R. Macdonald’s words, the playwright was “simply
becoming impatient with comedy,”166 showing its limitations and the disturbing implications
beneath its veneer of happiness, renewal, and festive deflation. Robert N. Watson notes,
“Whether or not we accept the pseudobiographical impression that Shakespeare here vandalizes
his own comic form in deference to the great tragedies he had recently begun to write, we can
hardly deny the inadequacies of the comic resolution of Measure for Measure, the darkness it
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fails to dispel.”167 For many, Measure for Measure elicits the questions, “Who would write such
a play? Why adapt such a story to the comic form? Couldn’t he have changed certain details?”
Allegorical interpretations168 may or may not make intellectual sense but fail to assuage the
emotional unrest the play often causes. Claims of the corrupting influence of a collaborator (such
as Thomas Middleton169) or “revising botcher”170 assume that one cannot make sense of this
play, so someone must have interfered with Shakespeare’s “vision.” But I cannot agree with
those who say that Shakespeare was working beneath his powers or too much in the tragic mind
while writing his last comedies. To call a play a failure is (often) to ignore its challenges.
Measure for Measure may not have the structural integrity of, say, Much Ado about Nothing, The
Merchant of Venice, or Twelfth Night, but to read any of those plays after Measure can stimulate
difficult questions about pat endings, the necessity of cruelty to outsiders, and the tyranny of sex,
in addition to the difficult questions each play raises on its own.
Numerous critics assert that Shakespeare turns against comedy itself. Kenneth Gross
suggests that it seems as if “the playwright himself grew disgusted with the dramatic machinery
he deploys so ruthlessly.”171 Clifford Leech proposes that the ending of the play, particularly
Isabella’s silence, may be the result of a
corrupted text or a strange heedlessness of the author […]. In Measure for
Measure we have a morality-framework, much incidental satire, a deep probing
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into the springs of action, a passionate sympathy with the unfortunate and the
hard-pressed. Only if we concentrate our attention on one of these aspects will the
play leave us content.172
Leech’s language of failing to be “content” mirrors other critics’ frequent use of images of
discomfort, such as Alexander Leggatt’s reference to the “comedy’s self-questioning uneasiness
about its own procedures.”173 A. P. Riemer claims that the play is “a technical exercise—an
experiment in exploring how far a comedy is able to tolerate emphasis on brutality, greed,
lasciviousness, and on the complicated means of arriving at the anticipated happy ending,
without shattering the mold of comic conventions.” 174 Vivian Thomas asserts that the ending is
deliberately unreal and shows us that such a regulated world suffocates life. 175 These critics are
generally correct, though they do not follow their ideas to the end. What does Shakespeare
demonstrate about the genre with which he had so many successes by writing this play?
For some critics, Shakespeare’s turn against his own conventions mirrors the play’s plea
for “equity.”176 Strictness in any form is opposed to life and cannot accommodate the varied
particulars of human existence. For example, Jean Howard posits, “in Measure for Measure
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Shakespeare self-consciously examined the negative consequences of a reliance upon convention
both for a playwright attempting to articulate an altered vision of reality and for an audience
attempting to assimilate that vision.”177 The problematic parts of the play “are deliberate and
self-conscious deformations of comic convention which serve to test the adequacy of those
conventions to create a convincing mimesis of real life”; the Duke especially “functions to reveal
the insufficiencies of overly schematic, conventionalized art to capture the complexity of life.” 178
We become aware of the genre and thus can reflect upon it. Heather Dubrow notes, “it is by
overturning our generic expectations that a writer can induce in his reader a series of intellectual
reflections and emotional experiences very like those being enacted in and by the work itself.” 179
Camille Wells Slights makes the clearest statement about the implicit politics of the form:
“changes of heart and voluntary relinquishments of power endorse hierarchical structures by
representing them as capable of benign adjustment and reinterpretation.” 180 Though this suggests
a conservative, or at least counter-revolutionary ideology, “Shakespeare’s comedies
acknowledge that arbitrary social structures, the duplicity of language, and the incompatibility
and inconstancy of human purposes and desires make the project of living together complex and
difficult.”181 The comedies make suggestions about how people could live together, and bring to
life fantasies about possibilities for communal and personal fulfillment. The late comedies raise
questions about such possibilities, and Measure for Measure represents what might be required
to institute and maintain a community focused on marriage and concord.
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Northrop Frye insists that the emotional response one has to comedy is ancillary: “A
comedy is not a play which ends happily: it is a play in which a certain structure is present and
works through to its own logical end, whether we or the cast or the author feel happy about it or
not.”182 This may be true of classical comedies and Shakespeare’s predecessors and successors,
but as I demonstrated about All’s Well That Ends Well and I will demonstrate about some of
Shakespeare’s other comedies, a figure of authority often insists that the other characters in the
play—and, by extension, the audience—be happy with its conclusions. They should feel relief at
the averted disasters and joyous for the people whose wishes are fulfilled. As Tom McBride
writes about Measure, “In intervening, the Duke should want to help Angelo become a man who
practices self-control not in the letter of stern duty but in the spirit of happy inclination. The
same goes for Isabella.”183 They are encouraged to be happy, but they are required to obey, and
they both fall silent. Neither of them wants to love, and neither is taught to love.
I contend that the discomfort aroused by Measure for Measure derives not just from the
events within it but also from the Duke’s persistent claims that his actions should stimulate
approval and contentment. He maintains that no justification is necessary and all should trust his
judgment as he directs their lives. The audience may have mixed feelings about the proceedings,
but the comic conclusion is similar to other comedies such that one’s moral judgment and
aesthetic enjoyment fall into an unfamiliar tension, enabling one to become suspicious of the
moral underpinnings of the genre itself. As Wylie Sypher observes, “the structure of the comedy
becomes thematic,”184 making the audience more aware of its latent tendencies and ideological
content. Sypher argues that this is atypical:
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The comic equilibrium is always being upset by the moral displacements—or else
the moral equilibrium by the comic displacements. There is no better evidence of
the structural instability of this comedy, which so far as it is comic is immoral,
and so far as it is moral (according to its own definitions) is not comic. This kind
of fissure between “comedy” and “morality” does not open in the earlier and later
plays.185
Sypher may be correct about many of the other comedies, in which the structure and the moral
content reinforce one another. However, whatever is morally questionable in Measure for
Measure serves the same ends as the other comedies. In this chapter and the next two, I will
unearth the moral and structural content of the play so that I may, in Chapter Five, demonstrate
its consistency with the comedies that precede it.
Measure for Measure makes explicit what is implicit in the other plays; since it wears its
moral concerns on its sleeve, we do not know how to judge it. It points to the difficulties of
living in community and discerning which forms of behavior are to be encouraged or tolerated.
Katharine Eisaman Maus asserts that Measure posits simultaneously that people are
fundamentally alien to one another while being fundamentally the same, and thus provokes us to
contemplate what we routinely assume about our personal and communal preferences, including
what we claim to enjoy from a Shakespearean comedy: “Members of audiences, like characters,
can generate an infinite variety of interpretive options. On the other hand, social life seems to
demand, despite this individualism, a fund of consensually accepted principles and a sense of
shared human lot.”186 David Scott Kastan similarly claims that the play struggles to endorse
some kind of communitarian tolerance:
To whatever degree it is capable of achieving a happy ending, Measure for
Measure depends on recognizing and rehabilitating our compromised
commitments, not to the doctrines of any Church but to one another. [...] The
comedy itself, if that is what Measure for Measure is, demands, as Mariana
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suggests in her psychologically implausible love of Angelo, only our belief in the
possibility of a happy ending “moulded out of faults” (5.1.439). 187
I agree with Kastan that Mariana’s “psychologically implausible love of Angelo” is central to the
play’s identity as a comedy. However, I dispute these humanistic interpretations by examining
how Shakespeare emphasizes the arbitrariness of what comedies prioritize and the coercion
deployed to generate the “happy ending.” The play frustrates our feelings and moral intuitions,
revealing our prejudices. It presents much of what we enjoy in previous comedies as demands,
exposing the manipulations necessary to secure the comic ending. It argues that we need to be
governed and our emotions need to be tutored. It interrogates the tacit “consensually accepted
principles” upon which comedies operate.

Mariana’s Happy Ending
Measure for Measure contains mixed signals about happiness within the play itself. As
Marjorie Garber notes, “happiness” in Shakespeare often refers to chance or luck. 188 The happy
events and endings of comedies testify to the randomness as well as the fortuitousness of events.
Comedies often bracket moral judgments because they depict people being lucky and unlucky;
their fates are not tied to their actions so much as their needs. For example, The Comedy of
Errors and Twelfth Night, both deeply influenced by Roman comedy, depict a string of
coincidences that, in the end, foster a sense of a blessed order of things that the characters within
the play acknowledge but that no one earned. The plot of Measure for Measure, however, is
entirely engineered by Duke Vincentio (who may or may not be improvising) and therefore the
potential happiness of the play, particularly its conclusion, is subverted by the unclear intentions
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of its driving force. Measure draws our attention to the unappreciated fact that our enjoyment of
a comedy is somehow premised upon our desire to watch people have good fortune and receive
better than what they deserve. Even if the Duke’s intentions and results are benevolent, his heavy
hand and access to his subjects’ private lives is discomfiting. The play addresses these questions
directly in Isabella’s speeches about “proud man, / Dress’d in a little brief authority” (2.2.117118) usurping God’s powers by judging and controlling other human beings. Measure for
Measure, like All’s Well That Ends Well, may be less pleasurable because the active character in
it has too much power, implying that “happiness” as a feeling of contentment and an experience
of good fortune may be mutually dependent. Comedies are supposed to depict people with
limited powers experiencing favorable consequences. The powerlessness and the luck are just as
essential as the results themselves.
Shakespeare’s use of the word “happy” and its synonyms is instructive. Some version of
the word “happy” occurs nine times in Measure for Measure: Escalus wishes the Duke happy on
his travels (1.1.74); Claudio refers to Julietta’s pregnancy “unhappily” (1.2.156); Lucio calls
Claudio “unhappy” (1.4.20), and Isabella asks why (1.4.21); in the Duke’s “be absolute for
death” speech he tells Claudio that man is not happy (3.1.21) because of his restless desire; the
Provost wonders if “Friar Lodowick” can save Claudio and uses “happily” to probably mean
“perhaps” (4.2.95); Isabella calls Claudio “unhappy” again (4.3.121), almost as an epithet;
Angelo and Escalus refer to the Duke’s return as “happy” (5.1.3); and, the Duke refers to the
reportedly dead Claudio as finally “happy” (5.1.399).189 I will examine some of these instances
189
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in greater detail as I proceed, but this brief survey indicates that the Duke is the only happy
character and the source of others’ happiness, while he himself maintains that Claudio can only
be happy if he is dead. With the exception of the convenient death of Ragozine—which is to the
Duke’s benefit as well as Claudio’s—no one in the play is fortunate as such; everyone’s fate is in
the hands of other human beings, not the benevolent force that usually guides the action of a
Shakespearean comedy. Measure for Measure is a comedy only because the Duke begins to
make it one halfway through the play, when he introduces Mariana and rearranges his plans to
benefit her.190
The Duke’s favoring of Mariana is clear not only in his plotting but in his final address to
her and her husband: “Joy to you, Mariana! Love her, Angelo!” (5.1.526). 191 She is the only
character to whom the Duke wishes joy, and his command to Angelo to love her is his second;
when the Duke pardons Angelo, he observes that Angelo does not deserve Mariana and, in fact,
he is being rewarded gratuitously for his bad acts: “Well, Angelo, your evil quits you well. /
Look that you love your wife; her worth worth yours” (5.1.496-497). Angelo’s reprieve and the
possible improvement of his character are entirely for Mariana’s sake.
The word “joy” is used two other times in Measure for Measure; significantly, one of
them is Julietta’s reply to the charge of “Friar Lodowick” to repent of the sins of fornication,
tempting a man to fornication, and seeking repentance not from love of God but fear of
damnation: “I do repent me as it is an evil, / And take the shame with joy” (2.3.35-36). Mariana
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could mean here that she has achieved a kind of self-knowledge in her confession, an
acknowledgement of her own vice, and thus she is comforted by the prospect of redemption,
though her lines can also be read as a defiant defense of her sexual identity or a refusal to engage
in the self-negating brooding to which Angelo and Claudio are given. Julietta, like Mariana,
wants little more than marital life, and thus both characters are capable of a happiness
unavailable to most other characters in the play.
The play’s other reference to joy is an allusion to sex. Lucio answers Claudio’s request to
find Isabella and ask her to plead on his behalf with “I pray she may; as well for the
encouragement of the like, which else would stand under grievous imposition, as for the enjoying
of thy life, who I would be sorry should be thus foolishly lost at a game of tick-tack” (1.2.187191). Lucio’s characterization of sex as “the enjoying of thy life” and a game played at leisure is
of a piece with most of the play’s uses of the word “merry.” Angelo accuses Isabella of having
“prov’d the sliding of your brother / A merriment than a vice” (2.4.115-116), and Pompey
laments, “’Twas never merry world since of two usuries the merriest was put down” (3.2.5-6).
These usages suggest a tension between the view of happiness as sex and the freedom to have it
as one pleases (whether with a spouse, a betrothed, or prostitutes) and the Duke’s stated view
when he attempts to console Claudio, “Happy thou art not, / For what thou hast not, still thou
striv’st to get, / And what thou hast, forget’st” (3.1.21-23). This tension can be resolved from a
view of the play as a whole: happiness is only possible in the world of Measure for Measure if
one wants sex and has regular access to it. Angelo and the Duke may bring an end to the
merriment of Pompey and Lucio but the Duke enables the joy of Julietta and Mariana. Happiness
in a comedy is grounded primarily in the interests of the henikosexual woman.
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The play further indicates that happiness is available to others by sympathizing with such
women. The Duke provides the model for such sympathy. Escalus testifies to the Duke’s
character.
DUKE [as Friar]
ESCALUS
DUKE [as Friar]
ESCALUS

I pray you, sir, of what disposition was the Duke?
One that, above all other strifes, contended especially to
know himself.
What pleasure was he given to?
Rather rejoicing to see another merry, than merry at any
thing which profess’d to make him rejoice; a gentleman of
all temperance. (3.2.230-237)

Escalus’s references to “strifes” and “contentions” demonstrate that the Duke is both selfabsorbed and generous. His concern with his own soul and mind led him to neglect his political
duties—possibly choosing to let his people be “merry” by pursuing sexual pleasure on their own
terms—and his subsequent behavior represents a change in tactics but not values. The Duke
wants his people to be merry, and his efforts in the play show that he thinks this is best achieved
through the promotion of marriage over prostitution and celibacy. Marriage thus becomes a form
of mandatory joy.
Though the Duke’s actions advocate on behalf of Mariana, and marriage in general, he
speaks on behalf of happiness as freedom from restless desire and the fear of death. Both Isabella
and Angelo echo the sentiment in their stated preferences for death over what would be to them
an unacceptable life. Isabella claims “I had rather give my body than my soul” (2.4.56) and she
would rather “strip myself to death [...] ere I’ld yield / My body up to shame” (2.4.102-104) in
response to Angelo’s propositions. At the end of the play, Angelo requests capital punishment
for his crimes: “let my trial be mine own confession. / Immediate sentence then, and sequent
death, / Is all the grace I beg” (5.1.372-374). Their deep capacity for shame indicates that
happiness, if it may be called such, is equivalent to honor; this is why Isabella assumes her
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brother would prefer his death to her rape. But this view of happiness is undermined and
defeated in Measure for Measure by the comic ideology of marriage, humility, and deference to
authority.

Prioritizing Henikosexuality
The presence of Mariana makes Measure for Measure into a Shakespearean comedy it
itself, but her plotline also provides a means to save Claudio and Julietta from death, Isabella
from being raped, and Angelo from being a rapist. Before she is introduced, the play seems to be
set up to be either a tragedy in which several people die or a comedy in which, as in two of the
principal sources for the play, the story of Epitia from Giraldi Cinthio’s Hecatommithi and
George Whetstone’s Promos and Cassandra, a woman is compelled to marry her rapist.
Shakespeare avoids this medieval plot convention by creating Mariana. She and the Duke are
Shakespeare’s primary innovations on his source material. The play becomes a comedy
specifically via the introduction of a woman who desires marriage with a particular man and has
no other goals or purposes. Helena in All’s Well That Ends Well is the exemplar of the type, but
Shakespeare shows in Measure that the henikosexual woman’s success is the essential feature of
his comedies, even if the character is minor and emerges only in Act Four.
The other henikosexual woman in the play, Julietta, also has her desires fulfilled; she is
brought onstage in the last moments of the play (just over fifty lines from the end) with Claudio,
and she has no lines. She enters the stage with Claudio; Shakespeare does not even provide a
scene wherein she learns that Claudio is alive. Her only stated purpose is satisfied: she and her
husband and their unborn child will live. The Duke provides this for her but does not even
acknowledge her. Like many of Shakespeare’s comic women, she ceases speech when her future
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is secured; he does not even grant her lines about being freed from jail. The Duke acknowledges
that Claudio will soon be his brother (5.1.493) and tells him, “She, Claudio, that you wrong’d,
look you restore” (5.1.525). He reverses his position from when he took Julietta’s confession that
her “sin [was] of heavier kind than his” (2.3.28), indicating that the Duke’s plotting in the second
half of the play is premised upon a change in his priorities. He sees women as wronged by men
and he works to satisfy (what he understands to be) their needs. Though the Duke barely refers to
Julietta, he ensures that she receives the life she wants; he does not command her to feel joy but
he commands Claudio to “restore” her. Claudio “wrong’d” her by not marrying her, and the
Duke speaks on her behalf. He does not wish her joy as he does for Mariana, possibly because he
assumes her joy is already secured.
Why does the Duke—and the play—care so much about Mariana? When the Duke
promises to help Isabella and Claudio, he mentions that his plan also enables them to “most
uprighteously do a poor wrong’d lady a merited benefit” (3.1.200-201) and “much please the
absent Duke” (3.1.203). Mariana, like Julietta, has a specific, identity-defining attachment to a
man and little compunction about premarital sex. Julietta and Mariana both have powerful erotic
impulses but suffer for economic (and, in Julietta’s case, legal) reasons: their marriages are
delayed or canceled because of complications with their dowries (see 1.2.149-151 and 3.1.213223). We learn in Act Three that Angelo—who confesses that he has never felt lust for a woman
before he met Isabella (2.2.185-186)—jilted his fiancée before he imprisoned Claudio and
Julietta; he is an enemy to marriage, and he is defeated by being forced to marry the woman who
has sex with him without his knowledge. The conclusion of the play is achieved by the victory of
the woman who wants to be married over the man who opposes marriage altogether (while
posing as one who promotes it).
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As I claimed above, when Mariana appears in the play, it is as if its status as a comedy
had been in doubt, and the Duke introduces her so as to reassert the generic requirements. To
make Measure for Measure a comedy, the Duke has to produce a woman with frustrated desire,
so that the plot may be adjusted to give her what she wants. In so doing, the Duke assumes
dominance over the play itself. Lynda Boose observes that the first half of the play consists of a
struggle between Isabella and Angelo, but then it shifts: “is only when the narrative is taken out
of the hands of the women claimants and the Duke can stage himself as sole authoritative truthspeaker that the public exposure of Angelo’s guilt may finally be played out.” 192 The Duke’s
power, however, is predicated on his advocacy for Mariana’s interests. Mariana is first
mentioned by the Duke in Act Three Scene One, immediately following Isabella’s outburst at
Claudio, the plot’s central impasse. Prior to this moment, the audience had no inkling of her
existence, and it is as if the Duke conjured her in order to create a backstory for Angelo and a
means to advance the plot. The Duke’s (and Shakespeare’s) introduction of Mariana is an
example of what comic-book fans call a “retcon,” i.e., “retroactive continuity,” which Marc
Bousquet defines as “a narrative strategy […] offering fans a new understanding of what they
already know, or in some cases, a new history that alters a character’s past.” 193 That this is done
for what is called “fan service” for popular narratives, satisfying audience’s desires, correlates
with Shakespeare’s deployment of a dramatic device which strains plausibility and standard
dramatic structure (it is not common for Shakespeare to introduce a new character in Act Four)
in order to provide a conventional ending.
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However, when Mariana first speaks, she addresses several of the central thematic
concerns of Measure for Measure directly:
Break off thy song, and haste thee quick away.
Here comes a man of comfort, whose advice
Hath often still’d my brawling discontent.
I cry you mercy, sir, and well could wish
You had not found me here so musical.
Let me excuse me, and believe me so,
My mirth it much displeas’d, but pleas’d my woe. (4.1.7-13)
The Duke is very much “a man of comfort,” though “comfort” is not sexual satisfaction (as one
might call a “woman of comfort”) or aristocratic leisure but the tempering of extreme emotions
(“brawling discontent”). The sadness of unrequited love is here described as violent and
disruptive, a riot when the mind should be peaceful. She apologizes for being “musical,” the
word used in a way that recalls the warning in As You Like It that “The Duke is humorous”
(1.2.266): subject to moods and dispositions, not governed by reason. In Mariana’s case, she is
indeed “musical”: she confuses bad and good for the audience and renders it difficult to make
moral judgments. The audience may sympathize with Mariana but not with Angelo, and it may
find her love for him confounding, but Shakespeare introduces her so as to provide the possible
explanation for the Duke’s behavior throughout the play such that the entire plot—the Duke’s
departure, the deputation of Angelo, the contretemps between Angelo and Isabella—is designed
to reunite Angelo with Mariana “And perform an old contracting” (3.2.282). Mariana’s interests
conquer the play; Claudio and Julietta become less important as the play proceeds, and Isabella’s
actions in Act Five serve Mariana’s interests at least as much as Claudio’s, and—depending on
how one feels about the Duke’s proposal to her—work against her own interests.
Mariana’s garden is the first private space in the whole play, and the only one represented
onstage. (Angelo’s “garden circummur’d with brick,” 4.1.28, is also named.) Here, Mariana is
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outside Viennese society, open only to the Duke’s direct influence, which we learn has been
ongoing. She is like Orsino in Twelfth Night, lovesick, self-confined to private spaces, surfeiting
on music, and dependent on others to solve her problems. She asks for the Duke’s mercy (the
bestowal of which becomes his signature act of beneficence as a ruler) and asks him to believe
her, as if her testimony is unreliable (the trustworthiness of women being another ongoing
concern in the play). Mariana in this condition is not capable of joy, but her pain can be treated;
there is no chance for positive feeling, only the negation of negative feeling. Though Mariana
gets her man in Act Five, the negation of negative feeling may be all that is available for Vienna
as a whole. The effect of the music provided by the boy for Mariana parallels the effect of the
political solutions provided for the audience by the Duke and the comic solutions provided for
the audience by Shakespeare.
The Duke replies, following this vein, with a warning about her (and humanity’s)
susceptibility to musical influence, and his worry about Mariana deciding for herself when and
how she will receive that influence: “’Tis good; though music oft hath such a charm / To make
bad good, and good provoke to harm” (4.1.14-15). The Duke is not just referring to music. This
is the charm that Isabella has with her rhetorical gifts and her “speechless dialect” (1.2.183), and
the Duke himself wishes to utilize similar charm through his scheming. People are malleable;
they change with circumstances, and they can be influenced and manipulated to do things they
know to be bad. Of course, much depends on the type of music. Aesthetic forms can overwhelm
one’s moral sense: we might laugh at or otherwise enjoy something in a comedy that would repel
or terrify us in real life, just as we might dance or weep or feel erotic longing in response to a
particular song or symphony.
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Shakespeare here thematizes the dynamics between one’s emotional responses and one’s
judgment. As the Duke describes Mariana’s emotional condition, Shakespeare challenges our
capacity for sympathy and identification: “This forenam’d maid hath yet in her the continuance
of her first affection; his unjust unkindness (that in all reason should have quench’d her love)
hath (like an impediment in the current) made it more violent and unruly” (3.1.239-243). The
Duke knows that Mariana should not love Angelo, but she does so irrationally, and so he strives
to reunite them. Isabella, concerned chiefly with her own welfare, is happy to facilitate
Mariana’s desires via the bed-trick. But how should the audience feel about Mariana’s “violent
and unruly” desire to regain Angelo? The play proceeds and the Duke prioritizes her regardless
of our preferences. That which makes Measure for Measure a comedy and gives it a “happy
ending” may not produce happiness in the audience or even in many of the characters. Its
happiness is Mariana’s (and Julietta’s) happiness, and those who share it vicariously or
sympathetically.
Mariana’s satisfaction depends upon Angelo being not only reprieved but rewarded with
a loving wife. The Duke’s care for her replaces or subsumes any claims for justice. It is not
anachronistic for audiences to find Angelo’s fate problematic. Ambivalence about the story’s end
is present in one of the principal sources. Following the story of Epitia in Cinthio’s
Hecatommithi is a story about the reaction of the women at court to it:
It would be hard to say whether the ladies were more pleased with Maximian’s
justice or his clemency. At first it seemed that they would have been content if the
grave outrage done with such ingratitude to the virtuous young lady had been
suitably punished. But they thought it no less praiseworthy that, since it had
pleased his majesty to marry Iuriste, and since the lady whose honor Iuriste had
stained had become his wife, he should have so far acceded to her pleading as to
turn justice into clemency. Concerning this, the more mature said that clemency is
a very worthy companion to the justice of kings, since it tempers penalties and for
that reason we read that it is most fitting for princes: for it induces a certain
temperance in their minds, which causes them to be kind towards their subjects.
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They concluded that Maximian had shown himself, both in his justice and his
clemency, truly worthy of empire.194
Similarly, the Duke, as a “gentleman of all temperance,” pardons Angelo at the request of
Mariana and Isabella. The sentiments in the passage above are also echoed in Isabella’s
aforementioned lines about authority and mercy. Angelo’s harshness makes him unfit to rule,
while the Duke’s mercy makes him “worthy of empire.” It is noteworthy that in Cinthio the
internal audience is all female, and they divide along generational lines in their affective
response to the Iuriste’s fate. The “more mature” women accept it not because of the particulars
of the case but because clemency is itself good and a hallmark of good rulers. This is precisely
the argument Isabella makes to Angelo in Act Two Scene Two, and it may be an argument made
by Measure for Measure itself. Cinthio provides the rationalizations that Shakespeare does not,
and Shakespeare leaves his audience to debate as the ladies of the court do in the passage above.
We are enjoined to applaud Angelo’s pardon because mercy is better than justice; comic endings
are good because they are comic endings, regardless of the particulars of the story. I do not think
Shakespeare makes that argument so much as shows that it can be made, and that comedies
assert it with their structure. Comedies encourage us to applaud marriage and the evasion of
death, especially when they suit the interests of a woman. A ruler can gain strength and
credibility by favoring such women.
The reciprocal relationship between Mariana’s happiness and the Duke’s power is
established in the planning and the aftermath of the bed-trick. In the first half of the play, Isabella
is a dominant figure, arguing on her brother’s behalf and challenging Angelo’s claims to political
and moral authority. She acts under Lucio’s direction in Act Two Scene Two, but then she
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maintains her own position in Act Two Scene Four and Act Three Scene One when she disputes
with Angelo and Claudio respectively. But when the Duke appears as “Friar Lodowick,” she
becomes his creature. After she comes to an understanding with Mariana about the bed-trick, she
has this exchange with “Friar Lodowick”:
ISABELLA
DUKE

She’ll take the enterprise upon her, father,
If you advise it.
It is not my consent,
But my entreaty too. (4.1.65-67)

Duke Vincentio needs for Isabella and Mariana to be implicated, not just directed and influenced,
but actively participating. They do not act only on their own self-interest but in compliance with
his commands, as if they believe that these are one and the same. The Duke proposes the bedtrick to Isabella out of “the love I have in doing good” (3.1.198) which will also “much please
the absent Duke” (3.1.203). The Duke’s sense that he knows what is best for all animates his
actions in the second half of the play, after his tentative observation and fact-finding in the first
half. When he proposes to Isabella in the play’s final moments, he frames it as “a motion much
imports your good” (5.1.535). He assumes that what pleases him is fitting for all. He therefore
resembles the King in All’s Well That Ends Well, though he is the active agent as well as the
spectator of the play. Both rulers are proxies for the audience who demand a suitable ending for
their comedies and could be seen as forerunners for the Citizen and the Wife in Beaumont’s The
Knight of the Burning Pestle. Shakespeare stages the audience’s demand for a comic ending in
such a fashion as to confuse and alienate that very audience, stimulating them to become
conscious of their own preferences and the implications within them.
Mariana, for her part, encourages deference to the Duke despite all personal reservations.
Just before she learns of the Duke’s plan, she tells him, “I am always bound to you” (4.1.25), as
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she encourages Isabella to be. Unlike Isabella and Angelo, she is as untroubled by lies as she is
by sex:
ISABELLA

MARIANA

To speak so indirectly I am loath.
I would say the truth, but to accuse him so,
That is your part. Yet I am advis’d to do it,
He says, to veil full purpose.
Be rul’d by him. (4.6.1-4)

Isabella does not like lying. She is used to being “veiled” so as to not show herself or be sexual
at all and thus tempt others; now she must “veil” the truth so as to deceive others and suggest
that she has had sex when she is not. But Mariana, like so many characters in Measure for
Measure, gets what she wants by eliciting Isabella’s empathy and assistance. Furthermore,
Mariana’s desires and the Duke’s power are so aligned that the Duke’s power increases by
serving Mariana’s interests. It is as if the Duke figured out that he could solve the problems of
Vienna, including the problem of his waning power and his neglect of his administrative duties,
by becoming the mastermind of a comedy, and the central fact of a comedy is that when a
woman wants a particular man she wins him.
Elizabeth Pope exhibits faith in the religious language Mariana uses to buttress her cause,
and writes an encomium to her request to Isabella to plead on behalf of the man who wanted to
rape her:
it is sheer, reckless forgiveness of the kind Christ advocates in the Sermon on the
Mount—the great pronouncement which in Luke immediately precedes and forms
part of the measure-for-measure passage. And like Christ, Shakespeare contrasts
this sort of forgiveness with another. Mariana is certainly more praiseworthy than
the “sinners” described by the Lord, for Angelo has treated her very badly; but her
mercy to him resembles theirs in that it springs primarily from preference and
affection: [...] the renewal of his devotion and a happy marriage with him. Hence,
however gracious and commendable her conduct may be, it differs markedly from
that of Isabella, who has nothing to sustain her but the conviction that she must be
merciful and the memory of what she had promised Angelo on the strength of it.
And then, almost before the audience at the first performance had time to catch its
breath, the Duke, having summoned Claudio and revealed the truth, proceeds not
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only to pardon him, but to let off Angelo, Lucio, and Barnardine as well, with
penalties entirely disproportionate to what their conduct deserved by ordinary
Renaissance standards.195
According to Pope, Mariana inspires the Duke’s general acts of forgiveness, but she reads too
much caritas into Mariana’s eros. Mariana never expresses concern for anyone beyond Angelo,
and her love for him may be a sign of grace in how much the play emphasizes it to be
undeserved. Isabella’s pleading is not out of charity to Angelo but to Mariana, respect for
Mariana’s eros, a desire to ease her suffering and let her have the man she wants. The play
suggests, and this may be applicable to many of Shakespeare’s men, that it does not matter if a
man is good or evil, only that he is loved. In As You Like It, Oliver experiences a conversion
when he witnesses Orlando’s virtue and Celia’s love, but we see no such conversion in Angelo,
only shame and self-pity. Nonetheless, this is irrelevant: he lives because Mariana loves him.
Eros triumphs in the play, and caritas is redefined not as letting people do as they please but as
encouraging heterosexual marriage. The fact that Angelo is Mariana’s “husband” because he had
sex with her (unknowingly) also shows eros’s power: the sexual act is binding because she was
willing. Her desire must be answered and defended.
Deference to Mariana’s interests runs through the play from her first appearance to the
very end. After the bed-trick is revealed but before Claudio’s “resurrection,” the Duke forces
Angelo to marry Mariana (offstage) but then orders his execution. The Duke knows Claudio is
alive, and so his command is probably a test of Mariana’s response, and perhaps even a
deliberate attempt to compel Isabella to plead on Angelo’s behalf. Mariana begs for her
husband’s life:
MARIANA
DUKE
195

O my most gracious lord,
I hope you will not mock me with a husband!
It is your husband mock’d you with a husband.

Pope, “The Renaissance Background of Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare Survey 2 (1949): 79.
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Consenting to the safeguard of your honor,
I thought your marriage fit; else imputation,
For that he knew you, might reproach your life,
And choke your good to come. For his possessions,
Although by [confiscation] they are ours,
We do enstate and widow you with all,
To buy you a better husband. (5.1.416-425)
Duke Vincentio pretends that he was concerned solely with Mariana’s honor, not her desire. He
asserts his warrant to execute Angelo, seize his property, and distribute it to his liking. He also
claims the right to determine who would be a suitable husband for Mariana, as if men are
fungible and replaceable. Echoing Lafew’s line from the end of All’s Well That Ends Well, “I
will buy me a son-in-law in a fair” (5.3.148), the Duke characterizes spouses as commodities
subject to market valuation. This is the economic logic that motivated Angelo when he rejected
Mariana, as it was the reasoning for Claudio’s and Julietta’s delayed marriage. The Duke shows
the inadequacy of this worldview: Mariana’s name and reputation are saved, her honor restored,
she gets his money and property, and now Angelo will die for Claudio: all of this is just and
should satisfy her and all claims of justice. The Duke even states that he is saving Mariana from
further trouble, since Angelo might “choke your good to come.” Now she can “buy a better
husband.”196 But, as the joke goes, she does not want a better husband, she wants Angelo: “Oh
my dear Lord, / I crave no other, nor no better man” (5.1.425-426). It is the specificity of
Mariana’s desire that requires satisfaction. She has an individual preference, and this is what
makes her the exemplary figure of the comedy. Her desire is her own, intensified by his cruelty
and unworthiness, and not otherwise subject to explanation or justification. She judges her own
cause, and the Duke facilitates her, and the audience is left to approve or disapprove but we
cannot bend the play to our preferences. Mariana’s erotic end, focused and singular, eclipses all

196

This recalls the end of the Book of Job, when Job gets all his money back and God provides him with new, better
children to replace those who died; see Job 42:13-15.

110

other claims. The Duke enacts resistance and asserts his authority, but Mariana eventually wins,
perhaps all according to the Duke’s intentions. He performs his preference for her and deference
to her.

Pleasure of/as Rule
If we are confused by the movements of Measure for Measure, the play nevertheless
makes it clear that the plot pleases Duke Vincentio himself. As I argued above, he favors
Mariana and works to grant her wishes, and his overall agenda in the second half of the play is to
provide husbands for women. Shakespeare presents the comic plot as providing pleasure while
emphasizing simultaneously the normality and the idiosyncrasy of that pleasure. As I will show
in Chapter Five, Shakespeare presents comic plots and resolutions as pleasing to characters and
audiences alike in his previous plays, but in Measure he makes the comedy into, as it were, Duke
Vincentio’s kink. What the audience is accustomed to accepting as a norm is in this play
represented as peculiar and coerced. Furthermore, as I will show in attending to the uses of
“pleas” and “pleasure” in the play, pleasure is generally linked to the caprices of power. 197
Discourses about pleasure can easily become normative, but it is always someone’s pleasure, and
Shakespeare makes it clear who is being catered to and thus who determines what is to be
considered legitimately pleasurable. In the previous comedies, the audience is given this status;
in Measure, the audience is put in the peculiar position of watching the Duke be pleased with his
own work. He does not involve the audience, much less express the wish that they enjoy what he
has done. The absence of the appeal to the audience is notable among Shakespeare’s comedies,
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and thus we are alerted to how our presumptions about the priority of our own pleasure involve
too-comfortable and unreflective expectations about the claims of the audience to demand that its
own preferences be placated.
Measure for Measure contains multiple references to being pleased as demanding
deference to one’s individual predilections. It is impossible to separate pleasure in the play from
domination and eccentricity. It is used throughout the play in expressions of courtesy, but the
repetition, along with other textual hints, drives home the sense of granting pleasure as
submission. This process begins early in the play: Angelo’s first lines, addressed to the Duke, are
“Always obedient to your Grace’s will, / I come to know your pleasure” (1.1.25-26). The lines
resonate through the entire play and can be taken as its subject: the audience is often as confused
as Angelo about what constitutes the Duke’s pleasure and the unfolding of the play is our
encounter with his shifting desires and preferences.
Variations on the phrase “if it please you” as an obsequious acknowledgement of
authority are frequent in the play. Elbow uses it twice with Angelo (2.1.47 and 2.1.53), and when
Escalus takes control of the questioning, Pompey and Froth continue to use it as a courtesy
(2.1.85, 2.1.196). It is used again in the next scene involving encounters between the “low”
characters and the authorities who question them, by the Provost to Escalus (3.2.196-197 and
3.2.212). The last use of this term of deference in the play is in the beginning of Isabella’s final
lines: “Most bounteous sir: / Look, if it please you, on this man condemn’d / As if my brother
liv’d” (5.1.443-445). The expression is used to not only acknowledge authority but to check in
with one’s superior and convey the hope that one has not offended.
Beyond courtesy—or rather, as a sign of what the courtesy actually means—“pleasure” is
used to refer to the right to punish. Elbow asks Escalus, “What is’t your worship’s pleasure I
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shall do with this wicked caitiff?” (2.1.183-184), 198 and the next scene begins with the Provost
worrying about Angelo’s power over Claudio: “I’ll know / His pleasure, may be he will relent”
(2.2.2-3). The Duke uses the term in this sense in Act Five when the Duke gives Angelo
permission to punish Mariana and “Friar Lodowick” for “slandering” him:
ANGELO

Let me have way, my lord,
To find this practice out.

DUKE

Ay, with my heart,
And punish them to your height of pleasure. (5.1.238-240)

The phrase “to your height of pleasure” suggests that the pleasure of the judge is not merely a
signifier of his status but also has personal, emotional valence. Earlier in the play, Angelo claims
to be an impersonal and disinterested enforcer of existing statues: “It is the law, not I, condemn
your brother. / Were he my kinsman, brother, or my son, / It should be thus with him” (2.2.8082), but the right to punish or show mercy is pleasure in the fuller sense of personal gratification.
It shows that the person cannot be separated from the office and its duties. This identification is
established further in Act Five when Lucio responds to the Duke’s anger with an act of
submission that may also be taken as a personal request: “If you will hang me for it, you may;
but I had rather it would please you I might be whipt” (5.1.505-506). Whether or not this line
suggests sadomasochistic thrills on Lucio’s part—it is often played as such in the theater—the
Duke refuses to have his own pleasure dictated to him, and he insists Lucio marry Kate
Keepdown: “Take him to prison, / And see our pleasure herein executed” (5.1.520-521). The
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Duke’s pleasure is in marriage, especially for women pregnant or with children; it is also in
judgment and command, in dictating what is good for his subjects.
The link between the pleasure of office and individual enjoyment is further underscored
when Isabella meets Angelo for the second time, after he has realized his anguished desire for
her. She returns to beg her brother’s case again but also because he requested she do so; her
pleading is his pleasure:
ANGELO
ISABELLA
ANGELO

How now, fair maid?
I am come to know your pleasure.
That you might know it, would much better please me
Than to demand what ’tis. (2.4.30-33)

As with Angelo’s first address to the Duke, his reply to her has resonance for himself and the
audience but not yet for Isabella. He wishes that he did not have to admit his desire aloud, not
only because it is unwelcome news but also because he wishes that she were more aware of his
desires, could anticipate them and accommodate them without him having to articulate them.
(This makes him analogous to the audience of a comedy who enjoy having their preferences
satisfied without those preferences and the power behind them being acknowledged as such.) He
is attracted to her partially because she seems so unaware of her own sexuality, but at the same
time he wants her to be more aware, if not of her own sexual desires then of his own. He is
desperate to be recognized as sexual and powerful; while he wants to diminish her, he always
wants for Isabella, with her full dignity, to acknowledge him as the man he has become. His
burden in this scene is to alert her to his sexuality and understand her place in it. This is the
fullest sense of his “pleasure”: not mere sexual gratification, but recognition of his place as
entitling him to the satisfaction of his personal desires.
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Later in the scene, when Angelo hints that his desires may involve Isabella committing
sins to save her brother, she attempts to assure him that what pleases him can be achieved
without sin:
ISABELLA
ANGELO

Please you to do’t,
I'll take it as a peril to my soul,
It is no sin at all, but charity.
Pleased you to do’t at peril of your soul,
Were equal poise of sin and charity. (2.4.64-68)

Angelo clarifies in this exchange that his pleasure is such at least partially because of it involves
transgression and coercion. As with the Duke’s sentencing of Lucio, pleasure is personal, not
mutual, and all the greater because the one providing the gratification feels violated. Angelo
displays this tendency earlier in the play when he leaves Escalus to question Elbow, Pompey,
and Froth: “[I] leave you to the hearing of the cause, / Hoping you’ll find good cause to whip
them all” (2.1.136-137).

Problematizing Pleasure
To continue my analogy between the acts of domination in the play and the audience’s
demand to be entertained by a comedy, we see throughout Measure for Measure Shakespeare’s
signal that he and his fellow theater people may not always enjoy providing the audience with
the pleasures of comedy, and that the repetitive performance of comedies may have alerted
Shakespeare to the insidious implications of his own dramatic practices. He may also simply be
signaling that the pursuit of pleasure can involve mutuality but it can also involve cruelty, and
the distinction is not always meaningful—or, it is especially meaningful—to those who seek
pleasure. Greenblatt, observing comedy’s quasi-pornographic function, notes the interplay
between sexual and theatrical pleasure with approval: “Shakespearean comedy curiously
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confirms the charge” of being “a place of erotic arousal […] not only by gesturing forward to the
pleasures of the marriage bed but also by the staging of its own theatrical pleasures. […]
Shakespeare’s enactment of the celebration confers on his comic heroes and heroines something
of the special beauty of sexual arousal.” 199 Measure for Measure, however, seems designed to do
the opposite, to give its characters and its audience the special ugliness of sexual disgust
expressed in Sonnet 129: “Enjoy’d no sooner but despised straight, [...] A bliss in proof, and
prov’d, a very woe, / Before, a joy propos’d, behind, a dream” (ll. 5, 11-12). As Greenblatt notes
in his more recent work, “Compulsion is an unwelcome guest at comedy’s banquet.” 200 Comedy
does not provide happiness to its characters and audience when the compulsion is too close to the
surface.
To further track the uses of “pleasure” in the play, we find a curious parallel between
Angelo’s tormented libido domanandi and Mariana’s “musicality.” As she is quoted above, after
she listens to the Boy’s song, she ends her first speech with “Let me excuse me, and believe me
so, / My mirth it much displeas’d, but pleas’d my woe” (4.1.12-13). Though Mariana is a figure
of emotional dysfunction and an object of pity, she is also capricious and demanding; these lines
are among the play’s first signals that this seemingly passive character cannot abide
dissatisfaction. She must have Angelo; without him, she employs a (notably male) servant to
entertain her and she has somehow enticed Duke Vincentio to visit her regularly and to reorder
his entire city and style of governance to suit her preferences. Her lines also indicate that to be
“pleased” is not precisely the same as being made happy in the sense of delight or positive affect,
but simply being obeyed and accommodated. To say of the Boy’s song, “My mirth it much
displeas’d, but pleas’d my woe,” is to reveal that Mariana’s only joy, as the Duke says at the end,
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can come from marrying Angelo, even if Angelo feels no love for her and wishes he were dead;
until then, her pleasure derives from nursing that unmet need. Mariana’s refusal to move on
makes her the immovable object at the center of Measure for Measure, assisted by the Duke’s
irresistible force.
I must note, however, that Mariana’s condition is not merely the product of her own
stubbornness. Mariana cannot “move on” because Angelo did not only jilt her but slander her, as
“Friar Lodowick” reports: “Left her in her tears, and dried not one of them with his comfort;
swallow’d his vows whole, pretending in her discoveries of dishonor; in few, bestow’d her on
her own lamentation, which she yet wears for his sake; and he, a marble to her tears, is wash’d
with them, but relents not” (3.1.225-230). Mariana’s devotion to Angelo is her peculiar, personal
desire, as I emphasize, but it is likely that she could not find another husband even if she wanted
to. Angelo did not only denigrate her but also, as John D. Cox notes, “made himself look better in
doing so.”201 Angelo’s greed and lack of sympathy improved his social status, and the Duke
seeks to reverse that, and otherwise improve the conditions of women in Vienna. It is possible to
interpret Mariana’s desire to marry Angelo as a form of revenge upon him, as much an exercise
of dominance in denigrating another sexually as we see in Angelo’s desire for Isabella.
If Mariana’s capture of Angelo is an exercise of “pleasure” in the sense of domination,
then we can see it as an instance of the unique, and rather grotesque, pleasure that Stephen
Greenblatt notes in Richard’s seduction of Lady Anne in Richard III. Richard’s attraction to her
is not just physical or political but premised specifically on her revulsion for him. In Richard’s
case, “his power, wealth, and sheer brazenness permit him to seize upon someone he wants, even
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someone who finds him repellent. It counts for him as pleasure.” 202 The audience, Greenblatt
notes, can “take vicarious pleasure in the release of pent-up aggression, in the black humor of it
all, in the open speaking of the unspeakable.” 203 Greenblatt, rightly, designates Richard’s action
as a primary example of his tyranny. The difference between Mariana and Richard (and Angelo)
may be that because Angelo wronged her, he deserves her revenge, even if one could also see
that revenge as a strange kind of reward. It is difficult to judge because any response will be
personal rather than general. Still, as I mentioned above, Mariana makes it clear that she wants
no man other than Angelo, and she wishes not for him to suffer as such (she goes to great lengths
to save his life) but to be devoted to her for the rest of their lives.
Whereas Richard, like Edmund in King Lear, enjoys conquest for its own sake and
becomes indifferent to people after they submit to him, Mariana, like Helena and Shakespeare’s
other henikosexual women, desires ongoing relationship. We see this elsewhere in Measure for
Measure when the Duke provides us with a way to understand the nuanced distinction between
pleasure and tyranny. Early in the play when he requests Friar Thomas assist him in assuming his
disguise as a Friar, Friar Thomas criticizes him and the Duke explains his deputization of
Angelo:
FRIAR THOMAS

DUKE

202
203

It rested in your Grace
To unloose this tied-up justice when you pleas’d:
And it in you more dreadful would have seem’d
Than in Lord Angelo.
I do fear—too dreadful;
Sith ’twas my fault to give the people scope,
’Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them
For what I bid them do; for we bid this be done,
When evil deeds have their permissive pass,
And not the punishment. (1.3.31-39)

Greenblatt, Tyrant: Shakespeare on Politics (New York: Norton, 2018), 80.
Ibid., 81.
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Interestingly, Friar Thomas is the only character in the play who knowingly second-guesses the
Duke to his face, and the Duke not only allows him but grants the criticism. This scene shows the
power of the office of a Friar, which the Duke arrogates for himself, though in the end of the
play he gives Friar Peter orders. Furthermore, this exchange has a cutting use of the term
“pleas’d” in reference to a person in an elevated position. It could have been the Duke’s
“pleasure” to enforce the laws of Vienna, but in his pursuit of his own interests and his desire to
see people be “merry” (3.2.235) he surrendered the pleasure of exercising power and enforcing
punishments.204 The incidents of Measure for Measure document the Duke’s attempts to realign
those pleasures, for the Duke to enjoy governing. Sarah Beckwith claims that “The Duke as friar
is part of a discourse on dominion which anciently pairs the notion of sexual and political
consent, and which therefore sees sexual ethics as an intrinsic part of the exploration of tyranny
where tyranny is understood as the ruler who acts for his own personal pleasure above the
common good.”205 However, the deployment of “pleasure” in the play, and the Duke’s shift from
public reticence to active intervention in his subjects’ lives, not to mention the increased energy
he displays in the second half of the play, suggest that the distinction between “personal
pleasure” and “the common good” evaporates for him. He centers his own pleasure and his
understanding of what will be Mariana’s joy, while urging the rest of his subjects to live
according to their interests (as he understands them) rather than their passions.
Moreover, the Duke here admits that the condition of Vienna is his own fault. He chooses
Angelo to enforce the sex laws because they would be “too dreadful” (1.3.34) coming from him.
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For the Duke, “tyranny” is inconsistency and caprice, while a consistently cruel (or consistently
permissive) ruler would not be a tyrant, though his permissiveness equates to encouraging
criminality. The citizens of Vienna have not internalized the principles that inform the laws, or
practice any moral codes besides doing whatever they please without fear of repercussions. The
Duke’s actions in the play demonstrate that only he himself may do as he literally “pleases,”
which includes deciding which of his subjects may experience pleasure, and what kinds of
pleasure are to be favored and encouraged. His entitlement to the “pleasure” of rule extends to
his proposal of marriage to Isabella.
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Chapter Three
The Pleasures of Government: Measure for Measure

Shakespeare presents a political interpretation of his own genre in Measure for Measure.
In his previous comedies, the fragile societies created in the endings are fulfillments of many of
the characters’ desires, and they are achieved through a combination of human initiative, luck,
and occasionally some measure of magic, miracle, or coincidence. Measure for Measure
demonstrates what would be necessary to make such a dreamworld into a social and political
reality. It compels us to wonder if what is pleasant in theory would be good in practice. One of
the principal ways it envisions its politics is in the Duke’s multiple claims that he acts in the
interest of his citizens. The Duke’s actions in the end of the play demonstrate that his
understanding of their interests consists of facilitating and in some cases demanding that they
marry, even (especially) if they lack the inclination to do so. He also demands that some people’s
crimes be forgiven while others be punished, though marriage then itself becomes a form of
punishment. Consistent with standard comic practice, he does not offer justification but he
promises further explanation, after the play ends, thus leaving the audience to deduce his
rationalizations on their own—or to consider that he has no justification and his actions are, as he
says, for his own pleasure.
As I argued in Chapter One, the King in All’s Well That Ends Well conveys his hope that
his subjects and the audience have enjoyed what has happened. The play also contains numerous
suggestions that its events are approved by God and even ordained by divine will, and that its
theatrical illusions can be appreciated as miraculous even if they are not actual miracles. I will
show in Chapter Five that these features are common in Shakespeare’s comedies. However,
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Measure for Measure lacks such statements and sentiments, except for the Duke’s wish for
Mariana’s joy. The play presents us with the standard features of a Shakespearean comedy but
without the attendant instructions on how to judge it or feel about it. The “miracles” of the
play—the unveiling of “Friar Lodowick” as the Duke, and of the “muffled fellow” (5.1.486)
prisoner as Claudio—may be performed and received as wondrous in the theater, but the play
itself contains no such cues. The Duke uses his own reveal to threaten Lucio, and Claudio’s
reveal to propose to Isabella. Isabella has no lines following Claudio’s unmasking; Shakespeare
offers his audience no commentary or instructions about the play’s theatrical miracles. This is, as
I will show, irregular; the audiences for Shakespeare’s comedies are accustomed to receiving
affective cues or for measuring their own feelings against those of the characters. But Measure
for Measure offers no spoken expressions of joy or wonder in its ending, only fear, despair, and
desperate pleading. Shakespeare exerts pressure on his actors and his audience to supply such
positive expressions, but he gives them nothing with which to work, other than perhaps their
customary responses to comic endings.
Rather than provide his audience with expressions of happiness and cues to participate in
them, Shakespeare presents the Duke as preoccupied with his own pleasure in deceiving,
accusing, judging, and governing the sexual life of Vienna. Furthermore, in the second half of
the play, the Duke makes several claims that he acts for the benefit of his subjects. He does not
seek to please them or make them happy, but to improve their lives according to his own values
and standards. He does his own work, not the work of God; his assumption of a friar’s habit and
enjoyment of the privileges of the clergy are used transparently for the pursuit of his own ends,
while the play’s miracles inspire fear of his power more than wonder or awe.
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Nonetheless, the Duke’s accomplishments in the end of the play satisfy the standard
requirements for the genre: marriage(s), social concord, reunions, villains are humiliated,
deceptions are unveiled, identities are restored, death is averted, and those thought to be dead
emerge alive. The play even meets the specific criteria I specified in my introduction: the
henikosexual women marry their men, Christianity is instrumentalized, and explanations are
deferred. The play provides everything audiences are accustomed to receiving, but it is all
coerced and choreographed. This is not dramaturgical or artistic failure so much as Shakespeare
accounting for the ways these comic elements have become normative for the genre and can
become normative in real life as well. If we want to live in a comic society (as opposed to, say, a
tragic one), and such a society does not emerge naturally or spontaneously, it can be forced upon
us, “for our good.” The play shows us what such a world would require and permits us to
question if it is truly desirable. I will demonstrate in this chapter that the scant justifications the
Duke presents for his actions in Measure for Measure represent Shakespeare’s signal to his
audience that his comic practice, and the social and political ideas implicit in that practice, lack
sufficient rationale and are effectively amoral. Comedies produce happiness, but they are still
comedies even if they do not. If a government is modeled along comic lines, taking the features
of comedy as its priorities—as is the case in Measure for Measure—but the only justification
offered is to reinstate hierarchy and order, then audiences have good reason to become
suspicious of comedy and its ideology. I will here account for the ways that Measure for
Measure lays bare that ideology.
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The Political Philosophy of Measure for Measure: Some Theories
Critics such as R. W. Chambers, J. A. Bryant, and Roy Battenhouse 206 interpret Measure
for Measure as a Christian allegory. Rosalind Miles locates its Christianity, interestingly, in its
realism: “Against the other dramatists’ naïve ideas of what statecraft is and how it operates,
Shakespeare’s procedures through the Duke reveal a far more precise, ultimately humane, and
well-directed conception of authority in action. […] [The Duke] represents a benign and
omniscient authority, but one which is for the most part presented in formal, distant, and
impersonal terms.”207 Miles argues that the play endorses mercy over retributive justice, a
position also taken by Bryant and Debora Kuller Shuger. 208 The play also shows why one must
not apply strict laws rigidly, why one must show equity and prudence. Similarly, Steven Marx
claims that a Christian worldview may be required to understand the play: “Accepting the
benevolence of the Duke and experiencing the ending as happy may require a kind of orthodoxy,
its very implausibility an exercise for the faithful.” 209
John W. Dickinson identifies the play’s view on equity as drawing from the early modern
humanist tradition.210 Perhaps unwittingly, Dickinson defends a system of proportional justice
designed to maintain hierarchy: “equity” was generally employed so as to protect men of rank
from legal punishment.211 Harry Jaffa praises Duke Vincentio and sees his work as an example
of Christian statesmanship: the play “ends with a scene of reconciliation and harmony, of charity

206

Chambers, “The Jacobean Shakespeare and Measure for Measure,” Proceedings of the British Academy 23
(1937): 30-58; Bryant, Hippolyta’s View: Some Christian Asatonpects of Shakespeare’s Plays (Lexington, KY:
University Press of Kentucky, 1961); Battenhouse, “Measure for Measure and the Christian Doctrine of the
Atonement.”
207
Miles, The Problem of Measure for Measure: A Historical Investigation (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976),
267.
208
Bryant, Hippolyta’s View, 99; Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England, 131.
209
Marx, Shakespeare and the Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 99.
210
Dickinson, “Renaissance Equity and Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare Quarterly 13.3 (1962): 287.
211
Ibid., 296. Shuger also notes that “the path of equity [...] leads in the direction of absolutism”; see Political
Theologies in Shakespeare’s England, 79.

124

and forgiveness. No innocent—or even guilty—blood has been shed. All the apparent evil-doing
has been in the service of a catharsis by which the bad and unruly passions have been purged. It
is almost as if an earthly city had been transformed into a heavenly one.” 212 But it is not at all
clear that the bad passions have been purged. We have no indication that Angelo or Isabella
approve of the Duke’s results, and we know Lucio is unhappy. People are forced to behave, but
the passions may remain. What makes the Vienna at the end of the play a “heavenly city”? Jaffa
maintains that
The laws will be enforced in a manner both tyrannical and necessary for their
authority. The force or vigor of this tyranny will come from an asceticism which
is but suppressed lust. The city will however be cured of the secret tyranny within
it at the same time that it will be cured of dissoluteness. The extremes will cure
each other, ‘measure for measure,’ to re-establish the mean. In so doing, the city
will be re-founded.213
Though too neat and clean, Jaffa admits that the Duke’s actions must be viewed outside the
bounds of politics and morality so as to provide the grounds for politics and morality, and are
thus beyond judgment. The people of Vienna have only varied forms of tyranny from which to
choose.
A recurring theme in political analysis of Measure for Measure is the play presents a
moderate, secular (or at least post-Christian) way of solving problems posed by adherence to
religious dogma. Judd Hubert writes that “secularization always has the last word in this play,
dominated by religious allusions.”214 For Brian Gibbons, the play is worldly education for its
largely inexperienced and extreme characters with their “absolute dedication to rigorous
principle, especially because of its temptations to those preoccupied with doctrine, whether of
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government of the self, of secular society, or the Church.” 215 People who actually believe in
things, particularly in a notion of the social good or any higher good, are a threat to stability and
order and the play is, according to Gibbons, constructed to identify and neutralize these dangers:
“The plot […] makes an audience recognize the limitations of prescriptive, inflexible systems of
government and self-government; the sequence of crises in the plot bring into focus varieties of
individual human intransigence.”216
Another crucial feature of the Duke’s politics, which I will address further later in this
chapter, is that the state assumes what were formerly religious functions. In the Duke’s
interventions as “Friar Lodowick,” Shakespeare shows how the “meddling friar” does the
necessary work that rulers and governments cannot do. He poses as an outsider, “a looker-on
here in Vienna” (5.1.317); Harry Berger, Jr. explains, “The assumption of that role [of the Friar]
allows him to stage his difference from and superiority to his Viennese subjects. It allows him to
exchange his absolute power for the moral authority that, in Act One Scene Three, he admits he
lacks, and for the power of the confessor who is entitled to try to inscribe the sinner’s discourse
in others.”217 This superiority can be taken as beneficial: Shuger praises the Duke for performing
religious functions without the moral baggage of Angelo or Isabella: “the play nowhere suggests
that the Duke’s actions are improper; the point of his taking on a friar’s role and garb, over and
above its utility as a plot device, seems to be rather to indicate, to gesture toward, the sacerdotal
nature of royal authority, and thus what it means to bear ‘the sword of heaven.’” 218
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The Duke’s instrumentalization of Christian powers and political use of mercy is
repeatedly contrasted in the critical literature to the rigidity of the professed Christians of the
play, Angelo and Isabella. If religious people are dogmatic and legalistic, i.e., principled, then
the Duke shows the virtue of humility and situational thinking. As James Knapp argues,
Shakespeare dramatizes how a penitential comportment toward the ethical
overcomes moral dogmatism at the same time that it complicates the demand that
ethical experience poses to the subject. […] [T]he penitential ethical subject that
emerges toward the end of the play is concerned not with his or her responsibility
to the law or a concept of justice but with responding to the singularity of the
situation at hand while acknowledging that judgment of any course of action must
be deferred to an inaccessible future.219
Knapp, pace Maurice Merleau-Ponty, connects this ethical-epistemic humility to “embodiment,”
and rightly so: since human beings have bodies, they must surrender their notions of the good
and abdicate their status as rational, responsible beings. They defer judgment to the State. So the
ethic of the play, for Knapp, is situational as well as “entirely secular and material.” 220
Contemporary critics write apologias for the Duke’s interventions because they are able
to intuit his intentions and contrast his successful deceptions to Angelo’s hypocrisy. Jonathan
Goossen, for example, writes, “What is rare in criticism is belief in the Duke’s sincere benignity
coupled with a questioning of his general approach to governance. Likewise, little of virtue is
ever found in Angelo’s initially earnest political philosophy.” 221 Michael D. Friedman also takes
the standard view about the Duke teaching his subjects restraint, “He forgives Angelo, not
because Angelo deserves mercy, but because pardoning him into a marriage to a woman with
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whom he may have conceived a child makes the most sense for Vienna.” 222 The warring factions
in the play each insist on justice, but the Duke insists instead on stability and continuity, and on
his right to be the one who decides what is to be done. This is “practicality” in favor of
reproduction, a position also taken by Watson and Jaffa. The Duke preserves his inscrutability,
his strategic ambiguity, because if he is too committed to a clear notion of justice, then he is a
mere functionary as Angelo claimed to be. This releases us from having our own convictions
about what is just; it is not that the Duke pursues justice or even moderation, it is that it is not the
place for his citizens (and the audience) to judge him.
Similarly, Julie Robin Solomon takes the view that somehow Vienna has been improved
by the Duke’s actions. She accepts the assumption that sexually-transmitted diseases are
metaphors for social “disorder” which can be cured by good government. 223 The assumption for
these critics is that “tyrannical” and “extreme” are always synonymous, while “moderate”
implies “reasonable” or even “democratic.” Conal Condren sees Angelo as the locus of the
play’s varied discourses of tyranny: “the less familiar relentless legalism that refuses to exercise
prerogative right” which could be called “the zealous lack of moderation.” 224 Jean Howard
asserts that the play shows how difficult it is to find a mean between “life-denying restraints
upon the self” and “unchecked appetite.” 225 Likewise, Virginia Lee Strain argues, “When it
comes to marrying formal law with social needs and values, I argue that the Duke’s superiority is
a function of degree, not kind; it is a function of his reformed or exercised judgment rather than
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sovereignty.”226 Strain analogizes the political and the literary forms, noting that the “peace”
achieved at the play’s conclusion “shapes standards for social maintenance based on mutual
interest rather than the realization of abstract ideals or individual preferences. […] At the end of
Shakespeare’s comedy there is a uniting of hands in multiple marriages regardless of a ‘uniting
of minds.’ As well as providing the conventional end of a comedy, this is a legal resolution, an
arbitrated or imposed resolution that prioritizes the common good and peace over individual
desire.”227
A less sympathetic view of the play’s politics is exemplified by Jonathan Dollimore’s
influential interpretation wherein he grants the same premises as the critics discussed above but
with a different ideological critique: “sexual transgression in Measure for Measure […]
represents a real force of social disorder intrinsic to human nature and […] the play at least is
about how this force is—must be—restrained.” 228 Control over sexual transgression legitimates
state authority, but “the play discloses corruption to be an effect less of desire than of authority
itself.” Sébastien Lefait builds on Dollimore’s argument, claiming that “the Duke first acts on the
realization that his old methods have become effective by implementing panoptic techniques,
without necessarily using them as instruments of oppression, before switching to a more complex
and innovative form of control.”229 Lefait associates the Duke’s “divine surveillance” to
Protestant doctrines about God’s constantly judging eye, though the play “reflects an evolution in
societies that turns divine surveillance into a merely human prerogative.” The Duke, in this
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reading, learns how to be seen, how to perform, and how to reveal in such a way as to provoke
terror.
Overall, critics agree on the Duke’s use of theatricality, secular appropriation, and
assumption of extraordinary powers to reinstate his rule in Vienna. Critical analyses of the
Duke’s actions tend to divide along the lines of the critics’ personal valuations of the Duke’s
actions. When the political work of the play is analogized to its genre, the divide remains. For
example, Frye claims, “Measure for Measure is not a play about the philosophy of government,
the responsibilities of rulers, the social problem of prostitution, or any of the things that so many
commentators insist that it is. It is a play about the relation of all such things to the structure of
comedy.”230 On the other hand, Kathryn Schwarz, discussing the ways that marriage in comedies
defines characters’ identities and relationships often against their will, connects the various
features of the genre and asks, “Marriage ritually binds normalcy to numbness in the name of a
future imperative. What is the status of informed consent in a structure governed by totalizing
will, whether that will inheres in heterosociality, in providentialism, in comedy, or in us?” 231 I
hope to demonstrate that Measure for Measure provides its own answer via the Duke’s repeated
but unarticulated claims to do right by his subjects and the silence of those subjects in response
to his actions.

Duke Vincentio’s Paternalism
The last lines of the play, spoken by the Duke, betray his priorities and the priorities of
the comedy itself. After he has revealed that he is “Friar Lodowick” and that Claudio is alive
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(and thus Claudio and Julietta can marry and have their child), he demands that Lucio marry
Kate Keepdown and care for their child, and he tells Angelo to love Mariana. He then addresses
the rest of the cast:
Thanks, good friend Escalus, for thy much goodness,
There’s more behind that is more gratulate,
Thanks, Provost, for thy care and secrecy,
We shall employ thee in a worthier place.
Forgive him, Angelo, that brought you home
The head of Ragozine for Claudio’s.
Th’ offense pardons itself. Dear Isabel,
I have a motion much imports your good,
Whereto if you’ll a willing ear incline,
What’s mine is yours, and what is yours is mine.
So bring us to our palace, where we’ll show
What’s yet behind, that[’s] meet you all should know. (5.1.528-539)
The last line is the familiar deferred explanation that I noted in All’s Well and will discuss in the
other comedies in my next chapters. His use of “meet” is “proper”: the Duke decides what
people need to know, and it is appropriate for them, not for the audience. His palace will become
the place where all the couples gather, a new kind of church/brothel, where the state-sanctioned
copulation can begin. In this speech we can observe many of the component parts of the Duke’s
claims of his own power and prerogative. His rule is consolidated and legitimized because he
provides good results according to his own priorities, values, and methods: marriage, concord,
reconciliation, stability, the strategic utility of deception, the right to punish and forgive
according to his own arbitrary preferences, and the trust of authority without full understanding,
i.e., the values and priorities of Shakespearean comedy.
The Duke ends the play with a final statement of the exchange of respective “goods.”
There will be four marriages, and the society is reformed in such a fashion that sexuality is
permitted but controlled. Lucio is sent to prison but everyone else is forgiven, and the Duke
instructs them to forgive one another. The Duke promises vague rewards to those who have

131

served him, singling out the Provost for his willingness to be disloyal to Angelo while assisting
the “Friar.” He also, interestingly, asks Angelo to forgive the Provost, as if Angelo is in a
position to consider himself wronged. However, earlier in this speech, the Duke assures Angelo
that since he received Mariana’s confessions he can testify to her virtue (5.1.527); it is striking
how much the Duke comforts Angelo in these last moments and attempts to prevent him from
holding any grudges or worries. I have demonstrated that the Duke shows an overwhelming
concern for Mariana’s welfare, but he also attends to Angelo’s emotional state, perhaps because
the happiness of Mariana’s marriage remains most important to the Duke. Beyond that, the Duke
offers a clear statement of his capacity to determine when breaking laws is sufficient for
preserving order (“th’ offense pardons itself”), and what does or does not merit forgiveness. His
proposal to Isabella is offered as to her advantage, and he promises to clarify what may still
confuse everyone when they are all in his palace; he will literally contain his society within the
site of his power and demonstrate his authority to tell the story of the play and supply its
meaning.
The second half of Measure for Measure is marked by the Duke’s repeated insistence that
he acts in the interests of his citizens. When he (as the “Friar”) speaks to Isabella, he assures her,
“The satisfaction I would require is likewise your own benefit” (3.1.154-156), and just before he
proposes the bed-trick, he attributes it to his own principled motivations: “To the love I have in
doing good a remedy presents itself” (3.1.198-199). At the end of the scene, he assures her, “The
maid will I frame, and make fit for his attempt. If you think well to carry this as you may, the
doubleness of the benefit defends the deceit from reproof” (3.1.255-258); he is confident that he
can also convince Mariana that he acts in her interests, and that his plan will justify itself in the
results it provides for everyone involved. When he speaks to Mariana, he is clear that it is “for
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some advantage to yourself” (4.1.23-24) and that Isabella “comes to do you good” (4.1.51). The
Duke is assured equally of his own benevolence and of his subjects’ acting only on their own
self-interest. He uses everyone’s desires to live their lives their own way to his advantage;
Isabella, especially, participates in the bed-trick without charity or compassion for Mariana but
rather to “do no stain to [her] own gracious person” (3.1.202). The varied and conflicting
preferences of the city of Vienna is the central problem of the city, and the Duke’s work to
assemble them all into a single ideological project is both coercive and normative even if one
agrees with his goals. He repeatedly asserts that what he’s doing is “good,” though not in the
moral sense of “good”: we can deduce that and supply our own justifications, depending on our
own values and positions on questions about prostitution, nuclear families, jilted brides, and
religious celibacy. The “good” the Duke pursues is, he claims, everyone’s “benefit,” but he is
strategically vague. The justification for his actions is deferred, like the explanation he promises
to his subjects. The audience is left to judge on its own, without the cues from the playwright it
has been conditioned to expect.
The Duke later states directly that his conception of Isabella’s good varies from her own,
and that the end of the play is as much to manipulate and confound her as it is Angelo:
The tongue of Isabel. She’s come to know
If yet her brother’s pardon be come hither.
But I will keep her ignorant of her good,
To make her heavenly comforts of despair,
When it is least expected. (4.3.107-111)
These lines echo Parolles’s excuses in All’s Well That Ends Well for Bertram delaying the
consummation of his marriage (as I discussed in Chapter One). The Duke manipulates Isabella’s
emotions by making her believe terrible things have happened so that when she learns the truth
she will be delighted not by anything being gained but by the fact that she never lost what she
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thought she had. Even if the Duke is sincere in his professed desires to improve the conditions of
Vienna, much of his work in the play is making matters seem worse so as to generate gratitude
for them being as they actually are. His line “I will keep her ignorant of her good” has the
additional resonance that the Duke may already have his proposal of marriage in mind, and that
this “good,” which Isabella may not recognize as such, will also be offered to her in a moment of
extreme relief and vulnerability.232
Later in the same scene, the Duke continues to inform Isabella that it is to her advantage
to trust him, and—like Helena in All’s Well—his work is guaranteed and approved by God. He
counters her expressions of powerlessness with his own claims to control events:
ISABELLA
DUKE [as Friar]

ISABELLA

Unhappy Claudio! Wretched Isabel!
Injurious world! Most damned Angelo!
This nor hurts him, nor profits you a jot.
Forbear it therefore, give your cause to heaven.
Mark what I say, which you shall find
By every syllable a faithful verity.
The Duke comes home to-morrow—nay, dry your eyes—
One of our convent, and his confessor,
Gives me this instance: already he hath carried
Notice to Escalus and Angelo,
Who do prepare to meet him at the gates,
There to give up their pow’r. If you can pace your wisdom
In that good path that I would wish it go,
And you shall have your bosom on this wretch,
Grace of the Duke, revenges to your heart,
And general honor.
I am directed by you. (4.3.121-136)

We see how the Duke convinces Isabella to be obedient: he appeals to her desire to “profit” and
to harm Angelo, and he (falsely) claims access to the Duke’s intentions via his access to the
232
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institutional Church which she, significantly, does not have. (Shakespeare here highlights the
contrast between her service to the Church being silence and prayer, while the “Friar” is
politically active and makes personal use of the information he and others receive from penitents.
Isabella’s power in the play derives not from her status as a nun but from the fact that she is not
fully a nun yet.) The stark asymmetry between her desire for revenge and her incapacity to carry
it out on her own makes her the willing subject of the “Friar” and, later, the Duke. When he
proposes to her at the end of the play, his entreaty is offered “for your lovely sake” (5.1.491); all
he does for Isabella, he claims, is out of his superior claim to know and be able to act in her
interests and for the general welfare of Vienna.
What is his understanding of those interests? The Duke transitions from an idea of what
should be punished to an idea of what should be fostered. In the first half of the play, he entrusts
Angelo to the task of restoring order to Vienna, and it is not entirely clear what the Duke wanted
him to do, though the Duke (in his disguise as “Friar Lodowick”) tells Lucio that Angelo “does
well in” suppressing prostitution and punishing fornication because “It is too general a vice, and
severity must cure it” (3.2.96, 99-100). Earlier in the scene the Duke loses his temper with
Pompey and expresses his revulsion at prostitution:
Fie, sirrah, a bawd, a wicked bawd!
The evil that thou causest to be done,
That is thy means to live. Do thou but think
What ’tis to cram a maw or clothe a back
From such a filthy vice; say to thyself,
From their abominable and beastly touches
I drink, I eat away myself, and live.
Canst thou believe thy living is a life,
So stinkingly depending? Go mend, go mend. (3.2.19-27) 233
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The Duke-as-Friar sees prostitution as the source of general corruption in the city. Maus asserts
that “the sexual ‘crimes’ the Duke wishes to root out are victimless,” 234 but disease, fatherless
children, and (arguably) prostitution have their victims. The problem is deeper: sex has taken on
an economic dimension for the citizens of Vienna, and that has led to the delay of Julietta’s
marriage and the cancelation of Mariana’s. Sex in Vienna is either prostitution or marriage-fordowry. As Maslen writes, “Measure for Measure is filled with metaphors of sexual procurement;
[…] Shakespeare finds pimping and prostitution in every form of social intercourse.” 235 Peter
Lake and Michael Questier argue that Shakespeare’s original audience would have been alert to
the degradations of the play’s Vienna having an economic cause from their own experience as
well as the work of Shakespeare’s contemporaries: “Even more perhaps than in Jonson’s
rendition in Bartholomew Fair, the festive world of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque is presented
here as having been almost entirely corrupted by commerce. […] Here, then, is no alternative
vision or source of order or human solidarity, but an asocial world of greed and sexual
gratification.”236 However one feels about the world of the play, the substitutions within it imply
“imaginative sympathy” and “unity” that, however, imperfect, is necessary for a functioning
society. Maslen states that the Duke’s time in disguise gives him an education in empathy, in
becoming one of his own subjects. He is one of many critics who attempts to justify the Duke’s
actions, taking the Duke’s word that his work is for the good. I will address these arguments at
the end of this chapter.

Lupset (1538): “They be as hyt were etyn away,” which is glossed as “To remove, destroy by gradual erosion or
corrosion; literal and figurative.” The OED further cites the “Biblical phrase, to eat one’s own flesh: said of an
indolent person.” See “eat, v.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), December 2019.
234
Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance, 160.
235
Maslen, Shakespeare and Comedy, 212.
236
Lake and Questier, The Antichrist’s Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists, and Players in Post-Reformation England
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 648.

136

The Duke’s rage against prostitution and his expressed approval of Angelo’s work—even
while he is in the process of thwarting it—indicate the tension between comedy’s drive towards
marriage and its celebration of festivity and personal enjoyment. The festivity of the genre is
ordered towards the end of heterosexual marriage, and the Vienna depicted in the opening scenes
of Measure for Measure is a world in which marriage has declined as an institution. The Duke
seems to realize halfway through the play that he must work directly to redress this. But the
dichotomy between marriage and prostitution is blurred in the play in the deployment of the bedtrick and the repeated statements of marriage being a matter of interest rather than passion. Marc
Shell accounts for this connection in the play’s de-spiritualized account of marriage:
one person purchases another for money; the Duke, for example, offers Mariana
money with which “to buy you a better husband” (5.1.425). […] Thus Measure
for Measure depicts the purchase and sale of human beings for money, which is
Pompey’s business and the business transacted in several of Shakespeare’s
sources. The essential aspect of flesh-mongery or the “trade” of lechery (3.1.148)
in the play is, however, the use of human beings as money.237
All human bodies function in the play as media of exchange, and this does not change in the last
scene: the Duke makes it a state market rather than a free market. The state uses its power
because the forces of economics and social status facilitate sexually exploitative arrangements
between those with money and those without. So the Duke facilitates marriage, but with no
concern for money—nothing is said about Mariana’s or Julietta’s fortunes arriving or not. The
marriages themselves are sufficient, for the Duke and the genre, if not for the audience.
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The Repurposing of Christian Things
As I noted above, the theatrical miracles in Measure for Measure do not provoke
expressions of wonder from the characters in the play. Moreover, the play contains multiple
instances of Christian practices that are deployed, sometimes travestied, to advance the secular
plot. Andrew Barnaby and Joan Wry offer one of the best accounts of how the play “offers a
cautionary tale about the dangers of deploying the privileged language of the Bible in secular
political contexts,”238 noting the Duke’s use of the Friar’s habit, Isabella’s and Angelo’s usage of
religious arguments for personal ends, the mockery of religious claims by Lucio and the other
low characters of the play, and the staging of public forgiveness for the Duke’s political
purposes. Huston Diehl praises the way confession is deployed in the play, arguing that with it
“Shakespeare insists on the capacity of theater to activate the conscience, arouse guilt, and elicit
confessions of wrongdoing,”239 and she takes the play’s premises that such practices are
necessary for the maintenance of community seriously. However, Claire Griffiths-Osborne notes
that “Friar Lodowick” repeatedly divulges the spiritually privileged information he claims to
have received from hearing confessions, 240 tapping into a deep cultural fear about this power
held by Catholic priests and their capacity to abuse it. Furthermore, the Duke’s staging of
Claudio’s “death” and “resurrection,” as I have already noted, is a ruse designed to humiliate
Angelo, torture Isabella, and advertise the Duke’s power, “like pow’r divine” (5.1.369), to
control people’s behavior and perceptions. As Leah Marcus states, “In Measure for Measure, the
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rule of law is overthrown by something that may be divine transcendence, but can also look like
royal whim, unruly ‘license,’ a mere recapitulation of the abuse it purports to rectify.” 241
I will therefore write about two less-appreciated examples of the use of Christian
concepts, particularly the afterlife, as transparently instrumentalized in the final scene of
Measure for Measure. The first is Isabella’s and Mariana’s desperately expressed wish for their
testimony to be believed, which they each present as conditional upon their audience’s belief in
heaven. In Isabella’s case, she enters to accuse Angelo—falsely, we know, because Isabella did
not actually have sex with him. Angelo defends himself by calling her hysterical: “My lord, her
wits, I fear me, are not firm. / She hath been a suitor to me for her brother, / Cut off by course of
justice” (5.1.33-35). Angelo’s claim is that a wronged person is an irrational person; to be the
victim of perceived injustice is to be unreliable. He also claims—and he knows he lies—that the
impersonal machine of Justice killed Claudio and he was merely doing his job. Isabella’s reply,
directed at the Duke, contains her central argument against Angelo’s question from earlier in the
play, “Who will believe thee, Isabel” (2.4.154):
Oh Prince, I conjure thee, as thou believ’st
There is another comfort than this world,
That thou neglect me not, with that opinion
That I am touch’d with madness. Make not impossible
That which but seems unlike; ’tis not impossible
But one the wicked’st caitiff on the ground
May seem as shy, as grave, as just, as absolute
As Angelo. (5.1.48-55)
Isabella here claims that believing her is analogous to believing in a rewarding afterlife, because
both are implausible and require faith without sufficient evidence. In her account, belief in the
Christian heaven can sound like madness; however, believing in it is not overstepping perceptual
bounds but rather accepting epistemic humility. Isabella argues that we can be suspicious of this
241
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world only if we have faith in another world. In order for Angelo to be exposed, people must
believe that another story is possible, that the truth can be hidden but it also can be found; they
must accept that their senses and their prejudices can deceive them.
The Duke responds with immediate sympathy for her:
By mine honesty,
If she be mad, as I believe no other,
Her madness hath the oddest frame of sense,
Such a dependency of thing on thing,
As e’er I heard in madness. (5.1.59-63)
His answer begins with a joke: just as Isabella swears by heaven, the Duke swears by his own
honesty: he self-aggrandizes while signaling to the audience that oaths are empty, since we know
he is not being honest at this point in the play. His “as I believe no other” is ambiguous: she is
mad and I do not believe anything else, but also she is mad and I do not believe anyone else. It is
as if she is mad but she is the only one he believes. What she says is not random: it follows and
has implied logical and ontological connections (“dependency of thing on thing”). The mere fact
of cohesion, of interdependency, makes her believable, even if her testimony does not
correspond to known (or knowable) facts. The Duke goes from “infirmity of sense” to “the
oddest frame of sense.” Empson finds this ironic,242 but it has at least two meanings: she is
irrational because her passion rules her reason; or, she is in the unfortunate situation of actually
making sense, and so she does not belong here in this insane world (a sentiment the Duke later
confirms). She shows that her truth is revealed in the accumulation of facts. She asserts, “truth is
truth / to th’ end of reck’ning” (5.1.45-46) and he agrees. He was quickly convinced. How? Her
argument is that the impossible is not the same as the unlikely, and that men can deceive and
pretend and perform, that evil can hide behind the mask of good. This is not logic, “dependency
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of thing on thing,” but rather a statement that we can be deceived by our senses and expectations.
It is humility, not rationality. Moreover, she bases this on the Duke’s belief in things unseen,
goods not experienced. She is arguing against discursive thinking: one should not assume
something is impossible because it is unfamiliar. If you believe in the possibility of heaven, then
you can also believe that a respectable man is actually “an arch-villain” (5.1.57). Isabella’s
argument is informed by faith, not reason, yet the Duke declares her arguing reasonable and thus
plausible. The Duke knows what is actually true, and so his response to Isabella is play-acting:
he performs credulity, as if openness to the unlikely, whether comforting or horrible, is the best
means to discovering the truth. He further performs his own role as the arbiter of not only what is
true but how to separate truth from falsehood, and he models judgment for his audiences, both
internal and theatrical.
Isabella’s plea is echoed later in the scene by Mariana, reveals that she, not Isabella, had
sex with Angelo, and also unlike Isabella is actually speaking the truth:
Noble Prince,
As there comes light from heaven, and words from breath,
As there is sense in truth, and truth in virtue,
I am affianced this man’s wife[.] (5.1.224-227)
She swears by the existence of heaven and the power of words, both of which are thrown in
doubt repeatedly throughout the play. In Measure for Measure, there is nothing to swear on
because nothing is stable or commonly affirmed; all oaths are automatically ironic. Nonetheless,
as with Isabella’s oaths, one needs heaven to exist and words to have meanings in order to
propose that the world as it seems at the moment need not be such. Shakespeare repeats the oath,
once for a falsehood and once for the truth, thus undercutting the oath’s power. Belief in heaven
does not assist judgment; it can open one up to new possibilities, but it can also be part of an
elaborate, manipulative deception.
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The Duke solidifies the sense that belief in heaven makes a person more gullible and thus
governable in his treatment of the prisoner Barnardine. He pardons Barnardine so as to fashion
him into a properly obedient subject. Barnardine will not consent to death or participate in his
own execution; he insists that, if they are to kill him, they must do so by force, against his
resistance: “I have been drinking hard all night, and I will have more time to prepare me, or they
shall beat out my brains with billets. I will not consent to die this day, that’s certain” (4.3.53-56).
Unlike Angelo and even Lucio, Barnardine is incapable of shame and has no aspirations: he is
“A man that apprehends death no more dreadfully but as a drunken sleep, careless, reckless, and
fearless of what’s past, present, or to come; insensible of mortality, and desperately mortal”
(4.2.142-145). Phoebe Spinrad links him to Claudio, who though he is capable of shame, “is a
Worldly Man in a sense undreamed of by the sixteenth-century Moralists: the man who sees
nothing beyond the limits of his own consciousness, the quasi-solipsist who in his own demise
sees the disappearance of the universe.”243 Both men elevate their own lives above all other
concerns, and are willing to accept a limited life if it includes bodily pleasure and relief from
pain. The Duke, who earlier said of Barnardine, “He wants advice” (4.2.146), prefers that he end
his long period of drunken refusal to die and rather live and accept the terms of the new Vienna:
There was a friar told me of this man.
Sirrah, thou art said to have a stubborn soul
That apprehends no further than this world,
And squar’st thy life according. Thou’rt condemn’d,
But for those earthly faults, I quit them all,
And pray thee take this mercy to provide
For better times to come. Friar, advise him,
I leave him to your hand. (5.1.479-486)
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The Duke trusts Friar Peter to give Barnardine the instruction he requires to make him want to
live beyond drunkenness, and that requires, for unarticulated reasons, that Barnardine believe in
an afterlife. Critical responses to Barnardine’s fate vary considerably. Debora Kuller Shuger
finds his pardon an example of “the soteriological and pastoral aims of Christian justice [which]
simply replace the penal sentences of the law.” 244 Virginia Lee Strain sees it “as a form of social
tolerance, a social verdict that underwrites the Duke’s pardon.” 245 For R. W. Chambers246 and
Cynthia Lewis,247 the pardon of Barnardine is a simple affirmation of life. Alexander Leggatt
claims that Barnardine exists to show that “no human being is replaceable or expendable,” 248 but
I argue that Barnardine embodies the play’s politics of consent, its requirement that people
submit to government.
Barnardine is, ironically, what “Friar Lodowick” had encouraged Claudio to be: “Reason
thus with life: / If I do lose thee, I do lose a thing / That none but fools would keep” (3.1.6-8). He
accepts that he will die and has no opinion about it, but he refuses to grant the state permission to
kill him. He enjoys being incarcerated: “he hath evermore had the liberty of the prison; give him
leave to escape hence, he would not. […] We have very oft awak’d him, as if to carry him to
execution, and show’d him a seeming warrant for it; it hath not mov’d him at all” (4.2.147-152).
Barnardine does not want liberty, other than the “liberty” of confinement and isolation. Unlike
Angelo, he refuses to listen; rhetoric has no effect on him: “I swear I will not die to day for any
man’s persuasion” (4.3.59-60). The disguised Duke describes him as “a creature unprepar’d,
unmeet for death” (4.3.67), as if one must be “sensible of death” to submit to the state’s authority
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over oneself. The Duke cannot kill Barnardine without Barnardine’s permission; he must be in
the right mind to die, so that when the Duke decides if he lives or dies, the Duke does not seem
to appear a tyrant.
Barnardine shows that a man with no life can still cling to life. He cannot substitute for
Claudio even though Claudio is similar to him in his desperate fear of death. He also exists
because of the play’s dedication to nonviolent domination: no one can be killed, but a character
(Ragozine) can die conveniently, “an accident that heaven provides” (4.3.77). Still, Barnardine’s
lack of hope for a better world makes him ungovernable, and the Duke orders Friar Peter to
change his soul so he may become more politically compliant. As with Isabella’s and Mariana’s
claims about heaven, Barnardine’s belief in the afterlife will make him more susceptible to
believing in other things which may or may not be true, and will make him dependent on others
to determine the truth for him.

Comedy against Reason
As I have shown, the tropes of Shakespearean comedy are deployed in Measure for
Measure as tropes, imposed upon the characters and the plot for their own sake so that the
audience may recognize the genre, even anatomize it, by noting how the Duke assumes control
of his city and the plot of the play by reorienting his citizens towards comic ends. E. A. J.
Honigmann notes that “It is particularly in the second half of the play that its genre is brought
into question—and here Shakespeare protects himself, and teases his audience, by making it
more emphatically the Duke’s play” and ensuring that we notice it as such. 249 However,
Honigmann does not account for the political implications of the Duke’s (and Shakespeare’s)
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plotting. He claims rightly that audiences are provoked to ask, “What kind of play is it?” 250 but
we should go a step further: “Why are these plays like that?” The comic tropes of the reprieve
from violence, reconciliation, and even heteronormativity are presented in the play as gratuitous
and grafted-on, and the play itself demonstrates, with its scant internal justifications and its
otherwise deferred explanations, that the tropes have little foundation beyond their claims to
produce pleasure and happiness. Shakespeare shows in this play the problematic, perhaps even
totalitarian, underside of the production of pleasure and happiness.
The last sentence of Measure for Measure, “So bring us to our palace, where we’ll show /
What’s yet behind, that[‘s] meet you all should know” (5.1.538-539), is an instance of the
“deferred explanation” common to the final moments of a Shakespearean comedy. The word
“behind” can simultaneously mean “in the past” and “what is to follow,” 251 and though the word
is usually glossed (as in the Riverside and Arden editions) as solely the latter meaning, I think the
ambiguity is possible, as well as a sense of “behind” as that which one cannot see because one’s
perspective is directional rather than comprehensive. Regardless of these particulars, the Duke
here says that he will tell them not what they don’t know but what he deems appropriate
(“meet”) for them to know. He is the sole arbiter of truth and knowledge at the end of the play,
and he is aware that the confusions and unexpected revelations standard to comic conclusions
remain confusing.
A curious feature of the instance of the trope of the deferred explanation is that the Duke
uses it in the beginning of the play as well as at the end. At the end of the first scene, when the
Duke announces his departure to Escalus and Angelo, he informs them, “Our haste from hence is
of so quick condition / That it prefers itself, and leaves unquestion’d / Matters of needful value”
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(1.1.53-55). His mission is more important than its explanation, he claims; we later deduce that
his evasiveness is actually secrecy. The Duke cannot do what he plans to do unless it is
“unquestioned.” The audience is in the same position as Escalus and Angelo; though we later
learn some of his intentions, we are then placed in the position of Lucio, who says of the Duke,
“His [givings]-out were of an infinite distance / From his true-meant design” (1.4.54-55). In the
next scene in which he appears, the Duke requests assistance from Friar Thomas, and amidst his
account of the decadence of Vienna and its need for remedies, he says, “More reasons for this
action / At our more leisure shall I render you” (1.3.48-49). In the first two instances, the Duke
retains his prerogative to share and withhold information for the purpose of deception. His
promise at the end of the play, therefore, can be viewed with suspicion: the audience will not
hear what he deems “meet” for his subjects to know, but we have reason to doubt his veracity.
The deferred explanation is, in short, a power move, a tacit acknowledgement that
justification is unnecessary (“the’ offense pardons itself”) and that the speaker reserves the right
to clarify and explain according to his own preferences. As Kristian Smidt observes, the first half
of the play is driven “to a large extent in terms of persuasion and argument and, in addition to
confronting each other, the principals of the mounting tragedy are tested for their fortitude and
their humanity” while “The second half is entirely dependent on the mechanics of manipulation
and deception.”252 The play suggests that rational debate and justification by argument—staple
features of Isabella’s and Angelo’s rhetorical style—leads to tragic ends, while comedy
proceeds, as it were, amorally or consequentially. The living, functioning community at the end
of the play provides the argument that need not be otherwise articulated.
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Governing for Survival and Decorum
A significant amount of the happiness at the end of the play—which may be, as Frye
defines the genre, structural rather than affective—is produced by the simple fact of the survival
of the characters. The play threatens violence from the Duke’s first command to Angelo that
“Mortality and mercy in Vienna / Live in thy tongue and heart” (1.1.44-45). Claudio, Julietta,
and Barnardine are sentenced to death, Isabella is threatened with rape, and in the last scene the
Duke authorizes Angelo and Escalus to interrogate and punish via torture: “And you, my noble
and well-warranted cousin, / Whom it concerns to hear this matter forth, / Do with your injuries
as seems you best, / In any chastisement” (5.1.254-257). The right to punish and withhold
punishment is the signature perquisite of the sovereign, and as the Duke shows with his threats to
Lucio in the play’s final moments, the Duke reserves that right even if no one is actually
physically harmed in the play, at least not onstage.
The evasion of violence and death is recognized as central to comic practice. Anne
Barton claims, “Comedy pauses to look disaster squarely in the face, but is still able to proceed
honestly towards a conclusion flattering to our optimism. The maneuver is designed to shore up
the happy ending, to allow us to surrender ourselves, at least temporarily, to a pleasing
fiction.”253 The implication is that since the lack of violence is desirable, we will take whatever
comes with it. Shakespeare’s comedies often feature characters under threat, e.g., Egeus in The
Comedy of Errors, Valentine in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Antonio in The Merchant of
Venice, and Orlando in As You Like It, but in Measure for Measure, the Duke rescues his citizens
from violence he himself puts into motion and authorizes. As I mentioned above and as other
critics have observed, the play begins as a tragedy and then presents comedy as its remedy or
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correction; as James Trombetta states, it “fulfills comic decorum by grossly thwarting tragic
possibilities.”254 Comedies may provide happiness as relief and deliverance, prioritizing life over
death, but in Measure for Measure does the threat and reprieve derive from the same source. The
Duke’s relationship to his subjects is analogous to Petruchio’s relationship to Kate in The
Taming of the Shrew: he instigates the violence so as to dominate, and then presents himself as
magnanimous for fostering concord. As Philip Edwards notes, the Duke misleads Isabella about
Claudio’s death, “willingly to cause despair in order to show the beauty of divine
consolation.”255 The despair is gratuitous and unnecessary, or rather, it is deliberate by the Duke
so as to cause a feeling of relief and redemption.
Death and violence have greater urgency in Measure for Measure and thus the play draws
our attention to this characteristic of the genre. Marjorie Garber observes, “All throughout
Shakespeare’s dramatic career the comedies have tried to hold death at bay, to keep death outside
their charmed circle.”256 But since the Duke is both the source of the play’s violence and its
rescuer, we can see this comic trope as yet another form of manipulation. The Duke sets out to
not only prevent violence but establish the prevention of violence, via acts of public mercy, as
one of his political priorities. Isabella and Angelo both express a willingness to die, either in
martyrdom or in shame; Isabella even claims, when she learns of Mariana’s predicament, that
Mariana would be better off dead: “What a merit were it in death to take this poor maid from the
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world!” (3.1.231-232), just after she expresses shock at her brother’s lack of enthusiasm for his
own martyrdom. The Duke himself, in his “be absolute for death” speech, argues that life is
restlessness, suffering, and helplessness before powerful forces, “yet death we fear / That makes
these odds all even” (3.1.40-41). Death is relief, and, as Jonathan Goossen notes, the Duke’s
speech has no reference to an afterlife beyond that.257 The Duke learns, perhaps from Isabella,
that belief in an afterlife can make a person more of a fit subject, but it can also make people
prefer death to life. Barbara Everett notes that “Some of the comedy’s darkest, most peculiar
moments of humor come as we recognize how prompt Angelo and Isabella and even the
Duke/Friar are to proffer death for other people as frankly the best solution for most of life's
problems.”258 But the Duke’s own actions in the second half of the play demonstrate that the
prioritization of life is, like the belief in an afterlife, useful for guaranteeing obedience from
one’s subjects. His acts of mercy are another instance of the instrumentalization for Christian
practices for the secular end of fostering social concord via fear.
The Duke’s mercy contrasts starkly with Angelo’s political program, what Lake and
Questier call “a controlled experiment in puritan rule.” 259 However one may feel about the
Duke’s actions in the play, he benefits by being preferable to Angelo; this, as I will address later
in this chapter, was probably the Duke’s plan all along. Angelo believes that Vienna can be
literally re-formed by culling the population of those who cannot obey the sex laws:
ANGELO

The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.
Those many had not dar’d to do that evil
If the first that did th’ edict infringe
Had answer’d for his deed. Now ’tis awake,
Takes note of what is done, and like a prophet
Looks in a glass that shows what future evils,
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ISABELLA
ANGELO

Either now, or by remissness new conceiv’d,
Are so in progress to be hatch’d and born,
Are now to have no successive degrees,
But here they live, to end.
Yet show some pity.
I show it most of all, when I show justice;
For then I pity those I do not know,
Which a dismiss’d offense would after gall
And do him right that, answering one foul wrong,
Lives not to act another. (2.2.90-104)

If the problem had not been tolerated in its first manifestation, Vienna could have been spared its
corruption. Angelo has a “broken windows” 260 approach to crime: sins are never merely
“private” because they have repercussions in their capacity to set (or reset) norms of behavior.
Angelo wishes to punish one man so he does not have to punish thousands, and he wishes to
prevent the suffering of subsequent generations by cleaning up his society before it gets even
worse.
Who were “the first that did th’ edict infringe” (2.2.92)? The first fornicators of Vienna,
or of Christendom, or of Time? Angelo may be referring to Adam and Eve, as if they were not
adequately punished. If they were, there would be no sin. Theologically, this argument has some
merit: if God had, as he originally promised, punished Adam and Eve immediately by smiting
them from the earth, there would be no sin, either because there would be no one to commit sins,
or because God would have fashioned a better, less gullible/hubristic creature to bear His image.
However, this interpretation only endorses Lucio’s and Pompey’s warnings: if we are to kill all
the sinners so as to abolish sin, we will have few people left on the earth, and they will not
reproduce. Sin is not some genetic aberration that can be quarantined and eliminated from the
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base population: it is the base population. Angelo, like Isabella, believes sin is heritable, in the
blood, and he can kill and police his way to a better world.
In the clash of moral anthropologies and political philosophies in Measure for Measure,
Angelo counters the Duke’s former permissiveness with his own strictness. In his mirror imagery
(“the law […] Looks in a glass that shows what future evils”), the mirror shows the law what it is
and what it can be, reflecting an image and also projecting it into time. In Angelo’s analogy, it is
as if the personified law has intercourse with its own likeness and can imagine two possible
offspring. Angelo imagines a decadent Vienna reproducing itself in perpetuity, and he seeks to
abort this, literally, in his attempt to execute the pregnant Julietta and her unborn child. Mario
DiGangi notes, “The play’s allusions to abortion repeatedly evoke the unnaturalness of denying
or disrupting [the] reproductive economy. Oddly, however, most of these allusions are associated
with men—Angelo and the Duke—whose legal power to kill is linked to women’s unique power
to abort.”261 The political future of Vienna depends on who is born and by what means. For
Angelo, illegitimate children are “stamps that are forbid” (2.4.46), while the offspring of statesanctioned sex produces “life true made” (2.4.47). Angelo believes that Vienna can be improved
by a combination of executions and Puritan eugenics.
The Duke anticipates Angelo’s fall: “and but that frailty hath examples for his falling, I
should wonder at Angelo” (3.1.186-187). Angelo will fall not because he has in the past, but
because of the myriad precedents of any man who considers himself exempt from human nature
and possessing greater virtue or willpower than other men. Angelo resembles the men in other
stories (including Shakespeare’s own): he is atypical for Vienna, but typical for men in this type
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of story. The implication is that everything is proceeding according to the Duke’s plan. People
are fundamentally predictable, especially in sexual matters.
Angelo’s threatened violence is replaced by the Duke’s mercy, which itself involves
retaining the threat of violence for future use. Stacy Magedanz claims a distinction between
Angelo’s desire to punish and the Duke’s desire to reform souls, 262 but the play offers no
evidence that the Duke is interested in anything beyond conformity and deference. He manages
bodies, not souls. The Duke does not change the laws but rather reestablishes himself as the
arbiter of how the law is to be enforced. For the Duke, it seems, government exists to prevent
violence and order what is disordered in human nature. His theory is that if people have the right
kinds of sex then they need not kill one another. Deception, surveillance, and manipulation are
the necessary means to this end. The Duke sees this as self-justifying: “the doubleness of the
benefit defends the deceit from reproof” (3.1.257-258). Robert Zaller’s interpretation is
uncharitable but largely correct:
The Duke gratifies himself in almost every way a tyrant can, except the shedding
of blood: he humiliates worthy servants and raises up unworthy or unready ones;
provokes and enjoys the suffering of others; assumes false identities and forces
others to do so. Above all, he sows the terror of prospective death and then enjoys
the sanctimonious pleasure of granting reprieve. He is the author of the play’s
action, which proceeds from his apparent decision to desert his office and his
subsequent manipulation of persons and events, and he not only escapes judgment
or censure but wins the gratitude of those whose lives he has turned upside
down.263
Zaller’s last clause is unjustified; the play provides no evidence that the Duke’s subjects are
grateful. The Duke “escapes judgment” within the world of the play because he (or Shakespeare)
effectively silences all responses to his actions. The actors and the audience are left to decide
how justifiable or explainable his actions are. As Linda Anderson points out, the play offers no
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indication that the Duke has effected a moral shift or an advance in self-knowledge in his
citizens. He “extends a limited forgiveness to Angelo and Lucio not because they deserve it, but
because his power, wisdom, and magnanimity allow him to be generous.” 264 Laura Lunger
Knoppers further notes that the Duke’s “shaming serves less to reform Angelo than to enhance
the Duke’s own power as he keeps Angelo in the society, forgiven and humiliated.” 265 The
characters in the play do not confirm or express approval of the Duke’s acts of shaming and
mercy or his expressions of concern and care. If we decide to agree with the Duke that his work
is good, we take his word over the silence of his citizens.

The Comic Machiavel
Measure for Measure contains contextual suggestions of its political ideology. The
surface political interpretation of the play is that it depicts a city wherein lax rule and social
permissiveness have led to undesirable outcomes, such as a proliferation of prostitution, disease,
and illegitimate children. Duke Vincentio appoints Angelo to test his virtue, but, as Harry Berger
writes, “This hypothesis about the Duke’s motive […] has itself to be reconciled with the larger
agenda he describes to the Friar in 1.3, his plan to get someone without his track record for lax
governance to clean up the mess in Vienna.” 266 The Duke schemes against Angelo, allowing him
to meet social decadence with an excess of justice. Andrew Majeske argues that the Duke “is
intentionally creating an extreme situation in Vienna” 267 so that he can re-emerge as the
moderate alternative to his own deputy and enforcer. Duke Vincentio’s method here is analogous
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to Niccolò Machiavelli’s account of Cesare Borgia, “popularly called Duke Valentino,” in The
Prince.268 Borgia conquered Romagna and “he found that it had been controlled by violent lords,
who were more disposed to despoil their subjects than to rule them properly, thus being a source
of disorder rather than of order.” Borgia appointed the “cruel and energetic” Remirro de Orco,
who brutalized the populace into submission, but then Borgia had de Orco himself murdered: “in
order to dispel this ill-feeling and win everyone over to him, he wanted to show that if any cruel
deeds had been committed they were attributable to the harshness of his governor, not to
himself.”269 Machiavelli cites Borgia with approval and, as Norman Holland notes, “the
underlying situations in Measure for Measure and the episode of ‘Messiere Remirro de Orco’ are
the same; in each, the ruler appoints a deputy to do an unpopular job.” 270 Stacy Magedanz also
notes the similar stories while emphasizing the divergent outcome:
While it is unfair to compare the comic Duke to Machiavelli’s ruthless Borgia,
both clearly had an appreciation for the theatrical elements of governance. If the
judgment scene of Measure for Measure forms the counterpart to Borgia’s act, the
amazing spectacle becomes one of forbearance, not of brutality. The Duke’s
theatrical public judgment is intended, perhaps, to shock the audience out of
rational considerations of the story’s potential dramatic failings, and into a
contemplation of the irrational benefits of forgiveness. 271
The parallel between the two suggests that Shakespeare depicts and endorses the notion that
crafty political plotting (and poor dramatic plotting) can be excused by the happy outcome of
mercy and marriage. Duke Vincentio uses Machiavellian deception to avoid Machiavellian
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violence. The apparent ends, however, are the same: order, stability, and unchallenged rule. The
people are “satisfied and amazed”272 as a result.
The idea that the Duke simply wants to reestablish law and order is supported by his own
stated intentions early in the play:
We have strict statutes and most biting laws,
(The needful bits and curbs to headstrong weeds),
Which for this fourteen years we have let slip,
Even like an o’er-grown lion in a cave,
That goes not out to prey. Now, as fond fathers,
Having bound up the threat’ning twigs of birch,
Only to stick it in their children’s sight
For terror, not to use, in time the rod
[Becomes] more mock’d than fear’d; so our decrees,
Dead to infliction, to themselves are dead,
And liberty plucks Justice by the nose;
The baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart
Goes all decorum. (1.3.19-31)
The Duke here admits that (unlike Duke Valentino) the condition of his city is his fault. He
chooses Angelo to enforce the sex laws because they would be “too dreadful” (1.3.34) coming
from him. The analogies to lions and rod-bearing fathers indicate that governments should be
violent sometimes, not just to control the behavior of the population but also to demonstrate
simply that governments are violent.
The Duke is not specific about what has gone wrong in his city. As I discussed above,
Vienna has a host of social maladies which concern the Duke: prostitution, illegitimate children
ignored by their fathers, brides jilted and marriages delayed for financial reasons, and so on.
However, the Duke’s concerns are formal: the problem with the laws being disobeyed is that the
laws are being disobeyed. People exercise their “liberty” against “justice,” though it is not clear
what the Duke considers to be just or unjust. Hierarchy is not being respected, and “decorum,”
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what is appropriate between unequals, is not observed. The imagery of overgrown gardens and
rebellious children is deployed to naturalize the Duke’s complaints: just as gardens must be
weeded and children must not strike their nurses, people must follow laws and obey rulers.
The Duke also acknowledges that he fears “slander”—people would disparage him if he
were strict (1.3.42-43). He reiterates this when he worries later about people fantasizing about
torturing him (4.1.65). The people should fear him rather than vice-versa. Too much ground has
been ceded already and his actions, good or bad, could be unpopular and thus threaten his
position. Escalus agrees that Vienna requires governing. Though he expresses reservations, he
appreciates Angelo’s “severe” program: “It is but needful. / Mercy is not itself, that oft looks so;
/ Pardon is still the nurse of second woe” (2.1.282-284). 273 The Duke’s mercies in Act Five, if
they are not to foster further criminality, must be presented as threats and demonstrations of
power, just as much as they could be demonstrations of humility and leniency. Whether the
government is too weak, too forgiving, or simply ineffective, the play begins with multiple
statements that someone must punish and direct, reasserting the existence of the government and
its prerogative to regulate human behavior.
However, the law and order interpretation ignores the complex interplay of political ideas
at work in Measure for Measure. Duke Vincentio may be interested in consolidating his own
power, as Harold Skulsky claims: “both judicial and ducal supremacy are revealed as forms of
arbitrary power. In both cases, not the general welfare, but the assertion of political supremacy is
the ultimate motive of action.”274 Skulsky is among the many critics preoccupied with “equity”
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as the proper balance between mercy and brute power. 275 Critics speculate on the Duke’s
intentions and justifications, though I prefer to bracket such psychological and moral questions
so as to examine the kind of world the Duke seeks to create and to fully account for the costs of
that world. What is the Duke’s power and mercy for? The Duke presents a particular idea of the
rightly-ordered city, and Shakespeare depicts his actions as arising from a definite social context.

What’s the Matter with Vienna?
The social problems of Duke Vincentio’s Vienna are symptoms of a general breakdown
of community, relationships, and institutions. People pursue individual interests. Words are used
for mockery and persuasion rather than to express truths, leading to widespread cynicism and
confusion. Hypocrisy is expected. The hypersexualized culture links sex to money—hence the
incessant bawdy punning and economic metaphors. Those who pursue higher goods, like Isabella
and Angelo, must depart from the community or control it. The Duke, if he has a worldview at
all, believes that life is not worth living. He thus deceives his people and stages his interventions
of justice and mercy. He elicits confessions and grants forgiveness, but his people learn they
must commit to one another (i.e., in marriage), recognize legitimate authority, reintegrate into the
community with norms and standards, and not take mercy for granted. These political
conclusions are presented as “moderate”—the Duke avoids mass slaughter or incarceration—but
the political community at the end of the play is, I argue, a different form of tyranny. The Duke’s
politics, in the end, are the end of politics: once we all agree—or consent that we should agree—
that life on earth is the only life we have, then we must surrender to civic authority to grant us
the lives that it tells us we are supposed to want.
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Duke Vincentio restores balance by creating a post-Christian order. He cannot minister to
souls in his capacity as Duke. The religious ideas that grounded the institutions in Vienna have
lost purchase and thus the law is not respected. Angelo, when he rules, is viewed as an agent of
mere power: “Whether the tyranny be in his place, / Or in his eminence that fills it up” (1.2.163164). His religious ideas just make him strange and inhuman, out of touch with ordinary people.
Isabella, “enskied, and sainted” (1.4.34), is also a curiosity. So the Duke must re-found Vienna
with new, non-religious ideas, based on worldly interests for worldly ends. Angelo’s bloody
attempt to control Vienna is thwarted by his inability to live up to his own ideals, and the result
of his failed revolution is the Duke’s restoration of Vienna on almost entirely secular principles.
Measure for Measure depicts a city in decline. The street and prison scenes show
characters in varying states of disease, and the commodification of sexuality creates an
atmosphere of cynicism that pervades the play and affects all the other relationships. The
omnipresence of prostitution informs the anxiety about language itself that runs through the play.
The Duke laments, “There is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure” (3.2.226-227).
The first lines of the play, the Duke’s “Of Government, the properties to unfold / Would seem in
me t’ affect speech and discourse” (1.1.1-2), are an expression of the futility of speech: even if he
spoke honestly and correctly about government, he would seem to be lying or performing.
The absence of a common ground of truth in Vienna is a result of the characters
prioritizing their own personal understandings of how to live. Vienna is a city of preferences, not
truths. Isabella, of all people, states this most clearly: “I have spirit to do any thing that appears
not foul in the truth of my spirit” (3.1.205-207). She judges what is right for herself and so
Claudio cannot convince her to do what she finds abhorrent. Her truth is not the same as
everyone else’s, but her understanding of truth as personal is. People only obey convenient laws,
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and ignore or erase the rest; this is “equity.” This is also shown when Lucio jokes about the
“sanctimonious pirate, that went to sea with the Ten Commandments, but scrap’d one out of the
Table” (1.2.7-9) and the First Gentleman replies, “Why? ’twas a commandment to command the
captain and all the rest from their functions” (1.2.12-13), and when Pompey is asked if his work
is lawful: “If the law would allow it, sir” (2.1.224). People’s moral judgments suit their
predilections and livelihoods.
The divergent, personal truths of Vienna are possible, interestingly, because of a shared
understanding of nature: Epicurean human nature (people are pleasure-seeking/pain-avoiding
bodies), and the “nature” (not God) that influences human life and the order of the universe.
There are fifteen uses of the word “nature” in Measure for Measure. In his opening speech, the
Duke refers to “The nature of our people, / Our city’s institutions, and the terms / For common
justice” (1.1.9-11) as known and thus not necessary to be stated. Four other uses of the term in
the play refer to “the nature of” something, a synonym for “essence” or “that which makes
something what it is.” The remaining eleven uses of “nature” refer to it as that which constitutes
reality. Shortly after the Duke refers to the “nature of our people” to Escalus, he tells Angelo,
“Nature never lends / The smallest scruple of her excellence, / But like a thrifty goddess, she
determines / Herself the glory of a creditor” (1.1.36-39). Nature bestows gifts and talents: both
similar to Grace and its opposite, she offers her gifts only in exchange, not freely. Angelo
reiterates this idea when he tells Isabella, “It were as good / To pardon him that hath from nature
stol’n / A man already made, as to remit / Their saucy sweetness that do coin heaven’s image / In
stamps that are forbid” (2.4.43-46). Angelo appropriates the Duke’s money metaphor: nature is a
creditor. Human beings do not own themselves but borrow everything and must use it according
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to nature’s dictates. The Duke mirrors nature: he “lent” Angelo and “dressed him” in the office,
and he will return to collect.
Claudio also deploys this idea of nature when he pleads with Isabella to save him from
death: “What sin you do to save a brother’s life, / Nature dispenses with the deed so far, / That it
becomes a virtue” (3.1.133-135). Nature is again a balancing force, demanding payment or
granting credit. Claudio, unlike Duke Vincentio and Angelo, has a personal and even forgiving
understanding of nature, in contrast to Isabella’s idea of an unforgiving, demanding God.
Five of the remaining uses of “nature” in the play refer to human nature, and consistently
they confirm a notion of human beings as essentially animals:
CLAUDIO

Our natures do pursue,
Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,
A thirsty evil, and when we drink, we die. (1.2.128-130)

LUCIO

Lord Angelo, A man whose blood
Is very snow-broth; one who never feels
The wanton stings and motions of the sense;
But doth rebate and blunt his natural edge
With profits of the mind: study and fast. (1.4.57-61)

ANGELO

Never could the strumpet,
With all her double vigor, art and nature,
Once stir my temper[.] (2.2.182-184)

CLAUDIO

The weariest, and most loathed worldly life
That age, ache, [penury], and imprisonment
Can lay on nature is a paradise
To what we fear of death. (3.1.128-131)

DUKE

Son, I have over-heard what hath pass’d between you and
your sister. Angelo had never the purpose to corrupt her;
only he hath made an assay of her virtue to practice his
judgment with the disposition of natures. (3.1.160-164)

The “disposition of natures,” in these cases, is human beings as having bodily needs and prerational proclivities. It is, according to Elizabeth Hanson, “a condition of embodiment which
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manifests as ineluctable drives.”276 Katherine Park writes that nature was “increasingly […]
represented as premoral in the sense understood by Renaissance writers […]. Her contribution to
human life was limited to conferring on individual humans the particular physical attributes and
mental inclinations with which they were born.” 277 Angelo’s “natural edge” is suppressed by his
bookishness; prostitutes lure men not only with their craft but their nature. If this is universally
true of human beings, then they are not capable of agreeing on anything other than their shared
natures.
Isabella attempts to defend her view of the necessity of mercy, given human “natural
guiltiness” (2.2.139). She thinks it does not matter if Angelo has self-control if he has blunted his
natural edge: if we share a common nature, then we should not condemn one another. However,
she does not prevail, even though the Duke agrees with her somewhat. He does not argue that
mercy should be commonly granted because all share the same common nature—since he
appreciates Isabella herself as a possible exemption from her own claim, and he does not
acknowledge his own nature. The Duke prefers to follow and embody the “nature” of balance
and credit.
The most important fact about the use of “nature” in Measure for Measure is that the
word is not used in any form after Act Three Scene One, when the Duke begins his plan against
Angelo. In its place is craft and reason. “Reason,” in various forms, is used eleven times in the
play: twice in Act One, twice in Act Three Scene One, and then seven times from Act Four
Scene Four to the end of the play. This is consistent with the Duke’s political assault on what I
call the political Epicureanism at the play’s beginning; I have in mind here the account from
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Norman Wentworth DeWitt: “Especially conspicuous in the Canon of Epicurus is the omission
of Reason as a criterion of truth. Only the Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings are recognized
as direct contacts between man and his physical and social environment. By virtue of being
direct contacts, they acquire a priority over Reason and in effect exalt Nature over Reason as
affording a norm of truth.”278 The Duke’s “craft against vice” is another way of referring to
“reason against nature,” though it is only the Duke’s reason against everyone else’s nature.
As the Duke becomes more politically engaged, he seeks to make his subjects into
apolitical Epicureans, tending to their own desires, seeking comfort and the absence of conflict,
and uninterested in pursuing any ideals. As the play shows, Angelo’s ambitions of public virtue
and high office make him dangerous, and Isabella’s desire for cloistered, celibate life invest her
with a power the Duke seeks to utilize and then subsume. Epicurean philosophy is for life under
kings, not democratic participation.279 Fewer than fifty years after the first performance of
Measure for Measure, Hobbes would write the fullest account of (anti-)political Epicureanism in
Leviathan, wherein people surrender their right to contest the nature of the good in political
space and instead live according to their individual interests and preferences under an
unquestioned sovereign:
Competition of riches, honor, command, or other power, inclineth to contention,
enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire,
is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Particularly, competition of praise,
inclineth to a reverence of antiquity. For men content with the living, not with the
dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the
other.280
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Puritanism and meritocracy encourage a fractious competition for honor and, in many cases,
wealth. The Duke needs more Claudios and fewer Angelos. As Hobbes continues, “Desire of
ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a common power […]. Fear of death, and
wounds, disposeth to the same […]. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with
their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to
continue the causes of war; and to stir up trouble and sedition.” 281 The argument is clear: people
who enjoy comfort are easier to rule. Men with greater goals are a threat to existing political
structures. Hobbes here describes not just Angelo here but also Lucio, who waits in “hope of
action” (1.4.52), i.e., for military service. The Duke pretends he is engaged in high-level
diplomacy when he is instead reforming his own city to encourage men to not distinguish
themselves and instead pursue their sensual lives within civic strictures. He restores “decorum”
and restricts liberty for reasons he does not articulate fully, implying that decorum and law exist
for their own sakes. Shakespeare shows that the Duke’s political actions are not “natural” but a
rational human response to the natural human impulse to seek personal pleasures and undervalue
relational and civic bonds. What is peculiar about the Duke’s use of “reason” against “nature is
his lack of reasons; they are promised but not provided, just as the Duke promises his actions are
for everyone’s good. Shakespeare gives us no reason to trust him.
Measure for Measure suggests that there is no form of government that can be justified
theoretically. As Kenneth Muir notes, “The word ‘authority’ is used six times in the course of
[Measure for Measure], and in each case it is referred to not as a means of order, but as a
synonym for tyranny.”282 Angelo is the play’s resident theorist and his plans go terribly awry.
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He, like Isabella, uses Christianity to inform his politics, and they are both silenced. The Duke
strives to avoid the appearance of tyranny, but it is difficult (though not impossible) to view his
behavior in Act Five as allowing his subjects to make any choices other than what he demands of
them. Only a strong ruler—who can employ religious trappings but is not himself confined to
religious office or teaching—can save us from reformers who do not understand what human
beings are. Angelo wants to frighten us into obedience and/or kill all the bad people. The Duke
offers another way.

Forgiveness as Punishment
The Duke’s securing of Angelo’s forgiveness—against Angelo’s own wishes—suggests
that the Duke is more interested in social concord than in justice. It also testifies to the Duke’s
claim that he knows what is best for people more than they do themselves. He demonstrates that
his style of governance is to prevent people from doing the wrongs they intend to do, and when,
he deems it necessary, preventing them from seeking the justice they deserve. He preempts and
redirects people’s actions and thus denies them guilt even if it means denying them agency. He
therefore personally assumes the role that “fortune” and “miracle” play in Shakespearean
comedies; he schemes to guarantee the ends that audiences are accustomed to receiving through
the mostly-invisible hand of the playwright within the structure of comedy itself.
The consequence of the Duke’s actions is that his citizens are not only denied agency but
also denied much claim to determine what is good for themselves. They are unfree so that they
may experience what is good; their actions and ends are subsumed by the Duke. When Claudio is
revealed to be alive, the Duke notes, “By this Lord Angelo perceives he’s safe; / Methinks I see a
quick’ning in his eye” (5.1.494-495). Angelo is “safe” because Claudio is alive despite Angelo’s
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own efforts; this makes Angelo innocent insofar as he was ineffectual. We do not know how
Angelo feels about this, since Shakespeare gives him no lines after his stated wish to be
executed; the Duke interprets Angelo’s response for him (and for us), and so it is up to the actors
or readers to decide if the Duke acknowledges Angelo’s happiness or if the Duke informs
Angelo that he should be happy.
The Duke’s final words about Angelo are of a piece with Isabella’s:
I partly think
A due sincerity govern’d his deeds,
Till he did look on me. Since it is so,
Let him not die. My brother had but justice,
In that he did the thing for which he died;
For Angelo,
His act did not o’ertake his bad intent,
And must be buried but as an intent
That perish’d by the way. Thoughts are no subjects,
Intents but merely thoughts. (5.1.445-454)
Her reasoning is: deny reality and assume the best of a person. If a person’s bad intentions are
thwarted by the interventions of others, consider that person blessed. Men’s sins towards women
are at least partially the fault of women. There is no need to bury a man (i.e., kill him) when one
can bury (i.e., ignore or excuse) his frustrated intentions. We can kill the bad part of Angelo and
keep the rest alive. Phoebe Spinrad observes that Isabella does not do what Mariana asks here;
rather than have an “emotional reaction,” she considers “the merits of the case” and makes a
legal argument for Angelo’s lack of culpability: “This, too, is what Shakespeare asks the
audience to do.”283 The audience’s emotional response to Angelo’s pardon is blunted by
Isabella’s argument; it is encouraged to consider questions of motive and consequence
theoretically rather than affectively, the opposite of standard comic practice. The audience is left
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to ask, in tandem with the Duke’s practice, not “How does this make me feel?” but “Is this
good?” and to consider the relationship between those two questions.
The pardon of Angelo—controversial among audiences, as I have addressed—is
premised upon his own powerlessness and the Duke’s power. The Duke saves Claudio from
Angelo and Angelo from himself; he empowered Angelo in the first place so as to expose his bad
governance, his duplicity, and his failure to carry out his own misdeeds. A character like Angelo
can only exist in a comedy if he is thwarted, and we can see that comedy as a genre functions by
thwarting such men. Angelo, like Bertram, is deceived and defused rather than converted or
disputed. Isabella’s attempt to change Angelo’s mind only made him worse, just as in All’s Well
That Ends Well the King’s attempt to compel Bertram’s obedience only made Bertram worse,
and in previous comedies, e.g., The Merchant of Venice, Portia’s arguments against Shylock
push him to greater extremes and thus require harsher measures to stop him. Measure for
Measure argues that people need to be governed, and the government must be active, even
invasive, requiring not only the surveillance Jonathan Dollimore documents but direct
intervention in people’s lives, dictating what is best for them in the most intimate areas of their
existence. As I will argue in my next chapter, the ordering of human intimacy is the central
feature of Shakespearean comedy.
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Chapter Four
From Henikosexuality to Heteronormativity

The Relationship between Henikosexuality and Patriarchy
To the extent that All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure are critiques of
Shakespearean comedy, both plays demonstrate how central heterosexual marriage is to the
genre. Some critics have observed sites of resistance to marriage within the plays, while other
critics celebrate comedy’s figuring of marriage as a source of community-building, personal
humility, and openness to miracle and possibility. In this chapter I will discuss how the Measure
for Measure portrays the drive towards marriage as a totalizing force that can be used to affirm
and reify hierarchical social and political structures. The play also draws our attention to the
genre as a genre, an assembly of rules and assumptions that can be taken as natural, beneficial,
and inevitable, but which rather are human creations that favor certain persons and choices while
restricting and punishing others. Comedies can compel and even provide happiness and order,
but the late comedies underscore the compulsion over the happiness.
In Chapter One, I addressed the ways that All’s Well That Ends Well uses same-sex
alliances to advance heterosexual ends, even if those ends are themselves a means to other,
possibly less normative ends. Measure for Measure, however, is not only heteronormative but it
takes sexual norms as one of its primary subjects. Unlike some of the other comedies, the play
does not address same-sex relations directly; 284 it focuses rather on celibacy, promiscuity,
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prostitution, and marriage as an economic transaction as problems to be solved by state-ordered
heterosexual marriage. All’s Well features Diana, a woman committed to virginity, and Bertram,
a man who resists acknowledging his marriage to a woman who desires him; Measure, likewise,
has Isabella, who wishes to be a nun, and Angelo, who rejects Mariana but who lusts after
Isabella. In the source material, the Isabella-character is not committed to celibacy; Shakespeare
refashions her for the purpose of centering a non-desiring woman in a comedy and subjecting her
to the requirements of the genre. Shakespeare presents her refusal of the erotic as another
problem that comedy attempts to solve. I argue that Shakespeare creates Isabella to critique his
prior comedies’ depictions of women and sexuality by showing how erotic fulfillment can be just
as normative and restricting as any other form of life. What is liberating and wish-fulfilling for
some women is violent and confining for others, but comedies prioritize women like Mariana
and Julietta over women like Isabella. As Arthur Kirsch writes, endorsing the comedic norm,
“Nothing is clearer in a stage production than that Mariana wants her man, and far from being a
scandal, it is an education for Isabella.”285 Kirsch’s generalization about Mariana is unfounded; it
is possible to stage Mariana in various ways other than infatuated, but Kirsch’s point about
Isabella is more salient: the genre implores her to experience desire and accept her erotic and
marital fate in imitation of Mariana. Kirsch assumes that Measure for Measure is consistent with
Shakespeare’s comic practice rather than a critique of it. I argue otherwise. I will show that
Isabella’s view of sexuality, while judgmental and personally restrictive, is more tolerant of
difference than the normative sexuality enforced by the Duke and implicit in the genre.
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As I have noted, critics tend to explain the focus on marriage in Shakespearean comedy,
and especially in Measure for Measure, with the production of children. This makes sense, since
the play features a pregnant woman, and the play concludes with the Duke ordering Lucio to
marry the mother of his child. The preoccupation with the next generation can require the living
to see themselves as mere means to the end of social and human continuity, as Robert N. Watson
argues: “Ending with marriage emphasizes the survival of the type through procreation […] the
abrupt and formulaic comic ending encourages a suspicion that the aftermath of marriage and
death alike is merely a biological process with no regard for human consciousness” and thus “it
undermines our faith in the comic formula as a whole by the unsatisfying impositions of
marriage that conclude this death-filled play.” 286 Debora Kuller Shuger, more positively, also
locates the Duke’s priority in the maintenance of families and the care of children: “In setting up
the bedtrick and weddings, the Duke acts on behalf of the women and children, guarding the
right of the little ones and the weaker sex, even Kate Keepdown, against insolencies and outrages
of strong men.”287 Marilyn Williamson agrees but she notes a shift in the Duke’s views over the
course of the play: “if the Duke began the play as a man more concerned for bastards than for
prosecuting sexual crimes, his experience with Lucio and the subculture of Vienna has changed
him by the end of the action, when he seeks to control sexuality through forced marriage.” 288
These critics read much into the Duke’s actions, as if the Duke’s treatment of Lucio is
motivated by concern for Kate Keepdown, rather than anger at Lucio’s slanders of the Duke and
“Friar Lodowick,” as expressed when the Duke asks him, “Wherein have I so deserv’d of you, /
That you extol me thus?” (5.1.502-503). The Duke sees himself as the wronged party, and he

286

Watson, “False Immortality in Measure for Measure: Comic Means, Tragic Ends,” Shakespeare Quarterly 41.4
(1990): 411.
287
Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England, 98.
288
Williamson, The Patriarchy of Shakespeare’s Comedies, 87.

169

first orders Lucio to marry Kate Keepdown and be “whipt and hang’d” afterwards (5.1.513). It is
possible for the Duke to have both motivations, of course, and the threats may have been idle;
nevertheless, the Duke’s order of Lucio’s marriage is a redress for Lucio having lied about it to
the Duke previously and gloated about it (4.3.172-174). In Lucio’s case, the Duke carries out the
law and gets his revenge; if he cares for children, he keeps that concern for himself. It is just as
likely that he worries simply that the law has not been respected.
Feminist critics take a variety of positions on the play. For example, Kathleen McLuskie
claims, “Feminist criticism of this play is restricted to exposing its own exclusion from the text.
It has no point of entry into it, for the dilemmas of the narrative and the sexuality under
discussion are constructed in completely male terms—gelding and splaying hold no terror for
women—and the women’s role as objects of exchange within that system of sexuality is not at
issue, however much a feminist might want to draw attention to it.” 289 Marcia Riefer, however,
argues that “chauvinism, while present in Shakespeare’s previous comedies, has almost always
eventually been subverted in favor of mutuality. […] The world of patriarchy, antithetical to the
world of comedy throughout Shakespeare’s works, comes closest here to overthrowing the comic
world. […] [T]he stronger the forces of patriarchy, the less likely—or at least less convincing—
comic resolution becomes.”290 Mario DiGangi persuasively argues that “the relentless definition
and manipulation of female sexuality in Measure for Measure is the graphic symptom of male
anxiety about female agency: to unravel male-constructed meanings for erotic pleasure,
pregnancy, and abortion is to discover a fear of the dangers thought to ensue from a woman’s
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control over her own body. […] Measure for Measure foregrounds female sexual desire only to
deny the desirability of seeking pleasure for pleasure’s sake.” 291 These critics assume a binary
between men’s and women’s interests, particularly between male control and female agency, that
Measure for Measure complicates. The play stages alliances across genders, with the common
ground being different positions not on gender but on sexuality and social order.
I do not see feminism or patriarchy as outside of or opposed to the world of the play and
its form. I claim instead that the play exposes the relationship between patriarchy and female
henikosexuality. The play, and the genre it anatomizes, does not elevate men over women so
much as it demonstrates that the genre is premised upon cooperation between men in positions of
power and women who desire marriage with specific men. Men—and women—in the genre thus
establish the norm of the henikosexual woman, whose feelings may be authentic (insofar as such
a thing is possible) and not the product of patriarchal conditioning or assumptions. Kathryn
Schwarz argues that “Comedies display motivated extrapolations, through which particular
desires become general requisites. They trace conversion narratives that make exclusive
commitment a missionary position, and disclose stratagems that camouflage compulsory
structures as sentimental clichés.” 292 The interplay between social requirements and personal
desires varies from one play to another, and they exist more on a spectrum than a binary. In the
case of Measure for Measure, we can assume that Mariana and Julietta are happy because each
of them desires a specific man, with whom they already have had sex, and they can marry them.
These women express no other interests. Isabella, however, prefers celibacy, but the Duke
proposes to her, expanding the drive to marriage beyond rational bounds just as he does for
mercy. In Measure for Measure as in many of Shakespeare’s comedies, women who do not
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express a preference for a specific man nonetheless find themselves with a husband at the end of
the plays, sometimes against their own stated preferences.

Isabella’s View of Sexuality
When Duke Vincentio proposes to Isabella, he does not only express a personal wish for
a wife, but he completes a political program of establishing marriage as the norm for Vienna.
The other women in the play have their reasons to be married, but Isabella professes a desire to
be a celibate nun, and the “bed-trick” organized by the Duke is designed to, among other things,
prevent Isabella from having sex. The Duke’s proposal to her is therefore surprising, even if it is
prefigured in the Duke’s compliments of her beauty and virtue: “The hand that hath made you
fair hath made you good” (3.1.180-181). Isabella’s own view of sexuality is, as I will show,
nuanced while being quite simple: she argues that it is a normal and natural part of human life
and not to be denied as a fact, but she also insists that she pursue her celibate life of prayer while
other people make their own choices. Isabella is, in other words, relatively tolerant, while the
Duke’s world at the end of the play includes greater social pressures for women to choose one
life over others. His proposal therefore suggests a competition between their worldviews, with
the Duke’s in a strong but not necessarily winning position in the final moments of the play.
From the beginning of Measure for Measure, Isabella’s chastity is fundamental to her
self-understanding and her image. However, Measure for Measure draws her out, uses her power
as a virgin to advance the plot and suit other characters’ interests, and sexualizes her against her
will: many of the characters in the play, and many audiences and critics, refuse to let her alone.
Before Isabella appears onstage, her brother praises her, clarifying why he thinks she may be
able to convince Angelo to pardon him:
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[F]or in her youth
There is a prone and speechless dialect,
Such as move men; beside, she hath prosperous art
When she will play with reason and discourse,
And well she can persuade. (1.2.182-186)
Claudio’s use of “prone” carries opposing meanings: “either ‘inactive and lying flat’ (in
retirement or with a lover) or ‘active,’ ‘tending to,’ whether as moving men, by her subtlety or by
her purity or as moving in herself, for pleasure or to do good”; 293 “connoting both recumbence
and receptivity, [it] suggests that Isabella’s body speaks the language of sexual availability.” 294
Whatever else it means, Jonathan Bate argues, “she has the power to move the vital spirits
through a man’s body and make his penis stiffen.” 295 Her ability to use rhetoric and her sexual
attractiveness are paired throughout the play, though eventually men’s desire for her weakens her
rhetorical effectiveness and subverts her purposes.
It takes very little time for Isabella to be sexualized. Lucio finds her and appeals, “Hail,
Virgin, if you be, as those cheek-roses / Proclaim you are no less!” (1.4.16-17): her blushing
indicates her virginity more than her habit. 296 Virginity for Lucio is pre-sexual, an invitation to
being sexualized. Her blushing can be taken as her blood revealing her inner nature; blood is
linked to sex in this play as it is what gives life and circulates, involuntary but responsive to
stimulation. It is also what is revealed when we blush or are wounded—it is the humanity that
emerges in moments of passion and pain. We cannot pretend that we do not have it or control
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when it is aroused. Isabella’s reply to Lucio, “Sir, make me not your story” (1.4.29) resonates on
multiple levels. She presents this as a command, an insistence that she not be his mark or gull.
She can imagine him regaling friends with the tale of the way he scandalized a religious woman,
and she tries to interrupt him. This line also suggests that she does not want to be a character in
his (or any man’s) narrative; she does not want “story” at all.
Before Isabella can say more about herself and her own preferences or values, Lucio
expresses in hyperbole his respect for her religious commitment:
I hold you as a thing enskied, and sainted,
By your renouncement an immortal spirit,
And to be talk’d with in sincerity,
As with a saint. (1.4.34-37)
Lucio recognizes Isabella as an exception. He identifies her as a virgin yet does not treat her as
he normally would (i.e., attempt to seduce or scandalize her), though we know that eventually
Angelo, Claudio, and Duke Vincentio will attempt that. Lucio, unlike the others, can allow for
human variety. When he notifies Isabella of her brother’s predicament, her response
demonstrates her pragmatism: “O, let him marry her” (1.4.49). She is not Angelo, and she does
not expect others to live according to the standards she sets for herself.
Lucio, for all of his fooling, speaks authoritatively to Isabella, and she is directed by him
as she will later be directed by the Duke. He generalizes about men and sex, and informs Isabella
of her power: “when maidens sue, / Men give like gods; but when they weep and kneel, / All
their petitions are as freely theirs / As they themselves would owe them” (1.4.80-83). Isabella’s
rhetorical power is tied to her sexual identity, which suggests that the genre’s preoccupation with
preventing women from maintaining their virginity is of a piece with reducing women’s power.
As in Helena’s conversation with Parolles in the beginning of All’s Well That Ends Well,
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virginity is supposed to be temporary. Its strength is tied directly to being fragile and associated
with youth.
Though she does not recognize her own sexuality, when Isabella pleads with Angelo, she
makes claims about the universality of male sexual desire being an impetus for equality and
mercy:
Go to your bosom,
Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know
That’s like my brother’s fault. If it confess
A natural guiltiness such as is his,
Let it not sound a thought upon your tongue
Against my brother’s life. (2.2.136-141)
She refers here to Angelo’s sexual feelings; if he admits that he even has the inclination, then he
should not judge Claudio. Isabella herself voices the claim often used to justify Shakespearean
comedy: sexual desire makes people fallible, and it is a common human fact that, when
acknowledged, can lead to a loving community of people who accept each other’s faults. Isabella
wants Angelo to declare that he is no better than Claudio and thus unfit to punish him.
If Isabella has sexual feelings of her own, she considers them to be a weakness that
humans share and thus something to pardon in others rather than indulge, celebrate, or
commodify. She refers previously to Claudio’s sin as “a vice that most I do abhor, / And most
desire should meet the blow of justice; / For which I would not plead, but that I must” (2.2.2931). She disapproves of premarital sex but she takes her brother’s sin upon herself—or, she
thinks her holiness grants her powers of intercession. Angelo need not be blamed (or take credit)
for sparing Claudio:
That I do beg his life, if it be sin,
Heaven let me bear it! You granting of my suit,
If that be sin, I’ll make it my morn-prayer
To have it added to the faults of mine,
And nothing of your answer. (2.4.69-73)
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For her, pardoning Claudio is the potential “sin” here. Claudio deserves condemnation, but “I’ll
take it as a peril to my soul, / It is no sin at all, but charity” (2.4.65-66). She takes the same
position here that Angelo took in his argument with Escalus in Act Two Scene One: so long as
she is conscious of the law she is willing to be punished herself in its name. But failing to punish
the guilty is not the sin Angelo has in mind, and he accuses her: “Either you are ignorant, / Or
seem so [craftily]; and that’s not good” (2.4.74-75). His inability to know her mind, and indeed
know if she knows his mind, forces him to speak more bluntly. What this moment conveys is
that Isabella presents herself as capable of the sin of wishing for undeserved mercy for her
brother; she knows that he sinned and she wants him to live anyway. Angelo, however, wants
Isabella to sin by consenting to have sex with him—and consenting to admitting that her words
about the universality of human sexual desire apply to her as to everyone else. Isabella is not at
this point capable of fathoming such a possibility.
Isabella tries to preserve herself through acknowledging her sinful state yet disregarding
its particulars: “Let [me] be ignorant, and in nothing good, / But graciously to know I am no
better” (2.4.76-77). She does not want to know sin directly. She does not think herself sinless,
though she denied previously that pleading for Claudio is sinful. She risks God’s judgment
because the charity outweighs the sin. Is her awareness of her own sinfulness just a pose? Is she
willing to consent to sin and thus show her imperfection? Angelo suggests as much as he
critiques her circular reasoning: “Thus wisdom wishes to appear most bright / When it doth tax
itself; as these black masks / Proclaim an enshield beauty ten times louder / Than beauty could,
displayed” (2.4.78-81). Her purity only stands out in contrast to others’ sinfulness, including
Angelo’s own pride and assuredness of his purity, while her denials of her own holiness only
adorn her halo. Angelo distrusts Isabella’s affected ignorance and assumes she is using her wiles
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on him, authorizing his own sexual awakening. Angelo cannot decide if she is virginal, whorish,
or clueless; regardless, her effect on him is the same.
Isabella’s reply to Angelo’s proposal legitimates her previously-stated preference for
silence. Here and elsewhere, her own words undermine her. Angelo uses her arguments about
human nature and sexuality against her, and when she expresses her depth of religious feeling,
her words carry erotic undertones that conflate the two discourses and excite Angelo. When he
asks if she would surrender her body for Claudio, she replies,
[W]ere I under the terms of death,
Th’ impression of keen whips I’ld wear as rubies,
And strip myself to death, as to a bed
That longing have been sick for, ere I’ld yield
My body up to shame. (2.4.100-104)
Her imagery is itself sexual, as if she would derive pleasure from her torture. Knoppers argues,
“it can also be seen as resistance or reverse discourse. Isabella reverses the patriarchal spectacle
of shame: she pictures herself whipped and stripped naked not for sexual transgression but for
chastity,”297 but Isabella nevertheless evinces pride and excitement at the image of martyrdom. 298
Isabella is a threat to men not simply because she is a virgin and a nonconformist but because she
considers her way of life superior, unavailable to most people. Her sexuality or its lack, however
we configure it, bestows moral authority upon her.
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If the audience views Isabella sexually because of her verbal imagery and her appearance,
then it participates in the sexualization she experiences from Angelo, Claudio, and eventually the
Duke. Jonathan Bate claims, “In a good production, sexual chemistry crackles between Angelo
and Isabella even as she resists him. [...] As we watch, there is a little part of us that anticipates—
or even hopes—that they will end up marrying each other in the manner of Shakespeare’s other
sparring couples.”299 Bate’s “we” is too broad; he denies divisions among the audience, and that
Isabella herself laments the fact of women being viewed as sexualized creatures against their
will. Unlike Mariana and Julietta, Isabella experiences desire as an external force directed at her.
If she eroticizes her religious experience, that does not translate to her desiring a husband or a
male sexual partner. Nonetheless, Angelo applies her own logic back to her when he propositions
her. Angelo insists that men and women are both “frail,” i.e., subject to temptation, but again
Isabella misreads (willfully or not) his intent. She does not see women as desiring sexual agents.
Angelo responds by telling her to accept what she is:
ANGELO
ISABELLA

ANGELO

Nay, women are frail too.
Ay, as the glasses where they view themselves,
Which are as easy broke as they make forms.
Women? Help heaven! men their creation mar
In profiting by them. Nay, call us ten times frail,
For we are soft as our complexions are,
And credulous to false prints.
I think it well;
And from this testimony of your own sex
(Since I suppose we are made to be no stronger
Than faults may shake our frames), let me be bold.
I do arrest your words. Be that you are,
That is a woman; if you be more, you’re none;
If you be one (as you are well express’d
By all external warrants), show it now,
By putting on the destin’d livery. (2.4.124-138)
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In their previous scene together, Isabella warned about the “proud man, / Dress’d in a little brief
authority, / […] (His glassy Essence), like an angry ape” (2.2.117-120). She told him his attempt
to demonstrate his superiority to other men will only expose his inferiority to God. Janet
Adelman writes that Angelo is like Bertram in All’s Well That Ends Well, in that “both can desire
only when they imagine their sexuality as an illegitimate contamination of a pure woman,” 300 but
Angelo is also responding to the threat Isabella poses to him as chaste and therefore his moral
and religious superior. Angelo cannot let her be free from natural human weakness: since she
tried to convince him that all human beings are subject to temptation, she must include herself;
furthermore, his reference to the limitations of “our frames” suggests that human beings are only
as strong as their bodies, so her relative physical weakness should therefore align with moral
weakness, an inability to control oneself. Isabella presents women’s weakness as their capacity
to be deceived and manipulated by men, but Angelo reframes her words as indicative of
women’s weakness of will. However, Angelo does not insist that Isabella feel desire, only that
she be held to her words. He blames her for awakening his own sexual desires, but he does not
want her to be an unwilling victim of his lust; he wants her to confess her own desire and
participate, thus proving (or making) the universality of “natural guiltiness.” It is as if her
argument about the universality of sexual desire has authorized him to express his lust freely and
demand her consent.
Isabella’s comparison of women to mirrors, “Which are as easy broke as they make
forms” suggests that female frailty is like a mirror that reflects images just as easily as it shatters,
but “make forms” also implies pregnancy, and here we see how she links pregnancy with
destruction, being “broke” or smashed. Men “profit by” women, impregnating them and
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otherwise using them as they please, and this mars women’s “creation,” making them “credulous
to false prints”—able to be duped, as well as able to be slandered and demeaned via the actions
of men, such as when a woman is shamed after being raped as if she committed the crime.
(Isabella is in the next scene credulous to a “false prince,” “Friar Lodowick,” also known as
Duke Vincentio.) In this sense, Isabella is analogous to a radical feminist who rejects sexuality as
always a form of domination of women by men.
When Angelo refers to Isabella’s “external warrants,” he may mean “evidence” or
“proof” but also “license, sanction, authorization.” 301 Angelo uses legal language to refer to
Isabella’s body. “Warrant” means “assurance,” particularly a “command or permission of a
superior which frees the doer of an act from blame or legal responsibility; authorization,
sanction; an act of authorization.”302 Her female body itself licenses his sexualization of her.
There may also be a metatheatrical joke: since Isabella would have been played by a man (or
boy), then her “external warrants” are the costume of a nun or novice, and the “destin’d livery”
would be the apparel of a woman ready for sex, e.g., the night-clothes worn by Juliet or
Desdemona. “Livery” can also refer to the transfer of property or “the action or an act of handing
over or conveying to another”; her clothing would suggest that she is being exchanged or
surrendered.303 All of these roles are costumes, physical signs of identity that need not
correspond to inner disposition or even the physical body.
Isabella’s views of gender and sexuality emerge in greater detail when she speaks to her
brother. Since Angelo’s social position and gender give him the power to slander her and conceal
his own vices, Isabella hopes that Claudio, as a man, will protect her. In one of Shakespeare’s
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most cruelly comic turns, Isabella leaves her confrontation with Angelo assured that Claudio will
martyr himself for her chastity. She acknowledges Claudio’s weakness, but she also believes in
her own rhetorical gifts and religious convictions:
I’ll to my brother.
Though he hath fall’n by prompture of the blood,
Yet hath he in him such a mind of honor
That had he twenty heads to tender down
On twenty bloody blocks, he’ld yield them up,
Before his sister should her body stoop
To such abhorr’d pollution.
Then Isabel live chaste, and, brother, die;
More than our brother is our chastity. (2.4.177-185)
While the Duke blames Julietta for Claudio’s sin (“your sin of heavier kind than his,” 2.3.28),
Isabella attributes it to his own blood—as a man, not as her kin. She does not think of him as
having Christian scruples or guilt but rather classical honor associated with family and masculine
virtue, wherein a man would never sacrifice his sister’s virtue for his own life. She contributes to
the play’s pervasive discourse of disease and contamination when she refers to “abhorr’d
pollution,” and she assumes her brother will keep her safe from contagion. Robert Miola claims
that “Isabella’s conclusion, reached in a fury of self-righteousness, must give us pause […].
Isabella’s certainty that sexual intercourse with Angelo will damn her to hell, despite the
circumstances, makes God another Angelo, intent only on harshly punishing sexual activity,
insistent only on the letter, not the spirit, of the law.” 304 But Isabella’s restrictive view of her own
sexuality is premised upon her belief in an unforgiving God who holds her, if not everyone else,
to inflexible standards. Her sexual identity is her own, not a norm for others, deeply connected to
her personal view of God who may show mercy to others while making special demands of her.
She can contemplate a God who forgives her for loving her brother, but not for consenting to
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Angelo’s proposal. Isabella’s argument to Angelo was not that he was wrong in his judgment but
in his standing: he usurps and poorly imitates God’s authority.
When Claudio tells her that he fears death so much he wants her to consider Angelo’s
offer, Isabella objects not on feminist grounds but with her own idiosyncratic reasoning:
O you beast!
O faithless coward! O dishonest wretch!
Wilt thou be made a man out of my vice?
Is’t not a kind of incest, to take life
From thine own sister’s shame? What should I think?
Heaven shield my mother play’d my father fair!
For such a warped slip of wilderness
Ne’er issu’d from his blood. Take my defiance!
Die, perish! Might but my bending down
Reprieve thee from thy fate, it should proceed.
I’ll pray a thousand prayers for thy death,
No word to save thee. (3.1.135-146)
It now sounds as if all sex is transgressive and unnatural to her. His suggestion makes their
mother into an adulterous prostitute: all male sins, even just of thought, hurt a woman, and often
a man as well, since Claudio also dishonors their father. She says if she did this for him, then he
would deserve to die; if he died for her, he would deserve to live. She will now pray for his death
because his life is not worth living or saving. She prefers to “bend down” in prayer rather than in
sex, even to pray for death rather than have sex for life. Her rhetorical question, “Wilt thou be
made a man out of my vice?” (3.1.137), implies that in her mind Claudio is having sex with her,
or he gains his identity in some way from her. The question carries the implication of incest as
well as the essence of male supremacy: he is a man because she has to be a woman. He lives and
flourishes by the sacrifices of her body.
The rawness of Isabella’s anger is offset by the specificity of her critique. She is not
speaking on behalf of some received ideology or doctrine but of her own personal worldview.
She reveals in this scene her principal reasons for preferring a life of prayer and isolation, of
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releasing herself from her social bonds and familial relationships: “Thy sin’s not accidental, but a
trade; / Mercy to thee would prove itself a bawd, / ’Tis best that thou diest quickly” (3.1.148150). She refers to “trade” as in “exchange” as well as “job” or “profession,” as if that which
identifies a person is what one offers in exchange. Just as Pompey consistently justifies his own
behavior with his “trade,” Isabella suggests that Claudio’s appeal to her is not some exceptional
event in particular circumstances (“not accidental”) but his vocation, his way of being in the
world, and his means to survival and continued life and prosperity. He cheapens not only sex but
mercy, making all human activity into exchanges in a marketplace. Mercy is personified: not a
gift or act of grace, but an agent of transaction that turns human flesh into a commodity and sex
into another form of barter. The last line is not just her wish for his death, but her claim—
echoing the Duke’s claims about what is for everyone’s “good” or “benefit”—that death could
bring an end to Angelo’s life of sin. “’Tis best” implies that it is good not just for Claudio
himself but for the whole world; he is a pollutant and his death improves the state of things. 305
It is not clear what Isabella thinks sex actually is. It is “a vice that most I do abhor”
(2.2.29), and her quick suggestion that Claudio and Julietta marry may be driven by her
relationship with them than her abstract moral and religious beliefs. Her angry claim that
Claudio’s “sin’s not accidental, but a trade” (3.1.147) may indicate that she believes sex itself
has a sacredness or at least a value that should not be sullied by commerce; as Katherine Gillen
writes, “Isabella regards her own chastity […] as operating outside the realm of commercial—
and legalistic—evaluation, and she seeks to preserve its absolute value.” 306 However, for those
who are incapable of recognizing any value outside of a market, then Isabella’s behavior in this

305

Rosalind Miles notes the Shakespearean uniqueness of this scene: it is “in contradiction to all his sources”; see
The Problem of Measure for Measure, 260.
306
Gillen, “Chaste Exchanges and Theatrical Legitimacy in Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare Studies 44 (2016):
158.

183

scene is bizarre and pernicious. Kirsch sides with Claudio in his exasperation with Isabella’s
refusal to be sexualized. He asserts that “Isabella betrays the ideals by which she wishes to live
[…] because she cannot accept the reality of human instincts,” 307 though it is rather that she
accepts the reality but she just wants no part of it. She does not want to be any man’s prostitute,
despite the many attempts to make her one. For Kirsch, Isabella is merely repressed and refuses
to admit her own sexual urges, as shown in her sadomasochistic description of martyrdom and
her “subsequent abuse of her brother (including the hysterical image of incest)” which “confirms
[...] that she is afraid not only of Angelo’s desires, but of her own.” 308 Kirsch’s claims would
have some grounding if Isabella expressed any such desire, but she does not. The assumption
that she must be sexual, that male sexualization of her entails some quantity of desire on her part,
is not borne out by the content of the play so much as the fact that it is a Shakespearean comedy.
If audiences were accustomed to seeing a young, single woman onstage who expressed interest
in something other than marriage and even got the opportunity to pursue it, then Isabella would
not seem as out of place in the comedy as she does. Kirsch, like many critics who read
Shakespearean comedy as dramatizing biological and natural stages of human development, can
only see Isabella as stunted and repressed.

307

Kirsch, Shakespeare and the Experience of Love, 87.
As Katherine Eisaman Maus notes, male critics often call Isabella “hysterical”; see Inwardness and Theater in
the English Renaissance, 167. She cites Lever, Introduction to Measure for Measure, lxxx; and Richmond,
Shakespeare’s Sexual Comedy: A Mirror for Lovers (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 155. One can add
Hammond, “The Argument of Measure for Measure,” English Literary Renaissance 16 (1986): 506; and Lake,
“Ministers, Magistrates, and the Production of ‘Order’ in Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare Survey 54 (2001):
178. Stanley Wells calls her anger at Claudio “the hysterical, unreasoned outburst of a disillusioned, emotionally
immature girl, frightened of the very idea of sex”; see Shakespeare, Sex, and Love (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 130. Paul Fiddes also disapproves of Isabella: “undeniably virtuous, she also shows herself to be as
sexually repressed as Angelo is, and with a hint of the self-righteous about her”; see “Law and Divine Mercy in
Shakespeare’s Religious Imagination: Measure for Measure and The Merchant of Venice,” in Poetry and the
Religious Imagination: The Power of the Word, eds. Francesca Bugliani Knox and David Lonsdale (New York:
Routledge, 2015), 112.
308

184

Isabella’s Challenge to Comic Norms
Critics tend to label Isabella as selfish and overly principled (but also inconsistent), as
well as insufficiently empathetic and deferential to others’ desires. Lawrence Ross calls her “a
self-ignorantly humorless character, immaturely zealous for repressive regulation and
unconsciously betraying the self-idealizing fragile sublimation of her passionate nature.” 309 Stacy
Magedanz criticizes her “self-love that cancels out compassion.” 310 Arthur Quiller-Couch writes
of “something rancid in her chastity […]. To put it nakedly, she is all for saving her own soul,
and she saves it by turning, of a sudden, into a bare procuress,” 311 while G. Wilson Knight refers
to her “self-centered saintliness” and “ice-cold sanctity. […] Isabella lacks human feeling […]
Her sex inhibitions have been horribly shown her as they are, naked.” 312 Quiller-Couch and
Knight repeatedly refer to her nakedness, as if the play is designed to expose her. This is
somewhat Shakespeare’s doing: the audience is invited on multiple occasions to imagine
Isabella’s body, when men talk about her and in her own discourse, and some productions
feature Angelo becoming so aggressive in the second act that he tears or removes her clothing.
Simon Palfrey and Tiffany Stern see passion’s emergence from repression in Isabella’s
speech: her
prosodic forms remain broadly consistent: she speaks in a tightly reined blank
verse, often rhythmically jagged and broken, and only very occasionally either
heated or fluid (basically when roused to indignation). The sense the part gives is
of a mind in control of the medium, retaining even in the midst of passion some
power in reserve. […] She enters determined to skate on the situation’s surface, to
remain personally untouched and unrevealed, but again and again she is forced
into a violent commitment and baring of her self to the moment’s challenge. In
many scenes, therefore, we seem to witness Isabella warming up—or perhaps
thawing—into a fuller revelation of what we infer is “already” there: as though at
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the start of each scene she is some kind of statue or monument, waiting to be
quickened into motion.313
The language of “untouched and unrevealed” leading to “baring her self” is not subtle: they see
Isabella as the virgin who wants to be stripped bare but who needs conversation with a man to
stimulate her into becoming the woman she really wants to be. Palfrey and Stern suggest that she
lacks interiority, or that she “neurotically self-police[s]” herself. They also note that all of
Isabella’s language is spoken directly: she has no asides to the audience or to other characters. 314
This makes her vulnerable: she thinks people should speak their minds (not their hearts) straight
to other people, and she is unprepared when people say things she’s not expecting. Since she
does not appeal directly to the audience until the end of Act Two Scene Four, she does not have
their sympathy; she attempts self-sufficiency and thus she is isolated.
Other critics are more openly subjective. Frye avers, “Isabella is unlikely to be our
favorite Shakespearean heroine” because “militant chastity […] is seldom likeable.” 315 For
Raymond Southall, Isabella’s “commendable sincerity has to be strengthened with sympathy”; 316
Louise Schleiner states her “naïve spiritual pride” needs to be “broken” 317 and her marriage, like
all the others in the play, “is a form of moral correction for one or both partners”; 318 according to
Marjorie Garber, Isabella’s “self-righteous obstinacy” is tested and transformed so she can
undergo a “conversion from justice to mercy,” giving her “a new life, in which earthly love has
its place, and the selfishness of ‘Isabel, live chaste, and brother, die’ (2.4.184) is replaced by a
wish for the married happiness of Mariana and Angelo despite her own (supposed)
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bereavement.”319 The cumulative effect of so much criticism is to label Isabella selfish, cruel,
inadequately directed towards the good of others, and in need of growth and transformation. To
see her as requiring adjustment is to legitimize the processes within Shakespeare’s comedy that
effect it. Anna Kamaralli writes that “Those interpretations of Isabella that focus on whether or
not she is attracted to Angelo, or falls in love with the Duke, or is unnatural in not doing either,
show an attempt to limit a woman’s sphere of action to her relationships, and leave to men to
work on life’s larger issues.”320 What critics tend to ignore in their frustration with Isabella is the
play provides us not with Isabella’s understanding of her own erotic identity but rather with her
simple and unimpeachable preference to not be raped. She does not want to surrender her body
as an act of submission to a man with power over her, and she does not want sex to be
transactional. When Angelo states his terms boldly, he clarifies that he has no interest in
physically overpowering her, but in her cooperation: “Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite, / Lay
by all nicety and prolixious blushes / That banish what they sue for” (2.4.161-163). Angelo
insists that since Isabella has aroused him, her expressions of shame or resistance are expressions
of her true desires; like Lucio, he interprets her blushes as expressions of her virginity, though
unlike Lucio, he takes them as invitations, even demands. Angelo wants more than her body: he
wants her to be as sexual as everyone else and to participate in the sexual economy of the world
of the play.321 We need not accept Angelo’s framing, however: a woman’s desire to not be raped
should not be identified with her being proud, repressed, or a tease.
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In Act Five, as part of the Duke’s plan, Isabella must state publicly that she did submit to
Angelo and thus present herself as a sexualized woman. The seriousness of the situation is
undercut by Lucio, who makes a series of bawdy jokes at her expense. He explains his role in the
story: “I came to her from Claudio, and desir’d her / To try her gracious fortune with Lord
Angelo, / For her poor Brother’s pardon” (5.1.75-77). The First Folio has a comma after “desir’d
her,” which gives the line bawdy potential. Later, when Escalus says he will question Isabella
offstage, Lucio jokes, “Marry sir, I think if you handled her privately she would sooner confess;
perchance publicly she’ll be asham’d” (5.1.275-277). This joke serves as a reminder that Isabella
is perpetually an object of desire. As if Escalus “handled her privately” she would admit that
Angelo “handled her privately,” because privately women reveal their sexuality, “for women are
light at midnight” (5.1.279-280). According to Lucio, women are changeable, they can be
seduced, or they can be more or less forthcoming depending on mood or context.
Though the Duke’s proposals to Isabella are not as brutal and coercive as Angelo’s, they
are still premised on eroticizing her virtue: “grace, being the soul of your complexion, shall keep
the body of it ever fair” (3.1.183-184). The proposals are also transactional, presented “for her
good,” as I discussed in Chapter Three. Crucially, however, the Duke proposes marriage, not sex,
and therefore our consideration of Isabella’s possible response rests upon our recognition of the
genre’s yoking of those two phenomena. The play begins with sex and marriage as sundered,
mostly because of male prerogative, but Mariana and Julietta both treat sex as a preface (and in
Mariana’s case, a means) towards marriage. The meaning of sex transforms over the course of
the play; it is still a medium of exchange, but within a structure that, as I have shown, favors
women who express preferences. Isabella’s preference for celibacy does not protect her from

configure Isabella as resistant to market forces, and I build on their work though I see the economic concerns of the
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male attention; as with Diana in All’s Well, it is a source of attraction. In both women’s cases, we
do not know how they respond to the injunction to marry, but Shakespeare does ensure that we
see that his comedies involve such women being told from men in high positions of authority
that it would be best for them to become wives. Comedies do not guarantee marriage, but they
represent the normative pressure for young women to marry.
Comedies also depict the normative pressure for men to marry, but the genre’s preference
for the henikosexual woman is such that Angelo and Bertram are forced to submit by the very
mechanics of the plays they are in, while the pressure on Isabella and Diana is applied only at the
end and their answers are suspended. Both women are already deeply implicated in the sexual
lives of others and have participated in schemes to assist henikosexual women. The endings of
their plays signify that facilitating others’ marriages is not sufficient for celibate women; they
must also respond to powerful entreaties to marry, and Shakespeare does not provide them with
the means to resist verbally.
Since Isabella ends the play silently, we do not know if she responds to him any
differently than she responded to Angelo. The Duke proposes to her twice, the first as a
command: “Give me your hand, and say you will be mine” (5.1.492) and the second as an
appeal: “if you’ll a willing ear incline” (5.1.536), implying that the first may not have been taken
as well as the Duke expected. The Duke offers her a choice and requests her consent, but she has
already been deeply implicated in as well as fooled by the Duke’s deceptions. As Laura Lunger
Knoppers observes,
To the extent that the spectators of Measure for Measure make the ending happy,
then, they become complicit in the ideology of patriarchal church and state; to the
extent that they posit resistance, they obscure the coercion which Isabella has
undergone. Positing either happy compliance or successful resistance occludes the
process by which Isabella has been not educated but sentenced, not transformed
by love and potential marriage, but silenced by juridical shaming. […] She
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withholds the verbal assent for which the audience looks at the end of a comedy.
And the audience’s inevitable dissatisfaction with her silence evokes
dissatisfaction with the strategies (of Duke and playwright) which have produced
that silence.322
Knoppers makes clear how difficult it is to intuit Isabella’s response because her position is so
overdetermined by external pressures. Shakespeare ensures that we see Isabella as pulled into the
sexual world of Vienna against her own stated preferences, and her concern for others has been
repeatedly deployed against her. Her participation in the bed-trick is premised upon it being a
transaction beneficial for nearly all involved: “by this is your brother sav’d, your honor
untainted, the poor Mariana advantag’d, and the corrupt deputy scal’d” (3.1.253-255). “Friar
Lodowick” does not include himself among the beneficiaries, but at the end of the play, his
appeal to Isabella repeats the language of mutual benefit. If Isabella’s desire to avoid sex is
connected to it being transactional, then the play suggests that transactions are unavoidable. The
end of the play highlights that these transactions occur in contexts of asymmetrical power. If
Isabella consents to the Duke’s proposal, even if it’s out of love, it would also be a gesture of
submission.
Isabella’s pleading on Angelo’s behalf is also part of the play’s narrative of dominance.
Isabella submits to Mariana’s request, again presented in the language of transaction: “Sweet
Isabel, take my part! / Lend me your knees, and all my life to come / I’ll lend you all my life to
do you service” (5.1.430-432). Mariana effectively offers herself as a slave so that she can have
her husband. Isabella’s acquiescence to Mariana, and her claim that she is implicated in Angelo’s
fall (5.1.445-447), continue her work of accommodating the interests of others. According to
Lynda Boose, our personal feelings about mercy should not prevent us from noticing how the
play—and, I would argue, the genre—demands such submission:
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To circumvent punishment, the resolution instead invokes the model of mercy—a
model that would seem above critique, but one that, since it is never applied to
narratives of presumptive female guilt and men are never compelled by such plots
to forgive women their sexual crimes, must finally be considered outside of any
abstract moral category and reevaluated as a narrative strategy. By deflecting the
punitive focus of the scene, the mercy-over-justice plot acts as cover for a
reinstatement of the familiar cultural narrative. Thus, immediately after judgment
is awarded to Isabella, her award becomes the source of Mariana’s devastation,
and feminine revenge is reconstructed by a powerful iconography into a scene that
replaces male punishment with female abjection.323
In Boose’s reading, women are thus made to participate in their own subjugation, as they beg on
behalf of the man who wronged them, and serve the man whose solutions are premised upon a
restoration of marital gender hierarchy and a severe limitation of female agency. She is correct
about the social facts, though I would stress that Shakespeare presents Mariana’s abjection as a
consequence of her desire for marriage. Shakespeare allows us to recognize Mariana’s love for
Angelo as irrational and humiliating, and raising serious questions about justice, while also being
one of the defining features of the genre itself. Furthermore, Mariana’s desire for marriage
affects Isabella, not just in her work to facilitate Mariana’s story, but in her own story becoming
analogous to Mariana’s.
It’s possible to view the Duke’s actions in Act Five, leading to his proposal to Isabella, as
a way to make Isabella wear the “destin’d livery” of a wife. If Isabella submits, she would grant
the order of the regime and the genre; as Kathryn Schwarz argues, “her will reconciles reason to
passion and recuperates order, alliance, and continuity. We can trace versions of that pattern in
many comedies. Through rebellion and acquiescence, disguise and revelation, departure and
return, the feminine subjects of this genre vitalize the interdependencies that sustain social
forms.”324 The women of Shakespearean comedies sustain the forms, while those who oppose
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the women’s desires, the older men or structures who prevent the women from erotic and marital
fulfillment—which are sometimes manifested within the desired man himself—are overcome.
Measure for Measure reverses this process in Isabella’s case.
Our response to the levelling power of sexuality and the reification of gendered narratives
hinges upon our identification with Isabella’s capacity for resistance. If she rejects the Duke,
then she (and he) stand as the exceptions to the marital order the Duke fosters; he would have
something less than total power over his subjects, and the play might be something less than a
Shakespearean comedy. The Duke’s regime and the genre both, for unprovided reasons, require
women to marry or to be confronted with the injunction to marry. For Shakespeare to make the
Duke’s proposal the last phase of his strange, possibly-improvised plan enables us to see the
marital fate of women in comedy as normative but not necessary, even gratuitous. The play thus
presents the price of order by de-naturing the social and sexual contract. We see how the
structures require acquiescence, with the discourses of religion and morality serving a political
order that functions despite our judgments. To return to Schwarz’s analysis, “Measure breaks
open the comic unification of necessity and desire, revealing that they must converge, but cannot
cohere.”325

Returning to Measure for Measure’s Critique
With Measure for Measure, Shakespeare demonstrates, as I have argued, what happens
when the genre is imposed for the sake of the order it creates, and not, in Greenblatt’s words, “as
the apparently improvisational expression of a collective desire.” The desire in Measure for
Measure is selective, though I will show in subsequent chapters that it’s less collective in the
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previous comedies than is generally acknowledged. Shakespeare achieves the strangeness of
Measure through the replacement of courtship with sex. Many of his previous comedies feature
courtship, but the closest Measure for Measure comes to it is the Duke’s single flirtation with
Isabella; otherwise, there is sexual harassment and attempted rape. There is no playful wooing,
only Angelo insisting upon the bounds of Isabella’s agency. The improvisation and discovery
common to the genre is present in the Duke’s business with Ragozine’s head, not in the banter of
lovers. Hence the play’s preoccupation with consent: surrender is presented as the basis of
human relations.
The play offers none of what Paul Kottman defines as “lovemaking” in the true sense:
“Lovemaking and courtship enact the collapse of the explanatory authority of sexual
reproduction and sexual domination, at least for the subjects involved.” 326 One may interpret
Shakespeare’s previous comedies as mildly ironic celebrations of lovemaking, but Measure for
Measure perhaps signifies the collapse of the explanatory authority of lovemaking and courtship.
Kathleen McLuskie notes, correctly, that the end of the play “is no more inappropriate to the
characters concerned than the finale of many another romantic comedy.” 327 Measure for
Measure minimizes love and courtship while maximizing the controlling functions. Marriage is
for the regulation of sexuality and the care of children, but it also is a means to making human
behavior predictable and uniform. Love is not necessary. It is, nonetheless, possible: we can
imagine Isabella happy with Duke Vincentio, just as we can imagine other possibilities.
Productions of the play sometimes portray her receiving the Duke’s hand with joy, if after a
moment of discernment. But the play is designed to prevent her from becoming a nun, and
audiences and critics are often complicit in denying her this choice.
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Isabella’s silence at the end of Measure for Measure is both an acknowledgement of the
male preference for it and an interruption, if not a disruption, of the Duke’s new regime of
consent, and it is her refusal to participate in her further sexualization. What she desires at the
beginning of the play, and what is taken from her, is a foretaste of what it will be like for her to
be a woman in Heaven. According to St. Augustine, in dispute with other patristic authors and
even with Paul, women will be women when their bodies are resurrected: “The sex of a woman
is not a defect, but nature. They will then be exempt from sexual intercourse and childbearing,
but the female parts will nonetheless remain in being, accommodated not to the old uses, but to a
new beauty.”328 Margaret Miles’s interpretation of Augustine provides us with a possible
understanding of Isabella’s spiritual motives. Miles writes that part of what is so difficult but
necessary for us to imagine about Heaven or any world other than our own is that women can be
beautiful without being desired or otherwise enduring the challenges of having a woman’s body:
Female bodies with their vulnerability to rape, their domestic vulnerability to
unwanted or forced sex, and the discomfort and pain of childbearing, were
Augustine’s paradigm of the “used” body, the instrumental body that will be
transformed in the resurrection to a body whose beauty is enjoyed “for itself
alone” (City of God 22.24). The female body is Augustine’s normative body—on
pilgrimage, in life, and on the pages of The City of God—from rape to
resurrection.329
This is as good a gloss as any of the Duke’s lines to Isabella after he hears her berate Claudio and
before he proposes the bed-trick: “The hand that hath made you fair hath made you good; the
goodness that is cheap in beauty makes beauty brief in goodness; but grace, being the soul of
your complexion, shall keep the body of it ever fair” (3.1.180-184). “Friar Lodowick” creates a
scenario wherein Isabella can be beautiful and not used, wherein her beauty and her virtue are

328

Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003), 22.17.
Miles, “From Rape to Resurrection: Sin, Sexual Difference, and Politics,” in Augustine’s City of God: A Critical
Guide, ed. James Wetzel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 88.
329

194

not transient and usable but an intimation of eternity. She was created this way, and he attributes
to her the possibility of elevating the male mind. People in heaven will be perfectly integrated,
without the earthly hierarchical dichotomy of mind/soul over body but with a full, unmixed,
peaceful union within the self. This is what the convent offers Isabella, where she could be
beautiful with no fear of rape or even arousing desire. The Duke praises her for this and then he
uses her. At the end of the play, he attempts to deny her this life, while using others’ belief in
heaven as a means to securing their consent.
The Duke does not simply set out to dominate Isabella but to put his ideology into
practice without exception. However, he does seek to invalidate her form of life in a way
consistent with comic practice of sexualizing women and restricting people’s options. He
instrumentalizes compulsive heterosexual monogamy, as well as forgiveness and reconciliation.
He does this by making it apply to himself and Isabella, as if it must be total or it cannot work.
They have to forgive others, reorder the community, and then marry one another. The Duke does
not just let people marry if they so desire, because people, particularly men, will not do that
without compulsion. The political imperative for it must exist, or the economic imperative will
take its place and overwhelm the social imperatives.
A more charitable interpretation of the play, and particularly the Duke’s actions, is to
welcome the loss of selfhood and the creation of community as part of the Duke’s (and
Shakespeare’s) insistence that human life be relational. Human beings live in communities, and
communities must be governed. R. W. Maslen gives the play’s communal ideology a positive
spin: “Nothing in a given society, the play suggests—whether a possession, a social position, a
sexual relationship, or a crime—is any man or woman’s exclusive property. Instead it depends
for its very existence on a complex web of other things, deriving identity from the (primarily
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verbal) interaction between people of both sexes and every station—no matter how rigorously
we may try to dissociate it from its context,”330 but the Duke’s new community exists with a
singular idea of human flourishing: marital sex and passive obedience. The Duke offers a
political solution that demands a particular form of relational life while erasing other forms. Each
person should be in a sexual relationship with one person, in a social relationship with all
members of the community, and in a subordinate relationship to him.
Isabella’s religious claims over her own body are superseded by the Duke’s political
claims over her. He had granted bodily autonomy to everyone’s peril, but he also knows that a
sovereign cannot legislate sexuality. A religious leader, however, can, though better through
machination than proclamation or scolding. People cannot restrain themselves as such but they
can be managed, with due consideration of practicality, not morality. “Friar Lodowick” may
think that the embodied life is a dreadful thing, but he also knows that we all must live such a
life, so we are better to live it according to basic regulations and formalities. But this means that
everybody must live this way, including Isabella and himself.
What makes Measure for Measure so discomfiting and disorienting is that the play
undermines our understanding of human selfhood and agency, particularly female agency, all
while presenting us with a series of moral and political dilemmas. We want to judge people and
their actions but we cannot do so comfortably because we see all the behavior in the play as
somehow coerced. Intentions are obscure and thwarted; characters are tricked by others and by
themselves, and even by the form of the play itself; and the solutions the play offers seem to
make people even less free than they were before. Ronald R. Macdonald claims that the play
“suggests Shakespeare’s fast ebbing faith in the ability of comic scheming to produce real
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solutions for the social malaise,”331 and therefore, perhaps, we should not put our faith in comedy
to achieve such social ends or present to us an image of happiness without sufficient questioning.
Shakespeare’s comedies are usually premised upon people seeking and valuing marital and
communal life, or acquiescing to it when others want it. Measure for Measure exposes the
implicit coercion in the genre’s foregrounding and fostering of such desires.
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Chapter Five
Rethinking Sexuality, Authority, and Happiness in Shakespeare’s Comedies

Shakespearean comedy includes a wide spectrum of human behavior, particularly human
sexuality, including same-sex desire and, in the case of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, pedophilia
and cross-species desire. I focus in this dissertation on heterosexual relations and, particularly,
the restricted desire of the women I label “henikosexual” not to enlist Shakespeare in a socially
conservative project but to explore the ways he makes heterosexuality strange and demonstrates
how much personal and social effort is required to maintain the institution of heterosexual
marriage. All’s Well That Ends Well and, to a greater extent, Measure for Measure highlight the
strange singularity of such women as well as the human work of achieving and normativizing
marriage, drawing our attention to Shakespeare’s previous contributions to that work, and
demonstrating the social and political acts necessary to reaffirm heterosexual marriage. The late
plays show that the extent to which Shakespeare’s comedies are heteronormative, they enforce
not only opposite-sex relationships but also marriage and erotic relationships in themselves.
People can resist heterosexual marriage for myriad reasons, but the late comedies show that from
the standpoint of comedy, these expressions of resistance are mere plot obstacles, like an
obstinate father or a missing dowry.
As I wrote in Chapter One, the plays do not rule out same-sex relationships, just as they
do not rule out adultery: the comedies are rife with references to the inevitability of men being
cuckolded; for example, in the first chorus of the song that closes Love’s Labor’s Lost:
The cuckoo then on every tree
Mocks married men; for thus sings he,
“Cuckoo;
Cuckoo, cuckoo”—O word of fear,
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Unpleasing to a married ear! (5.898-902, repeated 907-911)
The play presents adultery as inevitable in spring as sickness and foul weather is inevitable in
winter. Shakespeare does not idealize heterosexual marriage. But comedies display the ways the
form of heterosexual marriage conflicts with and either subordinates or subsumes other forms,
such as inheritance, religious life, social hierarchy, war, gender as a binary, and so on.
I here use Caroline Levine’s sense of a form, which can be “defined as patternings,
shapes, and arrangements, [which] have a different relation to context: they can organize both
social and literary objects, and they can remain stable over time.” 332 Courtship and marriage are
ways of ordering people and securing agreements. As I noted in Chapter One, marriage must be
affirmed and performed even if its terms are not fully honored. Shakespeare’s comedies
analogize the function of marriage as an organizing force in the genre as it is in actual social life,
and note the attendant costs and benefits. Levine, however, resists the idea of “closure,” which is
“typically read as bringing the competing values and interests of the narrative’s middle into a
stable containing order. [...] Closure is not only the ending of a story, but the enclosing of
discordant energies and possibilities into a single ideological whole [...] the containing form of
the text mirrors a model of social unity.” 333 For Levine, as for the critics who emphasize the
emergent possibilities for life Shakespearean comedies create, a genre does not contain as an
object of enclosure. Using the example of Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South, Levine argues
that its ending marks a “beginning—the launching of a series of social and political relationships
[...]. The ending’s political force depends not on resolution and finality, but on repetitions that
will extend past the time represented in the text. To call this closure and containment is to
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overlook the future implied by the text, a deliberately uncontained temporal process.” 334 I
contend that her account of containment is very much the controlling image of Shakespearean
comic closure: this new set of arrangements will continue, that a new (old) form for social life
has been instituted with a clear understanding among all of where authority lies and how it
functions. Measure for Measure ends with the Duke calling people into his palace, an enclosed
space, to explain the world to them, “For better times to come” (5.1.485). That this is a
“beginning” is the point. As Robert Weimann writes of Love’s Labor’s Lost, “At the end of the
play there is promise, hinged on a measure of self-control, rather than fulfillment in a clear vision
of given options and circumstances.”335 What makes Measure for Measure distinct is the Duke’s
role as the organizer, sustainer, and enforcer of the order he creates, an order which coincides
formally with comic closure—marriage, concord, continuity—but with the coercion more
prominent than usual. In the previous comedies, this closure is ensured and enforced more
communally, though I will show how much Shakespeare highlights that certain characters foster
and enforce the comic ending over others whose silence can be as suspicious as Isabella’s.
In this chapter, I will survey Shakespeare’s comedies, noting how they possess the
features that the late plays foreground: i.e., the triumph of henikosexual women, the utilization of
various means to secure that triumph, and the pressure placed upon the characters and the
audience to approve what has transpired. I will argue against those who see Shakespearean
comedy as “liberating”; in my interpretation, comedy forecloses possibilities as it privileges
certain forms of life over others. I will argue that compulsory happiness and concord is still
compulsory, and that Shakespeare provides cues for us to recognize it as such.
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Universality over Liberation
I will show in my analyses how the coercive normativity of Shakespearean comedy
functions. I am not the first person to notice that comedy itself is coercive, given that the form is
quite strict in its recurring generic features. As Stephen Booth declares, “Comedy, by its very
physics, bullies us into actively exercising a faith in limits.” 336 The classic formulation of the
Classical version of the form by Northrop Frye is also worth reviewing:
New Comedy normally presents an erotic intrigue between a young man and a
young woman which is blocked by some kind of opposition, usually paternal, and
resolved by a twist in the plot which is the comic form of Aristotle’s ‘discovery,’
and is more manipulated than its tragic counterpart. At the beginning of the play
the forces thwarting the hero are in control of the play’s society, but after a
discovery in which the hero becomes wealthy or the heroine respectable, a new
society crystallizes on the stage around the hero and his bride. The action of the
comedy thus moves towards the incorporation of the hero into the society that he
naturally fits. The hero is himself is seldom a very interesting person: in
conformity with low mimetic decorum, he is ordinary in his virtues, but socially
attractive.337
Interestingly, this applies more to Measure for Measure than to many other Shakespearean
comedies. (There is a hint of it in A Midsummer Night’s Dream.) It is as if Shakespeare is
returning to the root of the genre. Claudio is ordinary and “socially attractive,” and he gains
respectability once the Duke decides that what he did can be pardoned. Thus a new society is
created. But Claudio is not the “hero” of Measure for Measure in an obvious sense. His triumph
comes when all those who obstruct him are brought down to his level and his way of life is
approved by his society. In the first half of the play, Angelo is the “blocking figure,” but then
Isabella takes that role.
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Just as much as tragedies, comedies feature a structural inevitability, wherein the
progression of events is incontrovertible and proceeds regardless of our desires. Or rather, they
tell us what we should desire, and uncover the implications of what we do desire: a society that is
both orderly and permissive, a God or concept of Fortune that favors us if it exists at all, sex
lives which are socially acceptable and personally fulfilling, rulers who are both like us and not
like us, and so on. When comedy is too uniformly funny and/or pleasing, according to Frye, “it
tends to become farcical, depending on an automatic stimulus and reflex of laughter. Structure,
then, commands participation but not assent: it unites the audience as an audience, but allows for
variety in response.”338 Frye’s tone is quite neutral, though he locates the difference between a
“community” (varied response) and a “mob” (uniform response). But in his contrast of
“participation” and “assent,” one sees that the “structure” of drama integrates the audience
without asking its permission. “Structure” renders the audience into passive Stoics as much as
pain-averse Epicureans: we cannot change the world, we have no choice or say about what we
see; all we have power over is how we feel about it. Comedies do not have an obligation to
please, though they often end with an expressed hope that they did.
Mihoko Suzuki considers the ideological bases to comedy to be largely patriarchal:
“comedies are usually considered a more mediated form in which elements of fantasy and wishfulfillment play a larger part than in tragedy. The questions that need to be asked of Much
Ado and Twelfth Night are, ‘whose fantasy?’ and ‘whose wish-fulfillment?’ […] [I]n Much
Ado Shakespeare not only calls attention to and critiques male fantasies as overdetermined
fantasies, but also dramatizes their cost to women.”339 I have noted the ways that patriarchy
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aligns with certain women’s desires over others’. Though there is much for feminists to decry in
Shakespeare’s comedies, Shakespeare demonstrates that its power functions not by the binary
opposition between men and women, but by the association of powerful men with marriageminded women over the rest of the community.
The happiness of a comic ending is such partially because it is usually not the
achievement of the characters but the gift of the playwright, presented as fortune or coincidence.
The characters accept their limitations, with the implication that they cannot solve their own
problems. Even the plays which are driven by a single character’s stage-management, such as
Rosalind’s in As You Like It, Helena’s in All’s Well That Ends Well, and Duke Vincentio’s in
Measure for Measure, require some quantity of luck and happenstance to reach their ends, and in
the case of the latter comedies, we see that the more the comic end is planned and executed by a
guiding intelligence, the odder and more off-putting it may be. It is as if the comic ending is best
if it just happens to all work out, as it does in Twelfth Night, because human effort is
untrustworthy. William Bache notes that “Since, typically, a Shakespeare comedy comes closer
to disaster in the second half of its action, art is needed in order to effect peace. It is as if
Shakespeare insists that his art makes the concord possible. In Shakespearean comedy, we, the
audience, are meant to be aware that without the hand of the artist, the play would not end
happily.”340 The goals of peace, concord, and happiness all require external assistance; human
beings cannot manage them on their own. Leo Salingar concurs,
If the initial entanglement in the pay springs from the disposition of the
characters—which is not always the case—the resolution always calls for
something extraordinary. Sometimes, the resolution is brought about, or mainly
brought about, by the skill of a single character—Portia, Helena, the Viennese
Duke, Prospero; but they all rely on devious and astonishing methods. And even
they depend at some point on the help of chance. 341
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The comedies as a whole argue that people should defer to whatever forces grant these desired
ends, and that other ends are not desirable.
Kiernan Ryan argues that reading Shakespeare’s comedies as I do—his term is
“realistically”—results in a failure to make the imaginative adjustments necessary for the
liberation the plays offer: “If realism is the frame of mind that keeps us in line with the status
quo, that reconciles us to the reality of the way things are, then Shakespearean comedy
constitutes a sustained assault on that tyrannous mentality in the name of how things should
be.”342 But I argue here that the fantasies the comedies present are quite real, not so different
from the “status quo” worlds they seem to reject, and themselves present a “tyrannous mentality
in the name of how things should be.” Ryan’s commitment to a liberating reading causes him to
judge much of whatever is problematic in the plays as justifiable because it appears to be
idiosyncratic or rebellious. For example, he cites Valentine’s offer to “give” Silvia to Proteus at
the end of The Two Gentlemen of Verona as “act[ing] unpredictably,” and the general
strangeness of the play is the expression of “its alienation from an alienated world.” 343 But what
if the world of the play is largely similar to ours, even if Shakespeare is deliberately vague and
free with geography and time? Moments of apparent randomness proceed towards a reliable
conclusion. The fantasy elements do not contradict but rather serve the ideological apparatus. In
this play, as in the other comedies, characters can seem to be rejecting what Ryan calls “the
predictable scripts of their culture,”344 but the audience—and the savvier characters—can
experience the genre as not just predictable but inevitable.
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It is possible that when Shakespeare’s plays premiered, they appeared transgressive. R.
W. Maslen claims that in its emphasis on common people and universal human tendencies,
comedy contains subversive potential, and “the Elizabethans saw comedy as having been subject
to the suspicion of rulers from ancient times to the present. […] Comedy […] made tyrants
uncomfortable and roused them to rage.” 345 In many of Shakespeare’s comedies, a cruel ruler
(such as Duke Frederick in As You Like It or Angelo in Measure for Measure) is replaced with a
kinder one, and a cruel law can be ignored or reasoned away (such as in The Comedy of Errors,
A Midsummer Night’s Dream, The Merchant of Venice, and again in Measure for Measure), but
the goodness of the rulers and their capacity to set aside laws, however desirable, amounts to an
argument for submitting to a ruler whose wisdom is evident in his elevation of heterosexual
marriage over other concerns. All’s Well and Measure feature rulers who side with henikosexual
women over men and women who resist their interests, and in both cases these rulers go so far as
to claim normative status for the women they favor. Shakespeare manages within these last plays
to write pro-tyrant comedies that can be read as anatomies of tyranny, perhaps even as vehicles
to instruct people why they welcome or tolerate tyrants, and why they accept the idea that one
form of life is superior to all others.
Ejner Jensen insists that Shakespeare is neither a moralist nor a psychologist, 346 but his
comedies depict characters making decisions according to moral precepts and interpreting their
own choices and fates. Many of the debates and difficult decisions within the plays are
arguments about particularity versus universality. Shakespeare’s characters are keenly aware of
the overdetermination of behavioral precepts, as if there are too many rules to follow, and one
must always understand one’s choices as conforming to or rejecting them. For example, in The
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Comedy of Errors, the first scene with Adriana and Luciana features them arguing about a
specific situation—Antipholus of Ephesus is not home for dinner—but Luciana responds to it
with a broad moral claim:
Good sister, let us dine, and never fret;
A man is master of his liberty:
Time is their master, and when they see time,
They’ll go or come; if so, be patient, sister. (2.1.6-9)
Luciana’s defense of patriarchy is expressed via moral norms presented as statements of fact,
even metaphysical laws, as one sees in the personification of Time as men’s only master, and in
her subsequent statement that man is “Indu’d with intellectual sense and souls, / Of more
preeminence than fish and fowls” (2.1.22-23). Luciana speaks as if these simple truths are not
only irrefutable but consoling, or at least quieting: Adriana should not “fret” but accept her place.
The facts about gender differences are deployed not to console but to police Adriana’s selfunderstanding and her emotional state. Luciana continues by offering evidence from the natural
world: “The beasts, the fishes, and the winged fowls / Are their males’ subjects and at their
controls” (2.1.18-19). According to Luciana, Adriana should interpret her predicament in light of
these universal precepts and, if once she accepts their truth, she will no longer feel distress or
anger. Resistance only brings pain: “headstrong liberty is lash’d with woe” (2.1.15).
Adriana’s response, however, is not to dispute her sister’s argument so much as
complicate it. Luciana’s perspective is determined not by her gender but by her unmarried status;
she would think and feel differently if she had a husband. For Adriana, marriage makes a woman
less gullible of patriarchal ideology. Luciana’s claims are premised upon the particularity of her
situation; she would utter different truisms if her circumstances changed:
Patience unmov’d! no marvel though she pause—
They can be meek that have no other cause:
A wretched soul, bruis’d with adversity,
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We bid be quiet when we hear it cry;
But were we burd’ned with like weight of pain,
As much, or more, we should ourselves complain. (2.1.32-37)
Not only does Adriana refuse to be silenced, but she accounts for how silencing functions:
people do not want to acknowledge the pain of others specifically because it is the pain of others,
not of oneself.
Sometimes Shakespeare represents a character convincing him/herself via moral proverbs
and precepts, as in Much Ado about Nothing, when Benedick decides to accept Beatrice’s love
after he overhears his friends speaking about it:
It seems her affections have their full bent. Love me? why, it must be requited. I
hear how I am censur’d; they say I will bear myself proudly, if I perceive the love
come from her; they say too that she will rather die than give any sign of
affection. I did never think to marry. I must not seem proud; happy are they that
hear their detractions, and can put them to mending. They say the lady is fair; ’tis
a truth, I can bear them witness; […] for I will be horribly in love with her. I may
chance have some odd quirks and remnants of wit broken on me, because I have
rail’d so long against marriage; but doth not the appetite alter? A man loves the
meat in his youth that he cannot endure in his age. Shall quips and sentences and
these paper bullets of the brain awe a man from the career of his humor? No, the
world must be peopled. When I said I would die a bachelor, I did not think I
should live till I were married. (2.3.223-244)
Benedick had previously been committed to a particular lifestyle, that of the bachelor-soldier;
earlier in the same scene, he has a soliloquy in which he derides Claudio for changing and thus
“becom[ing] the argument of his own scorn by falling in love” (2.3.10-11). But here Benedick
changes his mind by imploring himself with a series of imperatives: Beatrice’s love itself has
moral force, and her own wish to remain consistent places the onus on Benedick to suffer the
shame and ridicule of public hypocrisy. But then Beatrice’s love in itself becomes less relevant
and is replaced by the biological imperative to reproduce. “The world must be peopled” has a
possible echo of the biblical injunction to “bring forth fruit, and multiply, and fill the earth” (Gen
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1:28).347 Benedick repeats “must” and “they say” throughout this speech, as if his real flaw is
having his own opinions or a personal code of ethics and he must change to suit the needs and
beliefs of others. He even uses a proverb about learning to accept the corrections of others to
justify his change: “happy are they that hear their detractions, and can put them to mending,” a
saying possibly derived from Epicurus, 348 and which reorients Benedick not just in his choices
but in his goals. Benedick is now more interested in being happy than in being himself. Like
Luciana in Errors, Benedick also rationalizes his change via a theory of natural change (“doth
not the appetite alter”), referring to “a man” rather than himself, only to then combine natural
law with moral injunction: “the world must be peopled.” Benedick then ends the speech by
suggesting that his conversion is not his submission to external pressures but rather his own
personal disposition and feeling: “the career of his humor,” even though it was clear from the
outset that loving Beatrice (in particular) and choosing monogamous life (in general) are not his
humor. In this speech, one sees how ideological claims overcome individual preferences,
including the tenet that someone else’s individual preferences take precedence over one’s own.
Shakespeare may not be a moralist or a psychologist, but his plays depict moral and
psychological reasoning and we can attend to the purposes for which such reasoning is
employed.
Shakespeare’s comedies do not present love and marriage as liberating. Liberty is
generally not a preoccupation with his characters, and when it is, it is usually more aligned with
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freedom from marriage than it is with marriage. 349 For example, in the passage from The Comedy
of Errors quoted above, a man’s “liberty” is defined precisely in his capacity to leave his home
and ignore the concerns of his wife. When the word “liberty” is used elsewhere in the play, it is
twice aligned with sin and fear. Antipholus of Syracuse worries about the unique dangers of
Ephesus: “dark working sorcerers,” “soul-killing witches,” “disguised cheaters, prating
mountebanks, / And many such-like liberties of sin” (1.2.99–102). Later, the Abbess refers to
Antipholus of Ephesus’s adultery as “A sin prevailing much in youthful men, / Who give their
eyes the liberty of gazing” (5.1.52–53). As in the exchange between Luciana and Adriana,
“liberty” is a male prerogative against marriage. But then towards the end of the play, the
Abbess refers to her own (re-)marriage to Egeon as his passage from bondage to liberty; he
becomes free so he can marry her: “Whoever bound him, I will loose his bonds, / And gain a
husband by his liberty” (5.1.340–341). “Liberty” shifts in the play from a general sense of male
freedom to a specific sense of a man’s recognition of his married state. Egeon acknowledges his
wife and asks about his son (5.1.353–355), but does not speak further. The contrast between
“liberty” and “bond” is then taken up in later plays.
When Shakespeare uses “liberty” in a comedy, it is often to refer to freedom from
marriage or any specific way of life, while its opposite, “bond” or “bondage,” is linked to
contracts, slavery, and love-relationships. The only use of “liberty” in Much Ado about Nothing
is, tellingly, by Don John, wishing to be free of restraint to do as he pleases: “if I had my liberty,
I would do my liking” (1.3.35–36). Meanwhile, in As You Like It, Celia—a character at this point
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uninterested in love or marriage—refers to wearing disguises while traveling to the Forest of
Arden as “To liberty, and not to banishment” (1.3.138). When Jaques speaks of his right to
wandering and folly, he insists, “I must have liberty / Withal, as large a charter as the wind, / To
blow on whom I please, for so fools have” (2.7.47–49). Liberty is the capacity to be oneself or be
someone else, to live on one’s own terms and whims. Meanwhile, the word “bond” is used fortyone times in The Merchant of Venice, forty of which refer to Shylock’s loan to Antonio, while
one is used by Salarino to refer to Lorenzo’s message to Jessica: “Venus’s pigeons fly / To seal
love’s bonds new made” (2.6.5–6). In As You Like It, Touchstone threatens to kill William if he
attempts to marry Audrey: “(to wit) I kill thee, make thee away, translate thy life into death, thy
liberty into bondage” (5.1.52-54). William’s liberty is his possibility to live and not marry
Audrey. The word “bond” is used two other times in the play, both referring to love: once early
by Le Beau to refer to Rosalind and Celia “whose loves / Are dearer than the natural bond of
sisters” (1.2.275–276) and once late by Hymen to refer to marriage: “Wedding is great Juno’s
crown, / O blessed bond of board and bed” (5.4.141–142). In The Comedy of Errors, Dromio of
Ephesus is called Antipholus’ “bondman” (5.1.141), while in Twelfth Night, Sir Toby jokes
about gambling with his freedom and becoming Maria’s “bond-slave” (2.5.191). Comedies do
not grant liberty; they forge bonds. Characters become tied to one another, as in contracts or
terms of service. Twelfth Night has the fullest description of marriage in all the comedies, spoken
by the Priest:
A contract of eternal bond of love,
Confirm’d by mutual joinder of your hands,
Attested by the holy close of lips,
Strengthen’d by interchangement of your rings. (5.1.156–159)
Marriage is bond, joining, combining, exchange. It is words sealed by physical actions and the
exchange of material objects. There are no mentions of “liberty” in Twelfth Night.
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In Love’s Labor’s Lost, “bond” is not spoken, and “liberty” gets only two mentions in a
comical exchange between Don Armado and Costard. Don Armado promises to “enfranchise”
(i.e., set free) Costard, which Costard (willfully) misconstrues as a promise to marry him to a
woman named Frances. Armado replies, “By my sweet soul, I mean setting thee at liberty,
enfreedoming thy person: thou wert immured, restrained, captivated, bound” (3.1.123–125). He
will set him free, not give him a wife; liberty is not being tied to a master or a wife. Armado then
contrasts liberty to “durance” (3.1.128). This passage may have been in Shakespeare’s mind
when he wrote Measure for Measure, since “immured” and “durance” are significant in that
play. “Immured” reappears as “circummur’d” (4.1.28), a word Shakespeare coined, 350 one of
many references in this play to restricted and confined spaces. “Durance” is used when Isabella
tells Claudio that his only way to escape death will “fetter” him for the rest of his life. Claudio
asks, “Perpetual durance?” (3.1.66), to which she replies, “Ay, just, perpetual durance, a
restraint, / [Though] all the world’s vastidity you had, / To a determin’d scope” (3.1.67–69).
Claudio thinks she means life imprisonment, which she does, only metaphorically: for Claudio to
live by Isabella surrendering her virginity would deny him his honor and thus, in her eyes, his
freedom. “Durance” means something different to her than it does to him, because she cannot
imagine Claudio prioritizing his life over his (and her) honor. She asks him, rhetorically, “Wilt
thou be made a man out of my vice?” (3.1.137): “made a man” suggests surviving as well as
thriving, with a sexual connotation which she develops in her later questions about incest. As I
discussed in Chapter Four, the reasoning is that since he was sexual, she must be sexual, which
means neither of them can be free. Sexuality is a form of bondage. Liberty here is thus figured as
freedom from sexual and physical life.
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“Durance” is here contrasted to “scope,” an important word in Measure for Measure,
associated with “liberty” in Claudio’s account of his own arrest:
From too much liberty, my Lucio, liberty:
As surfeit is the father of much fast,
So every scope by the immoderate use
Turns to restraint. (1.2.125–128)
In the earlier comedies, “liberty” was subtly contrasted to the “bond” of marriage, but now
liberty goes too far and demands to be limited. None of the comedies celebrate liberty, but the
later comedies attest to its danger, its tendency toward excess that requires correction. “Liberty”
in Claudio’s case is premarital sex, while Lucio uses the phrase “use and liberty, / Which have
for long run by the hideous law” (1.4.62–63), a phrase well glossed in the Riverside: “license that
has become customary.”351 Lucio echoes Duke Vincentio here, who in the previous scene
lamented, “liberty plucks justice by the nose” (1.3.29). “Liberty” means ignoring laws and thus
establishing lawlessness as a norm. Measure for Measure shows that liberty undoes itself, first
by becoming a rule unto itself, and then by fostering a counter-rule.
All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure show that the pursuit of freedom and
pleasure is itself a form of bondage. Two key passages demonstrate this clearly. In the opening
scene of All’s Well, Helena announces her desire to cure the King and get the man she wants.
Prior to this announcement, she debates with Parolles about virginity. She first asks how she may
defend her virginity and announces that she will defend it: “I will stand for’t a little, though
therefore I die a virgin” (1.1.133–134), only to allow herself to be persuaded otherwise, and then
to ask, “How might one do, sir, to lose it to her own liking?” (1.1.150–151). Once she realizes
that sexual life is inevitable, she decides that she will have her preference of partner. This is the
principal form of agency and choice a woman has in a comedy. She then soliloquizes:
351
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Our remedies oft in our selves do lie,
Which we ascribe to heaven. The fated sky
Gives us free scope, only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.
What power is it which mounts my love so high,
That makes me see, and cannot feed mine eye?
The mightiest space in fortune nature brings
To join like likes, and kiss like native things.
Impossible be strange attempts to those
That weigh their pains in sense, and do suppose
What hath been cannot be. Who ever strove
So show her merit, that did miss her love?
The King's disease—my project may deceive me,
But my intents are fix’d, and will not leave me. (1.1.216–229)
This speech is a meditation on the paradox of fate and free will—or, more accurately, it is an
expression of how freedom is the acceptance of the forces that drive the self under restricted
circumstances over time. One is given “free scope” in and by “the fated sky,” 352 and by taking
action a person may be propelled by powers and natural forces towards “native things.” “Native”
repeats the sense of “natural,” with associations of that which is inherent to itself, instinctual, and
sharing an origin.353 One finds oneself and those things with which one belongs (one could say
“bound”) by forces greater than oneself, and this action is a return. The alternatives are inertia,
i.e., allowing gravity to reduce oneself to stasis; or, prudence, to “weigh […] pains in sense,” to
consider the consequences of actions. She does not deliberate; when she declares that her
“intents are fix’d,” she speaks as if these intents are not expressions of her will but of the
“power” acting upon her. To choose is to submit to force or another. On the metadramatic level,
Helena here casts her own story as heroic—she will “show her merit” and pursue her goals, like
the people in the old stories, despite others’ warnings and doubts. 354 Self-assertion in a comedy is
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not “liberty” but embracing one’s role in the story, as people once did. Helena announces herself
as a comic heroine, a woman driven entirely by her desire for a specific man. 355 Robert Ornstein
notes that “whenever Helena speaks of her desire she feels compelled to abstract it from anything
resembling sensual longing.”356 She does not lust after Bertram, or want his money; she wants to
be the main character of a story that involves miracles and marriage.

Henikosexuality as a Problem
Shakespeare’s first three comedies are quite different from one another. However, they
each feature women enclosed in the systems of heterosexual relationships, often with a
considerable amount of suffering. Adriana in The Comedy of Errors has been effectively
abandoned by her husband and she pines for his return and the reestablishment of her marriage.
Julia in The Two Gentlemen of Verona is jilted by Proteus but she continues to love him and even
serves him despite his cruelty; Silvia, meanwhile, is desired by two different men and the one she
prefers attempts to present her to the other as a gift. Katherina in The Taming of the Shrew is
mistreated by her husband until she learns to perform obedience and submission. Her sister,
Bianca, is courted by many men and chooses one to marry, perhaps not in the pursuit of
happiness or liberation but simply because she has no other options. Shakespeare depicts the
pains and confinements of women’s lives in these plays while portraying the women as devoted
to their respective men (Bianca is perhaps an exception at the end of her play), indicating that
women’s desire and their participation in heterosexual courtship and marriage is essentially a sad
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but unavoidable fate. Adriana and Julia in particular are presented as loving undeserving men
who are incapable of returning their love, while Katherina and Bianca present alternative options
for women’s acclimation to the institution of marriage. Women’s desire and compliance may be
essential for the social order and communal happiness presented (or at least articulated) at the
endings of these plays, but Shakespeare emphasizes the psychological burdens and the minimal
rewards the women receive in return.

The Comedy of Errors
The Comedy of Errors is based on (among other sources) two plays of Plautus but takes
place in the biblically significant city of Ephesus. It mixes the classical and the Christian worlds;
it also, as Martine van Elk demonstrates, mixes the genres of farce and romance. 357 For my
purposes, it also presents one of Shakespeare’s strongest early examples of a significant
henikosexual female character. In the end, she is reunited with her husband. In addition, another
long-separated couple is united, and two male characters imply there will be two more
forthcoming marriages. The play also ends with promises of clarification and injunctions to
rejoice, contains a character who nearly escapes death, uses theatrical devices to effect wonder
and confusion, and affirms the sovereign ruler who witnesses and approves all that happens. It
fulfills most of the criteria that I specified for Shakespearean comedy in my Introduction; what’s
missing in the play is much deliberate deception, except perhaps by the conjurer Dr. Pinch. The
play contains no dominant character who drives the action, though the Abbess leads the crucial
recognitions in the play’s final moments. For the most part, the problems of the play solve
themselves when the characters figure out who they are and how they are related to one another.
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I will explore some of these features, focusing on the sexual pairings, the establishment of order,
and the play’s encouragement of affective responses.
The problem of the henikosexual female character in The Comedy of Errors is that she
loves her husband and he does not return her love. Though Shakespeare presents her
sympathetically, her longing and resentment towards her husband dominate her character. She
attributes the entirety of her physical and emotional state to his treatment of her:
Hath homely age th’ alluring beauty took
From my poor cheek? Then he hath wasted it.
[...]
Do their gay vestments his affections bait?
That’s not my fault, he’s master of my state.
What ruins are in me that can be found,
By him not ruin’d? Then is he the ground
Of my defeatures. My decayed fair
A sunny look of his would soon repair.
But, too unruly deer, he breaks the pale,
And feeds from home; poor I am but his stale. (2.1.89-101)
Unlike the comedies which are concerned with courtship, The Comedy of Errors depicts a
marriage at its center, and the play suggests that the entirety of a wife’s well-being depends on
her husband. This is of a piece with the play’s general depiction of characters finding themselves
via their relations with others, particularly their family relations. As Dympna Callaghan writes,
“the play [...] asks probing questions about whether we are ever psychologically and spiritually
whole without our partners, our siblings, or our parents and our children.” 358 Though Adriana
spends much of her time with her sister, she thinks of herself almost entirely with reference to
her husband. As the quote above indicates, she figures herself as the victim, but she also
imagines her husband as a deer kept in a confined space under her control; a proper marriage, in
this image, would consist of him remaining in the space she provides. If he treated her better, she
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would make him happier and he would not be inclined to stray. But her unmet desire to be
noticed and recognized by her husband is the source of her physical and personal degradation,
and she is not optimistic: “Since that my beauty cannot please his eye, / I’ll weep what’s left
away, and weeping die” (2.1.114-115). Her sister mocks her for her unreasonable infatuation,
“How many fond fools serve mad jealousy?” (2.1.116), but Adriana’s wish never changes over
the course of the play.
In the following scene, she conveys to the man she thinks is her husband that she is
nostalgic for the deep bond of their early relationship:
I am not Adriana, nor thy wife.
The time was once, when thou unurg’d wouldst vow
That never words were music to thine ear,
That never object pleasing in thine eye,
That never touch well welcome to thy hand,
That never meat sweet-savor’d in thy taste,
Unless I spake, or look’d, or touch’d, or carved to thee.
How comes it now, my husband, O, how comes it,
That thou art thus estranged from thyself?
Thyself I call it, being strange to me,
That, undividable incorporate,
Am better than thy dear self’s better part. (2.2.112-123)
Adriana’s current condition is identical to her husband’s former condition: he used to derive all
his joy and meaning from his spouse. She uses the familiar Christian language of “one flesh,” as
is commonly noted, but she refers to more than bodily unity. For him to not love her anymore is
for neither of them to be themselves: as they are married, their true identity consists of living and
acting as spouses to the exclusion of all other concerns. Colin Burrow observes that in this
speech Adriana is significantly different from her antecedent in Plautus: “Adriana is not the
Romano-Greek wife who wields domestic power because of her dowry; she articulates a notion
of companionate marriage so powerful that it makes husband and wife the same self.” 359 She
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claims that he once “unurg’d wouldst vow” that she was all he wanted, suggesting that she does
not only miss her own romantic feelings but her husband’s spontaneous testimony of his own
love for her. Later in the speech, she asks him how he would act and feel if she were adulterous;
she demands equity in the relationship: “Shouldst thou but hear I were licentious, / [...] Wouldst
thou not spit at me, and spurn at me, / And hurl the name of husband in my face” (2.2.131, 134135). The word “husband” would be sufficient to identify the wrong being done, because in her
view of marriage one should fully assume the role, perform the duties, and not only feel the bond
but also testify to it. Her claims may be hyperbolic and idealistic, but they signify that the
entirety of her identity is being Antipholus of Ephesus’s wife.
As I discussed above, Adriana has complaints about the condition of married women as
cloistered and powerless, and she rejects “servitude” (2.1.26). However, when she encounters the
man she thinks to be her husband, she offers to tend to him and offer forgiveness: “Husband, I’ll
dine above with you to-day, / And shrive you of a thousand idle pranks” (2.2.207-208). In the
last scene of the play, when she believes he has been hurt, she demands, “I will attend my
husband, be his nurse, / Diet his sickness, for it is my office, / And will have no attorney but
myself” (5.1.98-100). Her reference to “office” and “attorney” suggests her conception of her
duty as distinctly her own. “Office” can mean “position” and “duty” as well as “kindness” 360
(earlier in the play, Luciana asks Antipholus of Syracuse if he has “quite forgot / A husband’s
office,” 3.2.1-2), and Adriana’s discourses on marriage consist largely of her desire for it to be a
mutual sharing of pleasures and devotion, with neither spouse receiving joy or pleasure from
anything else, even food or music. Though she chafes at the restrictions of her life, she is
unspecific about what she could want beyond a loving marriage. Adriana suffers for this desire
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but, as we have already seen with Helena in All’s Well That Ends Well and Mariana in Measure
for Measure, and as we will see for many of the henikosexual women in the other comedies,
Shakespeare returned to this type repeatedly. The henikosexual woman not only wants just one
specific man and will accept no substitute; she also has no interests or sources of joy beyond that
man.
Plautus’s Menaechmi ends with the Wife (she has no other name) being auctioned by her
husband. Shakespeare instead brings Adriana and Antipholus of Ephesus together and has them
discover that the harm she did to her husband was caused by her mistaking him and his twin
brother, and therefore, at least, their recent conflicts are not the result of ill-will but confusion.
When she realizes her brother has a twin, she asks the wrong man who he is and the right man
answers:
ADRIANA
ANTIPHOLUS OF SYRACUSE
ADRIANA
ANTIPHOLUS OF EPHESUS

Which of you did dine with me to-day?
I, gentle mistress.
And are not you my husband?
No, I say nay to that. (5.1.370-372)

Antipholus of Ephesus does not affirm that he is her husband, but he does insist that his brother
is not her husband. This is as much as Shakespeare provides for their reunion before the
characters turn to the matter of the missing chain and money. As Robert Ornstein notes, “there is
no explicit reconciliation of husband and wife in the final scene of Errors, and there is little if
any intimation that Antipholus has learned something about himself during the play. Although
the denouements of Shakespearean comedy may depend on sudden revelations, they never
depend on sudden ‘moral discoveries.’” 361 Adriana does not get everything she wants from her
husband, or even a direct acknowledgement that he is her husband. She (and we) may want more
from him, but this scene will be consistent with much of Shakespeare’s comic practice. The
361

Ornstein, Shakespeare’s Comedies, 33.

219

woman who wants her man gets him, whether he be her husband or her future husband, but the
man need not express desire or devotion of his own. It is simply the fact of marriage that the play
affirms. Order is restored in distinguishing the relationships among people, but the play does not
indicate that, in Adriana’s case, her husband’s behavior or self-understanding will change.
Despite the unpleasant image of marriage the play presents, the final scene includes three
other prospective pairings. The Abbess reunites with Egeon, who has narrowly escaped death;
however, they share no words of feeling beyond their mutual recognition. He asks about their
son and she tells him what happened (5.1.347-356); overall, Egeon expresses much more
concern for his children than his wife. Afterwards, Antipholus of Syracuse expresses his desire
“to make good” (5.1.376) on what he began with Luciana, and Dromio of Syracuse anticipates
that his brother will marry Luce (5.1.417). Luciana does not reply to Antipholus of Syracuse’s
overture, though she does speak later about another matter; Shakespeare leaves us to wonder
about her response, and he presents his actors with choices about how to stage it. We see here
that Shakespeare utilized this technique of silence early in his career; what matters in a comedy
is not always the pairing but the man’s expression of desire. Henikosexual women are forthright
and active in their pursuit of their men, but other women are left to accept or not accept the men
who present themselves. If a woman does not express desire in a Shakespearean comedy, a man
will express his own for her, or—as in the King’s words to Diana at the end of All’s Well—his
desire that she find a husband. It is difficult for a woman in a comedy to get through the play
without being somehow identified as a wife or a prospective wife.
Much of what I find significant about Shakespearean comic endings is contained in the
final speech of the Abbess:
Renowned Duke, vouchsafe to take the pains
To go with us into the abbey here,
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And hear at large discoursed all our fortunes;
And all that are assembled in this place
That by this sympathized one day’s error
Have suffer’d wrong, go keep us company,
And we shall make full satisfaction.
Thirty-three years have I but gone in travail
Of you, my sons, and till this present hour
My heavy burthen [ne’er] delivered.
The Duke, my husband, and my children both,
And you the calendars of their nativity,
Go to a gossips’ feast, and go with me—
After so long grief, such nativity! (5.1.394-407)
The Abbess begins with a gesture of deference to the Duke, whom she invites to join the
festivities. She promises further discussion in her enclosed, holy space, allowing the characters to
figure out what happened, particularly what pains they endured together. The audience will be
left out of this “gossips’ feast”; they may know what happened, but they will not hear the
characters reach their common understandings or convey their feelings for one another. The
Abbess’s image of shared perspectives and communal “satisfaction” is pleasant but it is also a
command: she speaks in the dual position of authority as an Abbess and as the mother of the
Antipholi. Her use of the word “sympathized” is defined by the OED as “To make up or
compound of corresponding parts or elements; to form or contrive harmoniously or
consistently,” but van Elk notes that Shakespeare used the word with other resonances in “The
Rape of Lucrece”:
There, it points to similarity and profound emotion as well as decorum: “True
sorrow then is feelingly sufficed / When with like semblance it is sympathized”
(ll. 1112-13). For this more mystical sense, we should turn to the OED’s
definitions of the word “sympathize,” which go beyond the neutrality of “share”
to suggest deep emotion, similarity, and harmony: “To suffer with or like another
… to be similarly or correspondingly affected”; “To have an affinity; to agree in
nature, disposition, qualities, or fortunes”; “To agree, be in harmony, accord,
harmonize.” The early modern understanding of sympathy differs from our
modern definition in highlighting a mystical affinity leading to a correspondence
of experience, as well as a natural fellowship. Emilia’s declaration thus posits a
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spiritual order based on kinship and similarity, to overcome the chaos caused by
kinship and similarity in the main plot.362
The creation of social harmony based on familial and affective bonds becomes one of the
standard tropes of the Shakespearean comic ending. The Abbess assumes that the assembly of
component parts will include the sharing of pains and joys and “full satisfaction,” with herself
and the Duke in positions of authority. What critics take for granted is that the Abbess’s words
actually speak for the ending of the play as a description of what will happen, rather than as a
command of what she wants to happen. She tells everyone what to do and how they will feel.
The Duke expresses immediate approval: “With all my heart, I’ll gossip at this feast” (5.1.408),
but no one else does. Then, after some final, brief confusion about which Antipholus is which,
Antipholus of Syracuse tells Dromio of Syracuse to join as well: “I am your master, Dromio. /
Come, go with us, we’ll look to that anon. / Embrace thy brother there, rejoice with him”
(5.1.412-414). Even as the master tells his servant he is included in the festivity, he also gives
him an order—about how to feel. The end of The Comedy of Errors contains a considerable
amount of silence and scant verbal displays of emotion, but it does include injunctions to
celebrate and be happy. If the characters and the audience find the ending to be joyous, it is
because, among other reasons, they were instructed to do so.
The ending of The Comedy of Errors can nonetheless instill a sense of wonder in the
audience, even though the revelations of the play’s finale consist of unlikely but non-magical
events. Aaron Landau writes, “While Errors is fraught with the anxiety of error, it does not
disperse this anxiety by finally vindicating common sense, but, on the contrary, by literally
celebrating the implausible, the sensational, and the wondrous. The tremendous emotive power
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of the ending decisively outweighs the constraints of reason, law, and civic orderliness.” 363 I
dispute his reference to the “tremendous emotive power” of the ending, but the play does assert
the weakness of human reason. The characters in The Comedy of Errors are confused because
they think they know what they know, and they don’t think much about what they don’t know;
their assumption of continuity and stability makes them unprepared for disruptions or the
introduction of new facts. Shakespeare’s comedies themselves function on that tendency towards
and desire for stability; our capacity to feel wonder requires us to have a sense of what is regular
and expected.
As an early comedy, Errors begins what will be Shakespeare’s ongoing process of urging
audiences to feel rather than think. (To return to Measure for Measure: that play’s provocation is
its reversal of this comedic program. The audience is encouraged to think and even debate
following the play, and thus to be aware of how much comic enjoyment rests upon not thinking.)
Martine van Elk also endorses the play as effecting wonders: “the ending revalues the factual and
the material as a perfect representation of a sacred order,” 364 but as Barber and Wheeler
acknowledge, “the objects of feeling are secular, a vulnerable father and a mother both sanctified
and managerial.”365 In short, the play invites us to invest spiritual meaning into a series of
coincidences. We can enjoy knowing more than the characters do throughout the play and then
share in their feelings of fortuitousness when they learn what we know. As Richard McCoy
writes, Shakespeare’s practice in this play and in other comedies encourages audiences to take
pleasure and experience wonder in what they know to be constructed:
The Comedy of Errors’ happy ending is only seemingly providential, the product
of a poetic and theatrical design rather than a godly purpose. The “blessed power”
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that delivers those who wandered in illusions is a stage trick that is itself another
illusion and plot device. Emilia’s language imparts religious overtones to poetic
faith, but there is no higher or stronger force beyond the flimsy contrivances of
the plot.366
In other words, the play and its genre ask us to enjoy being manipulated, and to enjoy the real
affective responses that theater can provide. In order to have the pleasurable experiences of a
Shakespearean comedy, one must accept its premises and accommodate oneself to its purposes.
The institution of a social order that defines people’s identities and relations to one another is the
play’s greatest human contrivance that presents itself as miraculous.

The Two Gentlemen of Verona
Though the title of the play and much of the critical response to it suggest that male
friendship is central to The Two Gentlemen of Verona, the play also features two henikosexual
women characters. The love-plots are complicated: Silvia is courted by Valentine and Thurio, the
latter of whom is her father’s preference. Julia has varied potential suitors but she loves Proteus
only. The plot turns on Silvia’s father, the Duke of Milan, banishing Valentine, while Proteus
experiences a change of heart (or another organ) and falls in love with Silvia. These
developments are resolved—structurally if not affectively—at the end of the play, wherein Silvia
and Julia get the men they desire. Despite Proteus’s betrayals, the male friendship bond is
restored, but equally significant is that the female characters, whose love never wavers, have
their wishes fulfilled, to much critical and audience consternation.
R. W. Maslen interprets The Two Gentlemen of Verona’s presentation of gender
difference in feminist terms. Since Julia wears a disguise in her pursuit of Proteus, the play
shows that men are changeable inside but remain the same outside, while women are the
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opposite: “The play, then, mounts a stalwart defense of women at men’s expense; and in doing
so it mounts a defense of the comic mode to which women were allied by Elizabethan
culture.”367 Maslen places the play in context of anti-comic discourses that claimed that the genre
encourages gender confusion and female insubordination. He is correct to align the genre with its
portrayal of the differences between female and male (and same-sex and opposite-sex) desire,
though he asserts that “Shakespeare’s comedy refuses, in fact, to essentialize women, as his men
are always trying to do.”368 I disagree. In this play, women are essentialized by their
steadfastness and their single-minded focus on the men they want to be their husbands. The other
two women in the play, the servants Lucetta and Ursula, exist to support the leading women.
Shakespeare presents Julia and Silvia winning their men mostly via being patient with them. The
“happy ending” is announced as such within the play by the men who gain their restoration of
their friendships as well as social acceptance and order; the women have their wishes granted but
they do not express happiness. This is frequently noted but I will highlight its salience as a
hallmark of the genre of Shakespearean comedy.
Shakespeare delays the first indication of Julia’s intense love for Proteus so as to give it
greater power when it is first revealed. Once she speaks it aloud, she maintains it, and undergoes
multiple trials which only increase her devotion to Proteus. In her first scene in the play, she asks
Lucetta about various men, as if she is considering the merits of prospective candidates. When
Lucetta praises Proteus, Julia asks her why, to which Lucetta responds, “I have no other but a
woman’s reason: / I think him so, because I think him so” (1.2.23-24). The play gives us no
grounds to doubt this claim: women’s affection is often unexplainable but, here and in the other
comedies, it is constant. It even intensifies if it is unwanted or if the man demonstrates it to be
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undeserved. As I have noted, this is highlighted in All’s Well That Ends Well and Measure for
Measure, but we also see it present in the earlier comedies.
When Julia is alone, after being coy with Lucetta, she bursts out with her feelings for
Proteus:
What ’fool is she, that knows I am a maid,
And would not force the letter to my view!
Since maids, in modesty, say “no” to that
Which they would have the profferer construe “ay.”
Fie, fie, how wayward is this foolish love,
That (like a testy babe) will scratch the nurse
And presently, all humbled, kiss the rod!
How churlishly I chid Lucetta hence,
When willingly I would have had her here!
How angerly I taught my brow to frown,
When inward joy enforced my heart to smile! (1.2.53-63)
The social conventions of female behavior constrain Julia, who wants only to read
Proteus’s letter. These conventions compel her to annoy her maid and torture herself; she
is conflicted about how to behave, but her desire for Proteus is foundational for her
character. The previous part of the scene indicates that even when she is not expressing it,
she feels it. She is oppressed by her own inner life; as Stephen Cohen theorizes, “The
ideological containment of the individual within an interiorized, private modern
subjectivity was in many ways made possible by the even stricter confinement of women
within an essentialized gender identity that, rooted in biology, could perhaps be concealed
but never escaped.”369 She has had to force herself to hide her desire, and so her actions
throughout the play, including dressing as a boy, contain a spirit of rebellion against the
social constraints. Her rebellion leads to the comic ending, wherein order is restored, if
with an emphasis on men’s interests. The play indicates that Julia’s love for Proteus,
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however disruptive, is not only a threat to the play’s order but a guarantor of it. She has to
become a boy, so she can become a wife, so the men can reconcile with one another. Since
she accepts Proteus at the end, then Valentine may have Silvia, and all conflicts can end.
Julia’s expressions of love for Proteus are reminiscent of Adriana’s for her
husband. In both cases, the woman’s well-being is premised upon the man’s attention:
O, know’st thou not his looks are my soul’s food?
Pity the dearth that I have pined in,
By longing for that food so long a time.
Didst thou but know the inly touch of love,
Thou wouldst as soon go kindle fire with snow
As seek to quench the fire of love with words. (2.7.15-20)
Whereas Julia previously referred to her outward behavior, here she stresses her internal
emotions: “the inly touch of love.” She assumes that only those who have shared her
feelings can understand, and that such emotions are beyond verbal expression. She
addresses possible divisions in the audience between those who find her love off-putting or
degrading and those who may find it compelling or even noble. Rational arguments could
not sway her or change her. Marjorie Garber argues that The Two Gentlemen of Verona “is
not concerned with developing characters who possess individual psychology” or
“complex and nuanced motivations,”370 but a crucial feature of the henikosexual woman,
so central as a type to this play, is that her desire is not complex or nuanced, or even
articulable in a way that can be transparent to the audience. As we saw with Helena in
All’s Well, Julia’s love for Proteus is the beginning of her story and, for the play’s
purposes, of her entire character.
Julia later asks Lucetta—and the audience—to grant her permission to pursue
Proteus:
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Then let me go, and hinder not my course:
I’ll be as patient as a gentle stream,
And make a pastime of each weary step,
Till the last step have brought me to my love,
And there I’ll rest, as after much turmoil
A blessed soul doth in Elysium. (2.7.33-38)
She figures herself here—as we saw with Helena in All’s Well—as the hero(ine) of a
romantic quest, blessed by divine powers. Her language includes the familiar comic
dressing-up of a woman’s marital longing with the language of transcendence and spiritual
fulfillment. If anyone expresses reservations about her love of Proteus, that person is an
obstacle to her. Her image of romantic fulfillment is not passion but its end: she seeks
“rest” and completion. At the end of the play, the men discuss their future lives, but this
speech and Julia’s later silence suggest that her winning of Proteus is not a beginning
promising futurity but an end, or, possibly, an afterlife.
Julia expresses further religious devotion to Proteus, signifying that she does not
know him at all. She assumes the familiar language of the (male) Petrarchan lover: “His
love sincere, his thoughts immaculate, / His tears pure messengers sent from his heart, /
His heart as far from fraud as heaven from earth” (2.7.76-78). While the audience may
appreciate, though perhaps not enjoy, the irony, we can notice here that Julia arrogates the
power to define Proteus, to speak on behalf of his inner feelings and the meaning of his
actions. Her subsequent words to Lucetta show that she knows she is deceiving herself:
“Now, as thou lov’st me, do him not that wrong, / To bear a hard opinion of his truth: /
Only deserve my love by loving him” (2.7.80-82). Julia invites Lucetta, and all who listen
to her, to reserve judgment on Proteus, as if “his truth” is not what he says or does but
framed entirely by her love for him. Furthermore, her request is premised upon one’s love
for her: to love her is to accept her love for Proteus, and to attempt to see him through her
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eyes. The henikosexual woman loves against judgment and reason, and presents love itself
as sharing or indulging in another’s delusions.
When Julia goes so far as to deliver messages of love to Silvia on Proteus’s behalf,
she expresses awareness of how singular her behavior is: “How many women would do
such a message?” (4.4.90). The henikosexual woman is not paradigmatic for all women,
and it is central to her function in Shakespearean comedy that the specificity of her desire
be presented as uncommon. William C. Carroll suggests that Julia assumed her disguise—
“She is Shakespeare’s first comic heroine to become a man” 371—as a means to “exercise a
new self, or openly to reveal one’s secret self. Disguise almost always enables
liberation.”372 But Julia feels confined by her disguise; she has been “liberated” to deliver
her beloved’s messages to another woman, as Viola will in Twelfth Night, and she feels
that her love for Proteus binds her, restricts her from making choices, even at the level of
self-sacrifice: “I am my master’s true confirmed love; / But cannot be true servant to my
master, / Unless I prove false traitor to myself” (4.4.103-105). Her devotion to Proteus is
premised upon her self-identification as his future wife. Though her love often sounds
worshipful, it is also contractual: to be herself is to want Proteus all for herself. The
master-servant bond is in her eyes reciprocal.
Though Julia’s love is extreme and rare, Shakespeare here stages the normativity of
the genre in his privileging of the henikosexual woman’s desire and his display of the
contagion it fosters. The Two Gentlemen of Verona does not feature any couplings that are
not informed by henikosexual female desire, but the play displays the strange intensity of
that desire such that we can recognize its power when we encounter it in other plays. Non-
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henikosexual women, with their variety of sexual preferences and identities, are
encouraged to conform to the model of human relationships that henikosexual women
enact. This is normative specifically because it is clear that not all women are
henikosexual, but many of the women in Shakespeare’s comedies find themselves in
marital entanglements in the conclusions of their plays.
Julia’s earlier idealization of Proteus is undone by the end of The Two Gentlemen
of Verona, but she never stops loving him. In the last scene of the play, Proteus attempts to
rape Silvia, Valentine stops him, Proteus apologizes, and Valentine, infamously, offers
Silvia to Proteus as a token of their restored friendship. Julia, in disguise as a boy,
responds with “O me unhappy!” (5.4.84) and faints. When she wakes up, she reveals
herself, and rebukes Proteus:
Behold her that gave aim to all thy oaths,
And entertain’d ’em deeply in her heart.
How oft hast thou with perjury cleft the root?
O Proteus, let this habit make thee blush!
Be thou ashamed that I have took upon me
Such an immodest raiment—if shame live
In a disguise of love!
It is the lesser blot, modesty finds,
Women to change their shapes than men their minds. (5.4.101-109)
Her reference to “modesty” recalls her earlier lines, “Since maids, in modesty, say ‘no’ to that /
Which they would have the profferer construe ‘ay’” (1.2.55-56). Previously, “modesty”
prevented her from expressing her true feelings; here, “modesty” pronounces her socially correct,
or at least superior to Proteus’s inconstancy. In both cases, “modesty” refers to “decorum” or
“propriety,” a sense of what is appropriate.373 Julia’s acts of personal agency throughout the play
are nonetheless, in her mind, in conformity with standards of behavior; she imagines an external
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judge observing her and ruling in her favor. She asserts that Proteus should feel shame, not
because she thinks less of him, but because she maintains that he is a better man than his actions.
She also generalizes her criticism of Proteus to men and women generally, acknowledging that
they are held to different standards of behavior and claiming, in case the audience had not
noticed, that the women in the play are steadfast in their love but the men are not. Tony Tanner
observes that changing one’s mind “in this play, is an exclusively male activity.” 374 Valentine’s
shocking offer of Silvia marks Shakespeare’s general practice of presenting women as
unwavering once they have chosen a man, while his men are far less devoted and consistent. Just
as we may find Julia’s love for Proteus to be undeserved, she elevates that love to a sign of the
superiority of her gender. It is as if women are to be commended for maintaining their love for
lesser men.
Julia directly expresses unhappiness at the thought of Valentine giving Silvia to Proteus,
but she does not express happiness when Proteus returns to her. Instead the claims to happiness
come from Valentine:
VALENTINE
PROTEUS
JULIA

Come, come, a hand from either.
Let me be blest to make this happy close;
’Twere pity two such friends should be long foes.
Bear witness, heaven, I have my wish for ever.
And I mine. (5.4.116-120)

Julia has her “wish for ever,” her last line. The actor may express joy, relief, or even
aggression. Shakespeare, however, gives her no words of happiness, while Valentine’s
words of a “happy close” refer to his friendship with Proteus. The henikosexual woman’s
achievement is complete, and therefore she falls silent. Proteus’s line about having his own
“wish for ever” could just as well refer to his relationship to Valentine as to Julia; the
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former is more likely, since he is responding to Valentine’s line about them no longer
being foes.
Though Silvia is less prominent than Julia, she is another henikosexual woman.
She prefers Valentine to Thurio, against her father’s wishes, and therefore, like Julia, she
engages in acts of rebellion to pursue her man. Unlike Julia, however, she does not express
her love until the final scene:
O heaven be judge how I love Valentine,
Whose life’s as tender to me as my soul!
And full as much (for more there cannot be)
I do detest false perjur’d Proteus. (5.4.36-39)
Silvia’s love is often expressed as for Valentine and not for someone else; as the lines
above indicate, her hatred for Proteus is of equivalent intensity to her love for Valentine.
Earlier in the play, she says to Eglamour,
Thou art not ignorant what dear good will
I bear unto the banish’d Valentine,
Nor how my father would enforce me marry
Vain Thurio, whom my very soul [abhors]. (4.3.14-17)
Silvia does not enumerate Valentine’s virtue or otherwise account for her love for him.
She is, rather, more frank about her hatred of other men. In both quotations, we see Silvia,
like Julia, presenting her love as a fact to be judged as a public matter. Silvia’s love leads
her to ask for sympathy and assistance; others are enlisted as facilitators of these women’s
quests as tests of their love. Silvia reminds Eglamour of “thy lady and thy true-love died”
(4.3.20), and she assumes that his recognition of her own love presents him with the moral
obligation to accompany and protect Silvia in her pursuit of Valentine. Silvia and Julia
cannot achieve their ends on their own, and they anticipate Helena’s alliances in All’s Well
That Ends Well and Mariana’s in Measure for Measure. The henikosexual woman’s plight
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commands sympathy and accommodation, the cooperation of others, and thus becomes
foundational for communities united in their deference to these women’s interests.
The Two Gentlemen of Verona presents female henikosexual love as a model of
love for its own sake, perhaps even of Grace. Silvia, like Julia, does not express happiness
when she gains her man but she does refer to herself as “miserable, unhappy that I am”
(5.4.28) in response to the wrong man’s interest. Proteus insists that “by my coming I have
made you happy” (5.4.30) but she counters directly: “By thy approach thou mak’st me
most unhappy” (5.4.31). Again, Silvia knows what she does not want, and when she
chastises Proteus, she refers to his behavior as not just unwanted but immoral:
When Proteus cannot love where he’s belov’d!
Read over Julia’s heart (thy first best love)
For whose dear sake thou didst then rend thy faith
Into a thousand oaths; and all those oaths
Descended into perjury, to love me.
Thou hast no faith left now, unless thou’dst two,
And that’s far worse than none: better have none
Than plural faith, which is too much by one.
Thou counterfeit to thy true friend! (5.4.45-53)
If he recognized Julia’s love, he would love her in return, as a duty. He should be held to
his word even if he changed his mind. The moral model these women present entails the
first expression of love as a lifelong commitment. For a man to love one woman, only to
lose interest in her and then love another—which is relatively common for Shakespeare’s
men—is as bad as polytheism, which is itself here figured as worse than atheism. “Faith”
here is deployed in its meaning of belief in God as well as in loyalty to a spouse and
keeping one’s words and promises.375 Though there are no theatrical “miracles” in The
Two Gentlemen of Verona, the play contains myriad references to “heaven” witnessing and
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judging the characters, as well as the association between fidelity to a lover and belief in
God. Proteus regrets his “breaking faith with Julia whom I lov’d” (4.2.11), while Julia,
when she delivers Proteus’s messages of love to Silvia, laments that she must “praise his
faith which I would have disprais’d” (4.4.102). The women’s steadfastness towards their
men gives them moral authority, even though their love amounts to worshipping false
gods.
Silvia does not speak for much of the final scene of the play. She cries her last line,
“O heaven!” (5.4.59) in response to Proteus’s attempted rape. She witnesses silently the
subsequent developments, including Valentine’s offer of her to Proteus. Valentine,
Proteus, Julia, the Duke, and Thurio all make reference to her: in the end as throughout the
play, Silvia is more a subject for others’ consideration than a speaking agent on her own
behalf. The enacted responses of the actor playing Silvia, therefore, offer potential signals
to the audience about how to properly respond to what transpires onstage. Does she
express shock and disappointment at Valentine’s offer? Is she fumbled at like a football
when Thurio claims her for himself and Valentine counters? Elizabeth Hodgson observes
that the play “conjures up spectators on stage who are expected to observe and sympathize
with a speaker’s self-denying losses.”376 For the last 110 lines of The Two Gentlemen of
Verona, Silvia functions as, among other things, Julia’s witness, and her response to
Julia’s fortunes can provide cues to the audience for sympathy as well as for the
inadequacy of sympathy.
Silvia can watch, but what can she do? The actor has choices, but Shakespeare
provides no clues or cues. Like Julia, Silvia spends the last scene quietly maintaining her
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desire and waiting for the men to do the right thing while they negotiate their relationships
with one another. Jonathan Goldberg argues that Silvia’s silence is necessitated by her role
as the desiring woman:
Silvia is barred from discourse because of the limits that patriarchy
enforces; but she is also barred because the language of love puts her in a
position of mastery in which her beloved must be treated as a servant. Silvia
is, at once, empowered and disabled by the tropes of tyrannical desire (hers
is the illusion of power), doubly disabled since her power is a trope within a
discourse that she cannot control.377
Her desire eventually leads to the successful conclusion of a promised marriage with
Valentine, but just as we have no assurance it will make her happy, we have strong
assurance that she has lost power. If Goldberg is correct, then there is literally no
language—i.e., Shakespeare provides no language—for her to assert herself over
Valentine once they have been brought together. Hence the Duke offers her to Valentine as
a reward, because her sexual identity must be ratified, if not by God then by her father and
sovereign.
The Duke asserts himself in the final moments of the play, affirming his position though
he has contributed little. Since the women’s interests have already been served, and they have
never expressed concern for anything other than the men they desire, the play establishes that its
central priorities have been the male relationships and the male-dominated order. The women
have had considerable free reign to pursue their men, and even criticize them, but they have had
no effect on their world beyond their immediate relations. As Michael D. Friedman notes, “the
play strives to reincorporate Proteus into the Duke’s coterie of gentlemen at the cost of Silvia’s
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and Julia’s self-determination.”378 The Two Gentlemen of Verona displays the most striking
example of the ways the henikosexual women’s plots facilitate and become subordinate to
patriarchy:
DUKE

VALENTINE

Now, by the honor of my ancestry,
I do applaud thy spirit, Valentine,
And think thee worthy of an empress’s love.
Know then, I here forget all former griefs,
Cancel all grudge, repeal thee home again,
Plead a new state in thy unrivall’d merit,
To which I thus subscribe: Sir Valentine,
Thou art a gentleman and well deriv’d,
Take thou thy Silvia, for thou hast deserv’d her.
I thank your Grace; the gift hath made me happy.
(5.4.139-148)

The Duke was, in many ways, the source of several of the play’s problems: he banished
Valentine and tried to force his daughter to marry Thurio. However, here he shamelessly judges
the proceedings and distributes rewards as he sees fit. Though he caused much confusion and
conflict, he forgives those he wronged and reclaims his position as master of Silvia’s fate. He is
only aware of what the men have done and how they merit his pardons and rewards. He takes
credit for the achievements of peace, order, restoration of friendship, and proper marital
alignment. He elicits Valentine’s approval; at least someone is happy.
The men’s closing words present the familiar hallmarks of Shakespearean comedy: the
evasion of violence, the assertion of order, the affirmation of the sovereign, the deferral of
explanation, and the injunction to happiness. Most prominent in this play’s ending is its
homosociality. Valentine assures Proteus that he must be forgiven: “Who by repentance is not
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satisfied / Is nor of heaven nor earth, for these are pleas’d; / By penitence th’ Eternal’s wrath’s
appeas’d” (5.4.79-81). Valentine speaks on behalf of all and excludes anyone who does not share
his affective response. The restoring of bonds must be appreciated and approved by everyone.
Then, after Valentine has been given Silvia, he asks, “for your daughter’s sake” (5.4.149), that
his band of outlaws become the Duke’s attendants.
DUKE

VALENTINE

Thou hast prevail’d, I pardon them and thee;
Dispose of them as thou know’st their deserts.
Come, let us go, we will include all jars
With triumphs, mirth, and rare solemnity.
And as we walk along, I dare be bold
With our discourse to make your Grace to smile.
[...]
Please you, I’ll tell you as we pass along,
That you will wonder what hath fortuned.
Come, Proteus, ’tis your penance but to hear
The story of your loves discovered;
That done, our day of marriage shall be yours,
One feast, one house, one mutual happiness. (5.4.158-173)

Valentine’s priority is to please the Duke, and all the men’s priority is reestablishing community.
The Duke’s “include all jars” contains a singular use of “include” to mean “conclude,” though
there are secondary meanings such as “incorporate as part of a whole” and “to contain as a part
of a group.”379 The “jars,” i.e., disagreements or discord, with a literal sense of inharmonious
music,380 are brought to an end but also contained and assimilated into the “one house.”
Valentine presents himself as the principal storyteller following the play; he flatters the Duke
while securing his own position as the source of truth and authority regarding the events of the
play. The “mutual happiness” will be communal, not marital; just as Lucetta and Eglamour
facilitated the women’s stories, the women will then facilitate the men’s stories. Though Two
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Gentlemen lacks magic or miracle, Valentine still promises “wonder.” Proteus is welcomed back
by his friends and superiors, but he will have his follies and his identity explained to him, which
he will accept without fully understanding.
Several critics see the play as in need of rescuing from itself. For Robert Ornstein, it is a
failure, “a bad joke on the characters, the play, and the actors.” 381 The play is only acceptable for
Ornstein if we see Proteus as “capable of redemption.”382 Louise Schleiner, similarly, argues that
in order for the play to not “lose the audience,” then Julia’s swoon and Valentine’s response to it
should “move [Proteus] to view his own actions as a mockery that he can renounce if he chooses,
thereby swallowing correction and trading sexual fulfillment for a new socio-sexual power in a
subjectivity of marital selfhood.”383 This line of thought is also taken up by Lisa Hopkins, who
suggests that Proteus’s view that all relationships involve violence against the self will be
managed by marriage: “The radical fissuring that splits selves and societies can be kept from
cracking only by the constant repetition and reduplication of social and ideological bonds that
marriage alone is seen as capable of providing, forming as it does the one framework in which
the behavior of each partner is constantly visible, constantly subject to policing by the other.” 384
These critics agree the play can only be acceptable if the audience believes that Proteus has
changed and that his marriage to Julia will be both fulfilling and empowering. Hopkins’s
characterization of marriage as mutual policing is apt, since the play fails to confine the male
characters to norms of behavior we believe they will maintain. The violent shifts in Proteus’s
moods and Valentine’s general ignoring of his future wife imply that the women’s goal of
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marriage is effective as a form of social sorting but otherwise it has no psychological or even
moral consequences. Ornstein notes that “the comic ironies” in this play “are almost as brittle as
those of Measure for Measure,”385 and it is to be seen how and why the comedies in between
them contain so many similar elements but do not produce the same audience alienation, or
require dramaturgical interventions to render the play less egregious.

The Taming of the Shrew
The Taming of the Shrew is Shakespeare’s first comedy in which the henikosexual
woman is a minor character. Bianca is courted by several men and professes no interest in any of
them. She eventually chooses one, Lucentio, and marries him, and the final scene of the play
suggests the marriage is not happy. The “taming” plot of Katherina and Petruchio attracts more
attention than Bianca’s plot, partially because Shakespeare does not represent her decision or
give her any lines with which to articulate her feelings or reasons. I argue that Bianca’s plot
demonstrates one version of the henikosexual woman’s story in which she pragmatically makes
her decision and wins the man of her choosing not out of desperate love, as in Julia’s case, but to
take charge of her own life to the extent such a thing is possible. (Shakespeare will return to this
version with Portia in The Merchant of Venice.) Katherina’s final speech of patriarchal ideology
is directed towards Bianca, among others, and Shakespeare provides her and us with no
indication of Bianca’s response. Nonetheless, we can observe that the play ends with the
suggestion that Bianca has none of the devotion or submissiveness that Katherina implores of
women. Shakespeare thus creates Bianca to experiment with the possibility of henikosexuality
being an expression of agency, and marriage being a means not to the happiness of mutuality
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within the hierarchical social structures of gender (which Katherina and Petruchio perhaps
achieve) but to something approaching female independence.
I will contextualize Bianca’s story in the context of the general treatment of women in the
play. The restrictions upon women in the world of The Taming of the Shrew are demonstrated
early, when Baptista informs two of his friends that they may court Bianca “at your pleasure”
because he “love[s] you well” (1.1.53-54). Baptista then tells the silent Bianca, “get you in, /
And let it not displease thee, good Bianca, / For I will love thee ne’er the less, my girl” (1.1.7577). Baptista assumes that marriage is the only concern his daughters have, aside from their
attachment to their father, and he introduces the problem of the plot (the elder sister being
unmarried) as his own prerogative, a condition for everything that follows. Katherina draws
attention to his assumptions in her address to the audience: “Why, and I trust I may go too, may I
not? What, shall I be appointed hours, as though (belike) I knew not what to take and what to
leave? Ha!” (1.1.102-104). Katherina chafes at her father’s presumptuousness, and we learn later
that Bianca has her own resistance as well. Later in the play, Katherina says of Bianca, “Her
silence flouts me, and I’ll be reveng’d” (2.1.29), signaling that Bianca’s many silences in the
play can be expressions of disapproval, even disgust.
The sisters’ fates are linked in the play to their bodies as well as, at least in Katherina’s
case, the fact of their own desires and the requirement that those desires be performed.
Shakespeare signals that Katherina may be more sexually inclined than Bianca. Katherina
worries that Bianca may marry first: “she must have a husband; / I must dance barefoot on her
wedding-day” (2.1.32-33); her use of “must” suggests that both women are confined by social
conventions, but this can be taken as Katherina also worrying that she may never have a husband
of her own. Katherina’s hostility to Petruchio stems from the nature of his approach, not the fact
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of it, and, after she has been tamed, she kisses him in the street after some initial embarrassment
(5.1.143-150). The taming process is sometimes portrayed as fueled by sexual chemistry, as in
Joseph Papp’s famous Shakespeare in the Park production of 1978. Meryl Streep, who played
Katherina, spoke of Katherina not as hating men but as waiting for one worthy of her, and that
the play shows how Petruchio’s treatment of her is ultimately acceptable because it brings out
their passion for one another.386 William C. Carroll agrees: “The central cause of Kate’s willing
transformation is her growing love for Petruchio, strange as it is.” 387 Karen Newman suggests
that Katherina’s erotic desires do not prepare her for patriarchal domination so much as drive her
resistance to it; they “motivate her shrewishness. Such behavior, which in a man would not be
problematic, her family and peers interpret as ‘hysterical’ or diabolic or both. Her ‘masculine’
behavior saves her, at least for a time, from her feminine erotic destiny.” 388 For my purposes, I
am less concerned about (or able to determine) Katherina’s emotional state so much as her
affective performance, and Katherina has many scenes, unlike Bianca, in which her physical
body is actively engaged with her male counterpart. Even if the actor playing Katherina enacts
resistance, it is easy for erotic assumptions to color one’s reception of her.
When Petruchio first speaks to Katherina, he speaks a resonant, definitive line about her
and about women in general: “Women are made to bear, and so are you” (2.1.200). “Bear”
suggests the carrying of burdens: children (in pregnancy and in child-rearing), men (in sexual
intercourse), the household objects of domestic duties, and the general burden of womanhood,
i.e., subjection to male authority. “Bear” can also suggest having to tolerate or endure suffering.
Furthermore, it carries two potentially opposite meanings: “bear” can refer to wearing clothes,
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but “bare” can mean the removal of clothes; both meanings are operative for women’s condition:
they must wear the clothes appropriate to their sex and status, but they also must expose
themselves, be naked, provide men with sexual pleasure, and be mere bodies. 389 The exchange
ends with Petruchio assuring Katherina that she will be “Conformable as other household Kates”
(2.1.278): the angry and defiant woman will accept her place in the marital and social hierarchy.
The assumption throughout the play is that Bianca is already “conformable” and her problem is
that she has too many suitors.
However, a closer look at Bianca’s scenes indicates that she may not be actively
interested in men or marriage, though she does not strenuously reject them, either. The characters
in the play, including Katherina, are mostly interested in knowing her preference:
KATHERINA
BIANCA

Of all thy suitors, here I charge [thee] tell
Whom thou lov’st best; see thou dissemble not.
Believe me, sister, of all the men alive
I never yet beheld that special face
Which I could fancy more than any other. (2.1.8-12)

One could take Bianca’s response as meaning that she is waiting for the right man whom she
would judge by appearance, as having “that special face.” It is equally possible, however, that
since she refers to “all the men alive,” she implies that no man moves her. Earlier in the play, she
states clearly that she has other interests:
Sister, content you in my discontent.
Sir, to your pleasure humbly I subscribe;
My books and instruments shall be my company,
On them to look and practice by myself. (1.1.80-83)
Her “discontent” can refer to her condition as the object of varied men’s desires. Bianca's greater
concern is her self-cultivation. As Joanne Diaz argues, Bianca’s scenes with her suitors indicate
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her high level of education and a stronger mind than theirs. 390 When her father is not present, she
asserts herself, echoing Katherina’s complaints about being scheduled and ordered to perform
tasks according to others’ demands:
Why, gentlemen, you do me double wrong
To strive for that which resteth in my choice.
I am no breeching scholar in the schools,
I’ll not be tied to hours, nor ’pointed times,
But learn my lessons as I please myself.
And to cut off all strife, here sit we down:
Take you your instrument, play you the whiles,
His lecture will be done ere you have tun’d. (3.1.16-23)
Bianca here shows that she does not reject her condition as a woman but, anticipating Helena in
All’s Well That Ends Well, seeks to “lose [her virginity] to her own liking” (1.1.150-151). She
insists that since she is already educated, possibly an autodidact (the play makes no reference to
previous tutors, and her father’s hiring of a tutor in the play implies that he has not done so
before), she takes charge of the scene and arrogates her right to order her life according to her
own preferences. Her phrase “as I please myself” resonates as a powerful indicator of personal
privilege. As I discussed in Chapters Two and Three, “pleasure” has its association with
sovereignty, particularly deciding how others should behave. The Induction to The Taming of the
Shrew contains multiple references to “please” as a term befitting an aristocrat; the Lord instructs
his servants to trick Christopher Sly by repeating phrases like “Will’t please your lordship cool
your hands?” (Ind.1.58), which the servants do, beseeching Sly twice about whatever will please
him (Ind.2.2-3). Katherina repeats Bianca’s phrase during the wedding scene in a similar sense,
wherein she insists on not complying with others or living according to their schedules:
Nay then,
Do what thou canst, I will not go to-day,
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No, nor to-morrow—not till I please myself.
The door is open, sir, there lies your way;
You may be jogging whiles your boots are green.
For me, I’ll not be gone till I please myself. (3.2.207-212)
The phrase “till I please myself” is not a gesture of dominance, as with the aristocrat’s
“pleasure,” but rather a claim that one has the right to self-determination, particularly with
reference to one’s body, while others have their own rights to self-determination. In Katherina’s
example above, she makes clear to Petruchio that he can do as he pleases just as she can do hers.
In Bianca’s example, she informs her teachers that if they are to instruct her it will be on her
terms.
Attending to the use of the word “please” reveals Katherina’s transformation. After
Petruchio and Katherina have their first conversation, he assures her father and the other men
present that the two of them are already of one mind:
Be patient, gentlemen, I choose her for myself.
If she and I be pleas’d, what's that to you?
’Tis bargain’d ’twixt us twain, being alone,
That she shall still be curst in company.
I tell you ’tis incredible to believe
How much she loves me. (2.1.302-307)
He begins by asserting that he has made his choice, as if the marriage is driven by his desire, but
then he claims that “she loves me” and describes her as erotically overcome: “She hung about
my neck, and kiss on kiss / She vied so fast, protesting oath on oath” (2.1.308-309). He figures
her as the aggressor and preemptively interprets her behavior so that whatever she does will be
viewed as in cooperation with Petruchio’s wishes. Whereas “pleasing” and “pleasure” is
individual throughout the play, here Petruchio presents it as shared between Katherina and
himself, as if they have a pact that distinguishes them from the world. He is literally correct that
“’tis incredible to believe” what he describes, but audiences frequently do, not as a description of

244

their current status but as a prophecy. Since audiences and critics sometimes see Petruchio and
Katherina as forming a team, we can observe in these lines how they are conditioned to do so by
Petruchio’s lies.
Later in the play, towards the end of the taming sequences, Katherina surrenders to
Petruchio’s refusal to move forward until she conforms with his false claims about the time of
day:
Forward, I pray, since we have come so far,
And be it moon, or sun, or what you please;
And if you please to call it a rush-candle,
Henceforth I vow it shall be so for me. (4.5.12-15)
Pleasing oneself is, we see, linked to the management of time, and the course of one’s life. To
want to please another, in this context, is to acknowledge that the other’s preferences supersede
one’s own; it is not a claim of mutuality but submission. Katherina makes it clear that when she
agrees with Petruchio, it is to comply with his domination, not a statement of her actual
perceptions or feelings. As I discussed earlier and will discuss more in this chapter, the actors’
deference to the audience’s “pleasure” should therefore be understood as performative assertions
about the power dynamics between them.
To return to Bianca, her behavior with her teachers suggests that her wish to please
herself, if it must require a husband, will “resteth in my choice.” She flirts with Lucentio, using
the Latin lesson to tell him to neither presume nor despair (3.1.42-45). She also tells him to make
sure they are not heard, and thus she constructs a secret pact between them, dictated by her, that
may result in a marriage according to her preferences. Bianca is rational, and her silences should
be taken as strategic. During the wedding scene, her only line is in reference to her sister: “That
being mad herself, she’s madly mated” (3.2.244). If Katherina were sane, she would have chosen
a husband rather than wait for one. The pragmatic henikosexual woman recognizes the
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limitations of her life and acts within them, acknowledging that choosing her husband may be the
only form of agency available to her; or, more specifically, that making this choice can open new
possibilities for her agency. She may have a life of her own but it can only be achieved via
marriage, and therefore a woman should take control over the process rather than resist it or
submit to someone else’s control over it.
As I noted above, Shakespeare does not show Bianca making her decision, or sharing
much of her inner life. Instead, he provides a short scene wherein she and Lucentio flirt and go
off together, with their actions acknowledged by the other suitors:
LUCENTIO
BIANCA
LUCENTIO
BIANCA
LUCENTIO
HORTENSIO
TRANIO

Now, mistress, profit you in what you read?
What, master, read you? First resolve me that.
I read that I profess, the Art to Love.
And may you prove, sir, master of your art!
While you, sweet dear, prove mistress of my heart!
Quick proceeders, marry! Now, tell me, I pray,
You that durst swear that your mistress Bianca
Lov’d [none] in the world so well as Lucentio.
O despiteful love, unconstant womankind!
I tell thee, Litio, this is wonderful. (4.2.6-15)

This scene suggests that Bianca has awakened sexually. As Heather James notes, Ovid
concludes the second book of the Ars Amatoria by instructing his male pupils on
the method of achieving simultaneous orgasm. Bianca’s hopes may be high
indeed, if she also recalls Ovid’s boast, in Amores 3.7, that he once came nine
times in one night. Her freedom with speech, in any case, compromises her
modesty in the eyes of jealous characters within the play, such as Hortensio, as
well as critics of the play.391
Whether Bianca is driven by erotic arousal or sheer audacity—or, more likely, a combination of
the two—this exchange displays her superior knowledge as well as her continued insistence that
she control her own courtship. Lucentio asks her if her reading brings her “profit,” and she does
not answer but reframes the conversation so she is the one asking the questions and making the
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demands. For him to be “master of your art” is a joke about the obtaining of a master’s degree 392
in which she is in the position of the examiner. Diaz observes the ways that Bianca uses her
knowledge of Ovid to maintain dominance through the entire courtship: “She uses Penelope’s
letter of complaint to keep Lucentio in limbo until their next lesson, thereby encouraging another
tutorial without a promise of requited love. [...] Though the play may present Bianca as the more
innocent of the two sisters, her knowledge and use of Ovid’s most famous passages reveal her
interest in erotic desire and the ease with which she is able to tutor Lucentio.” 393 If Bianca’s
feelings for Lucentio are erotic, her sexual awakening would have come from her reading, not
her encounter with him, lending new possible meaning to her claim that in her self-education she
would “learn my lessons as I please myself” (3.1.20).
Her other suitors’ response to her intrigue with Lucentio clarifies the running difference
between men and women in Shakespearean comedy. We have no reason to think that Bianca
ever expressed interest in Tranio, but he takes her preference for Lucentio as a rejection of him,
as if she had deceived him; he immediately generalizes this to all women as “unconstant.”
Hortensio then resolves to marry the “wealthy widow, / Ere three days pass, which hath as long
lov’d me / As I have lov’d this proud disdainful haggard” (4.3.37-39). The Widow, though her
name indicates she has loved a man before, has been devoted to Hortensio and not expressed
interest in anyone else, while Hortensio, like Proteus in The Two Gentlemen of Verona and other
men in Shakespeare’s comedies, is able to shift his affections quickly. Though he is frustrated,
Hortensio is not particular, and he will immediately accept a substitute for Bianca. Similarly, at
the beginning of the play, Petruchio announced that he would marry any woman who advanced
his interests: “Haply to wive and thrive as best as I may” (1.2.56), with no concern for her age,
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personality, or individual preference. Even if a woman is pragmatic, as Bianca is, her erotic and
marital choices are firm, despite men’s claims to the contrary.
The final scene of the play presents the resolution of the marriage plots, but prior to it is a
full statement of standard comic happiness of a piece with Shakespeare’s other comedies. The
end of Act Four features a speech by Petruchio that announces the culmination of the lostfather/mistaken-identity plot, reminiscent of The Comedy of Errors and in the tradition of New
Comedy. We see in this speech that happiness, while it may be not found in the marriage plots, is
engendered by the restoration of proper relationships among family members:
Happily we met, the happier for thy son.
And now by law, as well as reverend age,
I may entitle thee my loving father.
The sister to my wife, this gentlewoman,
Thy son by this hath married. Wonder not,
Nor be grieved; she is of good esteem,
Her dowry wealthy, and of worthy birth;
Beside, so qualified as may beseem
The spouse of any noble gentleman.
Let me embrace with old Vincentio,
And wander we to see thy honest son,
Who will of thy arrival be full joyous. (4.5.59-70)
For Petruchio, marriage provides happiness not simply in itself but in its expansion of the family.
Though he speaks to a man he calls his father, Petruchio demonstrates his own status in the play
as the one who determines the nature of relationships and the facts of identities and events. He
assumes the role taken by sovereign rulers in other comedies by instructing people what to feel:
“Wonder not, / Nor be grieved.” In this instance, a character is instructed not to wonder but to
believe what he is told. He also clarifies the values of the society which he expressed at the
beginning of the play and which now can be generalized or taken as normative: wealth, social
esteem, rank, and family connection. His reference to Lucentio as Vincentio’s “honest son” is
ironic (Lucentio has been using a false name for much of the play) but also a clear statement that
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Petruchio decides who is honest and who is false, just as he does in his games with Katherina. He
further anticipates Lucentio’s joy, which will derive from affirming his familial bonds more so
than from his marriage. As Petruchio describes Bianca here, whom he does not even name, she is
a prize and an ornament to Vincentio’s family, and little else.
To turn to the end of The Taming of the Shrew, we can recognize its familiar comic
elements: references to the miraculous, order, and hierarchy, as well as injunctions to happiness
and, as will be the case in some other comedies, to sex. The unity that other plays promise is
actually shown in the final scene, where everyone feasts together. The audience of a comedy is
usually left to wonder what happens when the characters come together after the end of the play;
as I have noted, the comedies usually end with a call to gathering and conversation but do not
represent them directly. The final scene of Shrew presents that gathering and makes clear that
even though conflicts seemed to have come to an end they remain. The scene begins with
Lucentio announcing their communal unity: “At last, though long, our jarring notes agree, / And
time it is, when raging war is [done], / To smile at scapes and perils overthrown” (5.2.1-3). These
could be the very last lines of a comedy; his first line echoes the Duke’s “We will include all
jars” (5.4.157) in the final moments of The Two Gentlemen of Verona. However, Petruchio
responds with exasperation at the constant feasting: “Nothing but sit and sit, and eat and eat!”
(5.2.12). The scene then proceeds towards the men’s wager about their wives’ obedience, and
leads to Shakespeare’s foregrounding of an explanation and interpretation of the play’s meaning
that he otherwise refuses to provide in his comedies’ conclusions. The play’s explanation is not
deferred but presented in Katherina’s long, didactic speech, though the audience has many
choices in interpreting it. It is possible that we may take the statements of happiness from Act
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Four Scene Six as the traditional comic closing, while the final act of the play functions as
commentary, a version of the conversation about the play over dinner that audiences may enjoy.
Katherina’s speech in Act Five Scene Two is addressed thoroughly in the critical
literature. John C. Bean surveys the critical divide as of 1983 between “revisionists” (who read
the taming ironically) and “anti-revisionists” (who see Katherina as abused and dominated). 394
Robert Ornstein speaks on behalf of the anti-revisionists: “she wants to enjoy all the traditional
pleasures of the wedding ceremony and the feast with family and friends. She is ready to be like
other brides and other wives.” 395 In the past few decades, critics have taken other approaches, but
the fault line remains. Lynda Boose396 and Frances Dolan397 contextualize the speech and the
taming scenes within early modern discourses and practices of domestic violence. Carolyn
Brown argues that Katherina draws our sympathy and continues to harbor resentment: “Her
language continues to present her relationship to Petruchio as more like a battle that she has lost
than a loving union.”398 Karen Newman,399 Amy Smith,400 and Marjorie Garber401 see greater
playfulness, if not irony, in Katherina’s behavior, and interpret the play as not containing her but
suggesting greater possibilities for challenging patriarchal norms in the play’s afterworld.
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Kiernan Ryan sees the taming as mutual, and the conclusion as a performance: Katherina and
Petruchio become “a double-act.” 402
My concern is the ways the speech is directed at Bianca and at the audience. Petruchio is
also part of her audience, and therefore we can witness divergent responses onstage just as we
can apprehend them within audiences. Katherina begins by noting that shrewishness is simply
unattractive: “It blots thy beauty” (5.2.139) and “in no sense is meet or amiable” (5.2.141). The
use of “meet” I discussed with reference to the closing words of Measure for Measure: what is
appropriate or fitting is both a political and an aesthetic decision, and Katherina’s references to
beauty figure gender hierarchy as not a moral concern but as, to return to my claims about
“pleasure” and power above, simply not pleasing. Lucentio’s reference to “jarring notes” (5.2.1)
at the beginning of the scene and his comment, “But a harsh hearing when women are froward”
(5.2.183) continue this aestheticization of female subjugation in the name of literal harmony.
People disagree, however, about what causes pleasure. Pamela Allen Brown claims that
the play is designed to divide the audience and thus demonstrate the lack of consensus about
women and marriage: “Kate is a figure who would annoy some women rather than inspire
identification or sympathy. But there is very little within the play that would prompt early
modern women to pity a woman who beats her sister, mocks her father, says not a word when
she is betrothed against her will, and hasn’t the wit to vex a suitor or revenge herself together. A
shrew was supposed to provide laughter, not tears.” 403 That tears are a possible response to what
for others causes laughter is part of Shakespeare’s work in this play and in the genre: he enables
us to track our responses and their ideological underpinnings. Empathy itself is used in the play,
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as in other comedies, as a means to secure submission. In her final speech, Katherina reframes
the struggle between men and women via foreground male suffering:
And for thy maintenance; commits his body
To painful labor, both by sea and land;
To watch the night in storms, the day in cold,
Whilst thou li’st warm at home, secure and safe;
And craves no other tribute at thy hands
But love, fair looks, and true obedience—
Too little payment for so great a debt. (5.2.148-154)
She plays upon women’s capacity for empathy to entice them to submission. The relative pains
and comforts of gendered life are such that, in her telling, men suffer so much more than women,
and therefore women should be grateful. At no point does Katherina suggest that marriage
provides happiness for women; instead, she offers security, obligation, and deference according
to social and natural conditions. The penultimate line of the speech contains the phrase “if he
please” (5.2.178), demonstrating that to the extent that the relationship is mutual, it is decidedly
hierarchical.
Furthermore, the very fact that the speech must be spoken, and directed to the other
women in the play—both of whom got the specific men they wanted for themselves—implies
that the domestication of women is a fragile social project in need of constant maintenance and
even cultural propaganda. Kiernan Ryan, who interprets the play quite sanguinely, nonetheless
acknowledges that “the system of sexual and social distinctions on which [the plot] depends are
unmasked as man-made and undermined”; 404 Karen Newman argues along similar lines: the
speech “subverts the play’s patriarchal master narrative by exposing it as neither natural nor
divinely ordained, but culturally constructed.” 405 When Katherina instructs women to “vail your
stomachs, for it is no boot” (5.2.176), she acknowledges that it is women’s appetite to resist men
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and seek what they think to be beneficial for themselves. Women must be tamed because they do
not want to be ruled. If Shakespeare’s comedies send messages about women’s proper conduct,
conditioning audiences to see women as fit for little beyond marriage, then The Taming of the
Shrew foregrounds this didactic purpose in ways that are recognizable from close attention to the
later comedies. The Induction contains references to the “pleasant comedy” having a therapeutic
function, to “frame your mind to mirth and merriment” (Ind.2.130, 135). Happiness is, as ever,
an injunction, for one’s good, and it entails stories of women, in various ways, being
accommodated to the institution of marriage.
Just as we are left to interpret Katherina’s speech, we also wonder about Bianca’s
reaction to it. The actor, typically, has many choices, because it is Shakespeare’s practice to
leave open the question of his henikosexual women’s emotional state. Bianca’s sexual
forwardness in Act Four Scene Two contrasts with Petruchio’s festive but aggressive command
that Katherina kiss him (5.2.180) after the speech, with the further injunction, “Come, Kate,
we’ll to bed” (5.2.184). If the relationship between Katherina and Petruchio is erotic, Petruchio is
the dominant figure. There is no evidence that Bianca’s married relationship with Lucentio has
retained the sexual excitement of their courtship; she is more interested in sleep (5.2.43).
Like The Two Gentlemen of Verona, The Taming of the Shrew contains no stage-magic or
theatrical miracle. In its place, Katherina’s apparent transformation is itself described as a
“wonder” multiple times. When Petruchio sends her to retrieve the other women, Lucentio
comments, “Here is a wonder, if you talk of a wonder,” to which Hortensio replies, “And so it is;
I wonder what it bodes” (5.2.106-107). The senses of “wonder” as “a figure of awe” as well as
“speculation” are deployed here: wonder can be the end or the beginning of thinking. Petruchio
answers them with his own interpretation: “Marry, peace it bodes, and love, and quiet life, / An
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aweful rule, and right supremacy; / And to be short, what not, that’s sweet and happy” (5.2.108110). This is not an encouragement to share happiness so much as Petruchio’s assertion of his
personal contentment from a marriage that is simultaneously normative and exceptional. In the
last line of the play, Lucentio repeats his claim: “’Tis a wonder, by your leave, she will be tamed
so” (5.2.189), returning to “wonder” as something confounding but which invites investigation.
Petruchio’s reference to “supremacy” takes the place of the affirmation of the sovereign, a
common feature of comedies; there is no Duke or King in this play, only a husband who
establishes himself as ruler of his own household and envy of his friends, who has organized his
life according to his pleasures and preferences. He is happy, if no one else is.

Henikosexuality as a Structural Principle
In Shakespeare’s first three comedies he portrays female heterosexual desire equivocally,
with its fulfillment conveying the completion of a story but not the achievement of happiness.
Adriana, Julia, Silvia, Katherina, and Bianca all get their men, but they also strain at the
continuing restrictions of their lives. In Shakespeare’s next two comedies, Love’s Labor’s Lost
and A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the women’s desires are dramatic facts that animate the plot.
The women have their bonds with their respective men; there are plot complications; the
complications are resolved. In Love’s Labor’s Lost, anomalous among Shakespeare’s comedies,
the women’s love is hardly articulated or investigated, and (therefore) the marriages are deferred
by a year according to the women’s demands. In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, however, the
marriages take place offstage and the couples spend the final act enjoying theater and (for the
men) conversation. In both plays, the women have their bonds with their respective men and,
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unlike the men, never experience confusion or misdirected affection. The henikosexuality is such
a given that it is invisible and draws little comment.
In these plays, Shakespeare begins to show a concern for male development and
improvement: their desires and behavior must become better fitted to the preferences of the
women who love them. This is a marked shift from the earlier plays, wherein the women
suffered men who either did not change or became worse, and it’s a contrast to the late comedies,
in which women’s love for undeserving men is aggressively thematized. Critics emphasize the
conflicts between the sexes in Love’s Labor’s Lost, but the nature of the women’s feelings for
their men is often unaddressed. I will investigate the love the women bear for their men in these
two plays while also noting the ways they disparage the pursuit of knowledge. The norm of
unwavering female commitment pervades the plays, which also discourage us from thinking too
hard about what happens in them.

Love’s Labor’s Lost
Love’s Labor’s Lost begins with the King of Navarre and three of his attendant lords
swearing to pursue knowledge and, for three years, abjure love:
Therefore, brave conquerors—for so you are,
That war against your own affections
And the huge army of the world’s desires—
Our late edict shall strongly stand in force:
Navarre shall be the wonder of the world;
Our court shall be a little academe,
Still and contemplative in living art. (1.1.8-14)
Navarre figures this commitment as heroic, a form of self-mastery and an impetus for admiration
and glory. As Katharine Eisaman Maus writes, “Self-mortification becomes a means to self-
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exaltation, a way to acquire the traditional aristocratic desiderata, honor and fame.”406 The
King’s claims are undercut quickly by Berowne, who asserts that knowledge is simply
unrewarding: it “with pain purchas’d, doth inherit pain” (1.1.73). Berowne’s language is
proverbially Epicurean: pain should purchase pleasure, and an activity should be measured by its
utility. Berowne further argues that astronomers who name stars “Have no more profit of their
shining nights / Than those that walk and wot not what they are” (1.1.90-91). His reference to
“shining nights” implies that those who know the names of the stars have no advantage over
those who do not, with a further implication that the ignorant enjoy other activities during their
evenings.
The men’s oath of celibacy shortly becomes the play’s obstacle to romantic coupling, not
because the men take their oaths seriously, but because of their shame and concerns about oathbreaking (and getting caught oath-breaking). There are several scenes of the men wrangling with
their feelings and their identities, and therefore they have drawn considerable critical attention.
Critics tend to read the play morally, as if it has a “message” about the power of love and the
problem of self-absorption. R. W. Maslen sees it as exposing men’s “readiness to allow the
pleasure of the moment to shape their actions regardless of promises, laws or responsibilities of
any kind—to dissolve all bonds in the interests of instant self-gratification.” 407 Robert Ornstein,
likewise, considers the play “a variation of the ancient literary joke of Cupid’s revenge on those
who would deny his sovereignty over the human heart. [...] [A]ll that matters is the ironic
peripeteia in which the scoffer is humbled by passion.” 408 Louis Adrian Montrose claims that
Shakespeare’s seeks “to exemplify through comedy how ‘sin of self love’ trips the wit,
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perverting the potentially complementary relation of such pursuits into seemingly irreconcilable
antitheses. The root of all the funny, silly, and occasionally vicious behaviors which forestall the
expected conclusion of Love’s Labor’s Lost is an obsessive self-involvement inimical to the
rhythm of reciprocity which binds individual, society, and cosmos.” 409 For Andy Mousley, the
play’s “serious message is about the pitfalls of egocentric seriousness and the need to be able to
laugh at ourselves” and this leads to “a degree of greater awareness and wisdom.” 410 These
critics all write approvingly of what they understand to be the play’s moral, and in so doing they
equate the desire for study and celibacy—for a life divorced from eros—as “self-love” that,
paradoxically, involves a failure to know the self. Reciprocity is figured as both a natural
necessity and a social duty. The women teach these lessons to the men, and thus the play
presents love as something women simply know and which men struggle to deny.
The women state their affections for the men in their first scene, and then proceed to play
flirtatious games with the men for the rest of the play. They critique the men’s behavior and
expressions of love, but they say little about their own feelings. It is not until the end of the long
last scene when the women express some reservations about their love and thus make their
demands upon their prospective husbands. As Maus observes, “despite their apparent
independence, the Princess and her ladies never have available to them a specifically feminine
subjectivity, a special claim upon the cultural or material resources available to the men.” 411 The
women are able to critique the men throughout the play but not question their love, as the men
can and do. Neither are they capable of withdrawing their love altogether, only suspending it
temporarily. Female henikosexuality is not presented as a choice but as a function of the ways
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Shakespeare’s comic plots configure gender difference. Though the women do not express much
desire for their men, they do not express interest in much else (the diplomacy that provides the
reason for their visit is forgotten for most of the play), and their games serve as a form of
courtship. They never express desire so much as receptivity to the men’s attempts to express
their desire, to which the women can mock and suggest improvements.
The couples are established in the women’s first scene, wherein each of the three
attending ladies discusses their histories with their respective men: they saw them at social
events and observed their virtues and flaws. The Princess responds to their speeches: “God bless
my ladies! are they all in love, / That every one her own hath garnished / With such bedecking
ornaments of praise?” (2.1.77-79). The Princess identifies love with exaggeration and
adornment, as the men will in their letters and encomia. The Princess herself expresses no love
for Navarre, whom she has not met. When they do meet, she mocks his vow with sexual
overtones:
NAVARRE
PRINCESS
NAVARRE
PRINCESS

Hear me, dear lady: I have sworn an oath.
Our Lady help my lord! he’ll be forsworn.
Not for the world, fair madam, by my will.
Why, will shall break it, will, and nothing else.
(2.1.97-100)

Her final line is a reference to sexual desire. This is a prediction but also, possibly, an invitation.
The Princess speaks on behalf of the inevitability of male sexual desire; she thus anticipates the
arguments Isabella will present in Measure for Measure, though perhaps the Princess is more
aware of the effect she has on her listener when she makes them. Love’s Labor’s Lost contains
much discourse about the infeasibility of even temporary vows of celibacy. Sexual desire
becomes an organizing principle, a means of ordering characters and, as Maus argues, continuing
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family names, a great concern for aristocrats. 412 The play presents male desire as in need of
tutoring, female desire as sufficient for sorting (one woman to one man), and the central concern
thereafter is getting the language right. The play’s jokes about cuckoldry, particularly the bawdy
songs at the end, are no more than expressions of unfounded male anxiety. Even though the
women of the play delay their marriages, there is no indication here that the women would even
consider being unfaithful.
After The Princess converses with Navarre, her attendant Boyet tells her that Navarre is
in love: “If my observation (which very seldom lies), / By the heart’s still rhetoric, disclosed with
eyes, / Deceive me not now, Navarre is infected” (2.1.228-230). Boyet provides an extensive
account of his assessment, to which the Princess replies, “Come to our pavilion—Boyet is
dispos’d!” (2.1.249). “Dispos’d” refers to being “inclined to merriment,” and so the Princess
dismisses Boyet’s claim, but after this scene, the four men and the four women are paired.
Shakespeare barely establishes the connections between them. In the comical scenes of letterreading, disguises, and banter, the burden is entirely on the men to affect sincerity and please the
women. The women’s feelings are neither doubted nor expressed. Their association with their
men is essentially motiveless. The characters are merely put into proximity with one another and
romantic games ensue. Shakespeare’s presentation of the men as ridiculous is premised upon the
women being unimpeachable, but also on their having no concerns beyond their games with the
men.
In the play’s final scene, the men wear disguises and the women switch identifying
tokens as a trick: “Their several counsels they unbosom shall / To loves mistook, and so be
mock’d withal / Upon the next occasion that we meet” (5.2.141-143). Anticipating the bed-tricks

412

Maus, “Transfer of Title in Love’s Labor’s Lost,” 219-220.

259

of the later comedies, this episode demonstrates that the men do not know the women they
supposedly love, and could easily share their intimate thoughts with the wrong person.
Especially significant is that the men are tricked because of their willingness to share private
thoughts; the women never do, and it is possible to speculate that the women have no private
thoughts to share; or, that the play’s emphasis on language is such that the women know better
than to attempt to articulate their status as the men’s love interests. When the women later
command the men to wait a year and do varied forms of penance, they tentatively promise to
love their men:
PRINCESS

If for my love (as there is no such cause)
You will do aught, this shall you do for me:
[...]
Then at the expiration of the year,
Come challenge me, challenge me by these deserts,
And by this virgin palm now kissing thine,
I will be thine; and till that [instant] shut
My woeful self up in a mourning house,
Raining the tears of lamentation
For the remembrance of my father’s death.
If this thou do deny, let our hands part,
Neither intitled in the other’s heart. (5.2.792-812)

KATHERINE

Come when the King doth to my lady come;
Then if I have much love, I’ll give you some. (5.2.829-830)

MARIA

At the twelvemonth’s end,
I’ll change my black gown for a faithful friend.
(5.2.833-834)

ROSALINE

[I]f sickly ears,
Deaf’d with the clamors of their own dear groans,
Will hear your idle scorns, continue then,
And I will have you and that fault withal;
But if they will not, throw away that spirit,
And I shall find you empty of that fault,
Right joyful of your reformation. (5.2.863-869)
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In three of these cases, there is a promise to return the man’s love, though with a variety of
nuances. The Princess and Rosaline demand the men earn their love by undergoing a trial, while
Katherine does not even promise that she will love Dumaine; it will depend on how she feels at
the time. Maria simply tells Longueville to wait and presents no further conditions; her
disposition will be indicated by her clothing (she will don “the destin’d livery”). The women
vary in personality and forms of attachment, but, as I have stressed, their function in the play is
to provide a locus for the men’s desire and a source of discipline for the men’s expression of that
desire. The women’s demands for delay this disrupt the form and defer the women’s final
absorption into it. As Peter Erickson writes, “Comedy cannot contain and transmute the
difficulties which have emerged in the relations between men and women. These relations cannot
be concluded and are not simply suspended for one year, but are fundamentally unresolved.” 413
The play’s deferral allows us to consider that these one or more of these women may entertain
the possibility of a life without marriage, or marrying some man other than their assigned
partner. Such developments are otherwise unthinkable in a Shakespearean comedy, and thus
Love’s Labor’s Lost is singular in its deferral not of explanation but of erotic unities and
unconditional marital promises. Nevertheless, the play does not foreground female desire so
much as assume it, while attending to the more important business of male folly. Berowne
acknowledges for the audience that the play did not end properly:
BEROWNE
KING
BEROWNE

Our wooing doth not end like an old play:
Jack hath not Gill. These ladies’ courtesy
Might well have made our sport a comedy.
Come, sir, it wants a twelvemonth an’ a day,
And then ’twill end.
That’s too long for a play. (5.2.874-878)
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Berowne licenses the audience’s disappointment. Furthermore, just as the play took on the
seriousness that attends death and mourning, Berowne reminds the audience of the artifice, the
fact of a play’s performance occupying a restricted period of time. The metadramatic moment is
useful for the audience to reflect upon its own assumptions. Had the play ended with its promises
of marriage and injunctions to joy, the audience may not have noticed their own expectations.
The audience is conditioned to await its standard romantic ending, even in a play wherein the
women have expressed little desire. Berowne draws our attention to theater’s limitations,
including the limits it places upon itself with genres and the expectations they engender. Cynthia
Lewis explains that the games and sports of the play make marriage unserious, but death makes
it serious,414 and therefore a comedy must strain beyond its own limits of time and representation
in order to grant due value to its own primary subject.
The play’s final moments feature the song of Winter, with its “merry note” (5.2.919, 928)
and other repetitions, another acknowledgement of the obligation to provide some sign of
happiness or promise of good fortune in the future. The very last line consists of Don Armado
telling the audience where to go and distinguishing them from the actors: “You that way; we this
way” (5.2.931). The command reminds the audience of its accustomed responsiveness to
commands from the stage while also highlighting that the audience does not share the condition
of the actors and need not remain in the play-world with its disappointments and suspended
gratifications.
Love’s Labor’s Lost provides some guidance on how to interpret it, which is by not
taking it too seriously. The play is anti-philosophical. It contains several discourses from
Berowne and others against the pursuit of knowledge. The play’s opposition of love and
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philosophy is highly gendered: the women seem to know everything they need to know, while
the men need to learn that all they need to know can be learned from the women. From the
outset, Berowne claims that more can be learned from a woman’s eye than from books:
Study me how to please the eye indeed
By fixing it upon a fairer eye,
Who dazzling so, that eye shall be his heed,
And give him light that it was blinded by. (1.1.80-83)
The claim is familiar from Neoplatonic philosophy, but the argument Berowne provides here and
elsewhere is that love does not give access to higher knowledge so much as humble the lover,
who learns to accept the universality of his condition as one whose “will,” i.e., libido, is stronger
than any oath. The woman’s eye is “fairer,” i.e., superior, not just to the man’s eye but to other
sources of knowledge. Men should not pursue fame and glory; rather than try to make Navarre
into “the wonder of the world” (1.1.12), the men should instead be “dazzled” by women.
Berowne further argues that he lives according to nature: “At Christmas I no more desire a rose /
Than wish a snow in May’s new-fangled shows, / But like of each thing that in season grows”
(1.1.105-107). One’s preferences should be in accordance with what is available and appropriate
to the time and place.
Furthermore, Love’s Labor’s Lost suggests that the common acceptance of the fact of
men’s common susceptibility to the power of women’s eyes will lead to greater understanding
among men who recognize what unites them. As Dumaine says when he hopes that his
colleagues have fallen in love just as he has, “None offend where all alike do dote” (4.3.124).
The capacity for offense is tied to a notion of superiority and self-elevation that the play rejects.
Berowne politicizes the point in his long speech to his friends, of which this is the key passage:
Never durst poet touch a pen to write,
Until his ink were temp’red with Love’s sighs:
O then his lines would ravish savage ears
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And plant in tyrants mild humility. (4.3.343-346)
The poet’s humility leads the poet to achievements which then humble tyrants and bring
civilization—not in the sense of greatness but in making men milder. Berowne ends his speech
by equating the love of women with the Christian love of humanity: “It is religion to be thus
forsworn: / For charity itself fulfills the law, / And who can sever love from charity?” (4.3.360362). Love of woman leads to love of neighbor, and thus communal harmony. As Kiernan Ryan
attests, “the vision it finds vested in the common lot of humanity, a vision which cuts across rank
and, at the close of the play, anchors us all in the seasons of the earth, the creatures of the
countryside, and the simple labors of the people.” 415 Berowne makes the argument for comedy
itself as a socializing and leveling force, one that does not undo the social facts of rank but rather
grounds humanity in the common fact of (hetero)sexuality. The men’s pact with each other is
undone so that the men may join the greater community of people who love particularly and
therefore are capable of loving in common. As John Kerrigan writes, “Embracing love
transforms the men’s circumstances by eliding eros with caritas and consequently easing their
oaths but also by changing the landscape of the promise. It is one thing to forswear women
indifferently, another to slight the future mother of your children.” 416 The men’s errors derive
from their conception of love as a general concept rather than a specific bond between a man and
a woman which becomes the source of all other bonds.
The play’s love plot is consistently anti-heroic. The men’s shame at writing their loveletters is derived not from it being a shameful activity in itself but that they swore not to love,
and thus set themselves up for humiliation. Breaking the oath becomes acceptable only if
everyone does it and therefore no one can judge another. The play thus anticipates the arguments
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made by Isabella to Angelo in Measure for Measure: Angelo claims distinction and the capacity
to judge others based on his reputation as a cold man not given to sexual desire, and the play
humbles and humiliates him. Love’s Labor’s Lost is more benign, but its claim is similar: men
should not aspire to something greater than being a husband. Angelo’s struggle is traumatizing,
for himself, other characters, and the audience, but Love’s Labor’s Lost, in Maslen’s words,
presents its men undergoing “a humiliating but delightful decline into total subjection to the
emotions.”417 The men claim that love makes them more charitable, though they do not act upon
that until the women force them.
Love’s Labor’s Lost encourages men to live within existing structures. Navarre provides
the play’s clearest statement of the wisdom of acclimating oneself to the world as it is:
The extreme parts of time extremely forms
All causes to the purpose of his speed,
And often, at his very loose, decides
That which long process could not arbitrate. (5.2.740-743)
Navarre’s argument for the power of time is also an argument for human powerlessness, and an
argument against any human desire to live outside of time or nature, or to know anything beyond
what love teaches. Andy Mousley claims that “Love seems only to reinforce the folly of human
beings. The existential message of comedy therefore seems to be to live humbly and with a sense
of one’s own limitations.”418 It is telling that only the men of the play even aspire to challenge
those limitations. Love’s Labor’s Lost for the most part presents women as comfortable already
within those structures and uninterested in change or new possibilities. While the men attempt to
integrate into the world metaphysically, in accordance with time and nature, the women look to,
in Maus’s words, “bring desires into accord with social requirements. For the Princess and her
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ladies are not revolutionaries. They do not want to undermine or escape from patriarchy, but to
find themselves a secure and relatively advantageous position within it.” 419 Marking a break with
his previous comedies, in Love’s Labor’s Lost Shakespeare begins his practice of presenting
women as comic enforcers whose place is to prevent men from attempting to live according to a
code or rule of life that precludes heterosexual relations. It is not until his late comedies that
Shakespeare will present women who themselves attempt to maintain such a code. At the end of
Love’s Labor’s Lost the women invest themselves with the power to decide when their relations
will resume and under what terms, but their agency is premised upon their acceptance of their
duty to acclimate men into the relational life that the women accept for themselves without
question or objection.

A Midsummer Night’s Dream
As I mentioned above, A Midsummer Night’s Dream takes female henikosexual as a
structural device. Like The Two Gentlemen of Verona, it presents the problem of two men in love
with the same woman, while a second woman loves one of the men. Whenever Shakespeare
presents a version of this problem in a comedy, the plot is resolved in accordance with the
women’s preferences.420 When Oberon watches the lovers and recognizes their situation, he
intervenes on the women’s behalf: the men’s desires are to be reordered so as to accommodate
the women. Male desire is a problem to be solved, while female desire is a fact to be
accommodated. That this is not often recognized is due to the play’s own interpretation of its
work: after Puck applies the love-juice to Lysander the second time, he chants,
And the country proverb known,
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That every man should take his own,
In your waking shall be shown.
Jack shall have Jill;
Naught shall go ill:
The man shall have his mare again, and all shall be well. (3.2.458-463)
Puck presents his work as serving the men’s interests: “his own” implies that the woman belongs
to the man because he desires her, as does the order of names in “Jack shall have Jill” and “The
man shall have his mare.” However, the play is ordered around the women getting the men they
prefer while the men’s desires are adjusted. (As I will address, Midsummer presents one of
Shakespeare’s only examples of a woman who is attracted to two different men, i.e., Titania,
though she does so because her husband compels her to, and the “man” is not precisely a human
male.) Puck’s lines imply not a misinterpretation so much as a statement that when a woman
desires a man, she is effectively his possession, “his own,” like his horse. The restoration of
relationships creates general peace. After the confusions and experiments of Love’s Labor’s Lost,
Shakespeare returns to his common practice in Midsummer with his presentation of henikosexual
female satisfaction as a source of normative social order, with its accompanying injunctions to
happiness in favor of analysis.
My interpretations of Shakespeare’s early and late comedies have emphasized their bleak
and coercive aspects, and I will continue to highlight those features. However, A Midsummer
Night’s Dream is Shakespeare’s first comedy that seems written almost entirely for the purpose
of producing delight. To find it dark or problematic requires some strain on the part of the critic.
Therefore, the play enables us to recognize what precisely constitutes the happiness that a
Shakespearean comedy fosters and why we receive it as such. Derek Gottlieb writes,
With regard to Shakespeare’s comedies, critics have sometimes complained that
the marriages, the happy endings, are somehow lacking; that the wrongs that the
characters have done to one another over the course of the play are not so easily
forgotten or dismissed. [...] Worries that the comedies do not show forth genuine
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happiness, I would contend, stem from a certain chimerical view of happiness.
The lovers at the end of Dream have found themselves in a position to go on from
and with the very words that they have earlier spoken. 421
I contend that “a certain chimerical view of happiness” is necessary to understand what makes a
Shakespearean happy ending happy. Midsummer is so much a fantasy that to ask if its happiness
is “real” or “genuine” is the wrong question. Its happiness and the general happiness of the genre
applies to certain people and their forms of life. The play makes it clear, as I will show, that such
happiness involves gestures of political deference and assimilation, including silence and
normative affective participation, as well as the discouraging of thought.
Whereas the women’s love in Love’s Labor’s Lost is inadequately articulated, in
Midsummer, Hermia and Helena announce their love forthrightly. Hermia’s is initially expressed
in her refusal to marry Demetrius, which gives her audacity that surprises herself:
I do entreat your grace to pardon me.
I know not by what power I am made bold,
Nor how it may concern my modesty,
In such a presence here to plead my thoughts;
But I beseech your Grace that I may know
The worst that may befall me in this case,
If I refuse to wed Demetrius. (1.1.58-64)
The play here signals its first intimation of a woman’s sexual prerogative as her own business
before she is married. Her request to “know / The worst that may befall” is a challenge to her
Duke to threaten her for the right she claims for herself. Such a right is claimed by women in
genre as a literary rather than a social fact; as Leah Marcus notes, we with “our quaint late
twentieth-century prejudice in favor of consensual marriage, find the notion of bridal reluctance
or coercion profoundly shocking. In the Renaissance, it was all too familiar.” 422 The respect that
Hermia wishes from her father and her Duke is later shown to her by Oberon. At this point in the
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play, Theseus tells Hermia to “question your desires” (1.1.67) but she insists, that she cannot
give herself to the wrong man:
So will I grow, so live, so die, my lord,
Ere I will yield my virgin patent up
Unto his lordship, whose unwished yoke
My soul consents not to give sovereignty. (1.1.79-82)
Her language is specifically sexual—her virginity belongs to herself and the man she prefers. No
authority can order her otherwise. Only her soul can give a man consent to her body;
“sovereignty” is hers to bestow. Lisa Hopkins reads this passage as showing a woman’s
resistance to marriage,423 but Hermia resists marrying Demetrius because she loves another man
instead. She wants to marry Lysander, and she will even accept life in a convent over marrying a
man she does not love. She does not consent to the sovereignty of Demetrius, her father, or
Theseus, because she wants to consent to Lysander’s sovereignty.
Helena, likewise, prefers Demetrius and cannot change, despite her suffering for it.
Shakespeare presents the henikosexual woman’s love as beyond account, a private fact and
fundamental orientation. Helena laments of Demetrius,
And as he errs, doting on Hermia’s eyes,
So I, admiring of his qualities.
Things base and vile, holding no quantity,
Love can transpose to form and dignity.
Love looks not with the eyes but with the mind;
And therefore is wing’d Cupid painted blind.
Nor hath Love’s mind of any judgment taste;
Wings, and no eyes, figure unheedy haste;
And therefore is Love said to be a child,
Because in choice he is so oft beguil’d.
As waggish boys in game themselves forswear,
So the boy Love is perjur’d every where;
For ere Demetrius look’d on Hermia’s eyne,
He hail’d down oaths that he was only mine;
And when this hail some heat from Hermia felt,
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So he dissolv’d, and showers of oaths did melt. (1.1.230-245)
The “eyes” that men worship in Love’s Labor’s Lost are here the source of the problem: men
speak of “women’s eyes” rather than the eyes of an individual woman to whom the man should
devote himself. Her own eyes, she knows, are faulty: she admits that her love for Demetrius
cannot be justified and is particular to her “mind” which lacks “judgment.” The play makes clear
that the men are sufficiently physically similar that Puck mistakes them for each other, just as the
women are reputed to be equally attractive (1.1.227). Sexual attraction is thus figured as a matter
of Helena’s “mind” and Hermia’s “soul,” not a simple attraction of bodies or weighing of
qualities.
Helena’s predicament is familiar in Shakespeare: women are constant but men are not,
and men’s failures only increase women’s love. As Mariana says in Measure for Measure on
behalf of the henikosexual women, “They say best men are moulded out of faults” (5.1.439).
Helena begins this speech with “How happy some o’er other some can be!” (1.1.226), providing
the play’s idea of happiness as erotic and marital fulfillment, with no other available possibilities.
Helena prefers to suffer with Demetrius than to attempt to live without him: “herein mean I to
enrich my pain, / To have his sight thither and back again” (1.1.250-251). Whereas Hermia
presents her love for Lysander as a privilege she arrogates to herself, Helena’s unfulfilled love
for Demetrius is self-abasing but nonetheless intractable, and it ultimately results in her triumph
over Demetrius, who fails in his courtship of Hermia. As Melissa Sanchez writes of Helena, her
“relentless devotion demonstrates how, taken to a masochistic extreme, fantasies of female
submission and obedience can pervert and threaten men’s privileged access to sexual initiative
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and agency.”424 In Midsummer, the confusions among the lovers are reordered according to the
women’s preferences.
When Oberon intervenes on Helena’s behalf, he functions as a driver not just of the plot
but of the genre: he favors the henikosexual woman and seeks to solve her problem, though his
preference for her is unexplained. After witnessing her degrading scene with Demetrius, in
which she offers herself as his “spaniel” to be abused (2.1.202-210), Oberon states, “Fare thee
well, nymph. Ere he do leave this grove, / Thou shalt fly him, and he shall seek thy love”
(2.1.245-246). Oberon models for the audience how to sympathize for the unrequited
henikosexual woman, i.e., immediately and without reflection. It would have been just as easy
for Oberon to apply the love-juice to the women so that Demetrius could have Hermia and
Lysander could be consoled with Helena, but he does not. His use of the term “nymph” even
suggests a species affinity with Helena, as if she is somehow part of his own world and not
merely human. His work on her behalf anticipates the Duke’s for Mariana in Measure for
Measure and exemplifies Shakespeare’s general tendency of favoring the henikosexual woman.
When Oberon realizes that Puck has applied the juice to the wrong man, he conveys
further concern for Helena: “All fancy-sick she is and pale of cheer / With sighs of love, that
costs the fresh blood dear” (3.2.96-97). He provides this description so Puck may identify her,
but he also diagnoses her so he may assist in her healing. His partiality to Helena is unexplained,
as mysterious as the love the characters feel for one another in the play. Shakespeare’s comic
plots present some people’s feelings as mattering more than others’ but he does not account for
it. It is arbitrary but consistent. When Oberon sends Puck to fix his error and reorient the men
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towards their appropriate women, he presents the genre’s ideology of proper heterosexual pairing
as the origin of happiness and social peace:
Then crush this herb into Lysander’s eye;
Whose liquor hath this virtuous property,
To take from thence all error with his might,
And make his eyeballs roll with wonted sight.
When they next wake, all this derision
Shall seem a dream and fruitless vision,
And back to Athens shall the lovers wend,
With league whose date till death shall never end. (3.2.366-373)
Oberon presents the love-juice as a correction that delivers men from error. A man’s love should
return a woman’s love; mutuality begins with women’s desire. Oberon’s use of “league” refers to
a covenant or alliance, often with military and political connotations. 425 Though Oberon did not
witness the opening scene’s drama between Egeus and Theseus, his political claim here and at
the end of the speech (“all things shall be peace,” 3.2.377) drive home the play’s vision of rightly
ordered sexual relationships as the origin of social stability and perpetuity. Oberon thus redresses
the wrongs that Helena attributes to Cupid.
The social concord Oberon promises is then recognized by Theseus. Like the Duke in
The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Theseus was instrumental in thwarting the lovers and thus
causing the central problem for the play, but then he quickly expresses approval when he learns
that the lovers have resolved their difficulties. Just before he encounters the reordered lovers, he
refers to the marvel of his dogs barking in harmoniously: “match’d in mouth like bells, / Each
under each” (4.1.123-124) and then, noticing the lovers properly arranged, marvels further:
I know you two are rival enemies.
How comes this gentle concord in the world,
That hatred is so far from jealousy
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To sleep by hate and fear no enmity? (4.1.142-145)
The passages are paired to emphasize their connections and contrasts. The harmonious dogs are
rare and “bred out” (4.1.119) for their specific traits, a feat of human intervention with and over
nature. Fostering specific traits in dogs is long-standing practice based on the reliability and
regularity of genetic inheritance. Theseus’s dogs are not especially good for hunting (they are
“slow in pursuit,” 4.1.123) but he values them for their aesthetic quality and preciousness. The
“gentle concord” of the reconciled and reoriented lovers, on the other hand, is the result of
magical interventions none of the humans understand. The result of their reordering leads to
Egeus’s angry demand that Theseus intervene, to which Theseus replies that they will be married
against Egeus’s wishes and the law. Leonard Tennenhouse credits Oberon as an intermediary
figure who solves Theseus’s problems for him and licenses him to rebut Egeus, so the “revelers
and Duke can comprise a harmonious political body where the juridical power of the monarch
exists independently from that of the patriarch.” 426 In familiar comic practice, the sovereign ruler
exercises equity (as I discussed in Chapter Two), setting aside the law to produce what he
believes to be justice, thus strengthening his own position as arbiter of his subjects’ interests.
The play’s trope of the deferred explanation is linked to its use of the trope of the silent
woman. Demetrius begins to describe what they have experienced, to which Theseus replies,
“Fair lovers, you are fortunately met; / Of this discourse we more will hear anon” (4.1.177-178).
They agree, and the women help the men sort out whether or not they are awake, after which
they depart, with Demetrius saying, “Why, then, we are awake. Let’s follow him, / And by the
way let’s recount our dreams” (4.1.198-199). The shared activity of sense-making occurs
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offstage, and for the remainder of the play, the male lovers’ dialogue consists almost entirely of
commentary on Pyramus and Thisbe and supplications to Theseus. As for Helena and Hermia,
once their romantic fates are secured, they stop talking entirely. They are onstage as part of the
audience for the Rude Mechanicals’ performance, but they have no lines. The play provides no
reason to think their silence conveys something other than contentment, but it is silence
nonetheless; the genre is such that women’s stories often end before men’s, and they generally
do not participate in the commentary. The genre favors them insofar as it grants their relational
desires, but it provides little else for them, including the right to participate in the play’s internal
judgments upon its events. This is ironic because the Mechanicals are especially aware of the
sensitivities of female theater-goers, as Peter Quince worries: “And you should [roar] too
terribly, you would fright the Duchess and the ladies, that they would shrike; and that were
enough to hang us all” (1.2.74-77).
Theseus’s sovereignty becomes central to the play’s final scenes. He interprets the play
for the audience and then directs his subjects in the proper conduct to be the audience for the
play they watch. Shakespeare foregrounds and ironizes his comic practice (absent in Love’s
Labor’s Lost) of instructing the audience in how to think and feel about the play they are
watching. In Midsummer, Theseus’s interpretation—presented in conversation with his wife—is
removed and equivocal:
HIPPOLYTA
THESEUS

’Tis strange my Theseus, that these lovers speak of.
More strange than true. I never may believe
These antic fables, nor these fairy toys.
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends. (5.1.1-6)

As Frye and others have recognized, Theseus’s disbelief is premised upon the distinction
between apprehension and comprehension. To “apprehend” is to “seize,” as well as to

274

“understand” and even “anticipate,”427 while “comprehend” is to “incorporate,” “contain,” or
“include.”428 For Frye, the distinction is simple: “In ordinary life sense experience apprehends
and reason comprehends. Here reason is or should be in charge, and it rules out or modifies
sense-data when they are distorted by excessive emotion.” 429 Theseus is therefore offering a
polemic against poetry, with perhaps some wistfulness about what he’s missing. For Theseus,
that which is strange must be accounted for and distinguished from what is “true.” Notably,
Theseus offers no counter-theory, just skepticism about the lovers’ explanations; furthermore, he
states his refusal to believe in magic (or the claims of poets) as a personal choice: he refers to his
own frame of mind before he generalizes. His speech is as much an appraisal of the power of the
imagination as it is his statement of his own suspicion of it. If we take the speech as his
interpretation of the play itself, it becomes a claim on behalf of a sovereign ruler committed to
rationality and his own ability to distinguish truth from fiction and his need to “comprehend,”
i.e., bring disparate parts together, decide what will be included and excluded.
Adam Rzepka challenges Frye and provides context for understanding Theseus’s speech
with further reference to comedy itself: “the extension of the claim about the poet seems to
encompass something that anyone with a strong imagination might do in everyday life: in
longing to apprehend something joyful, we imagine its arrival and mistake this fantasy for a
reasonably probable reality.”430 To favor “comprehension” is to deny oneself not just visions but
happiness, particularly the happiness of lasting contentment. Shakespeare not only suggests that
greater joy is available to one who believes in fairies and magic (and poetry), but that the attempt
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to put all the parts together requires that one “comprehends some bringer of that joy” (5.1.20),
i.e., supplies missing pieces, such as the origin of whatever it is that provides happiness.
Theseus’s skepticism is such that such an origin is unknowable and therefore beyond the
capacities of analysis. Ronald F. Miller argues that the play allows for the two mutually
contradictory interpretations of its events: “first, as a natural disorder mythologized and, second,
as the working of some immanence behind events. In defiance of all logic, neither alternative is
rejected; both coexist in the complex comic vision.” 431 I argue rather that Theseus is arguing
against interpretation itself. The play suggests that one cannot enjoy the play and analyze it at the
same time; these are distinct acts. Theseus’s analogy of the source of joy and an imagined bear in
the woods (5.1.21-22) further implies that not only is the source conjectural and probably
nonexistent, but also that it could provoke fear, not greater joy. Midsummer continues the work
of Love’s Labor’s Lost in its disparaging of the pursuit of knowledge or an understanding of how
happiness functions, from whence it is derived, and what it means socially or psychologically.
The play’s presentation of itself as beyond or opposed to analysis is also figured in the
speech Bottom delivers upon waking up after his night with Titania: “Man is but an ass, if he go
about [t’] expound this dream. Methought I was—there is no man can tell what. Methought I
was, and methought I had—but man is but [a patch’d] fool, if he will offer to say what
methought I had” (4.1.206-211). Beneath the humor is an argument for the impossibility of
imaginative sympathy. Since no one knows what it is like to have sex with a fairy queen while
being part-man/part-ass, there is no language Bottom could use to articulate it. Bottom inspires
laughter but also silence, or purely speculative commentary. His experience now isolates him
from other people. His Pauline echoes (“The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not
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seen,” 4.1.211-212) instrumentalize the Christian rhetoric of mystery in an analogy of God’s
providential purposes and Bottom’s transgressive sexual experience.
Bottom’s insistence on his own singularity of experience has relevance for the play’s
configuration of sexual practice as well: heterosexual union is presented as universal, good, and
the source of social order. When heterosexuals face obstacles, the genre ensures they are
overcome, even if it requires sympathetic magic to do so. Bottom’s experience, which is
heterosexual but cross-species, is not only singular and indescribable but, as Bruce Boehrer
explains, it is an adjunct and complement to heterosexual experience: “the erotic overtones of
their encounter are essential to the logic of substitution whereby Bottom prepares Titania to
return to the heteronormativity she has abandoned by preferring her Indian page to Oberon.” 432
Attending too closely to Bottom’s dream means examining the ideological content of the play
and its genre.
The heteronormativity of the play also displaces same-sex desire. Lysander jokes that if
Egeus likes Demetrius so much, “Do you marry him” (1.1.94), which not only insults Egeus, but
which Egeus associates with his paternal prerogative: since he loves Demetrius, he claims “all
my right of” Hermia to give her to him (1.1.97). 433 When Hermia recalls earlier intimacies she
had with Helena, “Upon faint primrose beds were wont to lie, / Emptying our bosoms of their
counsel [sweet]” (1.1.215-216), she notifies Helena that she plans to use the same place as her
sanctuary with Lysander, “To seek new friends and [stranger companies]” (1.1.219) in what
Montrose calls “a delicate repudiation of youthful homophilia.” 434 Valerie Traub makes the
stronger point that the women in the play figure their own same-sex desire as a phase:
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It is the female, rather than the male characters of these plays, who, by their silent
denial of the other woman’s emotional claims, position homoerotic desire in the
past. Female homoeroticism is thus figurable not only in terms of the always
already lost, but the always about to be betrayed. And the incipient
heterosexuality of the woman who is recipient rather than enunciator of
homoerotic desire comes to stand as the telos of the play.”435
Heterosexuality therefore becomes an inevitability for these women, however they may have
lived before. Shakespeare establishes that henikosexual women may have had other sexual
feelings and experiences with women prior to their appearance in a comedy—just as it is
possible that these women will have such relationships following their marriage—but for the
duration of the comedy itself her attentions and actions focus on the man she wishes to marry.
The play does not “contain” other energies; as I discussed at the beginning of this chapter,
Caroline Levine argues that “closure” implies continuity of a set of orderings and arrangements.
However, the silence of the women and Theseus’s dominating presence in the play’s final act
suggest that the structures of authority within the play will remain intact, and the social
preferences for sexual behavior exhibited in the play will also remain priorities if not strictly
enforced rules.
More so than other comedies, A Midsummer Night’s Dream instructs its audience on how
to enjoy itself, with subtle hints that can raise doubts and questions about the nature of such
commands. Just following Theseus’s speech on “cool reason,” he says to his subjects, “Here
come the lovers, full of joy and mirth. / Joy, gentle friends, joy and fresh days of love /
Accompany your hearts!” (5.1.28-30). He tells them how they feel and wishes for it to continue.
Lysander replies with a strange compliment: “More than to us / Wait in your royal walks, your
board, your bed” (5.1.30-31). Lysander acknowledges Theseus’s superiority of station, material
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circumstances, and even sexual fulfillment. Theseus wishes happiness for his subjects but he is
happier than they are. The happiness is not distributed equally, and it is possible to detect
resentment in Lysander’s rejoinder.
It is also possible to detect defensiveness on the part of the actors in the play’s final act,
and an enactment of the privilege involved in seeking pleasure and joy. As I have discussed
above and in previous chapters, versions of the phrase “as it please you,” while pro forma,
nonetheless indicate power relations. The performance of Pyramus and Thisbe is prefaced with a
request to Theseus from Philostrate: “So please your Grace, the Prologue is address’d” (5.1.106).
Theseus authorizes his entrance, and then Quince, speaking as the Prologue, begins,
If we offend, it is with our good will.
That you should think, we come not to offend,
But with good will. To show our simple skill,
That is the true beginning of our end.
Consider then, we come but in despite.
We do not come, as minding to content you,
Our true intent is. All for your delight
We are not here. (5.1.108-115)
The humor of this passage derives from it being read improperly, such that it says the opposite of
what the author’s intentions are. Read properly, it is another customary address to an audience
about the intention to please and not offend. Read poorly, draws attention to the status of such a
Prologue as an preemptive apology as well as a sign of the audience’s capacity to be offended
and suspect the intentions of the performers. This language is echoed in the Epilogue of
Midsummer, which begins with Puck’s request,
If we shadows have offended,
Think but this, and all is mended,
That you have but slumb’red here
While these visions did appear. (5.1.423-426)
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The audience can interpret this speech as not only unnecessary, if the play did not give offense,
but as performatively contrasting the audience’s actual positive response to the hissing (“the
serpent’s tongue,” 5.1.433) to which Puck refers. The speech can signify the actors’ anxiety
about the audience’s response as well as the actors’ confidence that such anxiety is unnecessary;
furthermore, it reminds the audience that the purpose of the play is to be simply enjoyed and not
taken as real. Puck implores, “Gentles, do not reprehend” (5.1.429), to which he rhymes “mend”
(5.1.430, just as he uses “mended” to rhyme with “offended,” 5.1.424) and (twice) “amends”
(5.1.434, 438); aurally recalling Theseus’s talk of “apprehend” and “comprehend.” The language
of perception and understanding has been replaced by the language of disapproval and repair.
The comic injunction to enjoyment can be expressed with its negative corollary, the defensive
request not to have caused harm or provoked censure. In both cases, the actors designate the
audience’s judgment as their primary concern while also claiming for themselves the capacity to
direct those judgments.

Henikosexuality as Norm
In two comedies from Shakespeare’s middle period, Much Ado about Nothing and The
Merry Wives of Windsor, he deploys the henikosexual woman as a secondary character,
resuming his practice from The Taming of the Shrew and anticipating Measure for Measure. In
all of these plays, the henikosexual woman’s passivity contrasts with their respective leading
women, who have their own plots and concerns, and who resist the conventional limitations
placed upon women. In Much Ado and Merry Wives, like Measure, the henikosexual woman is
unable to achieve her goal on her own and requires the assistance of others in deceptions so she
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may win her man; she also participates in deceptions to discipline other characters for violating
social norms.
Anne Page in The Merry Wives of Windsor and Hero in Much Ado about Nothing are
objects of desire and gossip; they are surrounded by older people who have plans for them and
who make declarations about their desires and interests. These women speak little and do not
convey much desire for the flawed men they marry, but the success of their marriages is essential
to the order and happiness in their plays’ endings. Their interests are served, though the audience
is never given much information about their own understanding of their interests. They exist in
their plays to get married and to protect marriage.

The Merry Wives of Windsor
The main plot of The Merry Wives of Windsor consists of Falstaff’s attempt to instigate
adulterous affairs with Mistress Ford and Mistress Page for the purpose of obtaining their
money: “I will be cheaters to them both, and they shall be exchequers to me” (1.3.69-71). The
subplot involves Anne Page, the daughter of Mistress Page, being courted by several men and
eventually marrying one of them, a young aristocrat named Fenton. For my purposes, the Anne
plot is more relevant to the play as a comedy, in that I identify the henikosexual woman’s pursuit
of marriage as a central condition for the genre. I here follow Frye, who interprets the play in
New Comedy terms: “Fenton, who marries Anne Page by stealth, becomes the technical hero of
the play” because “his ability to do what Falstaff could not do, enter the prosperous middle-class
society of the Fords and Pages and share its wealth, marks a rebirth of society older than the
action of the play.”436 Unlike Frye, however, I will foreground Anne’s role in the play so as to
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explore its particular treatment of the henikosexual woman and to the normativity inherent in the
genre.
Anne has barely thirty lines in the play and is often silent when she is onstage. Critics
debate her level of agency. Bertrand Evans notes that “All practices in the play that do not relate
to Falstaff’s affair relate to Anne’s. Until the final scene, however, Anne plays no part in any
intrigue, but is rather a destination than a participant.” 437 Rachel Prusko however, sees more
agency in Anne: “Not only does she rebel against her parents’ wishes in the choice of a husband,
but she also intervenes in and destabilizes the norms established for young girls by her parents
and community.”438 I argue that Anne’s agency is difficult to determine because her motives are
so opaque. Shakespeare makes her unknowable, and as such she serves more as a function of the
plot than as a character with goals and purposes. Her marriage to Fenton and her contribution to
the humiliation of Falstaff render her a site of the play’s ideological functioning which
Shakespeare presents as ordering the characters and events rather than deriving entirely from
their own preferences.
Though Anne marries Fenton rather than her other suitors, her desires are never stated
clearly. She is unlike Julia, Bianca, or the women of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and she
starkly contrasts with the aggressiveness of Rosalind or Helena. Prusko observes that “nowhere
in the play does Anne say that she loves Fenton—it is Fenton himself who claims Anne returns
his affections—and she’s certainly suspicious of this broke aristocrat.” 439 I disagree that she is
“certainly suspicious,” if only because there is so little evidence for her feelings throughout the
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play. After Fenton notifies her that her father will not bless the match and admits that “thy
father’s wealth / Was the first motive that I woo’d thee, Anne” (3.4.13-14), her reply is brief:
ANNE PAGE

SHALLOW

Gentle Master Fenton,
Yet seek my father’s love, still seek it, sir.
If opportunity and humblest suit
Cannot attain it, why then hark you hither!
Break their talk, Mistress Quickly, my kinsman shall speak
for himself. (3.4.18-23)

Shallow’s line suggests that Anne and Fenton have begun to confer silently, perhaps intimately,
and thus Shallow seeks to interrupt them. Editors often insert stage directions; for example, The
Riverside Shakespeare has “[They converse apart.]” between Anne’s last line and Shallow’s
first, while The Norton Shakespeare inserts the entrance of Shallow, Slender, and Mistress
Quickly between “why then” and “hark you hither” in 3.4.21. The Norton editors thus suggest
that the arrival of the adults has made Anne secretive, with “hark you hither” being a command
to Fenton to step aside so they will not be overheard. (The Riverside editors put an exclamation
point after “hither” to further suggest this line reading.) That kind of staging equates the adult
characters with the audience, both of which speculate about Anne’s desires and best interests.
This editorial intervention is premised upon Anne and Fenton already being committed to one
another and given to private conversations and plotting.
It is also possible to read Anne’s last line as an indication that she and Fenton have been
interrupted and they have no further discourse. They do not have to be speaking silently onstage
for Shallow to want to “break their talk”; they could be simply standing together in the moments
following her last line. Moreover, the previous lines show that Anne was considering what to do
in the event that Fenton never secured her father’s approval, or, in her words, his “love.” This
was the substance of their conversation prior to their interruption:
FENTON

I see I cannot get thy father’s love,
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ANNE PAGE
FENTON

ANNE PAGE

Therefore no more turn me to him, sweet Nan.
Alas, how then?
Why, thou must be thyself.
He doth object I am too great of birth,
And that my state being gall’d with my expense,
I seek to heal it only by his wealth.
Besides these, other bars he lays before me,
My riots past, my wild societies,
And tells me ’tis a thing impossible
I should love thee but as a property.
May be he tells you true. (3.4.1-11)

This exchange, taken with what follows it, shows that it is important for Anne that Fenton obtain
her father’s love. Fenton requests of her “no more turn me to him” but she retorts, “still seek it,
sir” (3.4.19). She also shows ambivalence when Fenton laments that her father suspects his
motives and she replies, “May be he tells you true.” (Prusko’s assertion that Anne is “certainly
suspicious” is premised on this “May be.”) Later in the scene Anne allows herself to be wooed
by Slender, her father’s choice, to whom she asks the blunt questions, “What is your will?”
(3.2.56) and “what would you with me?” (3.2.60-61). Slender’s reply is, “I would little or
nothing with you” (3.2.62-63); for him the transaction is entirely between himself and Page.
Shortly thereafter, Anne makes clear to her parents that she does not want to marry her mother’s
choice Doctor Caius. Anne does not want her the suitors her parents favor, but it is not clear in
this scene that she has strong feelings for Fenton, either. The dialogue focuses more on Fenton’s
motives than on hers.440
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Shakespeare seems to have designed Anne Page to be a character that exists almost
entirely in the thoughts and plans of others. At the end of the scene discussed above, Mistress
Page tells Fenton,
Come, trouble not yourself. Good Master Fenton,
I will not be your friend nor enemy.
My daughter will I question how she loves you,
And as I find her, so am I affected. (3.4.88-91)
The phrase “how she loves you” acknowledges that Anne and Fenton have asked for the father’s
permission and therefore they would like to marry, though it is possible that Fenton is the driving
force—hence his instruction to Anne, “thou must be thyself” (3.4.3) and take up the cause on her
own. Notably, we do not know if she does: what would it mean for Anne to be herself? Mistress
Page speaks to her daughter offstage and, though she promised that she would be “affected” with
Anne’s preferences, she continues her campaign to marry Anne to Doctor Caius.
The characters in the play have difficulty distinguishing their knowledge of Anne’s mind
and their own wishes for her. Mistress Quickly insists repeatedly, “I know Anne’s mind for that.
Never a woman in Windsor knows more of Anne’s mind than I do, nor can do more than I do
with her” (1.4.127-129). Quickly equates knowing her with manipulating her. A few lines later,
she assures Fenton that Anne loves him, only to say after he leaves, “Truly, an honest gentleman;
but Anne loves him not; for I know Anne’s mind as well as another does. Out upon’t! what have
I forgot?” (1.4.163-165). The last part signals to the audience that Mistress Quickly is not to be
trusted. In the next scene, Mistress Quickly comes to the Page household to visit Anne, and she
goes in to speak with her along with Mistress Page and Mistress Ford. Anne is not present in the
scene and their conversation is entirely offstage. The episode serves no purpose beyond
obscuring Anne from us, and reminding us that people talk to her about their plans for her.
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Anne’s inscrutability performs two related functions in the play. It shows that, as a
wealthy woman of marrying age, she is the object of interest of every person in Windsor save,
perhaps, Falstaff. People either want to marry her or to arrange her marriage to someone else. It
also shows that she fulfills her role as the heroine in a comedy passively. She marries Fenton on
his initiative: he arranges for them to elope, and he plots with the Host to send boys in dresses as
decoys for Anne’s other suitors. As Jonathan Goldberg notes, “The only proof of her desire for
him is that she winds up with him—if it is that, as well as a letter that Fenton claims to have from
her whose contents are never revealed.”441 Aside from her participation in the Fairy sequence,
Anne has no lines between Act Three Scene Four and Act Five Scene Five. Her only line in the
final scene comes after her parents realize she has married Fenton: “Pardon, good father! good
my mother, pardon!” (5.5.216). Bertrand Evans claims that “Only Mistress Quickly and Anne
Page are spared moments of unwitting exposure” 442 at the play’s closing, but Anne’s line still
conveys shame. Her wish to reconcile with her parents, along with her previous statements to
Fenton, demonstrate that the only clear feeling Anne has is the desire for her marriage to suit her
and her parents; she wants everyone to agree, and for her marriage to not disrupt or replace her
family relationships. To the extent that she does desire marriage with Fenton—and it’s clear that
she does not want to marry anyone else—she recognizes her status as not just a marriageable girl
but an agent for communal connection. In other words, she wishes to be nothing more than the
henikosexual woman in a comedy, the norm for appropriate erotic life (i.e., always leading to
heterosexual marriage) and for social concord. Her participation in the torturing of Falstaff is of a
piece with her normative behavior: though Falstaff’s language indicates that his attempts at
adultery are motivated by his desire for wealth, the Fairies, including Anne, emphasize his lust as
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they torture him. Anne is an agent of the comic plot and its ideology, and her place in Merry
Wives shows the henikosexual female need not express desire in order to play her part.
Though Anne says little on her own behalf, Fenton speaks for her in the final moments of
the play:
You do amaze her. Hear the truth of it.
You would have married her most shamefully,
Where there was no proportion held in love.
The truth is, she and I (long since contracted)
Are now so sure that nothing can dissolve us.
Th’ offence is holy that she hath committed.
And this deceit loses the name of craft,
Of disobedience, or unduteous title,
Since therein she doth evitate and shun
A thousand irreligious cursed hours
Which forced marriage would have brought upon her. (5.5.220-230)
Here we see an additional clear statement of comedy’s elevation of the henikosexual woman. As
I have shown, usually the commitment to the women’s triumph is structural to comedy but not
articulated, but here Fenton moralizes, stating that Anne’s deception and disobedience is
justifiable for her to avoid pain. He claims that marrying the wrong man would have brought her
intolerable suffering; he does not claim that marrying the right man will bring her happiness.
But, consistent with Shakespeare’s practice, it is acceptable (or “holy,” as Fenton says) to break
an oath or violate a bond of family or friendship to avoid “forced marriage,” which, as it is
figured here, is not coercing a woman to marry against her will, but to marry a man when she
prefers another. When a woman agrees to marry a man in a Shakespearean comedy, even if the
desire is not expressed other than in the agreement, the woman’s wish cannot be subverted.
Though The Merry Wives of Windsor is in many ways unlike Shakespeare’s other
comedies, it nonetheless contains the familiar injunctions to happiness, deferral of explanation,
and the gathering of community. After Falstaff’s humiliation but before many of the various
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other tricks have been revealed, Page says to Falstaff, “Yet be cheerful, knight. Thou shalt eat a
posset tonight at my house, where I will desire thee to laugh at my wife, that now laughs at thee.
Tell her Master Slender hath married her daughter” (5.5.170-173). The laughter in this case will
not be communal joy but rather homosocial bonding over Mistress Page’s humiliation. Page
himself is quickly shamed, but then the final moments of the play contain this exchange:
FORD
FALSTAFF
PAGE
FALSTAFF
MISTRESS PAGE

Stand not amaz’d; here is no remedy.
In love, the heavens themselves do guide the state;
Money buys lands, and wives are sold by fate.
I am glad, though you have ta’en a special stand to strike at
me, that your arrow hath glanc’d.
Well, what remedy? Fenton, heaven give thee joy! What
cannot be eschew’d must be embrac’d.
When night-dogs run, all sorts of deer are chas’d.
Well, I will muse no further. Master Fenton,
Heaven give you many, many merry days!
Good husband, let us every one go home,
And laugh this sport o’er by a country fire—
Sir John and all. (5.5.235-243)

Ford’s lines are an almost entirely secularized interpretation of what has happened: commerce is
blessed, including the selling of wives, though the seller is fate, not the wives’ parents. Falstaff’s
concerns are personal and competitive: he wants to assure that he has not been beaten. Page
wishes joy to Fenton (not to Anne), and his conclusion, “What cannot be eschew’d must be
embrac’d” is, as with many comic resolutions, an acceptance of powerlessness and an injunction
to adjust to the world as it is. Mistress Page also offers joy to Fenton, and she calls everyone
inside for further discussion and laughter, including Falstaff. The community is brought together,
and another notable feature of Merry Wives is highlighted by its absence in the conclusion: the
play has no sovereign ruler or authority figure to take charge. The characters speak in turn with
what Kiernan Ryan calls “democratic inclusiveness.” 443
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Another feature of the play’s inclusivity is in its same-sex marriages. Fenton’s trick on
Anne’s other suitors entailed sending boys disguised as Anne to marry them. The practice echoes
the masked games of Love’s Labor’s Lost and the bed-tricks of the late comedies, making the
common observation that men often do not know their women, and unlike women, could easily
accept a substitute. Wendy Wall speaks on behalf of many critics with her enthusiasm at the
transgressive possibilities these marriages offer: “Anne doubles as transvestite brides carried to
the altar by men, with the result that the specter of same-sex marriages challenges the strict
gender differentiation and normative sexuality ensured by marriage.” 444 Jonathan Goldberg
itemizes the sexual relationships in the play and finds them to be mostly driven by “cupidity” and
indifference, and he makes the keen observation that “Merry Wives assumes that, whatever
women want, it is not men. There is scarcely a moment in the play when a woman voices a
desire that is anything but the desire not to be with men.” 445 While Falstaff is punished for
endangering heterosexual marriage, and Fenton provides a norm for how those marriages should
originate, The Merry Wives of Windsor is quite typical among Shakespeare’s comedies in its
divorcing of marriage from happiness. The same-sex marriages in the play are unwanted and
lamented, borne from the play’s many acts of humiliation. Slender and Caius have not
discovered new possibilities for living; they are the butts of a prank, and the play even makes
clear that in Slender’s case the joke almost turned violent: “If it had not been i’th’ church, I
would have swing’d him, or he should have swing’d me” (5.5.184-186). Ralph Berry is correct
in his diagnosis of the play’s presentation of human interaction as aggressive and competitive:
“The idea of the play is revenge [...] The revenge motif unleashes much sadism in the
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audience.”446 The play portrays these same-sex marriages as themselves acts of violence, free of
desire, and therefore they function as parodies of the heterosexual marriages in the play.

Much Ado about Nothing
Henikosexuality and normativity are so obvious in Much Ado about Nothing that they are
manifest just in a simple summary of the play. Hero and Claudio plan to marry, but their plans
are thwarted when he is duped into believing her adulterous; she fakes her own death so as to be
miraculously “resurrected” and he can marry her—because her affections for him have not
changed despite his treatment of her. Meanwhile, Beatrice and Benedick verbally spar until their
friends convince them they love each other, tricking them into falling in love (or admitting their
already-present love) and marrying one another. The community enjoys a happy ending except
Don John, the villain who slandered Hero. Hero’s silent and uncritical love for Claudio is for
many critics the play’s “problem,” and Ejner Jensen argues that critics who focus too much on
them are also prone to overemphasize closure and thus render comedies “dark, unsettling,
problematic.”447 The play’s clear demonstration of people being tricked and managed into
marriage also leads critics into doing what I have done throughout this dissertation, i.e., locate
areas in the comedies wherein characters lose agency and are compelled to acclimate themselves
to generic and social structures, supposedly to produce happiness but just as likely to require the
performance of happiness. Kiernan Ryan, an otherwise sanguine reader of the comedies, writes
of this play: “Much Ado exposes the mechanisms that manipulate the heart and mind without
their knowing; it makes externally apparent as a conscious conspiracy the internalized machinery
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that unconsciously controls the way people think and feel.” 448 Much Ado about Nothing, in other
words, does much of what I attempted to demonstrate is done by All’s Well That Ends Well and
Measure for Measure, exposing the coercion beneath the comedies’ apparent festivity.
My work in this section, therefore, is not to prove that Much Ado is normative or that
Claudio does not deserve Hero, but rather to attend to the ways the play presents henikosexuality
in particular and heterosexuality in general as structural imperatives. I will show that
Shakespeare presents Hero, like Anne Page, not as falling in love with her man but rather as
inhabiting the role of the woman in a comedy who loves her man. Also like Anne Page, Hero
assists in her play’s secondary plot of protecting the institution of marriage from those who flout
it, and she goes about this secondary action with considerably greater enthusiasm and
expressiveness than she displays in her own love-plot. I will not attempt to argue that Much Ado
about Nothing is not a happy play, but rather I will show how it is consistent with my analyses of
how happiness is manufactured in Shakespearean comedy.
Hero’s henikosexuality is presented in the play as indistinguishable from her deference to
patriarchal authority. Whereas in Measure for Measure and All’s Well That Ends Well, the
patriarchal figure takes the side of the henikosexual woman whose love isolates her, in Much
Ado about Nothing Hero’s love for Claudio is kindled at the explicit request of her ruler, who
then secures the blessing of her father. Prior to this her father had instructed her that if Don
Pedro “do solicit you in that kind, you know your answer” (2.1.67-68). Hero has no lines in
response, though the actor playing her has a variety of possible responses. The father’s
instruction for his daughter to love the (high-ranking) man of his choosing is not used here as it
is in other comedies, i.e., as a set-up for conflict, but rather as an item of confusion: Don Pedro
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does later court Hero, but on Claudio’s behalf. Leonato’s line—and Hero’s silence—signify that
in this play the henikosexual woman’s love is a product of rather than in opposition to patriarchal
authority. By being courted by Don Pedro as Claudio’s proxy, Hero obeys her father and her lord
even by falling in love with a different man.
It is Don Pedro’s own idea that he woo Hero for Claudio:
Look what will serve is fit: ’tis once, thou lovest,
And I will fit thee with the remedy.
I know we shall have revelling to-night:
I will assume thy part in some disguise,
And tell fair Hero I am Claudio,
And in her bosom I’ll unclasp my heart,
And take her hearing prisoner with the force
And strong encounter of my amorous tale;
Then after to her father will I break,
And the conclusion is, she shall be thine.
In practice let us put it presently. (1.1.318-328)
Don Pedro combines the language of service, clothing, medicine, theater, Petrarchanism, war,
logic, and storytelling, all in service of declaring his enlightened authority. He demonstrates the
power of storytelling (“my amorous tale”) as a means of securing Hero but also of controlling
Claudio’s (and Hero’s) narrative. When he first hears of Claudio’s love, he tells him how to feel
about it: “If thou dost love fair Hero, cherish it” (1.1.308), and then asks, “Was’t not to this end /
That thou began’st to twist so fine a story?” (1.1.310-311). Don Pedro’s “conclusion” asserts his
power over the story and his claim to serve his friend: he knows what is best for his subjects, and
he assumes the role of go-between to exercise his authority as well as demonstrate his
lovemaking skills. He claims he will arrange for Hero’s engagement after telling her a single
story, a fiction told while he impersonates Claudio.
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Don Pedro is successful, a sign of how easily Hero’s love is won as well as of Don
Pedro’s competence. After some brief flirting, Don Pedro and Hero speak silently onstage; he
then reports the results:
DON PEDRO

LEONATO
BEATRICE
CLAUDIO

BEATRICE

I’ faith, lady, I think your blazon to be true, though I’ll be
sworn, if he be so, his conceit is false. Here, Claudio, I
have woo’d in thy name, and fair Hero is won. I have broke
with her father, and his good will obtain’d. Name the day
of marriage, and God give thee joy!
Count, take of me my daughter, and with her my fortunes.
His Grace hath made the match, and all grace say amen to
it.
Speak, Count, ’tis your cue.
Silence is the perfectest heralt of joy; I were but little
happy, if I could say how much! Lady, as you are mine, I
am yours. I give away myself for you, and dote upon the
exchange.
Speak, cousin, or (if you cannot) stop his mouth with a kiss,
and let not him speak neither. (2.1.296-311)

The passage is worth quoting in full because of Hero’s silent presence through it. Shakespeare
here shows that Hero’s love begins in silence and continues as such. It is less a personal feeling
than a social fact: the other characters discuss it and plan for it, and Hero contributes nothing.
Claudio is also quiet, and his line, “Silence is the perfectest herald of joy” could apply to Hero at
this point in the play, but it could also be another instance of Claudio’s misprision. Beatrice
metadramatically refers to Claudio’s “cue,” suggesting that lovers follow a script; she then tries
(and fails) to get Hero to speak, though she gives her the option of kissing instead, figuring
physical affection as a form of mutual silencing.
Hero is generally silent, and when she speaks she often expresses deference or otherwise
cooperates with others’ plans. When she flirted with the disguised Don Pedro, she followed a
familiar script for women in that circumstance. Hero’s only line in the latter part of this scene
consists of her agreement to participate in the practice upon Beatrice to make her fall in love

293

with Benedick. When Hero is not playing her part in her own romantic story, she facilitates
Beatrice’s. During the trick, Hero speaks a majority of her lines from the play, only one of which
is about her love: she says that Benedick “is the only man of Italy, / Always excepted my dear
Claudio” (3.1.92-93). The “always” has a note of humor, because this is the only time she praises
Claudio in the play, aside from complimenting the gloves he sends her (3.4.62-63). On the other
hand, for a man to be “the only man” is a concise expression of Hero’s idea of love. She says
Benedick is “the only man” because she is attempting to make Beatrice fall in love with him (or
acknowledge the love she denies). Her only other expression of love is “my heart is exceeding
heavy” (3.4.24-25). Otherwise, her love for Claudio is manifested entirely in her actions,
particularly her behavior during the wedding when she is shamed. Her words after her accusation
are incredulousness and self-defense. She conveys her inexperience and her obeisance to her
father:
If I know more of any man alive
Than that which maiden modesty doth warrant,
Let all my sins lack mercy! O my father,
Prove you that any man with me convers’d
At hours unmeet, or that I yesternight
Maintain’d the change of words with any creature,
Refuse me, hate me, torture me to death! (4.1.178-184)
She insists that she only knows what a woman in her condition should know, i.e., she knows
little of men. She licenses her father—who believes her accusers—to kill her if she is proved
wrong, just as she licenses God to damn her. Even when she stands up for herself, she
subordinates herself. Her use of “unmeet,” with “maiden modesty,” signifies her general
preoccupation with propriety. Later, when she is “dead,” she obviously does not speak or appear
onstage until she appears as her “cousin” to marry Claudio. She reveals herself, speaks a few
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lines affirming her virginity; later, she produces Beatrice’s secret love letter, and otherwise she
does not speak.
My analysis is not meant to suggest that Hero does not “love” Claudio, or that she is, as
Carol Cook calls her, a “cipher” who exists “to meet or reflect others’ expectations of what
women are supposed to be.”449 I argue instead that Hero exists to be a certain kind of a woman in
a Shakespearean comedy, just as Claudio exists to be a certain kind of man in the same play. Her
uninterrupted desire to marry him is the center of her character; that it was acquired secondhand
does not change it, and neither does Claudio’s treatment of her. As I discussed above, Hero’s
devotion to Claudio is linked to her respect for her father and for Don Pedro, and all three men
turn on her. It is possible for her to disappoint them, as is amply demonstrated when they all
curse her after she is slandered. As Jensen observes, critics concern themselves with Claudio’s
worth and debate whether he deserves her love at the end of the play. Robert Ornstein, for
example, defends Claudio: “When he denounces Hero he is fully convinced that he has been
terribly wronged and has the right to denounce her in public. If he is a gullible fool too easily
duped by Borachio and Don John, so too is the noble Don Pedro.” 450 That both men can be
tricked is Shakespeare’s point: their affiliation with Hero is predicated on some understanding of
who she is, which means she could be revealed as something else and that would end the
relationship. Her father even wishes she were dead, and asks, “Why ever wast thou lovely in my
eyes?” (4.1.130). Hero’s position is that she is vulnerable to slander and nearly everyone who
knows her could stop loving her if they believe she is, as Don John calls her, “every man’s Hero”
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(3.2.107). But not only is Hero innocent, but the play indicates that her love and deference to the
men in her life, not solely the man she wants to marry, is not subject to change.
If critics and audiences worry about Claudio’s worthiness and moral condition, Hero does
not. She does not articulate her motives, but her function in the play is to love one man and take
no substitute, and her distinguishing feature among Shakespeare’s henikosexual women is that
she never breaks faith with anyone. When Don Pedro turns on her, the Friar intervenes to restore
her to Claudio as well as to her father. From that point forward in the play, a rift opens among
the characters in the play: Leonato, Beatrice, Benedick, and Anthony all understand Hero’s
welfare to be their concern, and they participate in an elaborate series of deceptions, including a
false funeral, so as to reorder the community around Hero’s interests. Leonato’s bride-trick,
wherein he compels Claudio to marry his niece, “Almost the copy of my child that’s dead”
(5.1.289), is a ruse premised specifically on Claudio’s willingness to marry a substitute for Hero.
As in the bed-trick plays, a man’s lack of singular dedication is the means by which the wronged
woman—who cannot accept a substitute—claims him for herself. When she reveals herself, she
notes the distinction between Claudio and herself: “And when I liv’d, I was your other wife, /
And when you lov’d, you were my other husband” (5.4.60-61). She can refer to Claudio’s love in
the past tense, but not her own. When she reassures him that “surely as I live, I am a maid”
(5.4.64), she does not merely refer to social conventions that idealized women’s chastity, but she
notifies him that since it was established that she wanted to marry him, she has never stopped
wanting it.
Beatrice is different from Hero in many ways, but most relevant to my argument here is
that Beatrice is not henikosexual. When Don Pedro proposes to her, she replies, “No, my lord,
unless I might have another for working-days. Your Grace is too costly to wear every day”

296

(2.1.327-329), implying that she would want a second man in addition to him. (His proposal and
her reply can be taken as banter and not sincere.) Later, when Hero and Ursula trick Beatrice into
falling in love with Benedick, one of their tactics is to compliment him and declare that he is
worthy: “Doth not the gentleman / Deserve as full as fortunate a bed / As ever Beatrice shall
couch upon?” (3.1.44-46). Since Beatrice has some sense of Benedick’s worth, he is capable of
disappointing her when she asks him to do something he does not want to do. After Claudio
rejects Hero, Beatrice tells Benedick, “I love you with so much of my heart that none is left to
protest” before she demands that he “Kill Claudio” (4.1.286-287, 289). When Benedick refuses,
Beatrice responds, “I am gone, though I am here; there is no love in you. Nay, I pray you let me
go” (4.1.293-294). Unlike Hero’s love for Claudio, Beatrice’s love for Benedick is based on her
assessment of his qualities, which means that he could lose her by failing to live up to them.
Beatrice’s love for Benedick is conditional. Hence she jokes at the end of the play, with some
possible truth, that her love for him is “no more than reason” (5.4.74). Hero’s love for Claudio is
neither conditional nor rational.
Noting the difference between Hero and Beatrice can provide some space to explore the
difference between henikosexuality and normativity as they function in Shakespearean comedy.
Henikosexuality is essentially amoral, since it is not at all based on the man’s qualities or worth
once the woman’s desire to marry has been established. As we have seen in several cases, the
man can do nothing to end the woman’s love; he can hurt her or disappoint her, but she will
continue to love him. I have discussed the unwavering and undeserved love shown by Helena in
All’s Well That Ends Well, Mariana in Measure for Measure, and Julia in The Two Gentlemen of
Verona. Another example would be Helena in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, who can articulate
what Anne Page and Hero do not, as when she says to Demetrius:
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It is not night when I do see your face,
Therefore I think I am not in the night,
Nor doth this wood lack worlds of company,
For you in my respect are all the world.
Then how can it be said I am alone,
When all the world is here to look on me? (2.1.221-226)
Helena is aware that her perception of Demetrius does not match the reality, but it nonetheless is
her reality. He is the only man in the world for her, and this makes him “all the world.” She says,
“I think” and “in my respect” to highlight that her perceptions are subjective, which is the idea:
she sees Demetrius in a way that others do not. Her short speech is her justification for the
immodesty of traveling with a man at night, and later she criticizes him for making her conduct
herself inappropriately for a woman, but her love is such that it legitimizes any such behavior.
The henikosexual woman will go to extensive lengths, break rules, and abase herself, but her
lack of judgment towards her man makes her above judgment. It also gives her power, as when
Demetrius threatens to run away and risk being attacked by animals, and Helena replies,
The wildest hath not such a heart as you.
Run when you will, the story shall be chang’d:
Apollo flies, and Daphne holds the chase;
The dove pursues the griffin; the mild hind
Makes speed to catch the tiger—bootless speed,
When cowardice pursues and valor flies. (2.1.229-234)
“The story shall be changed” is a clear statement of her confidence that supernatural forces will
favor him because of her love. She also informs him that he simply cannot escape her. It is
following these exchanges that Oberon chooses to assist Helena, and so her confidence is
rewarded.
Another example of the henikosexual woman’s love is Rosaline at the end of Love’s
Labor’s Lost, quoted above in my discussion of that play, when she commands Berowne to
entertain sick people for a year (5.2.849-855). Her instructions sound conditional, but she clearly
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says that she will accept him with or without the fault of his excessive wit: “I will have you and
that fault withal” (5.4.866). She would be happier if he shed it, but she will still love him either
way. She wants the sick people to judge him and compel him to change because she cannot; she
can be annoyed by him but she cannot stop loving him.
To return to Hero and Beatrice, Hero enthusiastically participates in the practice upon
Beatrice to make her fall in love with Benedick. The idea for the practice comes from Don
Pedro, the sovereign ruler, and the tactic used with Beatrice is to humble her:
But nature never fram’d a woman’s heart
Of prouder stuff than that of Beatrice.
Disdain and scorn ride sparkling in her eyes,
Misprising what they look on, and her wit
Values itself so highly that to her
All matter else seems weak. She cannot love,
Nor take no shape nor project of affection,
She is so self-endeared. (3.1.49-56)
The reference to “wit” is not in the sense of the capacity to make funny remarks in conversation
but to the faculty of reasoning and judgment itself. According to Hero, Beatrice judges her own
faculty of judgment so highly that she overvalues it and undervalues everything else. Beatrice
assumes herself superior, and therefore is incapable of love. It is therefore implied that Hero,
who is capable of love, does not value her own judgment too highly, and hence her general
deference to others. Beatrice must learn to not trust her own judgment as much, and the plan
works: Beatrice later says of Benedick, “For others say thou dost deserve, and I / Believe it better
than reportingly” (3.1.115-116). Beatrice will switch, she says, from overvaluing her own
judgments to overvaluing others’. To the extent that comedies are about encouraging people to
love in the sense of forming heterosexual bonds, this normativity functions to make people
subordinate their own judgment to others’. Roderick McKeown points out that Beatrice’s
insouciance never made her a real threat to the social order: “She is unwilling to marry a man she
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sees as her inferior, it is true—but she never seems to put in doubt the commonly held view that
marriage is the proper goal of women. In highlighting her own exceptionalism, she defuses the
threat that she poses to the norm.”451 But Beatrice is still pushed towards marriage, because the
henikosexual woman tends to draw not just sympathy and assistance but also becomes an ideal to
be imitated. Henikosexual women’s love is not predicated on judgment or assessment of
character, as is made clear in this play: Hero does not judge Claudio, and love for him does not
even originate with him. Her love involves rather suspending judgment, and her sole concern
beyond her love for Claudio is to convince Beatrice to do the same. Hero is only partially
successful, but Beatrice still submits to the normative pressure. When she banters with Benedick
at the end of the play, she jokes that she will love him “upon great persuasion” (5.4.95).
To return to the question of Claudio, rather than interpreting him as undeserving or
unappealing, I would stress rather than he spends most of the play being manipulated. Don John
tricks him twice and then the Friar and Leonato trick him to undo Don John’s tricks. More so
than Beatrice, he learns to distrust his own perceptions, but his problem throughout the play is
his tendency to believe what others tell him. Anthony Lewis highlights Hero’s role in reorienting
Claudio through the wonder her “resurrection” generates: “Shakespearean comedy relies for its
central effects on the male reaction to the wonders apparently performed by the women, and not
vice versa. […] It is the women who are the rescuers in these plays, and not the men; it is the
women’s loyalty and their willingness to descend, their ability to be here and there, that saves the
men from their own worst intentions.”452 However, Lewis does not acknowledge that Hero’s
rescuing of Claudio is at the behest of the Friar and Leonato, who act in her and Claudio’s
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interests to promote reconciliation. The restoration of Hero’s and Claudio’s relationship becomes
the chief matter of public business in the play, tied as it is to the capture and punishment of Don
John and his associates by the constables. Marta Straznicky interprets the end of the play—and
the genre as a whole—politically, arguing “that literary design ‘governs’ the representation of
social relations in a very specific way, and that Shakespeare’s comedies—behaving in a manner
analogous to disciplinary codes—distribute power so as to promote a particular kind of social
equilibrium.”453 The play shows that the achievement of order through marriage is difficult work
requiring cooperation, respect for authority, and a shared purpose that is never explained. Don
Pedro’s motivation for putting Beatrice and Benedick together seems motivated by his simple
enjoyment of it and his peculiar desire to claim Cupid’s glory for himself. Falling in love is
presented in the play as the work of authority figures enforcing a particular way of life upon their
subjects, elevating the figure of Hero as a kind of moral exemplar. As Kiernan Ryan states,
“What’s usually viewed as a subjective, authentic, spontaneous experience is dramatically
objectified as a culturally enforced fiction.” 454
Hero’s welfare is established in the beginning of the final scene as public business when
Antonio, hearing of the exposure of Don John, states, “I am glad that all things sorts so well”
(5.4.7). Then, when Hero is revealed to be alive, the Friar speaks the familiar comic injunctions:
All this amazement can I qualify,
When after that the holy rites are ended,
I’ll tell you largely of fair Hero’s death.
Mean time let wonder seem familiar[.] (5.4.67-70)
He defers the explanation so as to allow the theatrical miracle to maintain its power for the
duration of the wedding (and the play), clarifying the role of wonder as submitting to an illusion
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for the sake of gaining happiness and restoring relationships in ways that would be impossible
without those illusions. The play’s injunction to joy comes in the form of Benedick’s command
that they all dance: “Come, come, we are friends. Let’s have a dance ere we are married, that we
may lighten our own hearts and our wives’ heels” (5.4.117-119). He then tells Don Pedro, “get
thee a wife, get thee a wife” (5.4.122), spreading the play’s message of marriage as a necessity,
as if happiness and social concord require it.

Henikosexuality and Beyond
All of Shakespeare’s women have to manage life among social expectations and
behavioral restrictions, though, as we have seen, they often subvert those restrictions in their
pursuit of the man they want. Natalie Zemon Davis provides a theoretical account which
undergirds much feminist criticism of the comedies, with which I essentially agree, that these
small acts of subversion maintain the systems of dominance rather than disrupt them, in that
assertive women “are ultimately sources of order and stability in hierarchical society. [...] [T]hey
do not question the basic order of the society itself. They can renew the system, but they cannot
change it.”455 It is my contention that the henikosexual women of Shakespeare’s comedies never
seek to change systems because it is impossible to distinguish between their preferences—often
expressed more in their actions and in what is said about them by others, rather than in their own
words—and the structures they inhabit and work within. These women want only to marry a
specific man, and their function in the plays is to anchor the plots even when the woman in
question is not the lead. Disruptive characters like Katherina in The Taming of the Shrew and
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Beatrice in Much Ado about Nothing are offset by their kinswomen who seek marriage with a
man more as a function of their role than as an expression of their passions.
The three plays I will discuss in this section all contain cross-dressing female leads.
Critics often debate the degree to which theatrical cross-dressing constitutes queer identity that
disrupts norms of gender and sexuality as opposed to the ways it is employed to affirm
heterosexual marriage. I am generally sympathetic to the latter view, well stated by Jean
Howard: the women in these plays are active and often the object of same-sex erotic attention,
but the plays all end with three or more marriages. The plays “do not allow a marriageable
woman to remain unmarried. And since marriage, even a ‘companionate one,’ place women in
political and economic subordination to their husbands, to make marriage the telos of women’s
existence effectively confirmed her permanent subordination and often in the plays, the
loosening of her bonds with other women.” 456 As I have already discussed, the loosening of
bonds with other women can be overstated, but nonetheless the disruptiveness and erotic
playfulness of cross-dressing takes place in plays that are arguably more marriage-focused than
some of Shakespeare’s other comedies. William C. Carroll claims that “Only when a woman is
trying to get a man must she become a man,” 457 which is not entirely accurate: among Rosalind’s
and Viola’s motivations for cross-dressing is their own survival. Carroll is correct, however, that
cross-dressing enables the women to achieve what they could not achieve as women, and which
their men fail to achieve: “The women are doing for the men what the men can’t do for
themselves.”458
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I will discuss the uses of cross-dressing and other acts that the heroines use to pursue
their men, as well as the standard features of the deferred explanation and the injunction to joy,
but my main concern in this section is what Shakespeare suggests about female desire. The
women in these plays speak and convey significantly more than many of the henikosexual
women of the other comedies and thus provide more avenues of analysis, and in many cases
more questions, than Shakespeare’s other women. Moreover, in my discussion of As You Like It,
I will explain how Rosalind’s status as an erotic character who is not henikosexual, i.e., not
singularly dedicated to the pursuit of a man, is central to her singularity among Shakespeare’s
comic women, and to that play’s special status among Shakespeare’s comedies.

The Merchant of Venice
It has been a central premise of my account of henikosexuality that the henikosexual
woman loves one man and accepts no substitute. This distinguishes her from men, and from
women who do not express specific preferences. Portia in The Merchant of Venice never
expresses desire for any man other than Bassanio, whom she marries; she has many suitors but
she ridicules and rejects them. She therefore is another example of Shakespeare’s devoted
women. However, when Portia gives herself and all her possessions to Bassanio, she compels
him to a specific contract:
I give them with this ring,
Which when you part from, lose, or give away,
Let it presage the ruin of your love,
And be my vantage to exclaim on you. (3.2.171-174)
This event is designed—by Shakespeare, if not by Portia—to guarantee that he will give away
the ring and face the consequences. The suggestion that Portia would reject him, or allow him to
“ruin” their relationship, makes Portia exceptional among Shakespeare’s henikosexual women.
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My discussion of Hero in Much Ado about Nothing above emphasized that, in her case, her love
for Claudio had no conditions or basis in his behavior. But Portia’s game with Bassanio is not to
punish him, or to provide herself with a means of escaping the relationship or establishing
dominance in it, or even to bind him. I will argue below that when she makes him surrender the
ring, she clarifies the nature of their relationship and effectively asserts her dedication to him
beyond the legal and social strictures of bonds and contracts that permeate the play. Furthermore,
like Measure for Measure, The Merchant of Venice contains injunctions to wonder but not to
happiness, and thus Shakespeare provides us with the possibility that the harmonies of the final
may not be happy but also do not need festive ratification or celebration.
Many of the relationships in The Merchant of Venice involve formal obligations,
agreements, and literal debts. Bassanio owes Antonio money, Antonio borrows money from
Shylock, and Portia is unable to choose her own husband because of the restrictions of her
father’s will. As she laments to her serving woman, “O me, the word choose! I may neither
choose who I would, nor refuse who I dislike; so is the will of a living daughter curb’d by the
will of a dead father. Is it not hard, Nerissa, that I cannot choose one, nor refuse none?” (1.2.2226). In previous comedies, Shakespeare presented the origin of some of his women’s love to be
obscure, but here he emphasizes Portia’s wish that she marry the man she prefers rather than
accept the result of the process her father established, the Game of the Three Caskets. Nerissa
tells her to trust her father because the correct casket “will no doubt never be chosen by any
rightly but one who you shall rightly love” (1.2.31-33). Nerissa’s claim, which turns out to be
true, is that Portia will love (not merely accept) the man who chooses correctly. The implication
here is that the man she loves is not solely an expression of her own singular desire but rather in
the cooperation between her preferences and the strictures of her world. Unlike, for example,
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Helena in All’s Well That Ends Well, Portia does not love the wrong man. She is more like Hero
in Much Ado in that she loves the man she is supposed to love but she also must manage his
inadequacies.
When Bassanio courts Portia prior to making his choice of casket, she further expresses
conflict about her preference for him and her duty to her father:
I could teach you
How to choose right, but I am then forsworn.
So will I never be, so may you miss me,
But if you do, you’ll make me wish a sin,
That I had been forsworn. Beshrew your eyes,
They have o’erlook’d me and divided me:
One half of me is yours, the other half yours—
Mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours,
And so all yours. O, these naughty times
Puts bars between the owners and their rights!
And so though yours, not yours. (3.2.10-20)
Implicit in this speech is how no part of Portia belongs to herself: the half of herself that she sees
in one of his eyes that she could claim for herself she already gives to him. As her prior lament
indicates, she has preferences, but she cannot make choices. She wishes she lived in a world
where there would be no obstacles or complications for their love, but she figures her desire as a
wish to be owned outright by him.
Portia is already aware, however, that Bassanio is not perfect. In her subsequent dialogue
with him, she asks him to “confess / What treason there is mingled with your love” (3.2.26-27).
Edward J. Geisweidt astutely reads the references to treason as Portia noticing that Bassanio’s
love is already mixed: “His love may not be false, but it is not comprised of just one desire.” 459
The language of treason also signifies that his conflicts have political overtones: he is not
singularly dedicated to her because he has other loyalties. Her conflict is between an obligation
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and a preference, while his is between two preferences. Their conversation is premised upon the
idea that he is speaking under torture, and thus she cannot trust him: “I fear you speak upon the
rack, / Where men enforced do speak any thing” (3.2.32-33). Given the overdetermined desires,
obligations, and bonds of the world of the play, Portia here addresses the problem of wanting to
be devoted to one man and no one else: she lives under various restrictions of her own, while he
is likely to not be as singular in his devotions as she is. She here prefigures the problem with
Bassanio she will address in Acts Four and Five.
Shortly after this conversation, Bassanio chooses the correct casket, and Portia submits
herself to him to be his wife. He uses the language of contract: “I come by note, to give and to
receive” (3.2.140), emphasizing mutuality, and he states that the contract is not final until she
authorizes it: “Until confirm’d, sign’d, ratified by you” (3.2.148). Portia rejects this language of
reciprocity to instead highlight her own self-emptying:
[T]he full sum of me
Is some of nothing; which, to term in gross,
Is an unlesson’d girl, unschool’d, unpractic’d,
Happy in this, she is not yet so old
But she may learn; happier than this,
She is not bred so dull but she can learn;
Happiest of all, is that her gentle spirit
Commits itself to yours to be directed,
As from her lord, her governor, her king.
Myself, and what is mine, to you and yours
Is now converted. (3.2.157-167)460
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Portia clarifies in great detail what marriage entails: an accounting of herself as goods to be
transferred, and a subject to a sovereign, but also as an unformed being of potentiality that can be
shaped according to Bassanio’s preferences. Of these varied configurations of herself, the last is
the one that she three times associates with her own happiness. She will be fulfilled when she
becomes whatever it is that Bassanio wants. She anticipates what she will do for the rest of the
play: protect Bassanio’s interests, permit him to continue in his other relationships and
commitments, release him from the formal contract of his marriage to her, and transform herself
into a person that is more suitable for him. This process begins at the end of this speech of
submission, in which Portia offers the ring with the lines that I quoted above: “I give them with
this ring” (3.2.171) which, should he lose it, invalidates their bond. She thus seems to be
reinscribing their relationship in the language of contract, though its goal is to free them both
from thinking of their marriage as such.
I will show that Portia’s plan to accommodate Bassanio comes to fruition in my reading
of the final scene of the play, in which it is relevant that neither Portia nor anyone else proclaims
that they are happy or that the community (and audience) should be. Ornstein misreads the
ending: “The comedy of the ring episode brings the trial scene to a happy conclusion and
provides an emotional transition from the rancor of the courtroom to the peacefulness of
Belmont” [...] All the news in the final scene of The Merchant is joyful.”461 Anne Parten is closer
to the mark: “Shakespeare, rather than [...] declaring a happy ending by fiat, creates a dramatic
situation in which the imbalance of power between the sexes is exaggerated, and drawn to the
audience’s conscious attention. [...] By making a breach in the sexual order explicit, and then by
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dispelling that threat, he eases a dangerous underlying tension in the play.” 462 Parten emphasizes
the fear of cuckoldry on the part of the woman, while my reading is premised more on Portia’s
concern for the effect on the relationship of her husband’s divided attentions. Portia solves her
problems, and the ending of the play accomplishes what it is supposed to accomplish, but within
the spoken words of the play itself, it is not a happy achievement. Jessica says at the beginning of
the scene, “I am never merry when I hear sweet music” (5.1.69), and when the disputes begin,
Antonio declares himself “th’ unhappy subject of these quarrels” (5.1.238). The “happy ending”
of The Merchant of Venice is such structurally, not affectively: the principal obstacle of Shylock
has been defeated, debts have been paid, Antonio’s ships arrive, and the women of the play have
married their men; order has been achieved. But Portia’s arrangement, despite its appearances of
ongoing conflict, is organized around the alignment of her preferences and Bassanio’s.
When Portia is disguised as the doctor of laws Balthasar, she gets the ring from Bassanio
specifically because Antonio presents them as obligated to him: they “stand indebted, over and
above / In love and service to you evermore” (4.1.413-414). The response of “Balthasar”
illustrates Portia’s sense of love as freedom from contract:
He is well paid that is well satisfied,
And I, delivering you, am satisfied,
And therein do account myself well paid.
My mind was never yet more mercenary.
I pray you know me when we meet again;
I wish you well, and so I take my leave. (4.1.415-420)
For “Balthasar,” the sense that events have proceeded as they should, and that a friendship will
continue, is sufficient. Relationships do not have to involve material debts or oaths of obligation;
they are free rather than “mercenary.” She also jokes here about how they do not recognize her:
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she knows they will “know me when we meet again,” unless she means that they will know
“Balthasar” if she assumes his identity again, which I think the end of the play suggests is a
possibility. Bassanio, however, requests “of force” (4.1.421) that he pay “Balthasar” in some
way, and thus Portia demands the ring. “Balthasar” promises that Portia “would not hold out
enemy forever / For giving it to me” (4.1.447-448). This claim turns out to be true and false:
Portia considers the loss of the ring a betrayal of the contract, but it does not make her an “enemy
forever” to Bassanio or Antonio.
When it emerges that Gratiano has given away Nerissa’s ring, Portia criticizes him for
losing “A thing stuck on with oaths” (5.1.168). She then refers to the ring she gave Bassanio,
about which she “made him swear / Never to part with it” (5.170-171). The rhetoric of oaths,
swearing, and force signify that the men have violated their marriages in the sense that marriages
are contracts between a man and a woman, ratified by socially-recognized rituals of material
exchange and transfers of property. When Bassanio confesses that he gave the ring away, Portia
promises him, “I will ne’er come in your bed / Until I see the ring!” (5.1.190-191), specifying
that their sexual relationship is itself part of the contract, which is presumably how he
understands it as well. His argument is that his obligation to “Balthasar,” and, it is further
implied, to Antonio, superseded his obligation to Portia:
What should I say, sweet lady?
I was enforc’d to send it after him,
I was beset with shame and courtesy,
My honor would not let ingratitude
So much besmear it. (5.1.215-219)
Bassanio presents himself as having to choose among conflicting obligations, and that male
honor and social conventions “enforc’d” him to displease his wife. (He does not mention that the
enforcement came from Antonio.) Bassanio presents himself as just as restricted by conventions
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as Portia is, but he retains his male prerogative to adjudicate among his duties and determine that
his same-sex bonds are a higher priority. As Karen Newman states, “We know this ring
symbolizes the bargain of faith in patriarchal marriage Portia and Bassanio have made in Act
Three, Scene Two. By obeying Antonio’s exhortation and giving his ring to Balthasar, Bassanio
affirms homosocial bonds—the exchange of women, here represented by Portia’s ring, sustains
relations between men.”463 Bassanio’s male shame is further expressed when he asks her to
“forgive me this enforced wrong, / And in the hearing of these many friends / I swear to thee”
(5.1.240-242). He does not get to finish his oath, but he repeats the word “enforced” and
struggles to regain his relationship with Portia by simply making another oath which Antonio
promises to police: “I dare be bound again, / My soul upon the forfeit, that your lord / Will never
more break faith advisedly” (5.1.251-253). The men operate as if oaths and bonds are the essence
of relationships, and that mutual keeping of oaths, shaming of those who break oaths, and
forgiving certain instances of disloyalty all serve the purpose of maintaining covenantal
relations.
Portia, however, finds a way to envision her marriage to Bassanio as not a covenant at all.
She first threatens Bassanio that if she ever encounters the man who possesses the ring, “I’ll not
deny him anything I have, / No, not my body nor my husband’s bed” (5.1.227-228), as if she is
contractually bound to the possessor of the ring and that contract supersedes her marriage to
Bassanio. She thus threatens Bassanio with precisely his own reasoning: one must adjudicate
among obligations and keep promises even if it means violating one’s marriage. But she then
gives the ring to Antonio to give to Bassanio, and when Bassanio recognizes it as the original
ring, he does not complete the oath. (Gratiano does: the last line of the play is his promise for
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“keeping safe Nerissa’s ring,” 5.1.307, but Bassanio has no such line.) She then explains that
“Portia was the doctor” (5.1.269), referring to herself in the third person, as if she is no longer
simply Portia but two people. Bassanio takes her cue and asks, “Were you the doctor, and I knew
you not?” (5.1.280), a question which Portia does not answer. (Again, Nerissa does, drawing the
contrast between her arrangement with Gratiano and Portia’s with Bassanio.) Bassanio then
informs her, “Sweet doctor, you shall be my bedfellow— / When I am absent, then lie with my
wife” (5.1.284-285). When Portia next speaks, it is to address Jessica and Lorenzo and then to all
that are gathered. In other words, after Portia announces that she “Portia was the doctor,” she
does not speak directly to Bassanio again. When he addresses her, it is as the doctor.
It is therefore possible that, for the purposes of their relationship, Portia becomes
Balthasar to suit Bassanio’s preference. He does not simply authorize “Balthasar” to lie with
Portia, as Portia warned, but he makes Portia essentially the third person in their marriage, with
the real bond being between Bassanio and Balthasar, who have no contract between them. Alan
Sinfield argues that “The last act of the play is Portia’s assertion of her right to Bassanio. Her
strategy is purposefully heterosexist: in disallowing Antonio’s sacrifice as a plausible reason for
parting with the ring, she disallows the entire seriousness of male love.” 464 I disagree with
Sinfield, whose reading is consonant with Newman’s, as well as that of Marilynn Williamson,
who argues that “the play effectively subverts the ostensible subordination of Portia in her
marriage. This play asserts all the codes on which it depends and subverts them at the same
time.”465 They see Portia as an unruly woman who defends heterosexual relationships and whose
disruptive behavior reifies patriarchal and heteronormative structures. I do not believe the
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opposite of their view so much as a nuanced version of it: Portia does not reinstate heterosexual
relations with her ring-trick so much as become a man to accommodate her husband. She
essentially undoes her heterosexual marriage as a contract between a man and a woman and
instead reframes her relationship with Bassanio as a free and open association between men.
Geisweidt interprets Portia’s work as accommodating Bassanio’s relationship with Antonio, as if
they form a triad rather than a standard heterosexual married dyad, 466 and I agree that Portia
allows for Antonio to be part of their arrangement: she twice tells him that he is welcome
(5.1.139, 239), and she understands that he and Bassanio are “much bound” (5.1.136). But the
relationship she enables between Bassanio and “Balthasar” is not binding, as Bassanio shows
when he gives Portia permission to “lie with” Balthasar when Bassanio is not home.
Portia is an interesting case of the henikosexual woman, in that her marriage to her
husband, whom she prefers over many others, is preserved because she creates a male identity
for herself who serves as a substitute for her husband and who serves her husband as a substitute
for his wife. If a henikosexual woman is going to take a substitute, it will be herself, and this act
will strengthen her marriage by liberating it from the rhetoric of bondage and contract. Portia
initially emptied herself when she submitted to Bassanio and pronounced herself happy to learn
how to be what her husband wanted. Her accomplishment preserves the institution of marriage
by demonstrating its inherent flexibility, and even grants the possibility for heterosexual
marriage not being heteronormative. Henikosexuality usually functions heteronormatively, but in
The Merchant of Venice it destabilizes such terms and ideas while demonstrating that the
woman’s need to marry her man—whom in this case she did not even choose for herself—
requires her to effectively erase herself as a woman in order to achieve her goal.
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Portia’s transition into a double identity, with her maleness being dominant, feeds her
ascent at the end of the play to the position of the authority figure who will explain what
happened and direct the other members of the community. Portia’s last lines in the play are:
It is almost morning,
And yet I am sure you are not satisfied
Of these events at full. Let us go in,
And charge us there upon inter’gatories,
And we will answer all things faithfully. (5.1.295-299)
Her interest in satisfying people and answering their questions shows that she understands
herself to be the controlling figure of the play and its community. Her use of “us” and “we”
signify her capacity to speak on behalf of everyone else as well as her new, plural identity. Her
reference to “inter’gatories” returns the play to the language of oaths, indicating that the
communal bonds will still function as such and that her obligation-free marriage will be therefore
all the more singular.

As You Like It
Critics and audiences often identify As You Like It as Shakespeare’s best and most
exemplary comedy. Anne Barton claims that it “stands as the fullest and most stable realization
of Shakespearean comic form,”467 while Ejner Jensen states that it defines the “Frye-Barber
pattern.”468 Its ending combines varied levels of romantic fulfillment with political and familial
restoration so as, in James Bednarz’s description, “to sanctify human experience through
mythology, which binds together the natural, the human, and the divine as coordinated elements
in a single all-inclusive order.” 469 Though the play ends with four heterosexual marriages, it

467

Barton, “As You Like It and Twelfth Night: Shakespeare’s Sense of an Ending,” 161.
Jensen, Shakespeare and the Ends of Comedy, 73.
469
Bednarz, Shakespeare and the Poets’ War, 128.
468

314

contains myriad queer elements; as Will Fisher writes, “the heterosexual telos of the play does
not completely mitigate the radical elements depicted therein.” 470 One of these elements is
Rosalind’s ongoing commitment to theatricality, a spirit of play that brings not only amusement
but also subverts conventions about gender and even reality when she claims magical powers for
herself. Richard McCoy observes that “As a girl and a boy, Rosalind’s gender remains a role or
‘counterfeit’ rather than a given, and both the character and actor remain committed to playing
both roles for the duration of the play.” 471 Rosalind’s performance of gender, in McCoy’s
account, is of a piece with the play’s many charms that are simultaneously illusory and
efficacious, compelling belief tinged with mockery.
I will argue that part of Rosalind’s charm is that she is not what I call henikosexual, and
that the freedom she displays in her games with Orlando contrasts her with Shakespeare’s more
devoted and single-minded heroines. Unlike Julia, Portia, and Helena, Rosalind is given to
playfulness and pleasure-seeking beyond whatever will secure the man she loves; as McCoy
observes, she is at least as committed to play-acting as she is to Orlando: “For Rosalind, the
play's the thing far more than it is for Hamlet, and its willful illusions sustain her happiness and
ours.”472 However, I will also attempt to demonstrate that despite her gender play, Rosalind is
committed to the performance of heterosexuality for herself and for others in the play. As Carol
Thomas Neely says of the play’s ending, “What are powerfully represented here, unlike in
Twelfth Night, are conventionally gendered heterosexual unions enunciated in Jaques’s
concluding blessings.”473 Heterosexual marriage is central to the play’s image of happiness
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which ends up being more convincing than most comedies, a theatrical embodiment of true wishfulfillment. Furthermore, in contrast to the other plays with a single strong character who drives
the action, Rosalind does not have to do everything: the non-romantic elements of the plot, such
as Duke Frederick’s and Oliver’s villainy, take care of themselves through convenient
conversions. The audience is encouraged to accept what As You Like It presents via the standard
comic injunction to wonder and not think.
In the beginning of the play, Rosalind raises the topic of love as “sport” (1.2.25), to pass
the time and put herself in a better mood. Shortly thereafter, she meets Orlando and watches him
wrestle, and she is aroused by his quick and surprising victory: “O excellent young man!”
(1.2.213), she exclaims, and she informs him, “you have wrastled well, and overthrown / More
than your enemies” (1.2.254-255). In the next scene, she tells Celia how much she loves
Orlando, and asks her to “love him because I do” (1.3.38-39). But then they are interrupted to be
informed that Duke Frederick is exiling Rosalind, and here it becomes clear that Orlando does
not dominate her mind to the exclusion of all other things. She has already expressed concern for
her own exiled father (1.2.5-7), and she agrees to Celia’s plan that they look for him in the Forest
of Arden. Rosalind suggests they wear disguises: Rosalind will dress like a man, and she enjoys
imagining herself as such:
A gallant curtle-axe upon my thigh,
A boar-spear in my hand, and—in my heart
Lie there what hidden woman’s fear there will—
We’ll have a swashing and a martial outside,
As many other mannish cowards have
That do outface it with their semblances. (1.3.117-122)
Rosalind derives pleasure from performance, and she notes wryly that many people pretend in
everyday life to virtues they do not have. As a woman pretending to be a man, she will
counterfeit bravery, just as men themselves do: this is the first of many comments about gender
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being largely a matter of artifice. She then suggests that she and Celia bring the clown
Touchstone with them to be “a comfort to our travel” (1.3.131). Rosalind seems to have
forgotten Orlando, and she quickly turns the sadness of exile into a promising journey,
characterized by Celia as such: “Now go [we in] content / To liberty, and not to banishment”
(1.3.137-138).
Rosalind’s next scene begins with her announcement that she is indeed enjoying exile:
“O Jupiter, how merry are my spirits!” (2.4.1). 474 Rosalind cheers up Celia as a way of
maintaining her new masculine identity: “doublet and hose ought to show itself courageous to
petticoat” (2.4.6-7): she continues to draw attention to her performance and associate gender
with clothing. She then encounters Silvius and Corin in the forest and she overhears him speak of
his unrequited love, to which Rosalind laments, “Alas, poor shepherd, searching of [thy wound],
/ I have by hard adventure found mine own” (2.4.44-45). This is the first time she has mentioned
Orlando since she was told of her banishment; he is one thing on her mind among other things,
and she feels not only desire for Orlando but sympathy for Silvius: “this shepherd’s passion / Is
much upon my fashion” (2.4.60-61).
Rosalind’s musings on gender, pleasure in performance, and concern for others
characterize her as having interests and personality beyond Shakespeare’s other heroines who
fixate on a man and whose actions focus narrowly on pursuing him and otherwise conveying
dedication to him. Portia also evinces pleasure when she imagines herself pretending to be a
man, but she takes on her disguise for the specific goal of assisting her husband and his friend
(and, possibly, to get her ring back); Rosalind’s disguise and her travel have nothing to do with
Orlando at first, and she is surprised to learn he is in the Forest of Arden. Furthermore, when she
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first learns that someone was posting poorly-written poems about her, she expresses curiosity
about who it might be and what he looks like. Celia drops hints that it is Orlando, but Rosalind
does not pick up on them, and she keeps asking Celia to tell her who it is. It is possible that this
is a game and Rosalind knew all along, but it is also possible that she was excited at the prospect
of a new admirer.
Rosalind gives further indications that her desire for Orlando is not all-encompassing,
self-denying, or exclusive. When she meets with him in her disguise as “Ganymede” (in whose
person she playacts as “Rosalind”), she notifies him that she will be moody, of varying humors:
“I will be more jealous of thee than a Barbary cock-pigeon over his hen, more clamorous than a
parrot against rain, more new-fangled than an ape, more giddy in my desires than a monkey”
(4.1.149-153). She performs sexual interest as a way of getting Orlando to talk, and she is at least
as interested in making sure he loves her properly and in having her realistic understanding of
love as she is in expressing her love for him. She demonstrates that he must learn to
accommodate her and attend to her varying desires. She even jokes about desiring other people:
ROSALIND
ORLANDO
ROSALIND
ORLANDO
ROSALIND
ORLANDO
ROSALIND
ORLANDO
ROSALIND

But come, now I will be your Rosalind in a more
coming-on disposition; and ask me what you will, I
will grant it.
Then love me, Rosalind.
Yes, faith, will I, Fridays and Saturdays and all.
And wilt thou have me?
Ay, and twenty such.
What sayest thou?
Are you not good?
I hope so.
Why then, can one desire too much of a good thing?
(4.1.111-124)

The joke is not idle: she repeats the possibility when she tells Orlando that if he wishes for her to
be less witty, “you might keep that check for it, till you meet your wive’s wit going to your
neighbor’s bed” (4.1.167-169). Rosalind does love Orlando, as she proclaims after he leaves: “let
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[Cupid] be judge how deep I am in love. I’ll tell thee, Aliena, I cannot be out of the sight of
Orlando” (4.1.214-216). However, this love does not prevent her from noticing other men, as she
does when she compliments Silvius, whom she tells, “You are a thousand times a properer man /
Than [Phebe] a woman” (3.5.51-52); she even tells Silvius that if Phebe keeps soliciting
“Ganymede,” she should keep sending Silvius: “if she love me, I charge her to love thee; if she
will not, I will never have her unless thou entreat for her” (4.3.71-73). This is an offhand
comment, but it indicates that Rosalind, who expressed sympathy for Silvius before and whose
cause she takes on, also simply enjoys his company and appearance. Rosalind even tells Phebe,
“I would love you if I could” (5.2.110-111), and in the Epilogue, she tells the men in the
audience that she would like to “kiss as many of you as had beards that pleased me” (Ep.1819).475 Rosalind lives for pleasure, and Orlando is one of her pleasures. Her love for him does not
define her or restrict her; it is one among her many interests, and she is Shakespeare’s singular
statement among his comedies that a woman’s desire to marry a man need not be the whole of
her story or identity. Beatrice is another possible example, but Much Ado ends with a man telling
her, “Peace! I will stop your mouth” (5.4.97), 476 while As You Like It ends with Rosalind being
given the Epilogue.
Rosalind enjoys her games with Orlando. She could have simply revealed herself to
Orlando when she first saw him and married him shortly thereafter, but she instead delays and
play-acts with him. He is the one who instigates marriage: when “Ganymede” asks him, “Why
then to-morrow I cannot serve your turn for Rosalind?” (5.2.48-49), Orlando replies, “I can live
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no longer by thinking” (5.2.50). “Ganymede” agrees to produce Rosalind the next day so they
can be married, but this event signifies Rosalind’s other major role in As You Like It, which is to
assist Silvius, and therefore serve as a kind of enforcer for heterosexuality.
Rosalind never explains why she takes on Silvius’s cause; as I mentioned above, she has
sympathy for him, but she also shows that she is offended by Phebe’s pride. She asks her, “What
though you have no beauty / [...] Must you be therefore proud and pitiless?” (3.5.37, 40), and
then tells her to marry Silvius while she can: “Sell when you can, you are not for all markets”
(3.5.60). These are not just insults; they show that Rosalind thinks that it is right for women like
Phebe to marry, and they should accept the love of the first good man who offers it. At the end of
the play, Rosalind tricks Phebe by assuring her, “I will marry you, if ever I marry woman, and
I’ll be married to-morrow” (5.2.113-114), and she gets Phebe to agree to her “commands”
(5.2.121). The next day, she ensures that Phebe has agreed to “our compact” (5.4.5) and orders
her, “Keep you your word” (5.4.21). Since Phebe has fallen in love with “Ganymede,”
Shakespeare presents us with a situation in which a woman falls in love with another woman
without knowing it. Though Rosalind often plays herself and “Ganymede” at the same time, she
also alternates between them at her convenience, and when she reappears as Rosalind on her
wedding day, she forces Phebe to marry Silvius by presenting herself at that moment as female.
She enforces heterosexuality by temporarily essentializing her gender. Hymen then tells Phebe,
“You to his love must accord, / Or have a woman to your lord” (5.4.133-134). However fluid
Rosalind’s gender may be, she cannot marry Phebe, and so Rosalind ensures that whatever queer
possibilities there were between herself and Phebe must end and Silvius must get what Jaques
calls “a long and well-deserved bed” (5.4.190). Phebe must “accord,” as she is told, because she
made an oath; her final lines are, “I will not eat my word, now thou art mine, / Thy faith my
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fancy to thee doth combine” (5.4.149-150). Phebe admits that she must use her “fancy,” her
imagination, to marry Silvius; the very imaginativeness and spirit of play that Rosalind uses to
enjoy various identities and pleasures is used by Phebe to marry a man she does not love. The
joys of the play are unequally distributed.
The play’s heterosexual agenda is further displayed in the paradoxes of the ending as a
moment of both clarity and illusion. When Rosalind (still dressed as “Ganymede”) makes sure
that Silvius and Phebe will keep their oaths, she says, “I have promis’d to make all this matter
even” (5.4.18) and ends the same speech with “from hence I go / To make these doubts all even”
(5.1.24-25). The word “doubts” is peculiar in this context; it is rarely glossed by editors, but it is
not clear what is being doubted. A doubt can refer to uncertainty, but also to fear or dread, as
when Othello says, “Nor from mine own weak merits will I draw / The smallest fear or doubt of
her revolt” (3.3.187-188); Shakespeare also uses it to mean “danger” or “risk,” as in Richard II,
when the Gardener says of Richard, “Depress’d he is already, and deposed / ’Tis doubt he will
be. Letters came last night / [...] That tell black tidings” (3.4.68-71). 477 Rosalind’s work in the
play is to confuse and encourage flexibility on some matters, but in the matter of marriage, she
ends doubts. Hymen’s language continues the idea: “I bar confusion, / ’Tis I must make
conclusion / Of these most strange events” (5.4.125-127). Rosalind and Hymen do not secure the
marriages with rational arguments about the nature of marriage, but with the simple assertion
that Rosalind is a woman and therefore she cannot marry Phebe. Otherwise the audience is left to
speculate about how it all transpired. Hymen offers the familiar comic call to wonder: “Feed
yourselves with questioning; / That reason wonder may diminish / How thus we met, and these
things finish” (5.4.138-140). The implication here is that reason cannot account for what has
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happened in the play, including the enforcement of heterosexual marriage, and that “wonder”
must be employed to understand it, just as Phebe must use “fancy” to accept Silvius as her
husband.
One of the other marriages at the end of the play is Celia’s, and here I can address the
play’s treatment of henikosexuality. Celia does not begin the play as a henikosexual, but she
becomes one quickly and not quite believably, as one of the miraculous events in the play’s
second half that secure the well-ordered and heterosexual “happy ending” of the comedy. Celia’s
intense love for Rosalind is expressed less and less as the play proceeds—as Rosalind and
Orlando play their games in front of Celia—and Celia’s conversion to love for Oliver is reported
entirely secondhand. Shakespeare presents Celia’s story as a journey from same-sex love to
heterosexuality, conditioned by the contours of the plot rather than Rosalind’s direct
interventions.
Celia’s story shows that love in the play can vary, but it ends in heterosexual coupling.
Celia spends much of the play, especially the first act, devoted to Rosalind: in their first scene
together, Celia wishes that Rosalind could forget her father and think of Celia as her sister, and
Rosalind’s failure to do so means “thou lov’st me not with the full weight that I love thee”
(1.2.8-9). When Rosalind brings up “falling in love,” Celia replies that she “love[s] no man in
good earnest” (1.2.27), declaring her lack of interest in men while also assuming that “falling in
love” must refer to heterosexual love. She shows good will towards Orlando, but when Rosalind
later speaks of him, Celia tells her to “wrastle with thy affections” (1.3.21). When Duke
Frederick banishes Rosalind, Celia claims that she too has been banished. Rosalind disagrees, to
which Celia replies:
Rosalind lacks then the love
Which teacheth thee that thou and I am one.
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Shall we be sund’red? shall we part, sweet girl?
No, let my father seek another heir. (1.3.96-99)
Celia twice has told Rosalind that their love is asymmetrical, and that Celia’s affections are such
that she “cannot live out of her company” (1.3.86), and that her love for Rosalind exceeds her
love for her father or any other person. She wants her love to “teacheth” Rosalind that affinities
can be stronger than family: as Andy Mousley writes, “For Celia, kinship terms and the true and
lasting affections which they should ideally denote are transferable.” 478 Celia is also consistently
asserting the reality of same-sex love, and attempting to license it in Rosalind, or get her to
confess to it. Celia testifies to it: “We still have slept together, / Rose at an instant, learn’d,
play’d, eat together, / [...] we went coupled and inseparable” (1.3.73-76), just as Le Beau does,
indicating the women’s reputation: their “loves / Are dearer than the natural bond of sisters”
(1.2.275-276). The intimacy between them strongly suggests an erotic relationship, though
Rosalind never speaks of it.
When Celia and Rosalind (as “Aliena” and “Ganymede”) go to the Forest of Arden, they
keep a household together. Will Fisher observes that this household is part of the “liberty” they
acquire: it is not that “Rosalind and Celia are actually married, but rather that they mimic
matrimonial discourse and activities in constituting their own alliance. In the process, they
demonstrate how ‘heterosexual’ social discourses and practices might be appropriated as a means
of creating a ‘place’ where two women could exist, if sometimes only temporarily, outside
parental and patriarchal control.”479 However, as Fisher notes, “Ganymede” and Orlando conduct
their sessions at the house, often including Celia—including asking her to perform their
wedding—and it is possible to interpret Rosalind’s actions as ensuring that Celia recognize that
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Rosalind’s attentions have turned to men and to Orlando specifically (though not necessarily
exclusively). Alternatively, Julie Crawford argues that Rosalind’s “newfound love for Orlando”
takes place “in the context of her long-term love for Celia. Rosalind does not replace Celia here
[...] nor does she shift her loyalties from Celia to Orlando. Rather, she countenances a new bond
with an extant one, consanguinity and avowed kinship with marriage, same-sex with cross-sex
love.”480 However, in the passage to which Crawford refers, Rosalind insists, “that thou didst
know how many fathom deep I am in love! But it cannot be sounded; my affection hath an
unknown bottom, like the Bay of Portugal” (4.1.205-208). Rosalind emphasizes that Celia
doesn’t understand because Rosalind is experiencing something Celia has not, and that
Rosalind’s love for Orlando is much greater than any other she has experienced.
The play ends with Celia marrying Oliver; theirs is the principal wedding that the other
three couples join. Bart van Es claims, “There are certainly moments in the comedies that
suggest the possibility of homosexual longing […]. These are, however, temporary states that
heterosexual inevitably supplants. In the comedies homosexual identity can never be pressed as a
permanent sexual choice”;481 likewise, Douglas Bruster writes that same-sex desire is presented
as “a step towards mature heterosexuality.”482 This is not the case for men; it is possible to
imagine the Antonio of The Merchant of Venice or the other Antonio of Twelfth Night
maintaining same-sex relations, and I have argued in above that it is plausible for Bassanio as
well. As I previously discussed in Chapter One, agreeing with Julie Crawford, we do not know
what kinds of relationships the characters will have after the plays end. In the case of young
women, however, Shakespeare usually ensures that she is attached to a man, and when that
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attachment becomes central to her character, there is often nothing more in the play for her. To
the extent that the characters exist in plays that exist in genres, women are entangled in
heterosexual relations, and at least one woman becomes defined by it. This is what happens to
Celia, because she has no lines at all after Act Four Scene Three of As You Like It; she is onstage
for the festivities, but Shakespeare gives her nothing to say. The strangeness of her quick
courtship is first recounted in a conversation between Oliver and Orlando:
ORLANDO

OLIVER

ORLANDO

Is’t possible that on so little acquaintance you should like
her? that but seeing, you should love her? and loving, woo?
and wooing, she should grant? and will you persever to
enjoy her?
Neither call the giddiness of it in question, the poverty of
her, the small acquaintance, my sudden wooing, nor [her]
sudden consenting; but say with me, I love Aliena; say with
her that she loves me; consent with both that we may enjoy
each other. It shall be to your good; for my father's house
and all the revenue that was old Sir Rowland’s will I estate
upon you, and here live and die a shepherd.
You have my consent. Let your wedding be to-morrow.
(5.2.1-14)

Celia’s fate is presented as a matter between men. Oliver asks Orlando’s consent, and that they
all love another. Celia’s severing of her kinship tie with her father is now reattached to the De
Boys brothers,483 and Orlando (and thus Rosalind) stand to benefit materially from Celia’s
marriage. The repeated use of “enjoy” emphasizes that Celia’s relationship with Oliver will be
sexual. Oliver’s request that Orlando not ask questions is of a piece with Hymen’s injunction to
wonder: Celia’s marriage is another fact to be accepted and taken as fortuitous, even magical,
and not the subject of rational explanation.
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Rosalind has her own account of the love between Celia and Oliver: “There was never
any thing so sudden but the fight of two rams, and Caesar’s thrasonical brag of ‘I came, saw, and
[overcame]’” (5.2.30-32). Rosalind aligns Celia’s turn to heterosexuality as analogous to conflict
between male animals or to masculine imperial conquest. As with her advocacy for Silvius,
Rosalind is consistently on the side of the men. Mario DiGangi observes that “Rosalind’s
unbelievably hyperbolic account of Celia’s attraction to Oliver suggests how ideologically
motivated is the play’s need to match her with a marriageable partner. […] By so describing
Celia, Rosalind not only marks the end of their homoerotic friendship, thereby positioning both
Celia and herself as marriageable women; she also provides Orlando with a model of marriage
based in vigorous (hetero)erotic desire.”484 With Celia’s silence and her hastily-arranged
marriage, Shakespeare presents heterosexual marriage as possibly affected by mutual love
(Rosalind and Celia), deception (Silvius and Phebe), or genre convenience (Oliver and Celia),
but the results are the same. The marriage of Touchstone and Audrey, provided as a satirical
contrast to the others, is also secured by an agreement between two men: Touchstone woos
Audrey easily and then informs William, who “lays claim” (5.1.7) to her, that he cannot have
her.
The end of As You Like It does not defer explanations so much as obviate the need for
them. It contains injunctions to joy from Duke Senior, the patriarchal figure, who calls all to
dance “With measure heap’d in joy” (5.4.179). He also says of the weddings, “We’ll begin these
rites, / As we do trust they’ll end, in true delights” (5.4.197-198); the word “trust” being the
community’s final expression that heterosexual coupling and the Duke’s restoration are an image
of joy in which all can share. Heterosexuality as a norm is shrewdly inserted also in the play’s
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Epilogue: though the actor playing Rosalind announces the wish to kiss the men, he would do so
only “If I were a woman” (Ep.18), and in his/her address to the women and men of the audience,
the assumption is that the women love men and the men love women: as DiGangi explains, the
Epilogue “conjures up a consistently heteroerotic model of sexual desire.” 485 On the other hand,
Phyllis Rackin suggests that, since the Epilogue begins with an address to the women “to like as
much of this play as please you” (Ep.13-14), Rosalind (and Shakespeare) imply that the “you” in
the title refers to women.486 Rackin does not acknowledge that Rosalind hopes women have that
pleasure “for the love you bear to men” (Ep.13). Women and men are both addressed within the
context of heterosexual relations. Cynthia Marshall sees the Epilogue as conveying Rosalind’s
losses: “Rosalind gives up the freedoms and possibilities of Ganymede in order to marry
Orlando: she strongly embraces femininity as a limit. Rosalind’s final appearance as the
Epilogue, whose words unsettle the relationships between boy-actor, Ganymede, and Rosalind,
testifies to the diminution effected by Rosalind’s marriage.” 487 Marshall’s reading is plausible,
but Rosalind herself does not express any nostalgia for what she has lost. Once Orlando requests
the end to Ganymede’s games, Rosalind immediately complies before setting out to secure
Silvius’s marriage.
The happiness of the ending of As You Like It consists not only in the festive heterosexual
coupling and the delight in Rosalind, but in the play’s combination of human agency and
“magic” that provides the peace and concord the genre favors. The moral conversions of Oliver
and Duke Frederick and the sexual conversion of Celia all happen without the intervention of
Rosalind or any other character. Part of what makes the late comedies unsettling—and perhaps
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also The Merchant of Venice—is that a single character performs so much work to deliver the
play’s results. In As You Like It, Rosalind tricks Phebe into heterosexual marriage, but Celia
becomes the figure of henikosexual devotion, in that once she falls in love with her man, it
becomes the entirety of her character. Every Shakespearean comedy needs at least one such
woman.

Twelfth Night, or What You Will
Twelfth Night differs from many of Shakespeare’s comedies in the means with which it
achieves its comic ends. Shakespeare often features at least one character who carries out a
successful plan that results in marriage. Sometimes the agent secures their own, as with
Petruchio, Portia, Fenton, Rosalind, and Helena; sometimes the agent secures others’, such as
Oberon, Don Pedro, Rosalind (again), and Duke Vincentio. Twelfth Night has one such character,
Maria, who launches a plot to humiliate Malvolio that results in her marrying the man she wants.
However, the main plot of Twelfth Night recalls The Comedy of Errors, not just in its use of
twins and other New Comedy tropes, but in its use of chance and coincidence to solve its erotic
complications and achieve the happy ending. When a play solves itself, the playwright
simultaneously signals that the characters live in a mythic world of providence and that the
playwright is drawing attention to the genre itself. In comedies, we can take characters’ erotic
fates as expressions of both ideas: what providence and genre demand of them, both of which
have social implications: the play reflects the world as it should be. In the late comedies, All’s
Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure, the comic ends are secured by active, deceptive
interventions on the part of the controlling characters in the form of bed-tricks. Paul Morrison
provides the insight that bed-tricks are just an extreme instance of what comedies already do:

328

what if bed-tricks are “the mechanism of socially acceptable, socially compelled, erotic
substitution forced to speak its name? What is normative psychosexual development other than
an elaborate bed trick?”488 This is a plausible interpretation of Twelfth Night, with its various
substitutions and errors that result in what looks like a standard comic conclusion.
The play manifests sexual desire in varied ways and characters develop same-sex as well
as opposite-sex attractions—in the case of Viola and Orsino, their relationship is both, since he
becomes intimate with “Cesario” while Viola’s loves Orsino. The outcomes, however, fit the
standard comic pattern of heterosexuality that furthermore reifies the social structure of the
world of the play: Orsino marries Viola, Olivia marries Sebastian. Judith Haber suggests,
convincingly, that Viola’s love for Orsino is established so poorly that it is just “to reflect the
social and theatrical structures” that draw her to Orsino: “Heteroerotic love and the traditional
comic conclusion to which it usually leads are thus made to seem wholly conventional and
arbitrary.”489 As I have shown above, this perfunctory or even unstated love is quite normal for
the henikosexual woman in Shakespearean comedy. As for the play’s conclusion, Lisa Jardine
observes, “At the end of the play, the marriages of the twin siblings to Olivia and Orsino effect
what Orsino’s courtship was originally designed to achieve—the Orsino and Olivia households
enter into a kin relationship with one another.” 490 That the various marriages are facilitated by
chance, accident, and surprising revelation suggest that human agency should be subordinated to
stronger forces that present themselves as benevolent. While the play aligns desire and the
passive acceptance of fate with social and generic strictures, its portrayal of Viola’s unique
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passivity presents a distinctive instance of the henikosexual woman whose desire leads her
towards service and self-denial rather than the active pursuit of the man she loves.
The play contains several expressions of its characters surrendering to fate and admitting
their own powerlessness. When Orsino first sends “Cesario” to court Olivia on his behalf, Viola
acknowledges her predicament: “I’ll do my best / To woo your lady. Yet a barful strife! /
Whoe’er I woo, myself would be his wife” (1.4.40-42). Viola demonstrates too much
resourcefulness in courting Olivia, but she never actively tries to win Orsino, and only seeks to
serve him and spend time with him, even if that service involves conveying his love for another
woman. When Olivia falls in love with “Cesario,” Viola wonders aloud what to do about it:
How will this fadge? My master loves her dearly,
And I (poor monster) fond as much on him;
And she (mistaken) seems to dote on me.
What will become of this? As I am man,
My state is desperate for my master’s love;
As I am woman (now, alas the day!),
What thriftless sighs shall poor Olivia breathe!
O time, thou must untangle this, not I,
It is too hard a knot for me t’ untie. (2.2.33-41)
Viola reconciles herself to her own powerlessness. Several factors are, to her, immovable: her
desire for Orsino, Orsino’s desire for Olivia, the impossibility of attaining Orsino (because
“Cesario” is a man) and the impossibility of appeasing Olivia (because Viola is a woman). Viola
concedes that time must solve it, which is consistent with her statement in the beginning of the
play that she would disguise herself as a boy to serve Orsino and “What else may hap, to time I
will commit” (1.2.60). As James Bednarz observes, “What Shakespeare focuses on is the extent
to which life is shaped by seemingly accidental events beyond human will or power. Already
subjected to chance, Viola surrenders to its process. […] Victimized by experience, she now
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willingly accepts its unknowable agency.”491 The “unknowable agency” is the genre itself, as
Ejner Jensen attests: Viola “wait[s] in hope for the beneficial operation of forces that we know to
be guaranteed by the laws of comedy itself.” 492
Other characters make similar concessions to fate. When Olivia realizes she is in love
with “Cesario,” she expresses uncertainty about her own judgment but resigns herself to her fate:
I do I know not what, and fear to find
Mine eye too great a flatterer for my mind.
Fate, show thy force: ourselves we do not owe;
What is decreed must be; and be this so. (1.5.308-311)
Since her love for “Cesario” is “decreed,” she now sees herself as a character in a story. She puts
herself in the peculiar position of advocating for her own fate and, it seems, joyfully surrendering
to the forces driving her towards “Cesario.” She experiences them not as internal but as like “the
plague” or some other bug that “With an invisible and subtle stealth / To creep in at mine eyes”
(1.5.297-298).
In the next scene, Sebastian prepares to leave Antonio, and he announces, “My
determinate voyage is mere extravagancy” (2.1.11-12). The paradox is deliberate: Sebastian will
wander in order to learn what his destiny is. In the first scene of Hamlet, Horatio refers to tales
he has heard that when morning breaks, “Th’ extravagant and erring spirit hies / To his confine”
(1.1.154-155); “extravagancy,” like “error,” suggests going outside standard boundaries, but in a
comedy, such actions are what lead directly to the characters’ fates. Sebastian presents this line
as his excuse for leaving his relationship with Antonio, to which Antonio responds, “If you will
not murther me for my love, let me be your servant” (2.1.35-36). Sebastian thus here construes
“extravagancy” as departing what looks like an intimate same-sex relationship, and his
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wanderings send him quickly into the arms of Olivia. His “determinate” voyage is his journey
from same-sex relationship to fortuitous heterosexual marriage with a beautiful, wealthy,
aristocratic woman.
His spirit of wandering mixed with passivity informs Sebastian’s speech when he is
mistaken for “Cesario” and Olivia prepares for their wedding:
That this may be some error, but no madness,
Yet doth this accident and flood of fortune
So far exceed all instance, all discourse,
That I am ready to distrust mine eyes,
And wrangle with my reason that persuades me
To any other trust but that I am mad,
Or else the lady’s mad. (4.3.10-16)
He uses the same imagery of questioning one’s vision and internal conflict. He cites the lack of
precedent and rational explanation, but, like Olivia and Viola, he trusts what is happening
because it is so fortunate. He attempts to prove to himself that Olivia is not mad by noting her
large estate, servants, and nobility; he does not argue because she is an aristocrat, and it is
entirely in his interests to marry her. He thus defers to fate, to her social position, and to the
desirability of the outcome. He says earlier in this speech, “’Tis wonder that enwraps me thus”
(4.3.3), and, like many of the other comedies, “wonder” is deployed by characters to they may
accept what they perceive to be in their interests: heterosexual marriage, and in this case,
increased social position.
Critical disagreements about Twelfth Night tend to fall along predictable lines, depending
on how much the critic emphasizes (or questions) the heteronormative comic ending as well as
the moments of same-sex eroticism throughout the play. Jean Howard presents the former view:
“The play enacts […] the containment of gender and class insurgency and the valorization of the
‘good woman’ as the one who has interiorized—whatever her clothing—her essential differences
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from, and subordinate relations to, the male. […] The whole telos of the erotic narrative is to
release this woman from the prison of her masculine attire and return her to her proper and
natural position as wife.”493 Casey Charles, on the other hand, provides a fine summary of the
alternative view:
When C. L. Barber suggests that Shakespeare’s festive comedies use the sexual
and social upheaval of conventional saturnalia in order to renew the meaning of
normal sexual relations, he may be overlooking the possibility that Shakespeare’s
play is as much about the unconventional treatment of erotic attraction in the
development of the drama as it is about the conventional romance ending in
marriage, as much about Viola fending off Olivia’s unknowingly lesbian
protestations as about Orsino’s decision to marry his page once she retrieves her
female habit from the sea captain in the last act. 494
We here see the common problem of emphasizing episodes vs. endings that Jensen diagnoses, as
I discussed in my Introduction. There are two ways to move beyond this impasse. One is a
reiteration of point made elsewhere by Julie Crawford and made in the case of Twelfth Night by
Carol Thomas Neely: that the ending of the play does not enclose or define the relationships:
“Neither marriage is represented as conventionally gendered or even exclusively heterosexual,
and bonds and pleasures other than marital ones explicitly persist and are acknowledged in the
final scene.”495 Since Orsino has already displayed attraction to a person he thought was male,
and Olivia to a person who turned out to be female, the characters can live as they please. The
institution of heterosexual marriage is affirmed, but as with The Merchant of Venice and As You
Like It, eros has been shown to not restrict itself to heterosexual marital confines. 496
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Nevertheless, I agree with Jean Howard that Viola “internalizes gender difference.” 497
Throughout the play, Viola attests that she does not love women: “I have one heart, one bosom,
and one truth, / And that no woman has, nor never none / Shall be mistress of it, save I alone”
(3.1.158-160). She here states that she is the only woman with power over her own heart, but
also she says that she is the only woman who has “one heart, one bosom, and one truth,” as if
other women are changeable and giddy. This is a clear statement of her henikosexuality, as I will
discuss, and her belief that she is the only one. At the end of the play we hear from Orsino: “Boy,
thou hast said to me a thousand times / Thou never shouldst love woman like to me” (5.1.267268). His use of the word, “Boy,” even after Viola has revealed that she is a woman, indicates
that he still sees her as male, and he asks her to change into her “woman’s weeds” (5.1.273),
which does not happen during the duration of the play. Viola sees herself as a woman even when
others do not.
Olivia, meanwhile, falls in love with “Cesario” only to later marry Sebastian, as if they
are interchangeable, and the play does not indicate any dissatisfaction on her part with the
eventuality. When Sebastian tells her she married him because “lady, you have been mistook; /
But Nature to her bias drew in that” (5.1.259-260), he implies that she was willing to marry him
specifically because he was a man, as if she would not have married “Cesario.” However,
“Nature’s bias” is not an expression of her internal desire but of the forces that drive human
events. As Laurie Shannon notes, the use of “bias” indicates that heterosexual relations are
“curved” away from their “straight course,” which would be same-sex relations. 498 We need not
take this line as something other than Sebastian’s opinion or rationalization. Furthermore,
Shakespeare stages it as a generic imperative in his usual fashion while giving Olivia no lines in
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reply, though she does speak shortly thereafter about Malvolio. Similarly, Viola does not reply
after Orsino tells her to put on her women’s clothes. Maria’s marriage with Sir Toby is reported
secondhand by Fabian. Shakespeare often does not give women space to express themselves
about heterosexual marital relations once they have been “resolved” within the play.
An alternative understanding of the functioning of sexuality in the play is to think of it as
not with reference to categories of attraction but to individual persons. As I discussed in Chapter
One, henikosexuality is premised not on desire for a sex or gender or another group but for a
specific person. What is clear in Twelfth Night is that two people are attracted to Viola and two
people are attracted to Sebastian. We have no indication of Olivia or Orsino expressing same-sex
attraction otherwise; Olivia’s prior preference had been for solitude, while Orsino enjoys
homosocial relations while performing the role of the pining heterosexual lover. The ending of
Twelfth Night solves its plot complications in favor of the henikosexual woman: Viola gets the
man she wants while everyone else takes a second choice. Only Viola’s love is exclusive. Orsino
expressed attraction to more than one person, while Olivia accepts a substitute for her initial
attraction. Viola and Sebastian are particularly attractive to certain people, but only Viola is
attracted to just one person, and the plot functions so she is rewarded.
Twelfth Night is significant for my thesis because it is the only play that directly asserts
its heroine’s henikosexuality, not just in her claim that she has “one heart,” but in Act Two,
Scene Four, wherein she challenges Orsino about the nature of women’s desire. In the scene,
Orsino begins by talking about himself and his intense desire for Olivia. He first describes
himself as obsessed:
For such as I am, all true lovers are,
Unstaid and skittish in all motions else,
Save in the constant image of the creature
That is belov’d. (2.4.17-20)
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“Unstaid” means “not subject to restraint or control,” 499 as if love makes a man not only focused
on the one he loves but makes him unable to maintain himself in any other fashion. He also
reveals that the “image” of the beloved is required. This makes sense considering his next lines,
wherein he says that women should marry older men:
For, boy, however we do praise ourselves,
Our fancies are more giddy and unfirm,
More longing, wavering, sooner lost and worn,
Than women’s are. (2.4.32-35)
However intense male desire is, since it is driven mostly by the woman’s beauty, the desire
passes as the beauty fades. Men’s affections change with women’s bodies.
“Cesario” asks Orsino how he would feel about a woman who “Hath for your love as
great a pang of heart / As you have for Olivia” (2.4.90-91), but Orsino challenges the premise:
There is no woman’s sides
Can bide the beating of so strong a passion
As love doth give my heart; no woman’s heart
So big, to hold so much; they lack retention. (2.4.93-96)
Orsino refers to passion as a physical capacity. Though he previously described all his emotions
other than love as “unstaid,” he now refers to his heart’s ability to retain, i.e., its “holding or
keeping something within itself; capacity for keeping for keeping or containing.” 500 In Orsino’s
account of passion, the man’s large heart can hold a great amount of love such that it may affect
the capacities of his other organs. Hence the male lover feels more, but as a response to specific
stimuli, and thus the heart has a great capacity but, as Orsino describes it, it “can digest” love,
i.e., pass it through the body.501
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“Cesario” replies to Orsino that women “are as true of heart as we” (2.4.106). He
maintains his male identity throughout the speech, referring to “we men” (2.4.116), and posits a
sister (“my father had a daughter,” 2.4.107) who suffered greater lovesickness than Orsino:
ORSINO
VIOLA

And what’s her history?
A blank, my lord; she never told her love,
But let concealment like a worm i’ the bud
Feed on her damask cheek; she pin’d in thought,
And with a green and yellow melancholy
She sat like Patience on a monument,
Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed? (2.4.109-115)

Viola (it is now Viola speaking, not “Cesario,” at least from the audience’s perspective) is
foretelling her own future. Rather than love being configured as hunger, as Orsino does, for her it
is disease and decay. When Orsino tells her that men’s passion tracks with women’s beauty, she
agrees: “I think it well, my lord” (2.4.35) and then laments, “Alas, that they are so! / To die, even
when they to perfection grow!” (2.4.40-41). Viola describes women’s lovesickness as slow death
that discolors and disfigures the body. Like Adriana in The Comedy of Errors, she attributes the
woman’s suffering and physical degeneration to lack of attention from the beloved man.
The “blank” she describes can be a “vacant space”: the OED cites this usage in Twelfth
Night as the first recorded instance in English. However, a “blank” can also refer to “a lottery
ticket which does not gain a prize” and “a document, ‘paper,’ or ‘form’ with spaces left blank to
be filled up at the pleasure of the person to whom it is given.” The OED cites uses from
Shakespeare for both meanings.502 A “blank” is not merely emptiness, but an item which failed
to serve its purpose, or which exists to receive information from another. If Viola does not
express her love for Orsino, she will become such a blank, she admits; or, “like Patience on a
monument,” one who waits for that which never arrives. Whereas Orsino configures male
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passion as receiving and digesting, Viola’s female love is closed, unproductive, unused.
Elsewhere she refers to “women’s waxen hearts” that receive “forms” (2.2.30), another image of
receiving impressions from outside that remain rather then get processed.
Viola is often described as “self-denying,” with her love for Orsino tied to her status as a
servant. Lisa Jardine refers to play’s exploration of “the erotic potential of service,” 503 while
Mario DiGangi contrasts Viola’s fate as a servant of Orsino and Olivia with Malvolio’s, showing
that the play ends with a “selective enforcement of the household’s social hierarchy.” 504 DiGangi
attributes Viola’s and Sebastian’s success to their noble blood, while David Schalkwyk argues
that, in Viola’s case, her devotion achieves its end: “It is Viola’s abject submission of her will to
Orsino’s desire […] which opens the space for an intimacy that encompasses more than the mere
social advancement of a favored servant or ‘Pittiful thriuor.’ […] Her complete attentiveness to
his will provokes promises of material reward and, ultimately, freedom from service; but all
Viola really wants is a transformation of the conditions of her service from page to wife.” 505 I
disagree; she wants to be his wife, but it is not clear that she wants to leave his service. Her
devotion is so intense that she expresses a willingness to let Orsino kill her to spite Olivia: “To
do you rest, a thousand deaths would die” (5.1.133), and though she in one sense exemplifies and
defines the henikosexual woman, I will show that she has other concerns as well.
At the end of the play, some of Viola’s final lines, among her most enigmatic, provide
another account of her love for Orsino. When he tells her that she has many times sworn love to
him, she replies,
And all those sayings will I over swear,
And all those swearings keep as true in soul
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As doth that orbed continent the fire
That severs day from night. (5.1.269-272)
The meaning of “orbed continent” is controversial.506 It may refer to the sun or the firmament,
and it is probably an allusion to Genesis 1:14: “And God said, Let there be lights in the
firmament of the heaven, to separate the day from the night, and let them be for signs, and for
seasons, and for days, and years.”507 The sun is first-made and it provides the framework in
which everything else operates. The word “continent” refers a “containing agent,” and has its
resonances with “continence,” self-control. 508 Mary Jo Kietzman glosses “orbed continent” as a
“stable soul that contains and regulates passionate expression, making her a model mechanism of
transformation and a vehicle of quotidian resurrections,” with “soul” possibly being a pun on
“sol” or sun.509 Viola thinks of her love as contained, but also something to be looked upon,
which facilitates the drawing of distinctions. Her love is not like anyone else’s. Viola never
pursues Orsino, but she waits for him, remains in his orbit, and does what he asks. Her next lines
are about retrieving her clothes, in accordance with his request; she does not address Orsino in
the play after this.
Just prior to this short speech, when Viola and Sebastian recognize one another, Viola
insists that they find the Captain who helped her disguise herself:
I am Viola—which to confirm,
I'll bring you to a captain in this town,
Where lie my maiden weeds; by whose gentle help
I was preserv’d to serve this noble count. (5.1.253-256)
This is the play’s deferred explanation: though they have begun to describe their father, Viola
needs for the full story to be told, and for the man who assisted her to be brought into the
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community. She later reveals that he is in prison; Viola has unfinished business, and marrying
Orsino and locating her brother are not everything for her. Here Viola makes a brief for one act
of human intervention in the otherwise fate-driven story; the Captain’s work made her story
possible, and he has been living his own story offstage for the duration of the play. Her words
suggest some openness to the ending of the play. She describes herself as contained, but her
world is not.
At the end of Twelfth Night, there are several injunctions to happiness. When Orsino
witnesses the realization that Sebastian and Olivia are married mistakenly but still married, he
states that “I shall have share in this most happy wrack” (5.1.266), a description of the ending’s
events that returns to the shipwreck of the play’s beginning and the general sense of fortunate
fatedness the characters endorse. It is happy for him, and perhaps also for Sebastian; it is not
clear who else feels joy. Later, when Malvolio rages at those who wronged him, Olivia tells him,
“Prithee be content” (5.1.351), and when he refuses, Orsino requests that someone “Pursue him,
and entreat him to a peace” (5.1.380). The happiness of the marriages, such as they are, does not
spread to the whole of the community or create full social concord. The affective community has
not been fully assembled and enjoined to happiness. The four married characters have formed a
family, but others’ fates are not determined. As Neely acknowledges, “The lack of projection of
a social order or of a reproductive or political future allows the circuits of desire to remain open
at the ending.”510 The play ends in uncertainty; there is more work to do. The play ends with
Feste singing to the audience, the last line of which is, “And we’ll strive to please you every day”
(5.1.408). Like As You Like It, Twelfth Night ends with the hope that the audience has enjoyed
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themselves, with an emphasis on what the actors have done for them. The audience is left to
decide how they feel.
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